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Introduction 
In the past fifty years historians have recognized increasingly 
that the formation of the first American party system at the 
close of the eighteenth century represented a major landmark 
in the expansion of political democracy in the United States.1 
Growing conflict between Federalists and Republicans for 
control of the national government precipitated intense 
partisan efforts to gain the active support and enduring 
loyalty of the electorate. From these early struggles modern 
party organizations and effective techniques of mass appeal 
slowly evolved. Such developments stimulated popular inter-
est in government affairs and led to the political awakening 
of an appreciable portion of the formerly dormant electorate2 
with a corresponding erosion of traditional elitist patterns 
of political behavior and practice. The nationwide political 
party thus became the vessel of democracy, the agency 
1 See, for example, Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian 
Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915), 465-67; Noble E. Cun-
ningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organiza-
tion, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 
vii, 259; William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The 
American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 4-208 passim; Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party 
System (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 19-31. 
2 J. R. Pole, "The Suffrage in New Jersey, 1790-1807," New Jersey His-
torical Society Proceedings, LXXI (January, 1953), 38-45; "Suffrage and 
Representation in Massachusetts, A Statistical Note," William and Mary 
Quarterly, Series 3, XIV (October, 1957 ), 560-92, XV (July, 1958 ), 412-16; 
"Election Statistics in Pennsylvania, 1790-1840," Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography, LXXXII (January, 1958), 217-19; "Representa-
tion in Virginia from the Revolution to Reform," Journal of Southern History, 
XXIV (February, 1958), 31-34; "Election Statistics in North Carolina to 
1861," ibid. (May, 1958), 227-28. 
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through which the governed finally removed the traditional 
deferential barriers separating them from their government 
and their governors. 
Until quite recently the Federalists usually have been dealt 
with rather harshly. Students of this period have regarded 
them primarily as a negative reference group. Focusing upon 
the social status, partisan rhetoric, and unsavory activities of 
some party members near the end of the 1790's, several 
generations of scholars have dismissed the Federalists as 
hopeless reactionaries in a great age of liberal political 
change.3 Historians have demonstrated that after 1790 in 
several key states those men who supported the Federalist 
cause represented the older, entrenched, ruling elites, and 
that individuals within these classes quite naturally exalted 
3 Sixty years ago John Spencer Bassett put the Federalist achievements 
and failures into a rigid perspective which subsequent scholarship has not 
changed materially. "The downfall of Federalism [in 1800] came because 
the party had outlived its usefulness. Its function of giving strength to the 
Union in the early days of 'the experiment' had been performed. It was 
the party of the superior classes, of men who were supposed not to be influ-
enced by passions and who had strong purposes and conservative instincts. It 
had solved the problems of the effective organization of a new government; 
but other questions were now at hand concerning internal affairs. Should the 
people be trusted with a large share of government? The Federalists 
recoiled at the prejudice and violence of the masses, declaring that incom-
petence could not be trusted. They sought to restrain the violent; they 
expressed open contempt; and they developed a party selfishness which 
they wished others to believe was patriotism. They fell into factions and 
dreamed mad dreams of expansion till at last they gave the masterly leader 
of men who opposed them an opportunity to organize a majority of the 
people against their supremacy. So much did they bring into contempt the 
idea of government by the superior classes, that no capable politician since 
1800 has dared to place his cause on any other ground than the will of the 
people." The Federalist System, 1789-1801 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1906), 295-96. Recently David Hackett Fischer, in an impressive study of 
Federalism in the Jeffersonian era, has reemphasized the elitist proclivities 
of the "Federalists of the Old School" in such forceful terms as to leave the 
inescapable impression that they were incapable of contributing anything 
significant to the American democratic tradition. The Revolution of American 
Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 1-28, 22~10 passim. 
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the ideal of exclusivist governance and condemned demo-
cratic aspirations.4 When partisan rhetoric and social status 
were viewed in conjunction with the reactionary practices 
of the high Federalist faction in 1799 and 1800, the unpleas-
ant stereotype of the party was complete: Federalists on both 
the state and the national levels were members of a loose, 
unstable coalition of self-seeking notables, wholly ignorant 
of the meaning and uses of modern party practice and 
ultimately unable, through weakness and incompetence, to 
retain either their rule or the supremacy of their values. 
According to this view, the election of 1800 inevitably con-
stituted a revolution in practice and ideals, if not in policy 
and measures. 
In the case of southern Federalists, neglect has been added 
to stigma. The early-and undeniably correct-impression of 
contemporaries that Federalism was given a far more hospi-
table reception in New England than in the South5 has 
doomed the southern wing of that party to suffer a decided 
4 Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism; Charles S. Sydnor, 
American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's 
Virginia (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Sydnor's book was first published 
as Gentlemen Freeholders (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1952). Paul Goodman, The Democratic Republicans of Massachusetts: Poli-
tics in a Young Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
5 Tobias Lear to George Washington, August 5, 1792, Edmund Randolph 
to Washington, June, 1793, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress, 
Vols. 255, 261. Subsequent scholars quickly seized upon this impression 
and concluded that early party divisions were wholly sectional in nature. 
In their view, the central struggle of the 1790's was between "Federalist" 
Massachusetts and "Republican" Virginia for control of the Union, and this 
seemed to preclude the need to examine in detail Federalist strength and 
activity below the Potomac. James Schouler, History of the United States 
of America under the Constitution (7 vols.; New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 
1880-1899), I, 181; Bassett, Federalist System, 161; Beard, Jeffersonian 
Democracy, 126, 151, 229, 242, 373ff., 397-98ff. In recent years scholars 
have begun to suggest the extent of Federalist strength in the South in the 
later 1790's, but they have not stated their findings explicitly. See, for 
example, Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of 
Federalism, 1795-1800 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1961; 
first published, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 379-83. 
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eclipse of scholarly attention. Aside from a few thin mono-
graphs and one excellent study of a leading South Carolina 
Federalist, which often goes well beyond its immediate topic, 
little has been written on the subject.6 
The following account is meant to suggest that from the 
perspective of southern Federalism a modest reassessment of 
the growth of the first American party system during the 
1790's along lines already suggested by William Nisbet 
Chambers is in order.7 I do not mean to resurrect the south-
ern Federalists as forgotten democrats; they expressed con-
sistent hostility to the notion of broad popular participation 
in the political decision-making process. Although, as I hope 
to demonstrate in the following pages, southern Federalists 
took their elitist and antidemocratic ideals almost wholly 
from their own experience and never attempted to system-
atize or rigidly fix them within the framework of a personal 
social philosophy, they nonetheless shared with northern 
Federalists an uneasy assumption that, as one of them put it, 
6 Ulrich B. Phillips, "The South Carolina Federalists," American Historical 
Review, XIV ( 1908-1909), 529-43, 731-43; Henry M. Wagstaff, "Federalism 
in North Carolina," ]ames Sp;unt Historical Studies, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Publications, 1910), 5-44; Gilbert L. 
Lycan, "Alexander Hamilton and the North Carolina Federalists," North 
Carolina Historical Review, XXV (July, 1948), 442-65; George C. Rogers, 
Jr., William Laughton Smith of Charleston; Evolution of a Federalist, 1758-
1812 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1962). One 
recent and valuable study of a leading North Carolina Federalist, William 
Barry Grove, and the forces which shaped his political commitment is 
Leonard L. Richards, "John Adams and the Moderate Federalists; The Cape 
Fear Valley as a Test Case," North Carolina Historical Review, XLIII 
(Winter, 1966), 14-30. Two monographs dealing with tangential subjects 
also contain some useful material on the evolution of southern Federalism: 
Delbert H. Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1931); John Harold Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democ-
racy in South Carolina, The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political 
Science, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1940). Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Founding Father 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), appeared too late 
for inclusion in this study. 
7 Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation, 1-169 passim, especially, 
34-52. 
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"the immediate passions of the people" had to be checked 
to avoid the imminent disintegration of the social and 
political fabric. 8 
Recent scholarship, however, suggests that the Federalists 
of the 1790's in both the northern and the southern states 
often were no more conservative than their Republican 
opponents. Norman K. Risjord's study of the southern Repub-
licans during and after 1798, for example, indicates that 
traditional eighteenth-century elitist values permeated "Jef-
fersonian democracy" almost from its inception until well 
into the 1820's. The conflict between Federalism and Jeffer-
son Republicanism, as these "Old Republicans" viewed it, 
did not involve artistocracy and democracy. Rather, it was 
a contest between competing aristocratic views of the good 
society, or proper social organization, and of public policy. 
Federalist programs were opposed by many Republican 
leaders in the South, Risjord maintains, because such pro-
grams were designed to create a centralized, neomercantilist 
society and a commercial ruling interest-both of which 
would eclipse the old values of the decentralized eighteenth-
century southern political society, traditionally dominated by 
the landed-gentleman interest.9 
On the level of practical party politics, the findings of 
Noble Cunningham and Stephen G. Kurtz demonstrate that 
as late as 1796 initiative within the Republican party with 
respect to the conduct of the presidential campaign still lay 
with a handful of leaders and party managers in Congress. 
Party development still was "rudimentary in many respects, 
especially on the popular level." Except in Pennsylvania, 
managers of both parties in 1796 apparently concentrated 
8 James Iredell, "Marcus" Papers, January, 1788, in Griffith J. McRee, ed., 
Life and Correspondence of James Iredell (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 
1947), I, 186. 
9 Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the 
Age of Jefferson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 2-11. 
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the bulk of their energies on winning over the traditional 
ruling elites in those states where the outcome was doubtful 
rather than on popular party propaganda campaigns. Not 
until the eve of the presidential election of 1800 did Republi-
cans begin to construct grassroots party organizations on 
state and local levels throughout the country to advance 
their cause.10 
There is, then, impressive evidence to indicate that at 
least on state and local levels the growth of democratic 
practices and institutions in America during the last decade 
of the eighteenth century was in many ways an incidental 
byproduct of the ultimate displacement of one set of elitist-
minded political interest groups by another newer set suc-
cessfully seeking "an equal access to power."11 Thus, to make 
a more balanced assessment of the origins of the first Ameri-
can party system-and of the measure of political democracy 
that system helped create-it is as necessary to study the 
activities and the responses of those whose power was 
challenged as of those who mounted the challenge. 
While the Republicans organized slowly and haltingly in 
the 1790's and did not begin to build grassroots support 
much before the end of the decade, many outspoken partisans 
of the federal administration, despite strong elitist habits and 
attitudes, were at an early date implicitly pressed to influence 
public opinion by those they served. They were to act as a 
"mass of influence" in favor of national policy within their 
local areas, with the responsibility of curbing, if not sup-
pressing, any massive demonstrations of popular antipathy 
to the "necessary" measures of government. Thus, these 
elitist-minded friends of government, in many cases directed 
by leading members of the national administration, were 
often the first to reach the grassroots. In so doing they 
10 Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 89-115, 144-74; Kurtz, 
Presidency of John Adams, 145-208. 
11 Goodman, The Democratic Republicans of Massachusetts, 202. 
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frequently found themselves caught in a paradox. Deter-
mined to curb popular political "passions," they encouraged 
an expansion of popular political participation. The Fed-
eralists' activities inevitably produced a gradual political 
awakening among the people and the erosion of the tradi-
tion of elitist rule which they so ardently wished to uphold. 
Southern Federalists never unified themselves into a single 
party12 and never formed a set of recognizable state parties 
in the modern sense. In the 1790's they never created general 
state caucuses, state central steering committees, county and 
local committees, and all the other machinery of party. Not 
until the election of 1800 did most Federalists make sustained, 
intensive efforts to organize and to develop effective tech-
niques of mass appeal. But the friends of government did 
develop at an early date recognizably partisan interest groups 
-or "masses of influence"-everywhere in the South. Under 
the pressure of a steadily rising and attractive, if not always 
well-organized, opposition the friends of government subse-
quently expanded the membership of their interest groups 
in both breadth and depth. Through the activities of their 
partisan groups southern Federalists helped to establish an 
atmosphere of definable and respectable political contention 
and ultimately sought popular support. In this way they, 
only slightly less than their Republican opponents, nurtured 
the seed of a slowly ripening democratic temperament in the 
American South during the 1790's. 
12 For example, prior to Adams' presidency there seems to have been but 
one instance in the South when it was suggested that supporters of the 
administration in several states should retain close and consistent contact 
to coordinate policy. In January, 1795, Henry Lee urged James Iredell, 
who had remained in close touch with the political affairs of North Carolina, 
to participate in a regular exchange of "sentiments & information on public 
matters." But the extant correspondence of both men indicates that Lee's 
suggestion was never pursued. Interstate contacts between friends of govern-
ment in the South remained superficial and trivial to the end of Washington's 
administration. Lee to Iredell, from Richmond, January 21, 1795, in McRee, 
ed., Iredell, II, 435-37. 
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I. The Founding of a Political 
Interest, 1789-1793 
Those who ascended to national power in 1789 had no 
thought of creating a national party system. A few of them, 
however, had definite ideas about the value, place, and pur-
pose of certain kinds of partisan interest groups within a 
republic. The "long shaping of the Federalist formation"1 
may be traced to the musings of Alexander Hamilton nearly 
a decade before the inception of national government. In 
1782 the young New Yorker already was arguing the necessity 
of surrounding any future central government worthy of the 
name with rings of loyal factions in the countryside. "The 
reason of allowing Congress to appoint its own officers of the 
Customs, Collectors of the taxes and military officers of 
every rank," he wrote prophetically in Continentalist VI: 
is to create in the interior of each State, a mass of influence in 
favor of the Federal Government. The great danger has been 
shown to be, that it will not have power enough to defend itself, 
and preserve the Union; not that it will ever become formidable 
to the general liberty; a mere regard to the interests of the Con-
federacy will never be a principle sufficiently active to crush the 
ambition and intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect 
it .... The application of force is always disagreeable, the issue 
uncertain. It will be wise to obviate the necessity of it, by 
interesting such a number of individuals in each State, in support 
of the Federal Government, as will be counterpoised to the ambi-
tion of others, and will make it difficult to unite the people in 
opposition to the first and necessary measures of the Union.2 
2/ Prologue to Democracy 
The future Secretary of the Treasury never made a clearer 
statement than this of the underlying goals of the economic 
program which he unfolded during 1790 and 1791. In later 
years, of course, he spoke out against "parties" and "factions" 
in bitter language. But clearly what he deplored was not 
their existence or their form but the spirit which created and 
sustained them. "Much has been said about factions," 
Hamilton said to the New York ratifying convention in 1788. 
"As far as my observation has extended, factions in [the 
Continental] Congress have arisen from attachment to state 
prejudices. We are attempting by this Constitution to abolish 
factions and to unite all parties for the general welfare."3 
Hamilton's eagerness to establish partisan political interests 
in every region of the country reflected his keen and uneasy 
awareness of the momentous changes that were sweeping 
through American political life in the late eighteenth century. 
Carl Becker's conclusion that the American Revolution repre-
sented not only a struggle for home rule but also a conflict 
over who should rule at home has been rejected implicitly 
by most modern historians as too extreme a view. It now 
seems clear that the winning of independence was not 
accompanied by a major shift in political power from the 
hands of traditionally dominant elites in each colony and 
state to the people. There can be no doubt, however, that 
the generation of the Revolution in America witnessed the 
breakup of the historically static relationship between gover-
nors and governed, and that few men, both conservative 
and progressive alike, were insensible to the change. Through 
mob action ultimately beyond the control of the governing 
classes, through petition and remonstrance, and through 
1 William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation; The Ameri-
can Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 43. 
2 Quoted in John C. Hamilton, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (7 
vols.; New York: John F. Trow, Printer, 1851 ), II, 200-201. 
3 Quoted in Richard B. Morris, Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of 
the Nation (New York: The Dial Press, 1957), 140. 
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popular movements of an often violent nature, such as 
Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts and Commodore Gillon's 
uprising in South Carolina, the great majority of the Ameri-
can people between 1763 and 1789 showed a growing aware-
ness of their right to political participation in the new nation. 
Often their actions profoundly alarmed those accustomed to 
the exercise of political power and the orderly conduct of 
public business.4 Few American political leaders, after Shays' 
uprising, for example, could share Jefferson's calm and 
kindly support of popular rebellion in a republic.5 Madison 
4 The growth and expression of popular political agitation in America in 
the quarter-century after the Stamp Act crisis may be traced in Allan Nevins, 
The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 395--403; Samuel Eliot Morison, ed., 
The American Revolution, 1764-1788; Sources and Documents (2d ed.; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1929 ), 9-13, 83-96, 146--48, 208-18; 
Herbert M. Morais, "The Sons of Liberty in New York," in Richard B. Morris, 
ed., The Era of the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1939), 269-89; John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 129-30, 142--46, 211-12, 
295-311, 320-21, 497-505; Edmund S. and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act 
Crisis (New York: Collier Books, 1963; first published, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1959), 157-262 passim; Marion Lena Starkey, A Little 
Rebellion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Lawrence Henry Gipson, 
The British Empire Before the American Revolution ( 12 vols.; New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1958-1965), XI, 137-38, 142--43, 185, 273, 275-85, 
498-575 passim and XII, 86--89, 94-95, 148, 157-58, 168-238 passim. 
Richard Maxwell Brown, in The South Carolina Regulators (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1963 ) , views that movement as, among other 
things, giving the underrepresented backcountrymen "a means by which to 
express their growing sense of worth and power, of pride and vigor" (p. 140). 
As early as March, 1793, a Boston Federalist reported that there was a 
"great bluster here about liberty and equality" and noted with contempt 
"how far our tradesmen are advanced in this science." Jeremy Belknap to 
Ebenezer Hazard, March 23, 1793, "The Jeremy Belknap Papers," Massa-
chusetts Historical Society Collections, Series 5, III (1877), 326. 
5 "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing," Jefferson 
wrote, "and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. 
Unsuccessful rebellions indeed generally establish the encroachments on the 
rights of the people which have produced them. An observation of this 
truth should render honest republican governors so mild in their punishment 
of rebellions, as not to discourage them too much." Jefferson to Madison, 
from Paris, January 30, 1787, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson ( 10 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-1899), IV, 
362-63. 
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viewed the revolt in Massachusetts with horror, as did Henry 
Lee, who nonetheless noted the mildness of the movement 
during most of its existence.u George Washington best ex-
pressed the reaction of the majority of the American ruling 
gentry to Shays' outburst. In December, 1786, he wrote to an 
acquaintance in Massachusetts, "I feel, my dear Genl. Knox, 
infinitely more than I can express to you, for the disorders 
which have arisen in these States. Good God! who besides 
a tory could have foreseen, or a Briton predicted them!" 
Somewhat earlier the general had demanded querulously of 
another colleague whether "the wise and good" would not 
bestir themselves and "strive hard" to avert the evil of 
recurrent civil insurrection.7 
The often crudely expressed democratic aspirations of a 
large segment of the American people at this period seemed 
to be in total conflict with the values of those who considered 
themselves suited by status, tradition, and temperament to 
mold the destiny of the young nation. Hamilton's plea for 
the establishment throughout the country of partisan interests 
that would rationally defend the central government and its 
policies represented an intelligent response to a potentially 
dangerous political impasse. The subsequent implementa-
tion of his plan reflects the basic civility of late eighteenth-
century politics while demonstrating that the first outlines of 
a partisan national political system in America were drawn 
by those who supported national policies, rather than by 
those who opposed them. 
Hamilton's desire to establish loose but effective partisan 
interests had other momentous consequences for the future 
6 Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964; first published, 19.50), 45; Henry Lee 
to Washington, September, October 11, 1786, Washington Papers, Vol. 236. 
7 Washington to Madison, November 5, 1786, to Henry Knox, December 
26, 1786, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
(39 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), 
XXIX, 52, 122. 
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political development of the United States. First, it meant 
that the Republican faction, which eventually came to oppose 
the policies of the federal government, would itself have to 
organize on a nationwide basis, and in disciplined fashion, to 
translate protest into meaningful political action. Second, it 
meant the end of any threat that a new nation of such 
political diversity as the United States might fall prey to a 
locally oriented multiparty system which would eventually 
lead to a political and administrative paralysis and the stagna-
tion of government. Third, it almost guaranteed the emer-
gence of a two-party system, given the necessity for those 
charged with the administration of the new government to 
set a definite, and thus inevitably controversial, public policy. 
Yet the outlook was dim for the emergence of such partisan 
political interests in any of the states south of the Potomac. 
Between 1787 and 1791 the southern states constituted a 
particular challenge to the proponents of a central govern-
ment. Nowhere else in America were fears so pervasively 
and so deeply expressed-even, on occasion, by supporters 
of the Constitution-that the creation of a federal union 
offered unparalleled opportunities for the exercise of personal 
and sectional tyranny. 
Even the writings of Washington and Madison before and 
after the Philadelphia Convention revealed fears of domi-
nance of the American political and economic system by 
northern interests and the northern states. The general and 
his political lieutenant for years had wanted to clear the 
Potomac River for navigation above Alexandria to bind the 
vast, politically unstable western territories more closely to 
the eastern seaboard and to strengthen the political economy 
of Virginia.H Washington's interest in the matter had strong 
8 \Vashington to Jefferson, from Mount Vernon, March 29, 1784, Washing-
ton to George Plater, October 25, 1784, ibid., XXVII, 373-74, 482-84; 
\Vashington to Madison, December 28, 1784, Madison to Washington, from 
Richmond, January 1, 1785, Washington Papers, Vol. 231. 
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sectional overtones. During the early stages of the Potomac 
River venture he revealed he was concerned that Virginia 
not be slighted in the race to carve out an American empire 
in the West. He confided his fears most clearly in a letter to 
Jefferson in March, 1784, saying "that not a moment ought 
to be lost in recommencing this business; for I know the 
Yorkers will delay no time to remove every obstacle in the 
way of the other communication."9 
Washington's sense of rivalry with northern interests in 
opening up the vast western country paled in comparison 
with Madison's later grim determination to secure the site 
of the permanent national capital for the Potomac area. The 
proper location for the national capital had been debated in 
Congress as early as 1784, but it seems to have been assumed 
at that time that ultimately it would be somewhere on the 
Delaware or the Susquehanna rivers or in areas to the north.10 
In the closing days of the first session of Congress in 1789, 
however, Madison abandoned his lofty nationalism to fight 
to secure the capital for Virginia. The issue was not resolved 
that year, nor in the brief interregnum between Congressional 
sessions; but Madison kept a wary eye on the constant 
politicking that went on. His correspondence on the resi-
dence question prior to 1790 bristled with such words as 
"threatened," "distrust," and "animosity," and the issue seems 
to have also deeply disturbed many of his colleagues.11 
In the Constitutional Convention itself, strong expressions 
of sectional mistrust were heard occasionally in closed-door 
debate. Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina expressed 
unhappiness over the sectional imbalance inherent under the 
9 March 29, 1784, Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXVII, 375. 
lOR. H. Lee to Washington, December 26, 1784, Washington Papers, Vol. 
231. 
11 Madison to Edmund Pendleton, from New York, September 14, 1789, 
James Madison Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 12; Richard Bland Lee to 
anonymous, from New York, September 12, 1789, Richard Bland Lee Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
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new system; William R. Davie of North Carolina and 
Pinckney's colleague, Pierce Butler, deplored the prevalence 
of abolitionist sentiment in parts of the North, as openly 
admitted at the time by Gouverneur Morris. Such uneasiness 
naturally led to the belief that there were, as Charles 
Pinckney put it, "two great divisions of Northern and South-
ern Interests" in the new nation.12 
Certainly the struggle over ratification of the Constitution 
revealed that the majority of southerners shared many of 
the fears of consolidated government and sectional tyranny 
frequently expressed by their political leaders. In only one 
southern state-Virginia-could the friends of the Constitu-
tion claim to have won an open, though narrow, victory in 
1788.13 In South Carolina the seemingly impressive margin 
by which the Constitution was ratified actually masked wide-
spread Antifederalist sentiment, for the backcountry dele-
12 Max Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 ( 3 vols.; 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), I, 567, 605, II, 221-23, 450-51. 
In the New York ratifying convention of 1788 Hamilton too spoke of the 
existence of several conflicting sectional interests within the American 
Confederacy. "There are," he said, "navigating and non-navigating States. 
The Northern are properly .the navigating States; the Southern appear to 
possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. This difference in 
situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting 
foreign commerce." Morris, Hamilton, 139-40. 
13 The majority of citizens and politicians even in Virginia doubtless were 
Antifederal, indicating that the Federalists' considerable efforts in the rati-
fying convention probably tipped the scales in their favor. As soon as 
Madison left the state, Patrick Henry and his allies quickly retrieved the 
initiative in the legislative session of 1788. The Antifederalists called for a 
new convention, deprived Madison of a United States senatorship, and 
almost gerrymandered him out of a House seat as well. The Federalist 
forces, left in charge of Richard Bland Lee, were young, inexperienced, and 
powerless to turn Henry aside. Richard Bland Lee to Madison, from Rich-
mond, October 29, November 25, December 12, 1788, R. B. Lee Papers; 
William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches ( 2 
vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891 ), I, 423-3.3; Madison to 
Edmund Randolph, from Alexandria, March 1, 1789, Miles King to Madison, 
from Hampton, Virginia, March 3, 1789, Madison Papers, Vol. 11. See also 
Jackson Turner Main's brief essay in The Antifederalists, Critics of the Con-
stitution, 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961 ), 
Appendix B, 285-86. 
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gates voted overwhelmingly against ratification, and they 
represented a majority of the free population in the state. 
Only the grim determination of the older-and staunchly 
pro-Constitution-society along the coast and in the city of 
Charleston not to part with its dominant and grossly dispro-
portionate representation in the legislature and in the con-
ventions insured South Carolina's ratification.14 
So strong was initial mistrust of the Constitution in North 
Carolina that by a lopsided majority the convention of 1788 
determined to defer consideration of ratification for a year. 
Only the inconveniences of independence finally compelled 
the state to submit to pressure and join the Union.15 
Even weak and remote Georgia, which desperately needed 
any assistance a strong central government might give, was 
invaded by Antifederalist agitation for a few months. Oppo-
sition to the Constitution was led by a Judge Bryon, who kept 
the state in political turmoil while playing on the uneasiness 
of at least some leaders over the prospect of joining in union 
with an abolitionist-minded North.16 
As the First Congress began its deliberations, sectional 
animosities still were evident. South Carolina's Senator Ralph 
Izard did not hide his contempt for Vice President John 
Adams, and the fiery William Maclay claimed that "Lee and 
Izard, hot as the burning sands of Carolina hate [Pennsyl-
14 William A. Schaper, "Sectionalism and Representation in South Car-
olina," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 
1900 (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), 
I, 376-80; Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation (Phila-
delphia, 1941 ) , 165-66. 
15 Albert Ray Newsome, "North Carolina's Ratification of the Federal 
Constitution," North Carolina Historical Review, XVII (October, 1940 ), 
287-301; Archibald 0. Maclaine to James Iredell, September 13, 1788, in 
Griffith J. McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 240. 
16 John Hannum to Anthony Wayne, from the Turkshead, Georgia, No-
vember 1, 1787, Anthony Wayne Papers, Clements Library, Ann Arbor, 
Mich.; Lachlan Mcintosh to Jonathan Wereat, from Skidoway Island, 
December 17, 1787, in Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan 
Mcintosh, 1774-1799," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XL (June, 1956), 159. 
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vania]" as a result of the Quaker memorials calling for the 
abolition of slavery.17 However, it was Izard's son-in-law and 
colleague in the House, William Laughton Smith, who at 
this time most forcefully enunciated southern fears, not only 
of the North itself, but also of strong central government in 
general. As early as August, 1789, he feared for the future 
of the new Union, seeing the clarification of the presidential 
power of removability as a monarchist plot whose center 
was in Massachusetts and whose leader was John Adams. 
Smith feared that Adams would succeed Washington in the 
presidency and that that office would be closed forevermore 
to southerners. The man from Braintree would choose a 
cabinet of lackeys, Smith continued, and all "the great Offi-
cers of govt. will be his dependents." From there "every 
engine would be set to work," every strategem employed, 
to secure the perpetual reelection of Adams to the presidency 
and to subvert the other branches of government-beginning 
with the Senate-to his will. Eventually the Constitution 
would be wholly subverted; the republic would become a 
mockery.18 Smith's remarks reveal that he feared more than 
mere sectional dominance; he feared political subversion and 
subsequent tyranny which seemed to be symbolized in the 
person of the Vice President. It soon became clear that his 
fears were shared by many southerners, to the consistent 
detriment of the emerging administration interests there. 
During the first Congressional session, however, it ap-
peared that these fears might dissolve. Many southern repre-
sentatives were impressed with the atmosphere of sincere 
compromise and cooperation which soon prevailed, and were 
17 Izard apparently coined the popular description of John Adams as "his 
rotundity" after suffering through Adams' futile campaign to impose titles on 
leading figures of the government. journal of William Maclay (New York: 
Albert and Charles Boni, 1927), 19, 29, ll8, 217. 
18 Smith to Edward Rutledge, from New York, August 9, 1789, Smith-
Rutledge Correspondence, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, 
S.C. 
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optimistic that such an atmosphere ultimately might dissipate 
existing sectional prejudices.19 When Alexander Hamilton 
submitted his successive plans for the redemption of the 
national credit, the chartering of a national bank, and the 
levying of an excise tax, however, sectional animosities were 
rekindled in all but one of the southern Congressional dele-
gations and in all but one of the southern states. 
Virginia led the way. Richmond financiers and Amherst 
County yeomen, former friends of the Constitution as well 
as its opponents, men from the northern counties as well as 
those from south of the James-all joined to oppose Hamil-
ton's funding and assumption schemes. As early as May, 
1790, David Stuart warned Richard Bland Lee that the Anti-
federalist spirit that almost had destroyed Madison's political 
career had not been so long interred that it could not be 
revived if a suitable issue were found. Even earlier that year 
Stuart had written a long, melancholy letter to Washington, 
the tone of which was captured in a few lines: 
A spirit of jealousy which may become dangerous to the Union 
toward the Eastern states seems to be growing fast among us-It 
is represented that the Northern phalanx is so firmly united as to 
bear down all opposition, while Virginia is unsupported even by 
those whose interests are similar with hers. It is the language of 
all I have seen or therein mentioned. 
Stuart, a closer observer of public opmwn than most Vir-
ginians at this time, also noted that the recent abolition 
19 See Annals of Congress: The Debates and Procedures in the Congress of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1834), I, 108, 115-18, 
202-18, 330, 379, 394-99, 441-43, 743, 803ff.; Richard Bland Lee to Leven 
Powell, from New York, April 30, 1789, in William E. Dodd, ed., "Cor-
respondence of Leven Powell," The John P. Branch Historical Papers of 
Randolph-Macon College (Richmond: Everett Wadding Co., 1901), I, 221; 
James Jackson to Anthony Wayne, from New York, May 10, 1789, Wayne 
Papers; William Loughton Smith to Gabriel Manigault, from New York, 
June 7, 1789, in Ulrich B. Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Cor-
respondence," American Historical Review, XIV (July, 1909), 776-77. 
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petitions to Congress from the Pennsylvania Quakers had 
intensified fear and hatred of the North below the Potomac. 
At one point "many who wished slaves" had circulated a 
report at Pittsylvania in southwestern Virginia that Congress 
was about to enact an emancipation law, and the credulous 
yeoman slaveholders had sold many of their hands "for the 
merest trifle."20 
Stuart was not alone in warning of widespread public 
bitterness. Edward Carrington informed Madison that he 
viewed assumption as "iniquitous" unless "each state was 
considered a creditor for so much of its debts as it had 
already redeemed." Henry Lee predicted Virginia's ruin 
as a result of Hamilton's policy, and on two separate occasions 
during that spring Edmund Randolph suggested there was 
a universal opposition to the assumption plan.21 
The almost immediate and ubiquitous presence of northern 
speculators increased the irritation of the Virginians. Even 
members of the Richmond financial community, who might 
have been expected to unite with northern financiers to make 
a killing, were enraged at the speculators' presence, and with 
good reason. As one Richmond observer noted, echoing 
Madison with presumable unintention, Virginia was specie 
poor;22 and in the course of frantically buying up all available 
securities-which were a means of commercial transaction-
northern speculators were making her poorer, since cash 
payments were made to parsimonious war veterans and 
widows, thus keeping money out of circulation. 
20 Stuart to Lee, from Abingdon, May 23, 1790, R. B. Lee Papers; Stuart 
to Washington, from Abingdon, March 15, June 2, 1790, Washington Papers, 
Vol. 246. 
21 Carrington to Madison, from Richmond, March 27, 1790; Lee to 
Madison, from Lee Hall, March 13, 1790; Randolph to Madison, from 
Williamsburg, March 10, May 20, 1790, in Madison Papers, Vols. 12, 13. 
22 George Nicholson to Thomas Blount, March 22, 1790, in Alice Barnwell 
Keith, ed., The John Gray Blount Papers ( 2 vols.; Raleigh: State Department 
of Archives and History, 1952), II, 31. 
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The climax of this abrupt and universal opposition to the 
policies of the federal government was almost predictable. 
In December, 1790, Patrick Henry emerged from retirement 
to lead the General Assembly in passing a set of resolutions 
bitterly condemning funding and assumption.23 
This was not the end of Virginia's opposition to national 
policy. The excise, levied in part to pay off the national 
debt incurred by funding and assumption, aroused great 
anger in Virginia. In January, 1791, Edward Stephens, 
writing from Culpeper County, stated that "Congress is much 
abused here about the Excise plan." Jefferson reported in the 
following June that Henry Lee had informed him that open 
resistance to the excise in "the upper country of Virginia" 
was "possible." As late as September, 1792, Randolph said 
there was talk of disfranchising the excise officers in the state 
by legislative decree.24 
The national bank plan met criticism, too, although it did 
not command the universal condemnation of the funding and 
assumption schemes or the excise. Carrington seemed to 
reflect popular opposition when he hinted that such an 
institution would menace the existence of private banks and 
would be a further means of taking already scarce specie out 
of circulation altogether.25 
The same general pattern of opposition to Hamilton's 
system prevailed in North Carolina. Some former friends of 
the Constitution, it is true, praised Hamilton's boldness and 
imagination. Archibald Maclaine spoke out unequivocally 
for assumption upon its passage into law; he told James 
23 State Gazette of North Carolina, November 26, 1790. 
24 Stephens to Madison, January 21, 1791; Jefferson to Madison, from 
Philadelphia, June 21, 1791, Madison Papers, Vols. 13, 14; Edward Carring-
ton to Alexander Campbell, January 25, 1792, Campbell-Preston Papers, 
Library of Congress, Vol. 2; Edmund Randolph to Washington, from Phila-
delphia, September 10, 1792, Washington Papers, Vol. 256. 
25 To Madison, from Powhatan, February 2, 1791, Madison Papers, Vol. 13. 
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Iredell that had it not taken place, "we could have been in a 
tottering condition-the Union must have been endangered 
as some of the States never could have discharged the load." 
The printer Abraham Hodge republished some proassump-
tion essays and on one occasion editorially derided Madison's 
conduct.26 
However, William R. Davie, who had so recently signed 
the Constitution, expressed relief upon hearing that the 
assumption bill had been recommitted. The Halifax lawyer 
explained that he was "tremblingly alive to every thing that 
threatens the prosperity of [the federal] Government" and 
that Hamilton's solutions to the financial crisis "were rather 
unfitted for its infant resources."27 When the public credit 
legislation became law, Davie and Thomas Pleasants, who 
were convinced-rightly, as historians have recently proved-
that the debts of most southern states were in the hands of 
northerners, proposed that the state undertake its own fund-
ing scheme "to avoid the evils of assumption," among other 
considerations.28 Nothing came of the plan, but Davie had 
revealed clearly disapproval of Hamilton's public steward-
ship. The influential Blount family, who also had supported 
the Constitution, liked assumption no better. At first, Ben-
jamin Hawkins, then a close friend of the family, seemed 
excited over the plan and sought to impart his excitement 
to the brothers. Soon afterward Hugh Williamson urged John 
26 Maclaine to Iredell, from New Inlet, N.C., August 21, 1790, James 
Iredell Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N.C.; State Gazette of 
North Carolina, May 8, July 9, 1790. 
27 Davie to Iredell, April 20, 1790, Iredell Papers. 
28 Pleasants to Madison, from Raleigh, July 20, 1790, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 13; Davie to John Haywood, from Halifax, January 15, 1791, Ernest 
Haywood Collection, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. A recent study of the effects of funding and 
assumption on southern finances is: Whitney K. Bates, "Northern Speculators 
and Southern State Debts: 1790," William and Mary Quarterly, Series 3, 
XIX (January, 1962), 30-48. 
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Gray Blount to begin speculating in Continental and North 
Carolina securities.29 
Enthusiasm quickly waned, however. Abishai Thomas, the 
family's business agent in New York, predicted unhappy 
results "if any Steps are taken according to the proposed 
Plan." In North Carolina itself the northern speculators 
already were ahead of the Blount family and in April were 
at work at the Hillsboro Court and elsewhere. Apparently, 
William Blount came away empty-handed and decidedly 
chagrined.30 By June, Thomas in New York was reporting 
that the assumption plan as it affected North Carolina "was 
a wicked thing & the more I think of it, the more I Dislike 
it."31 
The following November the General Assembly, led by 
Governor Alexander Martin, decided that it, too, had no use 
for Hamilton, Congress, or the Report on the Public Credit. 
No resolutions were passed as in Virginia, but the state's two 
United States Senators, who had voted against funding and 
assumption, were censured publicly by the turbulent and 
suspicious legislature. "It seems," wrote one disgusted ob-
server in Fayetteville, "they have not regularly corresponded 
with our Executive; and this alone, as far as I am able to 
learn, is the cause of the acrimony and malevolence shown 
them."32 Given the agitated state of public opinion in North 
Carolina and its recent conversion from Antifederalism, the 
29 Benjamin Hawkins to John Gray Blount, February 8, 1790; Hugh 
Williamson to John Gray Blount, February 24, 1790, in Keith, ed., John Gray 
Blount, II, 12, 21. 
30 Abishai Thomas to John Gray Blount, February 8, 1790, ibid., 14; John 
Haywood to Iredell, from Hillsboro, April 10, 1790, Iredell Papers; William 
Blount to John Steele, from Greensville, April 18, 1790, in Henry M. 
Wagstaff, ed., The Papers of John Steele ( 2 vols.; Raleigh: North Carolina 
Historical Commission Publications, 1924), I, 57. 
31 Thomas Blount to John Gray Blount, June 1, 1790, in Keith, ed., John 
Gray Blount, II, 60-61. 
32 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, January 12, 19, 1791. 
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refusal of the two men to correspond with the Assembly 
during a time when national legislation inimical to many in 
North Carolina became law seemed sinister to those far from 
the scene of action. 
The excise also agitated North Carolinians. In November, 
1791, Davie tried unsuccessfully to get the Treasury Depart-
ment to accept excise payments in North Carolina paper. 
Obviously, the tax had a cruel effect on a state that was 
specie poor yet burdened with a flood of nearly worthless 
paper currency. In this situation a national bank was seen by 
some as an added burden, since it would "help to make our 
bad Paper Money worse."33 
The excise was the prime factor in unifying opposition to 
Hamilton in South Carolina's backcountry.34 Georgians by 
1791 and 1792 were unhappy with the federal government's 
quasi-benevolent policy toward the Creek Indians after the 
Treaty of New York. In its ramifications this treaty denied 
to Georgia certain lands west of her borders which the state 
claimed by prior treaty. A further result of this treaty was the 
national government's assumption of complete responsibility 
for the strict regulation of relations between whites and 
Indians on the Georgia frontier, including those of merchants 
and traders. To underscore the federal government's deter-
mination, three companies of dragoons had been sent by 
Washington, unsolicited, to the Georgia frontier. Georgians 
were incensed, and in many ways their estrangement from 
33 Davie to Hamilton, from Halifax, November 17, 1791, William R. Davie 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, N.C.; Hugh Williamson to John Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, 
December 31, 1790, in Keith, ed., John Gray Blount, II, 160. Anti-excise 
essays appeared in Virginia and North Carolina newspapers as late as 1793. 
Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, August 23, 1792; Fayetteville 
Gazette, October 30, 1792; January 2, 1793. 
34 Hamilton to Cotesworth Pinckney, from Philadelphia, August 3, 1791, 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, 
S.C.; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, July 13, 1791. 
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the national administration threatened to become the most 
thorough and complete in the South after 1790.35 
There had been, of course, powerful countervailing forces 
at work in each southern state that inclined some political 
leaders to support the creation of a sovereign and effective 
national government at the Philadelphia Convention and, 
subsequently, to support the adoption of the Constitution.36 
Georgia, notwithstanding the existence of an Antifederalist 
faction, had favored the Constitution almost unanimously 
from the beginning. Her frontier condition and the insatiable 
desire of her citizens to encroach upon Indian lands west of 
their settlements had left her exposed to the threat of harass-
ment and even invasion by the Creek nation, whose chiefs 
often had the support of the Spaniards in East Florida and 
New Orleans.37 
35 Hugh Williamson to John Gray Blount, August 15, 1790, in Keith, ed., 
John Gray Blount, II, 94-95; Personal Memo, July 29, 1791, Thomas Jefferson 
Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 58; Georgia Gazette, May 20, June 17, 
December 16, 1790, November 24, 1791. The mixed reactions of a progov-
ernment Savannah merchant to the treaty and his comments on the intense 
popular opposition it aroused may be seen in Joseph Clay to William Few, 
from Savannah, November 5, 1790, in "Letters of Joseph Clay, Merchant of 
Savannah, Georgia, 1776-1793," Georgia Historical Society Collections, VIII 
(1913), 237-40. 
36 At Philadelphia the southern states en bloc, along with Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts, formed the most consistent force agitating 
for a strong and sovereign national government. For example, the southerners 
voted to establish a supreme national government with three coordinated 
but distinct branches: to give to that government all powers which the 
individual states were not competent to exercise, to strike down the New 
Jersey plan and any attempts to continue the institutions of the Confederation 
within the new government structure, to create a single executive exercising 
power for one long term, to strengthen and expand the federal judiciary, 
and, most surprising of all, to consider seriously the adoption of an assumption 
of state debts. Southern delegates also pressed for the provision that a bare 
majority of seven or eight states be sufficient to adopt the Constitution, which 
explains their vote against the nine-state provision. Farrand, ed., Records 
of the Federal Convention, I, 40, 53-54, 88, 97, 104, 121, 336-45; II, 327ff., 
428,437-38,460,477. 
37 Georgia's constant harassment by elements of the Creek nation in the 
years preceding the formation of the federal government may be traced in 
contemporary correspondence and newspapers. William Few to John Hous-
The Founding of a Political Interest, 1789-1793 I 11 
The lowcountry oligarchy in South Carolina had staunchly 
defended the national government throughout the Confed-
eration era.38 Moreover, as a result of the efforts of its 
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention, South Carolina had 
also come to expect a generous assumption of its state's debts 
by the new federal government. Indeed, such a large grant 
of funds was to be given to the state by the national govern-
ment that it seemed South Carolinians could expect an end 
to local taxation for several decades.39 In addition, the 
establishment of a national government with sole power over 
the currency and over the making of treaties had promised 
to resolve South Carolina's tangled financial situation and to 
help reopen the state's formerly lucrative trade with the 
British West Indies, which had been barred formally since 
the Revolution.40 
Two powerful political factions in North Carolina also had 
ton, from Augusta, May 16, 1783, "Letters of Members of the Federal Con-
vention," Dreer Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; 
Benjamin Fishbourne to Anthony Wayne, October, 1786, Wayne Papers; 
Georgia Gazette, June 11, 1789. Periodic Creek and Cherokee uprisings also 
threatened the western frontier of both Carolinas during the 1780's. But 
Georgia settlers, as well as the settlers in the Tennessee country, constantly 
suffered Indian warfare until 1800 and beyond. South Carolinians appre-
ciated this fact; see Thomas Pinckney to the Governor of Georgia, from 
Charleston, November 7, 1788, Pinckney Family Papers, Library of Congress, 
Box 14. Even as the Georgia legislature began debate on the Constitution, 
Washington told Henry Knox that "in the situation Georgia is, nothing but 
insanity, or a desire of becoming the Allies of the Spaniards or Savages, 
can disincline them to a Governmt. which holds out the prospect of relief 
from its present distresses." January 10, 1786, Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, 
XXIX, 377. 
38 Jefferson to Madison, from Annapolis, May 8, 1784, quoted in Koch, 
Jefferson and Madison, 11. 
39 Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, II, 327. Forrest 
McDonald has cogently discussed the importance of the assumption issue in 
inducing South Carolina to support the Constitution. We the People: The 
Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958), 205-206. 
40 George C. Rogers, Jr., William Laughton Smith of Charleston; Evolution 
of a Federalist, 1758-1812 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1962), 135-36. 
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anticipated immediate benefit from the establishment of a 
national union. The first was a group of lawyers, headed by 
Archibald Maclaine, Samuel Johnston, James Iredell, and 
William R. Davie, who resided in the crude little commercial 
villages which dotted the eastern and west-central portions 
of the state. They had been led to expect that their poten-
tially lucrative business as representatives of British and 
loyalist creditors, thwarted so far by the enactment of state 
confiscation laws in violation of solemn treaty obligation, 
would be unshackled by the creation of a national govern-
ment possessed of sufficient power and authority to coerce 
the individual states.41 The second faction, headed by Wil-
liam, Thomas, and John Gray Blount, represented the domi-
nant native merchant and speculative interests in the state. 
As merchants, these men wanted all restrictions on trade 
with the British West Indies lifted, a goal beyond the power 
of the individual states or the Continental Congress. As 
speculators, the interests of the three brothers in western 
North Carolina and the Tennessee country had been threat-
ened by a Cherokee uprising in late 1788, which the state 
government-standing alone-had been unable to handle.42 
Virginia, of course, had supplied much of the original 
leadership in the movement for a greatly strengthened 
national government. Frustrating experiences with the Mary-
land and Virginia legislatures over the launching of the 
Potomac River project had led Madison and Washington to 
conclude that the individual sovereign states, burdened with 
an excessive indebtedness, an exhaustion of credit, and 
41 Sir N. Dinkenfield to James Iredell, from Sulham, England, August 24, 
1787, Iredell Papers; McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 37-38n; James Hogg to Iredell, 
January 19, 1786; Iredell to William Hooper, January 29, 1786, ibid., 132, 
134. 
42 Charles Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina, 
1763-1789 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 168; Hugh William-
son to John Gray and Thomas Blount, from Annapolis, February 16, 1784, in 
Keith, ed., John Gray Blount, I, 150; Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, No-
vember 8, 1788, in McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 245. 
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frequent political impotence caused by the selfishness of 
competing local interests within their boundaries, were bar-
riers to large-scale political and economic expansion west-
ward. As a result of their efforts in the Virginia and Maryland 
legislatures on behalf of the Potomac project, Madison and 
Washington had acquired an appreciation of the need for a 
stronger national government which could regulate interstate 
commerce. As early as 1785, therefore, Madison had used 
the problems encountered in starting the Potomac project 
as an excuse to call the first interstate conference to meet at 
Mount Vernon and deal with commercial regulation and 
related matters,43 opening the way for subsequent meetings 
at Annapolis and Philadelphia which led to the dramatic 
change in the political structure of the nation. 
Whether the loyalty of these influential southern interests 
could be retained or regained after 1790 ultimately depended 
upon the actions of key administration officials. From the 
beginning Washington, and especially Hamilton, sought in a 
variety of ways to establish interests in the southern states 
favorable to the leaders and policies of the national adminis-
tration. In time both men came to rely heavily on members 
of the Society of the Cincinnati, an organization of veteran 
officers of the Continental Army, many of whom had served 
directly under Washington and who knew Hamilton per-
sonally. Throughout the early 1790's, Society members from 
both the northern and southern states were enlisted in the 
service of the administration; they held positions ranging 
from the highest cabinet posts44 down to the more obscure-
43 Irving Brant, James Madison, the Nationalist, 1780-1787 (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948), 375-81. 
44 During Washington's term in office, for example, no less than five 
cabinet officials-Hamilton, Knox, Randolph, Pickering, and McHemy-held 
membership in the Society. Edgar Erskine Hume, "Light Horse Harry and 
his Fellow Members of the Cincinnati," William and Mary Quarterly, Series 
2, XV (July, 1935), 277. Of these five all but Randolph, who was disgraced 
in the Fauchet affair, became staunch Federalist partisans. 
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though modestly remunerative-collectorships in the Treas-
ury Department. Washington relied particularly upon these 
and other veterans of the Revolution. The President summed 
up his patronage policy in a letter written in November, 1791: 
It is perhaps a fact too well known to make it necessary to 
mention it here, that numerous applications are made for every 
office created under this government, and it always happens 
where an office is desirable either for its respectability or emolu-
ment that it is sought for by those who have rendered service to 
their country in the course of the revolution either in the cabinet 
or the field, and so far from wanting men of respectable talents 
to fill places which require them that it is frequently a nice point 
to determine who among the applicants of this character have the 
best claims to public notice on account of services rendered.45 
The services rendered by members of the Cincinnati Soci-
ety during the years of Federalist ascendancy often exceeded 
the routine discharge of official duty. Many served as loyal 
and active government partisans in their home areas. After 
1790 they often openly defended controversial administration 
policies, notably those related to foreign affairs. Near the 
end of the decade they supplied much of the driving force 
behind what formal Federalist party organization and activity 
existed within the South. In large measure it was the mem-
bers of the Cincinnati Society, responding to the appeals and 
favors of both Washington and Hamilton, who initially 
fulfilled Hamilton's desire to build nationwide partisan inter-
ests that would defend and protect a national administration 
and its policies. 
During the first two years of his administration Washington 
had the opportunity to bring many former military and 
political allies into the government through patronage, and 
he made a series of brilliant and popular appointments of 
45 Washington to Monsieur Jorre, from Philadelphia, November 15, 1791, 
in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXI, 417-18. 
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southerners to important posts. In 1791 the President made 
a triumphant tour of the South that he fondly hoped would 
quell the public discontent with the policies and personnel 
of the national government. These significant activities repre-
sented Washington's major contributions during his term of 
office to the growth of partisan political interests below the 
Potomac. 
While the final session of the Continental Congress was 
quietly committing the Confederation to history, Washington 
was besieged with requests for federal office. Until some 
weeks after his inauguration as President, though, he turned 
aside all such applications with anguished tact. After politely 
deferring his request, Washington told one eager officeseeker: 
"I cannot but feel myself disagreeably affected by having 
the subject even obliquely forced upon my mind."46 
However, Washington's statements reflected careful prepa-
ration rather than hesitancy. He saw clearly that at the incep-
tion of the new government it was necessary to create an 
administration and judiciary of unimpeachable talent and 
unquestionable prestige. He also noted the necessity of 
binding as many former followers of 1788 as possible to 
the national government to insure wide acceptance and 
support. With the great pressures exerted upon him for 
patronage the implementation of such a program would be 
difficult. The President did not need to be reminded, as he 
often was, that in the matter of patronage, "there is a silent 
looking on from every part of the Union to see what turn 
that important business shall take. There are schemes and 
combinations innumerable to support each other, to support 
favorites and to establish a system of as vile corruption and 
intrigue as can disgrace a country."47 
46 To William Pierce, from Mount Vernon, January 1, 1789, ibid., XXX, 
175. 
47 Anonymous to Washington, from New York, n.d., Washington Papers, 
Vol. 243. 
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With these realities in mind Washington defined his 
patronage policy to a friend, the Charleston lawyer Edward 
Rutledge, several days after the inauguration. Admitting that 
appointments would be "one of the most difficult and delicate 
parts of the duty of my Office," he observed that "nothing 
could be more agreeable to me than to have one Candidate 
brought forward for every Office of such clear pretensions 
as to secure him against competition."48 Unfortunately, this 
was seldom the case; and in being forced to reward certain 
men at the expense of frustrating others, the President gave 
the first clear definition of a national ruling interest. 
The federal judiciary became his first concern. Wishing 
to staff it with "the first characters of the Union,"49 Washing-
ton found many suitable individuals in the South. For the 
Supreme Court the President chose John Rutledge, one of 
the leading members of the South Carolina oligarchy, and 
John Blair of Virginia. District judges would be of central 
importance in the new government, since they were among 
its most direct and most important representatives within 
the individual states. Washington asked Edmund Pendleton 
to take the district judgeship for Virginia; Thomas Pinckney, 
a charter member of the Cincinnati Society, for South Car-
olina; and Nathaniel Pendleton, Edmund's nephew, for 
Georgia. Although Pinckney and Edmund Pendleton de-
clined their appointments, Pinckney later accepted the 
prestigious ambassadorship to the Court of St. James. In 
further significant appointments Washington rewarded John 
Marshall with the federal attorneyship of the Virginia dis-
trict; Matthew McAllister, at Nathaniel Pendleton's urging, 
was given the same post in Georgia. Edward Carrington, 
who was then prominent in the Virginia chapter of the 
48 Washington to Edward Rutledge, May 5, 1789, from New York, in 
Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXX, 309-10. 
49 Washington to Madison, September 25, 1789, ibid., XXX, 414. 
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Cincinnati Society and later served as national vice president, 
and Isaac Huger became federal marshals for the districts 
of Virginia and South Carolina, respectively. James Iredell 
and William Blount, both high in the leadership of their 
respective factions, received coveted posts when North Car-
olina entered the Union. Iredell obtained a Supreme Court 
seat, while Blount was given the governorship of the territory 
south of the Ohio, which allowed him to strengthen his 
already tight control of politics in the Tennessee country. 
William R. Davie was offered the district judgeship for the 
north state, but he declined.50 
Southerners could not complain of lack of power in the 
Executive Department, either. The secretaryships of War 
and the Treasury went to northerners, but the portfolios of 
State and the Attorney Generalship were given to Virginians, 
Jefferson and Edmund Randolph. In the Treasury Depart-
ment Nicholas Eveleigh of South Carolina was the comp-
troller until his death. Finally there was Washington him-
self, who was in the early 1790's as in 1787-1788 the symbol 
of national unity above sectional and local considerations. 
His Virginia background and the flattering deference which 
he received in the North briefly attenuated those sectional 
jealousies which existed throughout the South.51 
Washington's astuteness and tact were not confined to the 
selection of appointees but pervaded his whole appointive 
process. He seldom made appointive decisions alone, but 
constantly consulted southern representatives and senators 
50 Washington to Iredell, February 13, 1790, ibid., XXXI, 10-ll; State 
Gazette of North Carolina, June 25, 1789; Matthew McAllister to Washing-
ton, August 26, 29, 1789, Nathaniel Pendleton to Washington, August 29, 
1789, in Warren Grice, ed., "Georgia Appointments by President Washing-
ton," Georgia Historical Quarterly, VII (September, 1923), 187-91, Edgar 
Erskine Hume, George Washington's Correspondence Concerning the Society 
of the Cincinnati (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941 ), xxv; Hume, 
"Light Horse Harry," 277. 
51 Henry Lee to Washington, July 11, 1789, Washington Papers, Vol. 243. 
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in Congress, as well as leading figures in the states. When 
considering appointments of South Carolinians, the President 
relied heavily upon the Charlestonians Edward Rutledge, 
Cotesworth Pinckney-also a leading member of the Cincin-
nati Society-and, after his early retirement, John Rutledge. 
Senator Ralph Izard and Representative William Loughton 
Smith were frequently the agents through whom Washington 
corresponded with Rutledge and Pinckney, and by early 
1793, Jefferson remarked acidly upon the effect of Izard's 
proximity to the presidential ear. "Izard hated Franklin with 
unparalleled bitterness," the Secretary noted, "but humbly 
adores the Presdt because he is in loco regis." The other 
South Carolina senator, Pierce Butler, successfully withstood 
the presidential influence and later moved into opposition 
along with Madison; but in 1790 he was proud that his strong 
recommendation of James Iredell for the bench had carried 
much weight in Washington's decision.52 
In giving patronage favors to Virginians, Washington 
most frequently consulted Madison and Edmund Randolph. 
Washington cleared Blair's appointment with Madison before 
sending it to the Senate, and the President apologized to 
Randolph for overlooking George Wythe when selecting a 
Virginia district judge. 53 
North Carolina patronage was administered in cooperation 
with John Steele in the House and Samuel Johnston in the 
Senate. Steele, under strong pressure from William Blount, 
was instrumental in securing Blount's appointment as terri-
torial governor south of the Ohio, while Samuel Johnston 
52 Rogers, William Laughton Smith, 180; Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge, 
September 26, 1789, in Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Correspon-
dence," 777; "Notes of Conversation with Other Cabinet Members," Feb-
ruary 26, 1793, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 82; Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, 
from New York, March 8, 1790, Iredell Papers. 
53 Washington to Madison, September 25, 1789, to Edmund Randolph, 
November 30, 1789, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXX, 414, 473. 
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joined Pierce Butler's efforts in Iredell's behalf. Johnston's 
pleasure at having his recommendations so quickly embraced 
was exceeded only by his excitement at being asked to sup 
at the great man's table with "Justice of Sup Ct, Atty Genl, 
Sec War and a number of others."54 Unfortunately, whatever 
future political usefulness Johnston might have had for the 
Federalist cause was cut short by his retirement in 1793. 
In North Carolina the President's patronage policies helped 
to keep some influential political leaders-notably Steele and 
Johnston-in the administration camp after 1790.55 In Vir-
ginia such policies helped to lay the foundations for a future 
factional organization around such men as Marshall and 
Carrington. In South Carolina these policies aided in the 
maintenance of an existing organization, coterminous with 
the lowcountry oligarchy, which was untouched by the anti-
Hamiltonian defections elsewhere in the South. In Georgia 
federal patronage actually stimulated the beginnings of a 
distinct proadministration consciousness and led to a close 
association of like-minded individuals who soon were to play 
influential roles in state politics. 
Between 1789 and 1796, five influential political leaders 
54 William Blount to John Steele, April 18, 1790, in Wagstaff, ed., John 
Steele, I, .57; Johnston to Iredell, from New York, February 1, 1790, in 
~1cRee, ed., Iredell, II, 281; Johnston to Iredell, from New York, March 4, 
1790, Iredell Papers. 
55 Along with the Constitutional amendments, national patronage policies 
had also helped to reconcile many North Carolina plain folk to the new 
government in the months just before the state's second ratifying convention 
was to meet. Passing through the state in October, 1789, after a fruitless 
attempt to negotiate with the Creeks in Georgia, David Humphreys assured 
Washington that "the appointments in general have met with almost uni-
versal approbation. The selection of Characters to fill the great Departments 
has afforded entire satisfaction particularly in the Judiciary. I heard it 
repeatedly said in Halifax that the Supreme Court would be the first Court 
in the world in point of respectability. These things cannot but auger well." 
October 28, 1789, from Petersburg, Washington Papers, Vol. 244. However, 
the government's decision the following year to hold all meetings of the 
district and circuit courts at New Bern angered local interests all over the 
state. State Gazette of North Carolina, August 6, 1790. 
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and one newspaper, the Georgia Gazette, energetically repre-
sented the rising partisan spirit of Federalism in the state. 
Of these five-Nathaniel Pendleton, Lachlan Mcintosh, An-
thony Wayne, Senator James Gunn, and Matthew McAllister 
-the first four had been in military service in the Revolution, 
Pendleton, Mcintosh, and Wayne in the Continental Army 
under Washington. Wayne, Gunn, and Mcintosh also were 
important Georgia members of the Cincinnati Society.56 
Pendleton, Mcintosh, and McAllister had been given presti-
gious federal offices by Washington; Mcintosh had won his 
over a rival for the collectorship of the Port of Savannah with 
the help of James Gunn, and Pendleton had materially aided 
McAllister in his quest for office. 57 
As early as 1789, Pendleton, then Chief Justice of the 
state, joined the editor of the Georgia Gazette in a propa-
ganda campaign stressing improvements in the state and the 
nation resulting from the change in government and the 
leadership of George Washington.58 As hostility toward the 
policies and leaders of the national administration later grew 
and hardened, friends of the government in Georgia defended 
it with energy, ability, and loyalty. Unfortunately, they were 
deficient in simple political wisdom and, above all, in integ-
rity, and this ultimately destroyed their political effectiveness. 
Such setbacks still were in the future in 1789-1790, how-
ever, and Washington could pride himself in a patronage 
job well done. But as opposition to the programs of the 
56 Nathaniel Pendleton to Washington, July 23, 1789, in Grice, ed., 
"Georgia Appointments," 193; Hume, George Washington's Correspondence 
Concerning the Society of the Cincinnati, xxv, 370. In 1784 Mcintosh was 
cleared of a slanderous charge unjustly leveled by then Governor George 
Walton of Georgia in 1780. Alexander Lawrence, "General Lachlan Mcintosh 
and his Suspension from Continental Command During the Revolution," 
Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXVIII (July, 1954), 101-41; Anthony 
Wayne to Sharp Delany, April18, 1790, Wayne Papers. 
57 Annals of Congress, I, 60; Georgia Gazette, August 27, 1789. 
58 Georgia Gazette, February 19, 26, March 12, May 7, 14, December 3, 
1789. 
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federal administration arose, the President did little more, 
either through patronage or exertion of personal influence, 
to halt the development of conflict within Congress between 
the supporters of Hamilton and those of Madison, Giles, and 
Jefferson. In 1791, however, the President made a final effort 
to regain southern support. The general had made a 
successful tour of the northern states during the previous 
year aimed at bolstering national unity. Soon after his 
return he determined to make a similar tour of the South. 
The trip proved to be profitable. Never had the President's 
power to evoke popular adulation been greater, and as the 
very symbol of the national government, Washington was 
able for a time to transfer personal adulation into loyalty to 
his administration. 
Governors, mayors, aldermen, merchants, agricultural soci-
eties, and Cincinnati clubs in each town through which the 
President passed planned elaborate addresses and entertain-
ments.59 His presence produced a solemn joy among the 
populace, which a more complex and cynical age scarcely 
can comprehend and to which only contemporary newspaper 
accounts do justice. The President's reception at Savannah 
was typical of the welcomes he received. 
On Thursday morning, the President of the United States ar-
rived at Purysburg [on the Savannah River above the city] 
where he was received by the Committee who had been deputed 
[sic] by a number of the citizens of Savannah and its vicinity for 
that purpose. The President with the Committee, his Secretary 
Major Jackson, Major Butler, Gen [Anthony] Wayne and Mr. 
Baillie, embarked at Purysburg between ten and eleven o'clock 
and was [sic] rowed down by nine American Captains who were 
dressed in blue silk jackets, black satin breeches, white silk 
stockings and round hats with black ribbons, having the words 
"LONG LIVE THE PRESIDENT" in letters of gold. Within ten miles 
59 Most of the addresses which Washington received during his tour have 
been collected in the Washington Papers, Vols. 250-51. 
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of the city they were met by a number of gentlemen in several 
boats, and as the President passed by them, a band of music 
played the celebrated song, "HE COMES, THE HERO COMES" accom-
panied with several voices. On his approach to the city, the 
concourse on the bluff, and the crowd which had pressed into 
the vessels, evinced the general joy which had been inspired by 
this visit of the most beloved of all men, and the desire of all 
ranks and conditions of people to be gratified by his presence.60 
Washington was pleased by the results of his southern trip, 
and he told David Humphreys soon after his return to 
Philadelphia that "tranquility reigns among the [southern] 
people, with that disposition towards the general government 
which is likely to preserve it."61 
With the conclusion of his southern tour, however, Wash-
ington made no further attempts to influence, either directly 
or indirectly, opinion or political activity in the states. 
After 1790 the influence he could create through patronage 
was reduced, since all he could do was fill existing vacancies. 
Moreover, Washington turned his attention to maintaining 
harmony within his cabinet. Although the President stead-
fastly refused to make a formal commitment to one side or 
the other in the growing conflict between Hamilton and the 
Virginia-led opposition, his own early patronage policies, 
particularly as they benefitted his friends in the Cincinnati 
Society, ultimately helped to sharpen and define the devel-
oping schism as it came to affect local and state politics in 
the South. 
Hamilton had even greater opportunities than the Presi-
dent to establish administration interests in the respective 
states at the beginning of the national experiment. Congress' 
successive decisions to delegate responsibility for the formu-
60 From Savannah, May 19, 1791, reprinted in North Carolina Gazette, 
June 4, 1791. 
61 Washington to David Humphreys, July 20, 1791, in Fitzpatrick, ed., 
Washington, XXXI, 318-19. 
The Founding of a Political Interest, 1789-1793 /29 
lation of national economic policy to the Secretary of the 
Treasury gave Hamilton an unparalleled opportunity to shape 
fiscal policies so that influential economic interests through-
out the country were bound to the central government. At 
the same time he had the potential for a private political 
machine literally handed to him with his commission. The 
power to appoint customs officials, tax collectors, and other 
officers was now in the hands of a man who less than a 
decade before had urged that such authority be given to the 
national government for the express purpose of establishing 
local partisan interests. In fact, there were about six hundred 
fifty positions to be filled in the Treasury Department in 
1793, according to the List of Civil Officers of the United 
States. These included inspectors, gaugers, weighers, meas-
urers, and boatmen-all employed in the customs service-as 
well as lighthouse keepers, supervisors, inspectors of the 
revenue, and a plethora of clerks on several levels.62 Obvi-
ously, Hamilton could neither ascertain nor consistently 
guarantee the partisan reliability and energy of the vast 
majority of the bureaucracy under his direction. Therefore, 
he chose wisely to place men of partisan reliability in certain 
key Treasury posts on the state and local levels in order to 
employ their intelligence and influence most effectively. To 
find and reward such men of partisan temperament in the 
South, Hamilton seems often to have turned-as had Wash-
ington-to the Society of the Cincinnati. Before seeking out 
active grassroots support in the South, however, Hamilton 
obtained a significant measure of southern aid within Con-
gress. 
Although the Treasury Secretary alienated most influential 
interests in the South by his fiscal policies, individuals in one 
62 Walter Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin, eds., American State Papers: 
Miscellaneous Affairs ( 2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 
I, 57-58. 
so I Prologue to Democracy 
critically important area stood to gain as much from funding, 
assumption, and the Bank as the financial and speculative 
groups of New England, New York, and Philadelphia. Low-
country South Carolina planters and the merchants and 
financiers in Charleston persistently had pressed for assump-
tion since 1787, and the ratification of the Constitution 
renewed their determination to see an assumption realized. 63 
Consequently, in Congress and at home from 1790 onward, 
residents of lowcountry South Carolina consistently sup-
ported Hamilton's policy and thus saved the administration's 
economic policies from condemnation as purely sectional in 
nature. 
South Carolina congressmen gave strong support to as-
sumption. According to Madison, "Mass. & S. Carolina with 
their allies of Connecticut & New York" were the strongest 
pro-Hamilton delegates at New York as the second session 
of Congress opened.64 Moreover, the lowcountrymen carried 
the support of the backcountry residents with them in this 
session, except for Sumter in the House. Smith, Aedanus 
Burke, and Izard campaigned energetically on behalf of 
assumption. In addition, Smith nominated himself as both 
unofficial whip of the state's House delegation and corre-
sponding secretary to the legal and financial groups back 
home.65 
There were some flaws in South Carolina's supposedly 
solid backing of Hamilton. Ralph Izard remarked that he 
63 In April of 1789 Senator Ralph Izard expressed the hope that "we shall 
not be wasting time with idle discussions about amendments to the Constitu-
tion, but that we shall go to work immediately about finances, and endeavor 
to extricate ourselves from our present embarrassed and disgraceful situation." 
Izard to Thomas Jefferson, April 3, 1789, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., 
"Letters of Ralph Izard," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical 
Magazine, II (July, 1901), 204. 
64 Madison to anonymous, April 13, 1790, Madison Papers, Vol. 13. 
65 William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, February 28, May 24, 
June 14, 18, July 25, 30, 1790, Smith-Rutledge Correspondence; Annals of 
Congress, I, 1175, 1292-95. 
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cared not one whit what compromise had to be made in the 
funding scheme, so long as assumption was assured; and, in 
fact, the South Carolina delegation was no happier with the 
funding portion of Hamilton's plan than were the congress-
men from Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. Also, it is 
doubtful whether Smith at this early date had overcome 
wholly his initial impression of Hamilton as a boastful, 
disingenuous professional hero, unwilling to give the southern 
militia due credit for helping win the late war.66 In the 
following months, however, such equivocation rapidly disap-
peared, and Smith became part of an increasingly well-
defined pro-Hamilton faction. 
So strong was the support for assumption in South Carolina 
itself that in February, 1790, the state legislature publicly 
supported the plan, an act which quickly was translated into 
heavy pressure on the few waverers in the state's delegation 
at Philadelphia.67 As the prospect for an assumption dimmed 
in the spring, members of Charleston's legal and financial 
communities joined the legislature in pressing their congress-
men on the matter, while privately expressing alarm over the 
fate of the Union if the states were not relieved of their 
debts.68 
When the funding and assumption bills finally became 
law, members of the South Carolina lowcountry oligarchy 
felt considerable relief. Representative Smith, in obvious 
reference to the funding as well as the assumption bill, con-
gratulated Gabriel Manigault, a Charleston financier, on the 
66 Smith to Cotesworth Pinckey, from New York, July 14, 1790, Pinckney 
Family Papers, Box 2; Smith to Edward Rutledge, December, 1789, June 14, 
1790, Smith-Rutledge Correspondence. 
67 State Gazette of North Carolina, April 10, 1790; Smith to Rutledge, 
February 28, 1790, Smith-Rutledge Correspondence. 
68 Cotesworth to Harriott Pinckney, from Charleston, April 7, 1790, 
Pinckney Family Papers, Box 2; Smith to Gabriel Manigault, from New 
York, March 26, 1790, in Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Corre-
spondence," 778. 
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passage of "a measure not only beneficial to the U.S. and to 
So. Car. particularly, but to yourself personally, a circum-
stance which adds much to the satisfaction I have felt." 
Governor Charles Pinckney informed the President in March, 
1791, that assumption and the Creek Treaty of 1790, "are 
both measures which very highly meet the approbation, & 
would I am sure if necessary very chearfully [sic] receive the 
support of this State upon any occasion." Pinckney had 
expressed publicly his satisfaction several months before in 
his annual address to the South Carolina legislature. His 
elder cousin, Thomas, seems to have said little on the subject, 
but the fact that at the time of his appointment as Ambassa-
dor to the Court of St. James he held certificates of funded 
debt amounting to $6,384.57 is sufficient testimony of Thomas 
Pinckney's interest in and loyalty to the plan.69 
Hamilton's Report on the Public Credit created a finely 
balanced coalition in Congress which became the nucleus of 
a well-defined Federalist interest in that body by the close 
of Washington's first term. Between January, 1791, and 
March, 1793, twelve significant votes were taken in Congress 
-mostly in the House-relating to the person and policies 
of the Secretary of the Treasury.70 These votes have previ-
69 Smith to Manigault, March 26, 1790, in Phillips, ed., "South Carolina 
Federalist Correspondence," 778-79; Charles Pinckney to Washington, from 
Charleston, March 29, 1791, Washington Papers, Vol. 249; John Kean to 
Cotesworth Pinckney, from Philadelphia, August 11, 1792, Pinckney Family 
Papers, Box 2; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, March 2, 1791. 
South Carolinians expected to benefit once more from Hamilton's 1792 plan 
for a further assumption of state debts. Robert Barnwell to John Rutledge, 
from Philadelphia, March 21, 1792, Robert Barnwell Papers, South Car-
oliniana Library, Columbia, S. C. 
70 These included divisions over the Excise Act, the National Bank Bill 
in both House and Senate, three attempts by the opposition in April and 
May, 1792, to destroy all or crucial portions of Hamilton's plan for further 
assumption of state debts (an assumption most favorable to Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, Annals of Congress, II, 595), an attempt 
the following November to relieve Hamilton of the responsibility for initiating 
economic policy (transferring such responsibility to a House committee), 
and, finally, a series of divisions over several of Giles' resolutions of March, 
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ously been summarized and categorized by Joseph Charles. 
Charles' primary object was to show that any attempt to 
pinpoint the exact time when significant and rigid party 
divisions came into being in Congress is "useless."71 How-
ever, the increasing attacks upon Hamilton by well-defined 
groups in the House in 1792 and 1793 and the staunch 
defense of his policies by certain other equally well-defined 
groups cannot be overlooked. It is clear that even before the 
Giles Resolutions, Hamilton on one side and Madison on the 
other had captured the allegiance of most congressmen, and 
this was important to the subsequent fate of the Federalist 
interest in the South. 
In general, the emerging Federalist nucleus in Congress 
between 1790 and 1793 centered about the New England 
delegations, except for Vermont (although Rhode Island and 
New Hampshire opposed funding and assumption, they were 
solidly in support of Hamilton after 1791), the representatives 
of the Hamilton wing in New York, and lowcountry South 
Carolina. These delegations either voted consistently for 
Hamilton's entire program or refused to oppose it publicly 
by abstaining from commitment on certain issues. Abstention 
was a favorite tactic of the South Carolinians, for instance, 
when the excise and bank proposals came to a vote, even 
though William Laughton Smith was in the majority support-
ing Hamilton. But the South Carolina group was explicitly 
and consistently pro-Hamilton on matters relating to plans 
for assumption and on matters in which the Treasury Secre-
tary's personal abilities and integrity were questioned pub-
licly. 
In 1791 and after, Hamilton gained some further support 
from the middle and southern states when the great majority 
1793. The votes are to be found in Annals of Congress, I, 1788, 1813, 1932, 
2012; II, 533-35, 597, 725, 955-60. 
71 Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (Williams-
burg, Va.: The Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956), 93-94. 
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of the Pennsylvania delegation, as well as John Steele of 
North Carolina and Francis Willis of Georgia, backed him.72 
This support was vitally necessary on two occasions-the 
first in late 1792, the second the following March. In 
November, 1792, the Republican interest in the House openly 
took the offensive against Hamilton for the first time when 
it was proposed that questions pertaining to the redemption 
of the public debt be referred in the future to a special House 
committee rather than to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
This proposal was defeated thirty-two to twenty-five. Those 
who publicly stood with Hamilton included the entire New 
England delegation except Vermont, the three pro-Hamilton 
representatives from New York, five of the seven representa-
tives from Pennsylvania, Steele of North Carolina, the three 
lowcountry South Carolina delegates, plus scattered sup-
porters in the New Jersey and Maryland delegations. Jackson 
and later Baldwin of Georgia, the backcountry South Car-
olinians, a majority of the North Carolina contingent, all of 
the Virginia representatives, the three members of the 
Clinton-Van Rensselaer faction in New York, the Vermont, 
and Kentucky representatives, and most of the Maryland 
delegation voted in favor of a House committee. The follow-
ing March, during the vote on the Giles Resolutions, Hamil-
ton still held the support given him the previous November 
and added to it from among the southern delegations the 
partial support of Grove of North Carolina, Samuel Griffin 
72 However, Steele's loyalty to Hamilton was tinged with equivocation at 
this time. He wrote to a fellow North Carolinian in December, 1791, that 
"our evil list" of expenditures "grows on us enormously." He complained 
that "few in this house have seized the opty [opportunity] to apply the 
shears to the estimate of the Secty of the Treasury." Noting that Hamilton's 
estimate of expense had risen steadily and was estimated at over one 
million dollars for fiscal 1792, Steele concluded: "This is a thing that would 
not Encrease the friends to the Government in North Carolina, if publicly 
known, and indeed it is not a little regretted among some good Federalists 
here." John Steele to John Haywood, from Philadelphia, December 5, 1791, 
Haywood Collection. 
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and Richard Bland Lee of Virginia, and Francis Willis of 
Georgia.73 
Despite the personal success of the President's patronage 
system and his southern tour, it was evident from the 
patterns of support for Hamilton's policies in Congress that 
by 1792 the administration's hold over the loyalties of most 
leading political interests in the South was weak. This was 
especially true of Virginia and North Carolina. The results 
of the vice presidential campaign in December gave adminis-
tration leaders further cause for unease. Not only was 
Adams soundly repudiated in all the southern states except 
South Carolina-a result which may have given Hamilton 
either joy or sorrow, since the chief beneficiary of this reac-
tion was his old New York enemy, George Clinton-but the 
names of the Vice President and Treasury Secretary were 
implicitly linked by a bitter southern press as coagitators 
for government by aristocracy and even monarchy.74 Despite 
73 In March, 1793, John Beckley, Clerk of the House, communicated to 
Jefferson a list of "paper men" in Congress, i.e., hard-core supporters of 
Hamilton who had either directly benefitted from funding and assumption 
or who were directly tied to the Bank of the United States through seats on 
the central or divisional boards of directors. "Private Remarks," March 2, 
1793, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 82. Of twenty-eight men on Beckley's list 
twelve were from Massachusetts and Connecticut alone; one was from 
New Hampshire, and three were from New York. A thin but impressively 
wide distribution came from the states south of New York. Two were from 
New Jersey, four from Pennsylvania, two from Maryland, two from North 
Carolina-Williamson in the House and Johnston in the Senate, both of whom 
retired from public life soon thereafter-and Smith and Izard from South 
Carolina. Hamilton's success in securing support of more than one-third 
of the House stimulated a Republican reaction. Beginning in November, 
1791, the Republicans successfully urged a broadening of the membership 
of the House by decreasing the ratio of representatives to citizens. Jefferson 
to Thomas Mann Randolph, March 16, 1792, ibid., Vol. 72. As a conse-
quence, the number of representatives had increased from 65 to 104 when 
the Third Congress convened in November, 1793. Curiously, the Hamil-
tonians apparently did not perceive the danger to their influence in an 
expansion of House membership, because the issue was never debated 
along party lines. Annals of Congress, II, 191, 418. 
74 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, February 15ff., April 11, No-
vember 28, December 5, 1792; Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Ad-
vertiser, February 28, 1793. 
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these setbacks to the popularity of his administration, Wash-
ington refused to do more to strengthen government influence 
in the region. Beginning as early as 1791, however, Hamilton 
began to employ his own resources-Treasury agents and the 
first Bank of the United States-in an effort to discover 
untapped sources of support for the government. 
The encouragement of manufactures seemed to offer 
promise for the attachment of a sizable segment of the 
ambitious commonalty in and out of the South to the adminis-
tration. At the close of the eighteenth century the term 
"manufacturer" connoted not the small New England factory 
owner of three decades hence, but rather the "mechanic" 
and artisan in the towns and cities of the country who com-
peted against imported products. Congress' demand for a 
report on the current state and future prospects of manu-
facturing in the United States offered Hamilton the chance 
to gauge the extent to which this rising interest might be 
of political value to the government. Undoubtedly, all of 
the correspondence relating to this topic does not survive, 
but if the letters from his Treasury agents and manufacturing 
societies in Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and South Carolina are any indication of the whole, Hamilton 
was exceptionally thorough in his attempts to inform am-
bitious entrepreneurs throughout the country that the federal 
government in general and the Secretary of the Treasury in 
particular were solicitous of their welfare.7" 
In the South, however, the response to Hamilton's efforts 
was discouraging. Daniel Stevens, the supervisor of the 
excise at Charleston, sent a circular letter to "the most lead-
75 Brunswick Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures to Hamilton, 
August 9, 1791; Elisha Colt to Hamilton, August 20, 1791; Sherman Swift 
to John Chester, August 22, 1791; Benjamin Huntington to Chester, August 
24, 1791; Constant Southworth to William Williams, September 1, 1791; 
Silas Condict to Aaron Dunham, August 25, 1791, ill Alexander Hamilton 
Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 12. 
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ing Characters throughout the State as per the Secretary's 
request" attempting to obtain as much information as possible 
on the state of manufactures in South Carolina, but received 
no reply. Stevens found that most of the state's manufactured 
products were swamped by a flood of cheaper importations 
from the North and from abroad, and local artisans were 
disadvantaged by "the long and general Credit given [local 
merchants] by the Importers." Unless import duties were 
significantly raised, the South Carolina mechanics and their 
trade would continue to languish.76 
The outlook in Virginia was even worse. After collecting 
data from all over the state, Edward Carrington, the recently 
appointed Federal Supervisor of Revenue, wrote that the 
economy of Virginia was devoted so overwhelmingly to 
agriculture of either a subsistence or commercial nature that 
manufacturing could be conducted only on a domestic level-
either by slaves or free artisans-and that economic self-
sufficiency was therefore the logical goal of all.77 
Undaunted that little influential support for his program 
could be mustered from among the southern common folk, 
Hamilton turned again to the financial interests of the region 
in his persistent attempts to build support. The chartering 
of the Bank of the United States offered him another op-
portunity to approach the southern moneyed interests. 
Through the financial patronage bestowed by his national 
bank, Hamilton insured further the perpetuation of a Fed-
eralist interest at Charleston while creating such a faction 
in the previously unfriendly city of Richmond. 
Hamilton's immediate entree to the Charleston financial 
circles and to the entire lowcountry faction was through 
William Loughton Smith, even though Hamilton knew John 
7G Daniel Stevens to Hamilton, from Charleston, September 3, October, 
1791, ibid. 
77 Carrington to Hamilton, from Richmond, October 4, 1791, ibid. 
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Rutledge, Cotesworth Pinckney, and other members of the 
South Carolina delegation at the Constitutional Convention. 
By 1792, Smith had become Hamilton's trusted political 
lieutenant in the House and his defender in the public press. 
In a little work entitled "The POLITICKS and VIEWS of a 
certain PARTY DISPLAYED," Smith fired the first shots in a 
pamphlet war between Federalists and Republicans that 
raged incessantly for the next decade. Smith first accused 
Madison of begetting the residence deal with Pennsylvania 
"in darkness ... its Nurses were afraid of its being exposed 
to the light," and then of abandoning the Pennsylvania al-
liance in the fight over the national bank question, since 
the establishment of such an institution at Philadelphia 
might well mean the capital would remain there after 1800. 
Smith then turned on Jefferson, accusing the Secretary of 
State of opposing certain government measures because of 
petty fears that they would increase the power and prestige 
of other members of the cabinet, as well as other sections 
of the country, at his and his state's expense.78 
Smith's outspoken loyalty to Hamilton guaranteed him a 
seat on the board of directors of the central bank. Of the 
twenty-five-member board, in the early 1790's only three 
came from the South; Smith, Samuel Johnston of North 
Carolina-who despite his retirement from public life in 
1793 maintained sizable shareholdings in the enterprise as 
late as 1796-and James McClurg, a Richmond doctor. 79 
Of the several branch offices of the Bank of the United 
States established prior to 1795, only one, at Charleston, was 
78 William Laughton Smith, "The POLITICKS and VIEWS of a certain PARTY 
DISPLA YEn" (Philadelphia, 1792); a copy of this pamphlet may be found in 
the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif. 
79 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, January 24, 1793; 
Samuel Johnston to Joseph Anthony, November 6, 1796, Preston Davie 
Collection, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, N.C. 
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in the South. 80 In early 1792 the first elections for the office 
of deposit and discount for this branch were made by the 
Bank's national directors. The list of those chosen by the 
central board to administer the Charleston office read like 
a who's who of South Carolina's ruling gentry. Included 
were Edward Rutledge, Daniel DeSaussure, and Henry 
Laurens. Smith himself was a partner in the Charleston 
banking house of Smith, DeSaussure, and Darrell. And, as 
his biographer states, "When the national bank was estab-
lished by Hamilton, the Charleston branch was firmly in 
the hands of this house. . . . Since William Smith was the 
only South Carolinian among the first directors of the parent 
bank in Philadelphia, he was obviously the channel through 
which bank patronage flowed."81 
The structuring of a pro-Hamilton faction in Virginia 
proceeded along similar lines. Initially, Hamilton could 
count only upon his agents for information and support in 
this politically alien territory. His chief contact in the state 
prior to 1792 was William Heth, the Collector of Revenue 
for Bermuda Hundred. Heth was a man of acute perception 
and was an indefatigable researcher who sent Hamilton long, 
brilliant analyses of the economic structure of the Old 
Dominion.82 He and his two brothers had also been con-
so Virginia financial interests were eager from the first, however, to obtain 
a branch office in the state. Businessmen from Alexandria, Norfolk, and 
Richmond all petitioned for such a favor as soon as the Bank of the United 
States came into existence. "The Bank of the United States," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, VIII (January, 1901 ), 288-95. Rich-
mond eventually triumphed, but the branch office was not established until 
1795. 
81 Georgia Gazette, February 23, 1792; Rogers, William Laughton Smith, 
189. 
82 See particularly Heth to Hamilton, June 28, 1792, Hamilton Papers, 
Vol. 16. Hamilton in the early 1790's also received at least one exhaustive 
and reliable report on political conditions in Virginia and North Carolina 
from Daniel Huger, a staunch supporter in Georgetown, South Carolina. 
Huger to Hamilton, from South Carolina, June 25, 1792, ibid. Huger later 
entered Congress as a firm Federalist. 
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nected with the Cincinnati Society from the beginning, and 
in 1784 he had been treasurer of the Virginia branch of the 
Society.83 As a potential political leader, however, Heth left 
something to be desired, because he was easily impressed by 
proximity to political power and the opportunity to play a 
minor role in its exercise. Hamilton was readily able to gain 
his allegiance by the most perfunctory exercise of cordiality 
and flattery. 84 If power shifted to another party or faction, 
however, such an individual might well shift with it. More-
over, Heth was not closely acquainted at the time with the 
commercial, financial, and speculative interests of the state.85 
As in South Carolina, someone was needed as an agent for 
admission into this presumably hostile group, and Edward 
Carrington proved to be the man. 
Carrington had been tightly bound to Madison, Jefferson, 
and Monroe in the late 1780's, and in 1789 Madison had 
helped to obtain for Carrington the post of United States 
MarshaP6 The first sign of a break between the two came 
with Madison's proposal for a discrimination in the funding 
plan. For if Carrington and others in Virginia roundly con-
demned assumption, they also claimed to see in a discrimina-
tion scheme a threat to public credit and a prejudice against 
the speculative interests centered in the towns.87 Madison 
83 Hume, George Washington's Correspondence Concerning the Society 
af the Cincinnati, 228, 422. 
84 This is apparent from a reading of Heth's own entries. See the Diary 
of William Heth, July 19, 1792-July 3, 1793, Journals and Diaries Division, 
Manuscripts Department, Library of Congress. 
85 La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt noted in 1795 that these interests were 
neither large in number nor "opulent." Le Due de la Rochefoucauld-
Liancourt, Travels Through the United States of North America, etc., in the 
Years 1795, 1796, and 1797 (2 vols.; London: T. Davison, Lombard Street, 
1799), II, 32-33. 
86 Jefferson to Monroe, from Paris, August 11, 1786, in Julian P. Boyd, 
ed., The Papers af Thomas Jefferson ( 14 vols.; Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1950-1958), X, 225; Carrington to Madison, from 
Powhatan, April 14, 1789, from Richmond, September 9, December 20, 
1789, Madison Papers, Vols. 11, 12. 
8 7 A discrimination "measure of the sort must necessary [sic] injure the 
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quickly exacerbated this division by his contemptuous dis-
missal of such complaints. "The language of Richmond on 
the proposed discrimination does not surprize [sic] me," he 
told Randolph soon after hearing from Carrington. "It is the 
natural language of the towns and decides nothing."88 Thus, 
the way was at least partially opened for a union between 
Hamilton and the few financial interests in Virginia, of which 
Carrington was a member. Hamilton's opportunity to per-
form a service for Carrington was not long in emerging. 
Less than a month after his criticism of the discrimination 
plan, Carrington complained to Madison that he was re-
ceiving but a sheriff's salary to perform a United States 
Marshal's job.89 Madison's reply, if there was one, is un-
recorded, but within the year Carrington had turned to 
Hamilton for help in securing a better position. In April, 
1791, he wrote the Treasury Secretary a warm letter of thanks 
for setting his mind at ease about accepting the post of 
Supervisor of Revenue in the state while still holding down 
the marshal's job. That same day Washington officially 
appointed Carrington to the Treasury position, and there-
after the Virginian proved to be a most valuable administra-
tion worker.90 
Carrington was immediately useful as an agent between 
Hamilton and the Richmond financial community. Not only 
was Carrington a part of this community, but his wife was 
John Marshall's sister-in-law; and Marshall was at the head 
of a Richmond faction-including Charles and Henry Lee 
public credit which with me is the most important consideration of all." 
Carrington to Madison, from Richmond, March 2, 1790, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 12. See also anonymous to Madison, March 6, 1790; Henry Lee to 
Madison, March 13, 1790, ibid. 
88 Madison to Randolph, March 21, 1790, ibid. 
89 Carrington to Madison, from Richmond, April 1, 1790, ibid., Vol. 13. 
90 Carrington to Hamilton, April 4, 1791, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 11; 
Washington to Carrington, from Mount Vernon, April 4, 1791, in Fitzpatrick, 
ed., Washington, XXXI, 274. 
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and Wilson Cary Nicholas-which was deeply interested in 
obtaining funds to purchase a part of the huge Fairfax Tract 
for speculative purposes. The members of this faction were 
popular and politically influential. Henry Lee, who was a 
leading figure in the Cincinnati Society and who soon proved 
to be a staunch administration partisan, was elected governor 
by the General Assembly for three consecutive years in 
1791, 1792, and 1793.91 Had he so chosen, Madison might 
well have attracted the allegiance of at least some members 
of this group, but he turned them down in late 1791 by 
refusing to intercede with the British Minister George Ham-
mond on the question of a possible prior claim to the Fairfax 
Tract by Baron Steuben.92 The situation was ideal for Hamil-
ton. James McClurg of Richmond was given a seat on the 
central board of the National Bank in December, 1792. In 
February, 1793, a bill passed the Virginia legislature provid-
ing for the charter of a bank in Richmond with a capital 
stock not to exceed $400,000. James McClurg was also a 
director and supervisor of this bank, along with John Mar-
shall, William Foushee and John Harvie, two other well-
91 Title Page, Vol. 6, John Marshall Papers, Library of Congress; "Land 
Papers, 1794, Survey and Letters," Wilson Cary Nicholas Papers, Drawer 
277, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.; Hardin Burnley to 
Madison, from Richmond, December 30, 1791, Madison Papers, Vol. 14; 
John Marshall to Charles Lee, from Richmond, April 20, 1797, The Adams 
Papers (Microfilm), Library of Congress, Reel 384; Virginia Gazette and 
General Advertiser, November 20, 1793. As late as the autumn of 1792, 
Henry Lee had counted himself a Madisonian. The previous February he 
had been instrumental in inducing Valentine Davis to publish the anti-
Hamilton Cassius essays in the Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, and 
in September he urged Madison to help defeat the plan to establish a branch 
office of the Bank of the United States in Virginia. Henry Lee to James 
Madison, from Richmond, February 6, September 10, 1792, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 15; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, February 8, 1792ff. Popu-
lar reaction against his beloved Washington's Neutrality Proclamation as 
well as government aid for his private speculative ventures seem to have 
been sufficient to cause Lee's shift to Federalism in 1793. 
92 Madison to Henry Lee, from Philadelphia, January 1, 1792, Madison 
Papers, Vol. 14. 
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known men who generally supported the national administra-
tion.93 Banking obviously was booming in Richmond, even 
though Hamilton's Treasury agent William Heth in his long 
letter on the Virginia economy had doubted that this could 
ever be so. Hamilton was employing the same tactics in 
Richmond that he had used in Charleston. A "safe" and 
needy follower had been made the middleman between the 
bank at Philadelphia and needy borrowers or financial in-
terests in the states. 
But these were not the only indications of an increasingly 
close connection between the Richmond financial interests 
and the Treasury wing of the cabinet. As early as June, 1792, 
Jefferson learned that Hamilton already had "expressed the 
strongest desire that Marshall should come into Congress 
from Richmond, declaring that there is no other man in 
Virginia who [sic] he wishes to see there." Marshall had on 
that occasion declined Hamilton's flattering proposal.94 A 
year and a half later-in December, 1793-with the Richmond 
financial interests already benefitting in good measure from 
their alliance with the Bank of the United States, Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph informed Wilson Cary Nicholas 
that he would be pleased to act as "paymaster" or "indorser 
or anything for your accommodation" in obtaining discounts 
for Nicholas' own notes from Philadelphia banks. At this 
time a recent yellow fever epidemic had driven the govern-
ment from the city and in the process had "shattered the 
credit of multitudes; and generated an extreme caution in 
the banks in discounting."95 
93 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, February 14, 1793. 
94 Jefferson to Madison, from Philadelphia, January 1, 1792, Madison 
Papers, Vol. 15. 
95 Randolph to Nicholas, from Germantown, December 7, 1793, Nicholas 
Papers, Box 1. Randolph's activity at this time on behalf of Marshall, the 
Bank, and doubtless Hamilton as well, is intriguing, since the Attorney 
General usually was found supporting Jefferson against the Secretary of the 
Treasury during the stormiest cabinet sessions. Further evidence of Ran-
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Madison was not unaware of the growth of this Richmond-
Philadelphia alliance or its implications for the emerging 
Republican interest. In September, 1793, he explained to 
Jefferson the reasons which at the time "disapate [sic] from 
full confidence in" Nicholas and Marshall. "It is said," Madi-
son wrote that "Marshall, who is at the head of the great 
purchase from Fairfax, has lately obtained pecuniary aid 
from the Bank, or people connected with it. I think it is 
certain that he must have felt, in the amount of the purchase 
an absolute dependence on the monied interest, which will 
explain him to every one that reflects, in the active character 
he is assuming."96 Marshall's "active character," to which 
Madison alluded, was his public and forthright defense of 
those administration policies most obnoxious to the J effer-
sonians. By midsummer of 1793 links based on economic 
self-interest, previous military comeraderie, and political 
loyalty had been forged between the Treasury at Philadelphia 
and the leading financiers and speculators in Richmond. 
With the creation of a distinct faction at Richmond by 
179397 the use of patronage by Hamilton and Washington 
to build political strength in the South came to an end. 
Whatever other plans Hamilton may have had to extend 
government favor to certain economic interests throughout 
the country were never pushed thereafter, as Hamilton at last 
was checked by an increasingly vigorous Republican op-
position in Congress. However, by the end of his first ad-
ministration Washington and his Treasury Secretary had 
succeeded in developing loosely-structured factions within 
dolph's increasing support of Hamilton is lacking. Probably personal friend-
ship rather than "party" politics induced Randolph to act in Marshall's 
behalf. In any case, the effect on the growth of a Federalist interest in 
Virginia was not diminished. 
96 Madison to Jefferson, September 2, 1793, l\ladison Papers, Vol. 16. 
97 Members of this group gathered in amiability at· frequent intervals 
throughout that spring and summer. Diary of \Villiam Heth, entries of May 
1, 3, June 29, 1793. 
The Founding of a Political Interest, 1789-1793 / 45 
the southern states loyal to the national administration. A 
spirit of active loyalty to the administration flourished in the 
dominant lowcountry of South Carolina and in the most im-
portant city in Virginia; it was nearly extinct in North 
Carolina, but only because Samuel Johnston and Hugh Wil-
liamson had chosen to retire voluntarily, while John Steele 
temporarily had lost the confidence of the electorate; and 
in Georgia an ambitious group of former military com-
manders who now were land speculators offered hope that 
once the problem with the Creek Indians had been resolved, 
Georgia might support the administration. 
Policy, patronage, and simply the passage of time made 
of these southern proadministration interests of 1793 some-
thing far different from the old Federalist parties which 
existed there in 1787 and 1788. In general, those who ex-
perienced immediate benefit from a stronger union or whose 
vanity was fulfilled by Washington and Hamilton willingly 
gave their allegiance and active support to the Constitution 
and its administrators. On the other hand, those whose 
expectations were in some way frustrated remained loyal to 
the Constitution while developing an inveterate opposition 
to its administrators. 
For example, the two Georgia delegates who signed the 
Constitution in 1787, William Few and Abraham Baldwin, 
both became bitter critics of government policy after 1790, 
although both subsequently spent some years in national 
political life. The defection of young Charles Pinckney-a 
staunch Federalist in 1788-from the newly emerging Fed-
eralist i.nterest of the early 1790's is considered at some length 
in subsequent pages. However, his voluntary withdrawal 
from the national government was a result of repeated per-
sonal frustrations in seeking patronage. In later years, how-
ever, young Pinckney worked strenuously in his state for the 
Republicans and advanced to power within the Constitu-
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tiona! strudure that he had helped to erect at Philadelphia 
and had defended in Charleston a decade before. Conversely, 
the staunchest administration supporters in South Carolina 
in the early 1790's-Ralph Izard, William Laughton Smith, 
Edward Rutledge, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney-all 
had formed close personal connections with important leaders 
in the national administration and had been amply rewarded. 
Eventually, indirect government favor was instrumental 
in securing for the friends of government the loyalty of the 
hotspur of the Antifederalist Party, Patrick Henry. Jefferson 
charged that Henry was won over after he had pocketed a 
handsome profit from Hamilton's fiscal policies. 
It is important to emphasize exactly what these emerging 
administration interests in the South were and what they 
were not. In form and structure they in no way conformed 
to the highly institutionalized party organizations which 
emerged later in the eras of Jefferson and Jackson. Rather, 
the partisan organizational pattern stayed much the same 
as it had been in the colonial era, when traditional ruling 
elites had been bound in loose connections and cliques, by 
ties of interest and friendship. The only change from earlier 
years-and it was significant-was that now these local ad-
ministration interests were part of a larger, though very 
loosely structured, nationwide political network, united in 
defense and support of a central governing and policy-mak-
ing institution. 
In purpose, however, the formation of these local interests 
was a break with tradition. Administration juntos in the 
South and elsewhere were expected to act as partisan groups, 
actively and constantly defending government policy; they 
were not expected to operate in an issueless vacuum. Their 
task, as outlined by Hamilton in 1782, was to rally support 
among the people for the government during times of un-
rest and crisis to avoid the possibility that ambitious schemers 
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might unite them into a solid bloc of opposition. The suc-
cessful fulfillment of such an assignment strongly implied 
the need for a more consistent and intimate contact with the 
electorate than ever before. It demanded flexibility and ef-
fectiveness from men who viewed the political process in 
traditional terms of the active and able few and the defer-
ential and inert many. It demanded in short, at least a partial 
modification of the eighteenth-century American political 
tradition of elitist rule. Such demands were especially press-
ing upon friends of government in the South, where, after 
1790, popular unrest and antipathy to government policy 
were high. They were charged with keeping at least a portion 
of that region firmly attached to the federal administration to 
avoid the destructive impression that the central government 
was run by and for the interests of a section rather than a 
nation. Unfortunately for the cause they served, nothing in 
their experience had prepared these proto-Federalists in the 
South for the responsibility of a sustained and effective con-
frontation with an electorate that often was sullen and 
suspicious. 
II. The Friends of(iovernment, 
1789-1794 
Southern supporters of the national administration during 
the early 1790's shared one trait: they had spent their adult 
lives in positions of public trust and authority. Planters, 
lawyers, merchants, and, in South Carolina, financiers formed 
the comparatively small cliques that year after year dom-
inated public life in southern states. In an agricultural 
society overwhelmingly oriented toward subsistence farm-
ing, where transportation was wretched and communication 
slow and fitful,l political activity inevitably was centered 
in the few towns, and cities-and in the adjacent plantation 
regions of eastern Virginia and coastal South Carolina-where 
trade and social life were concentrated. Beyond these 
narrow spheres in each state, public life was nonexistent. 
Outright mistrust of vigorous government was high, even in 
some areas where the plantation system was well estab-
lished.2 
The members of these southern ruling classes seldom 
wrote or spoke extensively to justify or explain the political 
society which had given them such conspicuous privilege 
and prestige. Their elitist values had been developed in-
stinctively from everyday experience rather than from formal 
training or extensive reading in eighteenth-century political 
theory. Background in management of extensive private 
enterprises, plus the existence of a political structure 
weighted wholly in their favor, precluded the need for 
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philosophical speculation upon the proper relations of men 
to the state. Restricted franchises, extensive property quali-
fications for offi.ceholding, oligarchic local governing bodies, 
sectionally imbalanced state legislatures with ascendant 
powers over the executive, all combined to restrict the 
exercise of political power to a privileged few.3 
For many, the enjoyment of a commanding status had 
been expanded by the Revolutionary War from the legis-
lative halls to the battlefield. An officer's commission and 
command of large numbers of men in action confirmed a 
status of social attainment previously recognized de facto 
but never de ;ure. Often those who had won their reputa-
tions in the Continental Army felt a self-conceived and 
self-imposed mandate to participate in political affairs as a 
1 Throughout the 1790's southern congressmen frequently complained 
that "contrary winds and bad weather" hindered their journeys and delayed 
important communications. Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, from New 
York, January 30, 1790, in Griffith J. McRee, ed., Life and Correspondence of 
]ames Iredell (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1947), II, 279; Ralph Izard to 
Edward Rutledge, from New York, December 29, 1789, in Ulrich B. Phillips, 
ed., "South Carolina Federalist Correspondence," American Historical Re-
view, XIV (July, 1909), 777; James Jackson to John Milledge, from Phila-
delphia, November 12, 1794, in Harriet Milledge Salley, ed., Correspondence 
of Governor John Milledge (Columbia, S. C.: State Commercial Printing 
Co., 1949), 36. 
2 Le Due de Ia Hochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels Through the United 
States of North America, etc., in the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797 (2 vols.; 
London: T. Davidson, Lombard Street, 1799), II, 24; Benjamin Harrison to 
Washington, from Berkeley County, October 4, 1787, Washington Papers, 
Vol. 239. 
3 William A. Schaper, "Sectionalism and Representation in South Caro-
lina," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1901 ( 2 vols.; 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 245-463 passim; 
Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the .Revolution, 1775-
1789 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 91-97; Fletcher M. 
Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: 
A Study in the Evolution of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of Nortll 
Carolina Press, 1930), 77-140 passim; Jackson Turner Main, The Anti-
federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1961), 28-30; Charles S. Sydnor, American Revo-
lutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia (New 
York: Collier Books, 1962), 14-16. 
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natural continuation of an earlier public trust. It is little 
wonder that so many southern veterans through member-
ship in the exclusive and unpopular Society of the Cincinnati 
symbolized a continuing interest in the military life and the 
ideal of national sovereignty. 
Despite their strong elitist tendencies southern "friends 
of government" (as they soon began to call themselves) 4 
fulfilled their partisan responsibilities to the national ad-
ministration with energy and effect between 1791 and 1794 
and took the first reluctant steps toward bringing a much 
larger proportion of the citizenry into closer contact with 
state and national political life. By the very prominence of 
their position and by occasional activities they began to 
bring some order to the prevailing confusion of local and 
state factional politics. Also, they focused the attention of 
the electorate upon an emerging system of polarized political 
conflict within which issues and individuals were far more 
clearly defined and definable than in the past. Most of these 
men did not then, or ever, significantly modify their elitist 
ideals, but they did ultimately realize that increasingly such 
ideals would have to be subverted in practice to muster the 
needed support for national policy. 
The transformation of southern politics from the chaos 
of local factionalism into the comparative order of a well-
defined party system had not even begun by the time of 
the Jay Treaty. Several events in 1795 and 1796 revealed 
the essential fragility and inadequacy of the factions that 
Hamilton and Washington had created in the southern 
states. But a basic "Federalist" achievement during these 
years cannot be denied. By their presence and occasional 
activities at the grassroots level the friends of government 
established many of the conditions for the development of a 
two-party system in the South. 
4 Henry Lee seems to have been the first southerner to use this phrase. 
Lee to Washington, July 11, 1789, Washington Papers, Vol. 243. 
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In 1790 no other political society in the South was as 
stable and well defined as that of South Carolina. The low-
country oligarchy of planters, lawyers, and merchants en-
joyed a security of status and an entrenchment of power 
and influence unknown to their colleagues elsewhere in the 
South. These friends of government in South Carolina were 
under the least immediate pressure of any proadministration 
group in the South to modify traditional principles of gov-
ernment by elites, though such pressure was to increase in 
time. Nearly all members of this immensely powerful group 
were bound to the national government by ties of influence 
and affection. Such loyalty represented one of the greatest 
triumphs of Washington's patronage policy and guaranteed 
support for early administration policies in the southern 
states. 
In South Carolina, social and political power for years 
had been concentrated in the charming townhouses of 
Charleston and in the great rice plantations along the coastal 
lowcountry. Planters such as Ralph Izard, Daniel Huger, 
William Washington, Pierce Butler, and Robert Barnwell 
were united by ties of marriage and of mutual interest to a 
group of brilliant lawyers in Charleston led by General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Edward Rutledge. 5 In-
cluded in the first rank of this Charleston lawyer element 
were John Rutledge; Cotesworth Pinckney's younger brother, 
Major Thomas Pinckney; and his younger cousin Charles. 
Young William Laughton Smith, Jacob Read, and, soon 
thereafter, John Rutledge, Jr., formed a second but highly 
respectable rank within the bar. This alliance of lowcountry 
planters and Charleston lawyers was strengthened further 
by ties with the community of British merchants in the city, 
5 Charles Pinckney and Edward Rutledge were pointed out to the French 
traveler La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt as the leading Charleston lawyers in 
1795. The Frenchman was told that the two earned as much as thirty-five to 
forty-five hundred pounds sterling a year from their legal business. La 
Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels Through the United States, I, 562-63. 
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as well as with the local financiers headed at the time by 
William Henry DeSaussure and Gabriel and Louis Mani-
gault. 
The peculiar geographic and social configuration of the 
state, which lent special force to sectional political tensions 
and conflicts, greatly enhanced the influence of these wealthy 
lowcountrymen. Charleston was the only major city and 
port on the American seaboard in the more than seven 
hundred miles between Chesapeake Bay and East Florida. 
Resulting ties, both commercial and social, with individuals 
and business firms in Europe and with New England and 
the middle colonies made Charlestonians aware that they 
were important members of the North Atlantic civilization 
of the eighteenth century.,; All the prominent Charleston law-
yers not only had lived abroad extensively, but had received 
professional training there as well, generally at the famous 
Inns of Court in London, where many future rulers of the 
empire prepared for their careers in public life. Ralph Izard, 
the greatest of the lowcountry planters and the virtual 
political boss of St. James Goose Creek Parish, adjacent to 
the city, also had spent some years in England and on the 
Continent before and during the Revolution. 7 
The superiority and comparative isolation of the low-
country oligarchy were confirmed by the underdevelopment 
of the surrounding regions. Settlement of many backcountry 
6 Carl Bridenbaugh, "Charlestonians at Newport, 1767-1775," South 
Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, XLI (April, 1940}, 43-47; 
Michael Kraus, The Atlantic Civilization, Eighteenth Century Origins (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1941); Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths and Realities: 
Societies of the Colonial South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1952). 
7 In this and following pages, unless otherwise noted, the biographical 
material used is taken from one or both of two main sources, which shall 
not be cited in detail: Allen Johnson, Dumas Malone, and Harris E. Starr, 
eels., The Dictionary of American Biography (21 vols. and index; New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958); The Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1961). 
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areas had not really begun much before the middle of the 
century; and although the rush of population into that area 
had been rapid, on the eve of the Revolutionary War there 
were few churches, no schools, and no social structure com-
parable to that of the lowcountry.R After the mid-1780's, 
however, the backcountry had fought for a larger share of 
representation in the legislature and had bitterly opposed 
the Constitution in 1788. Thus, the state was divided deeply, 
both politically and socially, between a comparatively raw, 
remote, provincial backcountry frontier area similar to those 
in Georgia and the Tennessee country and a cosmopolititan, 
urbanized lowcountry which resembled the urban areas of 
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. 
Having risen to prominence at the beginning of the Revo-
lution, members of the oligarchy had had experience in 
command, both afield and in legislative chambers, by the 
time that Washington and Hamilton tried to gain their 
services and support. Cotesworth, Thomas Pinckney, and 
Edward Rutledge all had fought against the British during 
the invasion and occupation of the South in 1779-1782. 
Rutledge had been captured and incarcerated at St. Augus-
tine for a year, while the service of Cotesworth and Thomas 
Pinckney was sufficient to earn for them the titles of general 
and major, respectively. John Rutledge had become so 
influential by 1779 that when the British appeared, the 
frightened legislature gave him dictatorial powers. From 
the vantage point of various North Carolina border towns 
he waged an implacable struggle to oust the English from 
Charleston. As a result of this determined opposition, most 
of the lowcountry leaders had their extensive holdings in 
land, slaves, and other personal property confiscated by the 
British. This, in effect, reemphasized to the common people 
H Robert L. Meriwether, The Expansion of South Carolina, 1729-1765 
(Kingsport, Tennessee: Southern Publishers, Inc., 1940), 125-56. 
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the many sacrifices which their rulers had made on behalf 
of independence.9 Despite the growth of popular political 
agitation, marked by the backcountry's incessant demands 
for more adequate representation in the legislature and by 
the protests of native artisans and merchants against the 
return of British factors in the early 1780's, members of the 
oligarchy continued to dominate politics and to represent 
South Carolina's interest in the Continental Congress through-
out the Confederation era. 10 
The struggle over the adoption of the Constitution re-
vealed the extent of the power and influence which the 
oligarchy could employ when aroused to united action. 
Disclaimers to the contrary, the Antifederalists had been 
actively and successfully campaigning in the backcountry 
prior to the meeting of the ratifying convention at Charles-
ton.11 Once that body convened, however, the lowcountry-
men took complete command. One of the backcountry 
representatives, Aedanus Burke, has left a record of his 
impressions of those days which imparts far better than the 
historian can hope to do a sense of the structure of South 
Carolina politics, the division of popular opinion, and the 
overpowering influence and determined federalism of the 
coastal oligarchs in 1788. 
It is now unnecessary perhaps to state to you the different 
causes, whereby the new plan has been carried in South Carolina 
notwithstanding 4/5 of the people do, from their souls detest it. 
I am convinced, from my knowledge of the country, that I am 
rather under, than over, that proportion. In the first place, we 
9 Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation (Philadelphia, 
1941), ll-12, 18-19. 
10 Ibid., 103-105, 113, 124, 164-67; Nevins, The American States During 
and After the Rewlution, 335, 401-403. 
11 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Rufus King, from Charleston, May 24, 
1788, in Charles R. King, ed., Life and Correspondence of Rufus King ( 6 
vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900), I, 328-29. 
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in the opposition, had not, previous to our meeting, either wrote, 
or spoke, hardly a word against it, nor took any one step in the 
matter. We had no principle of concert or union, while its friends 
and abettors left no expedient untried to push it forward. All the 
rich, leading men, along the seacoast, and rice settlements; with 
few exceptions, lawyers, physicians and divines, the merchants, 
mechanicks, the populace and mob of Charleston. I think it 
worthy of observation that not a single instance in So. Carolina of 
a man formerly a Tory, or British adherent, who is not loud and 
zealous for the new Constitution. From the British Consul (who 
is the most violent man I know for it) down to the British 
scavenger, all are boisterous to drive it down. Add to this, the 
whole weight and influence of the press was in that scale. Not 
a printing press, in Carolina, out of the city. The printers are, in 
general, British journeymen, or poor citizens, who are afraid to 
offend the great men, or merchants, who could work their ruin. 
Thus, with us, the press is in the hands of a junto, and the printers, 
with most servile insolence discouraged opposition, and pushed 
forward publications in its favour; for no one wrote against it. 
But the principle [sic] cause was holding the Convention in 
the City, where there are not fifty inhabitants who are not 
friendly to it. The merchants and leading men kept open houses 
for the back and low country members during the whole time the 
Convention sat. The sixth day after we sat, despatches arrived, 
bringing an account that Maryland had acceded to the scheme. 
This was a severe blow to us; for the next day, one of our best 
speakers in the opposition, Doctor Fousseaux, gave notice he 
would quit that ground, as Maryland had acceded to it. 12 
Intensive and sustained contact with the narrow ruling 
circles of the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world, 
when combined with the enjoyment and exercise of extensive 
political power at home, inevitably bred a strong elitist 
temperament among South Carolina's lowcountry oligarchs. 
Their lives had been passed in the houses and corridors of 
power among gentlemen with impeccable credentials to 
12 In George C. Hogers, Jr., William Laughton Smith of Charleston; Evolu-
tion of a Federalist, 1758-1812 (Columbia, S. C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1962), 156. Quoted by permission of the author. 
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rule. Times of crisis or the quiet of private correspondence 
between friends often called forth expressions of exclusivist 
sentiment from these Charleston lawyers or their colleagues 
along the adjacent coast. Occasionally such views were 
expressed with comparative serenity, as when Cotesworth 
Pinckney wrote from the Philadelphia Convention that the 
brilliance and reputation of his fellow delegates would surely 
"dispose our fellow Citizens to judge favorably of such 
measures as we shall adopt."13 More often, however, the 
tone was querulous. 
Ralph Izard best typified the attitudes of this South Caro-
lina gentry. A good friend of Edmund Burke, he shared 
Burke's regard for liberty and his mistrust of democracy. 
From his unintentional and unhappy exile in Europe, Izard 
called the American Revolution "the noblest" cause "that 
was ever contended for by a free people," and he spoke of 
the need "to put a proper value on the blessings of liberty." 
At the same time Izard expressed his dislike of democracy 
which placed the untrained, ignorant, and passionate masses 
in too close proximity to political decision-making. Soon 
after his return to South Carolina, the master of St. James 
Goose Creek complained to Thomas Jefferson that "Our 
governments tend too much to Democracy. A handicrafts-
man thinks an apprenticeship necessary to make him ac-
quainted with his business. But our back countrymen are 
of opinion that a politician may be born such . . . as well 
as a poet."14 Izard's antidemocratic bias carried well beyond 
mere words, and in the year after his letter to Jefferson, he 
13 To Harriott Pinckney, May 30, 1787, Pinckney Family Papers, Box 2. 
14 Edmund Burke to Izard, from Beaconsfield, July 20, 1777; Izard to the 
Duke of Richmond, November 9, 1775, to Edward Rutledge, from London, 
May 8, 1777, in Anne Izard Deas, ed., Correspondence crf Mr. Ralph Izard 
of South Carolina (New York: Charles S. Francis & Co., 1844), 144, 280, 
318-19; Izard to Thomas Jefferson, June 10, 1785, in Worthington C. Ford, 
ed., "Letters of Ralph Izard," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical 
Magazine, II (July, 1901), 197-98. 
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publicly harangued his constituents and even tried open 
bribery in an attempt to destroy the political career of a 
popular young doctor from Virginia, Thomas Tudor Tucker. 
When he later was chided for his actions, Izard retorted 
that he "'did not scruple to acknowledge what he had said, 
to insist on the right of saying it, and to wish every man in 
the parish had been present to hear it.' "H> 
As late as 1795 some lowcountry oligarchs still expressed 
grave doubts whether the backcountrymen and their chosen 
leaders possessed sufficient political maturity and wisdom 
to be given a majority voice in the conduct of the public 
business of the state. "At present," Henry William De-
Saussure wrote to his Virginia colleague, Richard Bland Lee: 
... the low Country ... possesses the great mass of property & 
information [and] has a representation proportioned to these 
advantages which secures a good administration on proper & 
federal principles. [The letter was written some months before 
the publication of Jay's Treaty.] Our upper country people are 
very unenlightened & of course rude & violent, easily misled by 
demagogues and governed by every passing wind-we are there-
fore afraid to allow any change in the representation-when they 
attain the Information possessed by your people in the Country 
above the falls of the rivers, and are guided by Men of Education 
& of settled principles of government, Many of our objections to 
encrease their representation will be done away, & we may 
probably follow the Example you set us of encreasing their 
representation by degrees. 16 
DeSaussure's remarks notwithstanding, the politically rest-
less South Carolina backcountry developed an increasingly 
competent corps of leaders during the early 1790's at the 
same time that its economy began to expand along lines 
15 Quoted in Rogers, William Laughton Smith, 128. 
16 DeSaussure to Richard Bland Lee, February 14, 1795, from Charleston, 
R. B. Lee Papers. 
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similar to prevailing conditions on the coastY For a time 
the perpetual struggles between the "upper" and "lower" 
interests in the Assembly aided the growth of a distinct and 
well-defined party in the proadministration lowcountry. 
Planters, merchants, and lawyers along the coast united in 
a self-conscious "Federalist" phalanx against the incessant 
assaults from the West upon their disproportionate exercise 
of power in the state.18 Moreover, in order to insure their 
ascendancy, members of the oligarchy disregarded their 
elitist instincts to indulge in the "petty electioneering arts" 
which one of them described as "the natural growth of the 
fungus of all popular governments," but as such "to be 
tolerated" for the sake of sustained political ascendancy. 19 
At home in Charleston the Federalist oligarchs continued 
to flaunt their privileged status through their membership 
in the Chamber of Commerce and the Cincinnati Society, 
both of which met in the best coffeehouse in the most ex-
17 The rapid political awakening of the backcountry and the emergence of 
young Robert Goodloe Harper as its chief spokesman is discussed in Schaper, 
"Sectionalism in South Carolina," 408. See also John Brown Cutting to 
Thomas Pinckney, from Columbia, December 19, 1794, Pinckney Family 
Papers, Box 6. According to a contemporary, as early as 1792 the back-
country began to undertake the cultivation and exportation of cotton 
on a "considerable" basis. David Ramsay, History of South Carolina, from 
its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808 ( 2 vols.; Charleston: David 
Longworth, 1809), II, 449. Meanwhile, the state increased its slave popula-
tion by one-third during the final decade of the eighteenth century, as more 
than .'38,000 Negroes were imported, while the rice industry along the coast 
declined steadily from the middle of this decade onward. Curtis P. Nettles, 
The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815, (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1962), 183-84, 187. 
1R In a joint letter in June, 1791, Edward Rutledge and Cotesworth 
Pinckney replied to Washington's repeated urgings that they accept a high 
government post in a tone that must have pleased Hamilton, if he had 
known of it. "\Ve think we can be of more real benefit to the general 
government & to our own State government," they wrote, "by remaining in 
the [state] Legislature, than we could possibly be by accepting of any office 
under either which fills the public eye with the appearance of being 
lucrative." June 12, 1791, Washington Papers, Vol. 251. 
19 John Brown Cutting to Thomas Pinckney, from Columbia, December 
19, 1794, Pinckney Family Papers, Box 6. 
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elusive section of the commercial district. The sailors' and 
mechanics' clubs-and the later Democratic-Republican 
Societies-also composed of sailors and mechanics plus the 
more modest planters, merchants, and professional people, 
met with equal ostentation in waterfront taverns.20 But in 
Columbia the oligarchs maintained close contact and even 
occasionally made deals with the representatives of lower 
society. Such efforts were beneficial for the national admin-
istration as a whole, for the lowcountry continued to dom-
inate the state throughout the Federalists' years in power, 
and excepting a brief period, the oligarchs remained loyal 
to that interest until the election of 1800. 
Georgia, with its raw frontier setting, seemed an unlikely 
place for the development of a well-defined ruling group, 
but commerce through the port of Savannah and recurrent 
Indian crises on the frontier during the Confederation era 
brought into being a definite governing class, composed 
mainly of merchants and military leaders. Included in this 
group were Edward Telfair, William Gibbons, Sr., the 
Habersham brothers of Savannah, and Generals James Jack-
son, William Few, James Gunn, Lachlan Mcintosh, and 
Anthony Wayne. The latter three were firm friends of gov-
ernment after 1790; Mcintosh and Wayne had long been 
prominent in the Georgia chapter of the Cincinnati Society.21 
These friends of government were faced with an early 
and deep opposition to the policies of the national admin-
istration both from within and without the Georgia ruling 
class, a radically different situation from that in South Caro-
~o Eugene P. Link, "The Republican Societies of Charleston," Proceedings 
of the South Carolina Historical Society, 1943, p. 26. 
~1 William W. Abbot, "The Structure of Politics in Georgia, 1782-1789," 
William and Mary Quarterly, Series 3, XIV (January, 1957), 47-65; James 
Jackson to John Milledge, from Savannah, November 4, 1793, in Salley, ed., 
John Milledge, 30; Georgia Gazette, July 9, 1789; Kenneth Coleman, The 
American Revolution in Georgia, 1763-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1958), 235. 
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lina. If Georgia-or any portion of it-was to be saved for 
the national administration, the practice of elitist politics, 
involving a measured aloofness from the populace, clearly 
was out of the question.22 By 1791, with popular antipathy 
to various government policies running high, the friends of 
government obviously needed to secure an immediate man-
date from the people or face extinction as a vital, influential 
force in the politics of the state. 
In Georgia the struggle between friends and opponents 
of the national administration began that same year, when 
Anthony Wayne determined to wrest a Congressional seat 
from James Jackson. Wayne's decision was not the result 
of whim, because Jackson already had become a prominent 
critic of national policy and a vigorous defender of local 
and state rights. 
Jackson was one of the earliest Congressional supporters 
of James Madison and as a result incurred the wrath of 
Hamilton's ally, William Laughton Smith.23 The Georgia 
representative had complained angrily about his state's share 
of the assumption, and he seems to have been the first to 
charge that Hamilton had tipped off northern speculators to 
the contents of his funding scheme before public announce-
22 It may be presumed from their status within the local ruling class and 
the occasional outspoken contempt which they expressed for popular opinion 
in the Yazoo incidents of 1789 and 1795 that the members of Georgia's pro-
administration faction were strongly influenced by the eighteenth-century 
elitist political tradition. Supposition cannot be substantiated by hard fact, 
however. The several relevant manuscript collections for the time provide few 
clues, and whatever pertinent debates and discussions may have taken place 
in the ratifying convention of 1788 are lost to record. 
:J:l After the funding and assumption plans finally passed Congress, Smith 
wrote bitterly of several of the critics. "I have observed," he complained, 
"that Sumpter [sic] regularly votes for any thing required by Georgia or 
Virg". Burke is also a great friend to that State, notwithstanding her Members 
execrate us & do all the Injury they can .... Jackson has behaved thro' this 
whole business in a manner which has excited the greatest indignation in 
my breast." Smith to Rutledge, August 8, 1790, Smith-Rutledge Correspon-
dence. 
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ment.24 If Jackson could be destroyed politically, the gather-
ing movement against current national policy possibly could 
receive a blow from which it might never recover. 
Jackson's conduct in Congress roused Wayne's ire, but 
there were other reasons for his opposition to the congress-
man. By challenging Jackson, Wayne said, he also was 
opposing the adverse reaction of Governer Telfair to the 
presence of United States troops in the state, as well as the 
public antipathy to "the late Treaty[,] Yazoo &c."25 It is 
significant that he chose to notify the Secretary of War-a 
close friend of the President-of his political intentions. 
Wayne's allusion to Yazoo needs some illumination. The 
rescinded 1789 sale of Yazoo lands and the one carried out 
six years later were intertwined intimately with the fortunes 
of the progovernment faction in Georgia. 
In 1790 Georgia was the only state in the Union not to 
have ceded her vast western claims-which stretched from 
the present-day southern Tennessee border to Spanish 
Florida and on out to the Mississippi River-to the central 
government. This explains the conflict between the state 
and the national governments over Indian policy and treaty-
making powers; and it explains also the constant pressures 
upon the Georgia legislature from private sources throughout 
the late 1780's and early 1790's to sell this area for ventures 
in speculation and settlement. 
Prior to the formation of the Union, Georgia had been 
little disturbed by speculators seeking her western claim, 
but in November, 1789, the representatives of four land 
companies appeared before the bar of the legislature. Three 
of these "Yazoo" companies-the South Carolina grqup led 
by Alexander Moultrie, Edward Telfair, and Isaac Huger; a 
24 Annals of Congress, I, 1132-37, 1181, 1744-52, 1760. 
25 Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox, May 12, 1790, to Richard 
Wayne, September 24, 1790, Wayne Papers. 
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company from Tennessee doubtlessly backed by William 
Blount; and a company from Virginia apparently led by 
Patrick Henry26-appeared at about the same time. The 
legislature was favorable toward selling, but wished, as one 
of the members said, to obtain "a good round sum down for 
this territory in State or other securities, so that we might 
pay so much of our Debt."27 While negotiations were in 
progress, a fourth company, composed mainly of Georgia 
speculators and led by James McNeil, a state senator, made 
a more enticing, and more concrete offer, promising to bring 
in at least 40,000 settlers from Ireland, Switzerland, and sister 
states "within a year or two," and, perhaps even more im-
portant, guaranteeing payment of a higher price and far more 
of it in specie than the other companies had offered.28 The 
offer of the Georgia company seemed irresistible on many 
obvious counts, yet by a single vote the three original com-
panies were favored instead.29 
Reaction was prompt, and in early January the legislative 
minority which had opposed the sale to the original three 
companies submitted a public report in the Augusta 
Chronicle which was spread quickly throughout the state. 
This report carefully avoided any implication that the 
26 Charles Homer Haskins, "The Yazoo Land Companies," Papers of the 
American Historical Association, V (January and April, 1891), 398-400; R. H. 
Lee to Patrick Henry, from New York, May 28, 1789, James C. Ballagh, ed., 
The Letters of Richard Henry Lee ( 2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1914), 486-87; Alexander Moultrie to Edward Telfair, n.d., 
Edward Telfair Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. Pierce 
Butler and Ralph Izard might also have had an interest in the South Carolina 
Yazoo Company at this time. See Butler and Izard to anonymous, 1789, 
Pierce Butler Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S. C. 
27 James to John Habersham, from Augusta, November 25, 1789, Personal 
Miscellany File, Library of Congress. 
28 Georgia Gazette, January 7, 1790; "Journal of the Georgia House of 
Representatives," December 8-12, 1789, in William Sumner Jenkins, ed., 
Records of the States of the United States (Microfilm, University of Cali-
fornia Library, Berkeley). 
29 "Journal of the Georgia House of Representatives," December 8-12, 
1789, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
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majority of the legislature had been bought by the three 
companies; it simply restated the facts, which were damning 
enough. It was clear that the majority had brushed aside 
every other issue before the legislature and every vestige of 
proper parliamentary procedure to insure the consummation 
of the sale. The report concluded by noting that sale to the 
Georgia company would "have given our citizens an op-
portunity of becoming purchasers upon equal terms with 
those of other states."30 Popular response was every bit as 
quick and strong as the minority had hoped and the majority 
had doubtless feared. Letters appearing in the press re-
flected the "convulsion" of the public mind over the sale, 
and during the following summer at least two county grand 
juries-those of Chatham and Liberty-presented formal op-
position to the sale.31 
These tactics succeeded in uncovering the leading legis-
lative proponent of the sale to the original companies, 
Lachlan Mcintosh. In late January, 1790, Mcintosh pub-
lished a formal reply to the minority report, saying the state 
was to receive nearly a quarter of a million dollars for but 
one quarter of its western claim and also was to be relieved 
by the three companies of the sticky responsibility of dealing 
with the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans.32 The public 
remained unconvinced, however. 
Actually, the 1789 sale never was completed, because the 
companies could not meet the final payment in 1791, though 
they tried unsuccessfully to meet their commitment with a 
mixture of Georgia, South Carolina, and continental paper 
currency of 1776.33 By this time the state had been divided 
into identifiable "Yazoo" and "anti-Yazoo" forces, with the 
central issue being whether the state was to retain control 
:w Georgia Gazette, January 7, 1790. 
31 Ibid., February 4, J nne 17, August 12, 1790. 
3~ Ibid., January 28, 1790. 
33 Haskins, "Yazoo Land Companies," 407-408. 
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of its western lands for distribution to its own people in its 
own way or whether it was to relinquish this responsibility 
through sale to outside forces. This issue was related to the 
Indian problem and posed the same question: was Georgia 
to deal with the recurrent Indian crises, or was it to be the 
problem of the federal government in distant Philadelphia. 
Those who stood on the side of the state, the "anti-Yazooers" 
and anti-Creek-treaty men, soon formed an identifiable 
group, led by Governor Telfair, James Jackson, John 
Milledge, Josiah Tattnall, Seaborn Jones, and Joseph Haber-
sham; the latter four had signed the minority report on the 
1789 sale. Among those who became identified with the 
three land companies from other states and who favored the 
federal government's dealing with the Creeks were Lachlan 
Mcintosh, Wayne, McAllister, Gunn, and the other members 
of the administration's patronage faction, including the 
editor of the Georgia Gazette. This distinct, fundamental 
cleavage in Georgia politics, so completely different from 
the confused situations in some other southern states, such as 
North Carolina, emerged in 1789-1790 and lasted until at 
least 1796. Nowhere else in the South during these years 
were proadministration interests and states-rights Republi-
cans-for, with Jackson at its head, so this latter group soon 
called itself-so easily identifiable. 
The Wayne-Jackson struggle of 1791 for the Congressional 
seat from the coast district was the first significant overt 
test of strength between the two parties, which they could 
accurately be called. 
Georgia was not free from the usual sectional antagonisms 
which characterized the politics of the other southern states, 
and as might be expected, the basic division lay between 
the upcountry frontier counties and the little town of 
Augusta, on the one hand, and the seacoast planter counties 
and the port city of Savannah, on the other. Political issues 
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revolved about unequal taxation and representation, with 
the added complaint of an alleged unjust burden placed 
upon the upcountry militia.34 
In addition, as late as 1791 a profound enmity existed 
between so-called "Old" and "New" Georgians, and this 
conflict played an important role in the Wayne-Jackson 
election. The division was confined largely to the city of 
Savannah and surrounding Chatham County. Wayne, who 
then was a resident of Savannah, identified the Old Georgians 
as those who had either "basely" fled the city or had re-
mained to cooperate actively with the enemy during the 
British invasion of 1780-1782. This group comprised a large 
proportion of the city's population, and it constantly at-
tempted to maintain its political identity and power. In 
contrast, the New Georgians were those few who had taken 
up arms against Albion in cooperation with large numbers 
of "Northern veterans." After the war this element had 
worked magnanimously, according to Wayne, to restore the 
property of the Old Georgians to rightful hands. Wayne 
added that the Old Georgians had regained their political 
ascendancy along with their property and now feared that 
the "new" men might eclipse their power and gain the con-
fidence of the upcountry counties, thus insuring an alliance 
which would obtain perpetual power. 35 
Some realignment of these interests occurred as Wayne 
gained the support of the "New" Georgians in Savannah and 
Chatham, while Jackson, though a patriot and military hero 
in his own right, did not discourage the support of the "Old" 
Georgia loyalist faction. Thus, old antagonisms played a part 
in the emerging party strife, and a new form of political 
order developed in Georgia, foreshadowing later develop-
ments in other southern states. 
34 Address of "A Planter" to the "Planters, Tradesmen, Shopkeepers and 
Other Voters of Chatham County," Georgia Gazette, October 1, 1789. 
35 Memo: "The Old Georgians Analyzed," Wayne Papers. 
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The campaign was quiet enough, and little space was 
devoted to it in the press. Wayne may or may not have 
soft-pedaled his support for Mcintosh and the Indian policy 
of the federal government; this is not clear. He did win, 
however, a seemingly signal victory for the administration. 
Jackson apparently took his defeat with grace, and when 
he returned to Savannah in April, 1791, he accepted a me-
morial expressing warm appreciation for his services in Con-
gress from Wayne's campaign manager, Mayor Thomas 
Gibbons. 
The apparent calm was shattered in July, however, when 
Jackson publicly accused Wayne of rigging the election in 
at least two of the five counties of the district. Working 
quietly, Jackson had amassed evidence of bizarre corruption, 
including moonlight balloting and destruction of Jackson 
votes by a bribed county sheriff, as well as the usual charges 
of ballot-box stuffing.36 Once again popular indignation 
quickly reached fever pitch as grand juries and public meet-
ings supported Jackson, and prominent followers of Anthony 
Wayne filled the press with essays either denying participa-
tion in the fraud or threatening Jackson with personal 
harm. 37 Jackson was vindicated in the legislature the follow-
ing November, after brushing aside a substantial bribe by 
the Wayne forces to forget the whole thing; and one of 
Wayne's aides-a justice of the state supreme court-was 
impeached on five counts.38 
Georgia could not deprive Wayne of his seat in favor of 
Jackson, however. That was a matter for the House of 
Representatives in Philadelphia to decide. Jackson's de-
36 Georgia Gazette, July 28, 1791. 
37 Ibid., August 4, September 15, 29, October 13, 27, 1791. 
38 Jackson to Joseph Clay, Sr., from Augusta, December 2, 1791, James 
Jackson Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C.; Georgia Gazette, 
December 8, 29, 1791, January 5, 1792; "Journal of the State Senate of 
Georgia," December 21, 1791, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
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termination to have Wayne's seat was well known, but 
Wayne was not going to give it up without a fight. He en-
listed the aid of Matthew McAllister back in Georgia, hoping 
that a perusal of the tax lists in those counties which had 
gone heavily for Jackson might reveal that many voters had 
in fact been ineligible. However, McAllister found no such 
evidence.39 
Despite personal antagonism between the two men, the 
Congressional investigation in February and March, 1792, 
proceeded smoothly in an atmosphere of "great honor."40 
However, the issue quickly became translated into partisan 
terms. From the first, even the staunchest supporters of the 
administration wisely refused to believe that Wayne had a 
case or could retain his seat.H The question was whether to 
give it to Jackson-an avowed follower of Madison. On 
March 16, Smith of South Carolina, acting for the Hamilton 
forces, introduced a simple resolution stating that "Anthony 
Wayne was not duly elected a member of this House." Three 
days later he inexplicably withdrew this motion, in favor 
of one by the Republican Representative Giles of Virginia 
which explicitly stated Jackson's right to Wayne's seat. After 
two days of debate the House deadlocked on this motion, and 
the Speaker broke it by voting against the resolution. Wayne 
lost his seat, but Jackson did not obtain it. The vote proved 
to be another indication of increasing party division in Con-
gress. Of the twenty-nine voting in favor of the Giles mo-
tion, only three were later found on the list of Federalist-
oriented "paper men" in Congress drawn up in March of 
1793 for Jefferson's information by Madison's political lieu-
39 Wayne to McAllister, from Philadelphia, September 7, 1791, Wayne 
Papers. 
40 State Gazette of North Carolina, March 30, 1792. 
41 William Laughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, from Philadelphia, 
March 24, 1792, Smith-Rutledge Correspondence. 
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tenant, Clerk of the House John Beckley. Of the twenty-
nine voting in favor of denying Wayne's seat to Jackson by 
declaring it vacant, twelve-including Smith-were subse-
quently found on Beckley's list.42 
Prior to Jay's Treaty the Wayne-Jackson election was the 
most important popular test in the South of emerging 
partisan strength on both sides. The administration hosts 
had not merely been defeated; they had been disgraced. 
Yet the friends of government in Georgia, undismayed, con-
tinued to battle their political opponents, as relations be-
tween the state and the federal government steadily 
worsened in 1793-1794. Wayne never returned to Georgia, 
but leadership was transferred to his friend, United States 
Senator James Gunn, who also took over the presidency of 
the Georgia Chapter of the Cincinnati Society and fought 
Jackson and his forces in the state legislature from 1792 
onward, boasting at one point of "bursting" an unspecified 
"premeditated blow" aimed by Jackson.4 :1 The Georgia 
Gazette opened its pages to a spirited war of essays between 
the administration spokesman "Casca" and the Republican 
"Correspondent" dealing with the relative rights and re-
sponsibilities of the state and national governments to 
regulate affairs on the Georgia frontier, in the wake of recent 
Indian uprisings, white reprisals and provocations, and il-
legal filibustering expeditions into the interior.44 In Decem-
42 The entire debate and the vote were reprinted in the Georgia Gazette, 
April 26, 1792. The reasons for Smith's lapse of partisanship at one point 
during the course of the affair in the House is inexplicable from surviving 
documents, but his general determination to oppose the seating of Jackson 
is clear. 
43 James Jackson to John Milledge, from Augusta, November 7, 1792, 
Salley, ed., john Milledge, 25; James Gunn to Anthony Wayne, from Phila-
delphia, January 3, 1793, Wayne Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia; Georgia Gazette, July 12, 1792. 
44 The "Casca" letters are in the issues of July 25, 1793ff. "Correspon-
dent's" reply is in that of October 10, 1793. 
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ber, 1793, Gunn went one step further and opposed both 
George Matthews and Telfair for the governorship, but 
Gunn became ill before the vote was taken and was forced 
to withdraw. The following month Nathaniel Pendleton 
chaired a meeting in Savannah that expressed approbation 
for Washington's neutrality policy. In the autumn of 1794, 
Telfair and Gunn again prepared to oppose each other, this 
time in a contest for Gunn's seat in the United States 
Senate.4 " Before this election took place, however, an event 
of far greater consequence for the future of party politics 
in Georgia intervened. 
The social bases of Federalist leadership in Virginia dur-
ing the early 1790's were unique and reflected subtle but 
unmistakable changes within the governing structure of the 
state. For decades, as in South Carolina, political power and 
polite society in Virginia had been concentrated in a single 
section and within a single class. The large and gracious 
plantations which dotted the tidewater and northern neck 
areas of the state were the centers of a tightly woven net-
work of political control by great families, while the vast 
stretch of land to the south and southwest of the James 
River, which belonged to the yeoman farmer prior to the 
nineteenth century, remained politically subordinate-and 
in 1788 was strongly Antifederal.46 
By 1785, however, few of the influential members of 
Virginia political society were recruited from the ranks of 
the great planter establishment. Berkeleys, Carters, Fair-
faxes, Fitzhughs-and even most of the Lees, Randolphs, 
and Washingtons-no longer provided the leadership in the 
4 '- Thomas Carnes to Seaborn Jones, from Philadelphia, January 20, 1794, 
Seaborn Jones Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C.; Georgia 
Gazette, January 16, 1794; John Wereat to Edward Telfair, from Hardwick, 
Burke County, August 25, 1794, Telfair Papers. 
46 Carrington to Madison, from Richmond, April 8, 1788, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 9. 
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public life of Virginia.47 This role had been assumed by men 
from somewhat lower ranks in society, and the change was 
to have momentous consequences for the subsequent political 
history of Virginia and the nation. 
Eight individuals shaped the course of Virginia politics 
during the final decade and a half of the eighteenth century: 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, William 
Branch Giles, Wilson Cary Nicholas, Patrick Henry, Edmund 
Randolph, and John Marshall. These were the men who 
mustered support both for and against a liberalization of the 
state constitution in 1785, who provided the leadership for 
both Federalist and Antifederalist interests in 1788, and who 
subsequently organized and led the Federalist and Republi-
can interests of the 1790's. 
The first four formed the hard core of the Republican party 
leadership in the state. All had remarkably similar back-
grounds, having been born into the lower-gentry class.48 
Monroe's father was a carpenter. Peter Jefferson, the elder 
James Madison, and William Giles all were members of the 
small-planter class and thus were involved intimately in the 
47 Washington never served his state in a public capacity after 1775, 
except at the Philadelphia Convention. His aversion to any further public 
service in the 1780's was well known to all and became the despair of his 
friends on the eve of the Constitutional Convention. See, for example, 
Henry Lee to Washington, November 11, 1786; Edmund Randolph to 
Washington, March 11, 1787; David Humphreys to Washington, April 9, 
1787, in Washington Papers, Vols. 236, 238; Washington to Madison, 
December 16, 1786, to Randolph, December 21, 1786, in John C. Fitz-
patrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington ( 39 vols.; Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), XXIX, 115, 120. 
48 Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the Politics 
of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George 
Banta Publishing Co., 1914), 1-9; Irving Brant, ]ames Madison the Virginia 
Rer;olutionary (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), 29-104 
passim; William P. Cresson, ]ames Monroe (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1946), 6--8; Dumas Malone, Jefferson the Virginian 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), 1-74; Nathan Schachner, 
Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1951), 1-31 
passim. 
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cliques which consistently dominated county government. 
One other point is of crucial importance. All four men-and 
their sons after them-steadily climbed toward the top of the 
economic and social structure of Virginia. All increased their 
wealth markedly in land and slaves-and thus their social 
status-during their lifetimes, yet none of them ever were 
great planters in the traditional sense. 
Thus, Jefferson and his later political allies emerged from 
a common social background that for its time and place 
might be called middle class-a background of achieved 
rather than ascribed status. Moreover, all four received a 
college education in Virginia or New Jersey or both places 
and chose the law rather than speculation in land, crops, and 
slaves as the surest means of attaining rapid social and 
political prominence. Not one of the four seems to have 
been burdened with either the elitist values of the great 
planters or the instinctive deferential spirit of the com-
monalty, both so fatal to political flexibility. 
Two of the other statesmen, Nicholas and Henry, exhib-
ited extreme equivocation with respect to emerging partisan 
alignments during the early 1790's. Nicholas eventually 
settled down as a Republican, and Henry ultimately became 
a Federalist. Marshall was a staunch supporter of the ad-
ministration as early as 1793, and Edmund Randolph also 
aided the friends of government until his disgrace in the 
Fauchet affair in 1795. Randolph had grown up in the 
security of Tazewell Hall, where signs of wealth and power 
in the forms of land, slaves, gentlemanly living, and political 
responsibility had always been present. Marshall, on the 
other hand, despite the eventual wealth which both he and 
his father attained, had grown up in the atmosphere of the 
frontier log cabin; and knowledge of the law-a sure path 
to social and economic advancement-had come from fitful 
and often hasty individual study rather than from leisurely 
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lectures to aspmng gentleman legalists in the halls of 
William and Mary or Hampden-Sydney.49 Yet the young 
lawyer who worked himself up to eminence through natural 
ability and the member of an old and entrenched great 
planter family found that they shared common political 
interests in a mutual dedication to the cause of union and 
later in a partisan allegiance to the federal administration. 
During the early 1790's Randolph and Henry Lee supplied 
the Federalist faction in Virginia with support from the de-
clining great-planter class. John Marshall, Edward Carring-
ton, William Heth-and Daniel Morgan and Patrick Henry 
somewhat later-brought the friends of government support 
from the rising and ambitious lower gentry element in the 
state. The varied social and political configuration of Fed-
eralist leadership in the Old Dominion by 1793 thus con-
trasted with the uniform background of the Republican 
leadership and implied an inevitable clash of values between 
members of the two factions. 
Certainly, the great planter representatives had never 
attempted to hide their elitist beliefs. During the Revolution, 
Lee had played the role of the cavalier aristocrat at the head 
of his light cavalry squadron with dash and pomposity. 
Randolph had warned of the perils of democracy in the most 
melancholy tones while introducing the Virginia plan at 
Philadelphia in 1787.50 
49 Albert J. Beveridge, Life af John Marshall ( 4 vols.; Boston and New 
York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1916-1919), I, 1-199 passim. M. D. 
Conway's biography of Edmund Randolph, Omitted Chapters of History 
Disclosed in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1888), is excessively partisan and simplistic. Randolph needs 
another and more sophisticated biographer. In the meantime I have relied 
primarily on the sketch in the Dictionary of American Biography. 
50 The biographer of the Lee family recounts that Henry Lee "delighted" 
in a uniform comprised of "a tall leather helmet, with horse hair plume 
streaming in the wind, green jacket, white lambskin breeches" and "shining 
boots reaching to the knees." Burton K. Hendrick, The Lees of Virginia 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), 336. Edmund Randolph 
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But for the most part the lower-gentry group among Fed-
eralist leaders in Virginia refused to contest the values of 
the planters. Indeed, awe of this slowly declining group, so 
absent among the Republicans, was still strong among the 
Treasury agents and influential war veterans within Vir-
ginia's Federalist ranks. 51 These men openly copied the 
great planters' style of living and their elitist ideals. 52 Not 
summed up the sentiments of his class when he introduced the Virginia 
plan at the Philadelphia Convention. "Our chief danger," he asserted, 
"arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. It is a maxim which 
I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government exercised by the 
people swallows [sic] up the other branches. None of the [state] constitutions 
have provided sufficient checks against the democracy. The feeble Senate 
of Virginia is a phantom. Maryland has a more powerful senate, but the 
late distractions in that State have discovered that it is not powerful enough. 
The checks established in the constitution of New York and Massachusetts 
is [sic] yet a stronger barrier against democracy, but they all seem in-
sufficient." Max Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 
(3 vols.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), I, 26-27. 
51 Heth's deference when in the presence of men of power has already 
been noted. Appreciation for the favor and attention of the great planter 
ran deep in the Marshall family. "Thomas Marshall, the father of John 
Marshall, was a close friend of Washington, whom he ardently admired. 
They were born in the same county, and their acquaintance had begun, 
apparently, in their boyhood. Also ... Thomas Marshall had for about 
three years been the companion of Washington, when acting as his assistant 
in surveying the western part of the Fairfax estate. From that time on his 
attachment to \Vashington amounted to devotion." Beveridge, Marshall, 
I, 7. Daniel Morgan, another Virginia Federalist who rose to prominence 
solely through his own talents, let his attachment to Washington largely 
shape his political commitment. Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, Revo-
lutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 
2-172 passim. 
52 Higginbotham notes the somewhat pathetic attempts of Daniel Morgan 
to remake himself from a "backwoods pugilist" into the image of the 
"military hero" he had become. Ibid., 172-85, especially 172-73. Carring-
ton's adherence to elitist ideals emerged in the wake of Shay's Rebellion. 
"It certainly originated," he said of the insurrection, "in the genuine 
baseness of the people. . . Man is impatient of restraint, nor will he con-
form to what is necessary to the good order of society unless he is possessed 
of discernment and virtue, or the Government under which he lives is 
efficient." Quoted in David Hackett Fischer, The Rewlution of American 
Conservatism; The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 373. 
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even John Marshall, whose personal manners apparently 
were those of a democrat, was entirely free from the in-
fluence of the exclusivist political tradition. This most valu-
able friend of government, who had reached the top of 
Richmond's legal profession by 1795 at the latest, 53 reminded 
the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788 that the new gov-
ernment was "drawn from the people." But such govern-
ment, he added, was to be administered by the better sort, 
who in America were always and should always be the 
ablest and most vigorous defenders of popular freedom. "The 
virtue and talents of the members of the general govern-
ment," he assured the wavering, "will tend to the security 
instead of the destruction of our liberties."54 
Thus, the formation of a proadministration interest in 
Virginia followed similar patterns in South Carolina and 
Georgia. Prominent and influential public figures strongly 
inclined toward the ideal of elitist governance were charged 
with winning public approval during times when govern-
ment policy was under attack. 
Friends of government in Virginia faced an early test of 
their political flexibility and effectiveness. In April, 1793, 
Genet's appearance and Washington's Neutrality Proclama-
tion pertaining to the recently renewed Anglo-French war 
divided the state as never before between the Jeffersonian 
friends of France and those who actively supported non-
involvement in foreign affairs. In recent years many friends 
of government in Virginia had attributed the developing op-
position to national policy in and out of Congress to the 
pernicious but inevitable effects of "factionalism" and 
Ga \Vhile staying at Richmond in 1795, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt was 
informed that Marshaii was the acknowledged leader of the Richmond bar. 
Travels Through the United States, II, 38. 
G4 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (5 vols.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippin-
cott & Co., 1941), III, 236, 420. 
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"wicked anarchy," and they now welcomed an opportunity 
to counterattack.55 
Members of the Richmond faction committed an initial 
error which was to plague them many times in future years: 
the assumption that their own hopes and anxieties reflected 
public opinion. Several days before the Proclamation was 
issued, Carrington assured Hamilton that most Virginians 
desired only peace. Their attitudes were tinged strongly 
with Francophilism. They regarded the Treaty of 1778 as 
binding, Carrington admitted; but the recent execution of 
Louis XVI was viewed with revulsion, and many persons 
were decidedly in favor of perfect neutrality, if a suitable 
"option" in conduct was available. Even in mid-June, six 
weeks after the publication of the Proclamation, Henry Lee 
insisted that the unmistakable evidence of a surge of public 
reaction against the official neutrality policy was merely the 
work of "a set of clamorous desperadoes."56 
Nonetheless, the members of the Federalist faction did 
not delay action, however much they may have deluded 
themselves over the real state of public opinion in Virginia. 
Hamilton, Jay, King, Higginson, and other leading Fed-
eralists already had begun to organize anti-Genet meetings 
throughout the northern and middle states.57 In early June 
Governor Henry Lee issued a public proclamation calling for 
support of neutrality policy, while Heth and Carrington 
attempted to rally popular opinion to their side through 
ad hoc county and town meetings. 58 The first was held in 
Richmond on August 17 with the venerable George Wythe 
as chairman. Marshall drafted a set of resolutions supporting 
55 Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 187. 
56 Carrington to Hamilton, from Richmond, April 26, 1793; Lee to Hamil-
ton, from Richmond, June 15, 1793, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 19. 
"' Harry Ammon, "The Genet Mission and the Development of American 
Political Parties," Journal of American History, LII (March, 1966), 729-30. 
r>S Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, June 5, 1793; Diary of William 
Heth, entry of June 19, 1793. 
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Washington's policy, and they were accepted without dis-
sent by a large gathering. The Republicans were mortified, 
and Madison wrote acridly that the proceedings were no 
doubt dictated "by the cabal at Philadelphia," and then 
stressed the need for countermeetings to discover "the real 
sense of the people."~.n 
As autumn touched the woods and gently rolling hills of 
Virginia, the public was aroused to an excitement unrivaled 
since the reception of Hamilton's fiscal plan nearly four 
years before. The two sides organized meetings throughout 
the state and collected resolutions, on the one hand praising 
Washington and his policy without exception and on the 
other hand rejecting any action which might impair the 
close ties existing between the world's only republics. In 
the battle of resolutions and meetings the friends of govern-
ment seem to have won, though doubtless the decisions of 
many county meetings have been lost. Washington could 
count on support not only in Richmond, but also in the 
commercial towns of Williamsburg, Norfolk, Fredericksburg, 
and Petersburg, and in the counties of York, Fairfax, 
Frederick, and Fauquier. The Republicans organized suc-
cessful meetings in Caroline, Shenandoah, Albemarle, and 
Culpeper counties.';o Jefferson and Madison apparently 
fl9 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, August 29, 1793; Madi-
son to Jefferson, from Albemarle County, August 27, 1793, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 16. 
60 Robert Taylor to Washington, from Norfolk, August 31, 1793, Wash-
ington Papers, Vol. 262; Madison to Monroe, from Charlottesville, October 
29, 1793, Madison Papers, Vol. 16. In his letter Madison indicated the 
extent to which the Richmond Federalists had activated and guided their 
allies in the various counties when he observed that the resolutions from 
Fauquier County were but a "servile echo of those in Richmond." See also 
Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, September 26, 1793; Virginia 
Gazette and General Advertiser, October 17, 23, 1793; Washington to 
Thomas G. Peach, to Ludwell Lee and R. West, October 24, 1793, to 
Nicholas Lewis, November 16, 1793, to Alexander White, November 23, 
1793, to William A. Booth, December 18, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Wash-
ington, XXXIII, 101, 136-37, 153, 155, 195. 
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continued to cleave to the view expressed by Madison three 
years before that the "town interest" counted for little in the 
politics of the state. 
The Richmond Federalists did an exceptional job in 
rousing favorable public opinion in a supposedly inhospita-
ble environment. By mid-September, however, the strain 
was already beginning to tell, as individual members could 
not be everywhere at once, nor could they be sure of the 
stamina of their supporters. At Staunton, for example, the 
organizer of the administration forces, "Gl. Jones," had re-
ceived letters from Marshall in Richmond urging him to 
organize a meeting immediately and to draft a suitable ad-
dress. Unfortunately, James Monroe galloped into town soon 
after with a readymade address by Madison in hand and was 
able to "effectually change the current and give it a direc-
tion against the anti-Republican faction."61 As winter ap-
proached it became apparent that neither side could claim 
a clear victory in the war of meetings and addresses. 
Whatever efforts may have been made to mobilize a por-
tion of public opinion in North Carolina on behalf of the 
government in the years preceding the Jay Treaty were 
frustrated by two factors. The first was the rapid depletion 
in the number of influential politicians willing to defend the 
national administration and its policies. The second was the 
disintegration once again of the structure of North Carolina 
politics into a welter of local and sectional conflicts with 
the passing of the ephemeral Federalist and Antifederalist 
parties of 1788 and 1789. 
As late as the Congressional elections in the spring of 
1791, it appeared that North Carolina's politics might retain 
some degree of polarity. Friends of Samuel Johnston, then 
believed by the public to be a tool of the national govern-
Hl Monroe to Madison, from Albemarle, September 25, 1793, Madison 
Papers, Vol. 16. 
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ment, battled outspoken opponents of Hamilton's fiscal 
policies for Assembly seats.62 However, the rout of those 
candidates backed by Johnston signified the rapid crystalliza-
tion of an anti-Hamilton consensus within the state. At 
about the same time several leading Federalists of the late 
1780's, including Johnston himself, James Iredell, William 
R. Davie, and, most important of all, Archibald Maclaine, 
were removed from the scene by death, retirement, or ap-
pointment to high nonelective posts in the federal govern-
ment.63 
As a result of these events, North Carolina politicians 
once again returned to the unresolved issues that continued 
to pit section against section and, within the eastern in-
terest, town against town. Thomas Blount, in a series of 
letters during the legislative session of 1790-1791, defined 
the state of North Carolina politics with clarity. The 
"Eastern interest," he told his brother, was "more than 
ever divided at a time when union was more than ever 
necessary." At the heart of the strife was the bitter annual 
struggle between the various commercial towns to obtain 
the legislative session for the coming year, since North 
Carolinians could not agree upon a permanent capital site. 
This struggle had hindered or enhanced political careers 
in the state at least since 1788.H4 Even Thomas Blount was 
involved in this bickering, and he predicted an early 
62 Anonymous to anonymous, from \Vashington County, January 22, 1791, 
Simpson-Bryan Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. Anti-Hamilton candidates also campaigned 
actively for seats in the legislature during the summer of 1790. J. G. Rencher 
to Richard Bennehan, from Orange County, July 23, 1790, Cameron Family 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, N. C. 
G3 William R. Davie to Iredell, from Halifax, June 20, 1790, Iredell Papers; 
Iredell to Jonathan Hay, from Philadelphia, April 14, 1791; Samuel Johnston 
to Iredell, from New York, February 25, 1790, from Williamstown, May 9, 
1793, in McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 281, 326, 385. 
G4 Archibald Maclaine to Iredell, from Wilmington, January 15, 1788, 
in McRee, ed., Iredell, 216. 
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vote on this issue in one of his letters, adding that "the 
damned New Bernians will fix it here [Fayetteville] by 
their usual obstinacy." When New Bern's attempt to do 
that subsequently failed, Blount reported with obvious re-
lief: "today we started Tarb[or]o (being our best nag)." 
Blount was not blind to the bitter fruits of his folly and 
that of his colleagues within the eastern faction. "It is now 
plainly seen," he wrote, 
that the Western members always tricked us, & could we devise 
ways to keep our members together we should be the strongest 
party on all questions; but unhappily for us that is not possible[.] 
they [sic] are now breaking ground daily & as soon as 
[the eastern J ranks are a little more thinned our Enemies will 
have a decided Majority & avail themselves of the opportunity 
of dividing 4 or 5 Counties by which means they will acquire 
the power of keeping us under forever. 05 
The election of a United States Senator by the state 
legislature in December, 1792, revealed the extent to which 
local and sectional influences dominated North Carolina 
politics in these years. No less than four candidates ap-
peared, one of whom, John Steele, from his voting record 
in Congress and his patronage contacts with the administra-
tion, could be considered a moderate friend of government. 
All four candidates represented distinct sectional or local 
interests. According to William R. Davie, who confined his 
mild proadministration feeling to the management of Steele's 
interests, five ballots and much logrolling were required 
before Alexander Martin, who had identified himself 
publicly with the rising anti-Hamiltonian sentiment, was 
elected. Steele's election was blocked, Davie claimed, for 
two reasons. In the first place, Martin's supporters threat-
n5 Thomas to John Gray Blount, from Fayetteville, November 18, 27, 1790, 
in Alice Barnwell Keith, ed., The John Gray Blount Papers (2 vols.; Raleigh: 
State Department of Archives and History, 1952), II, 143, 146. 
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ened the upper Cape Fear area with perpetual opposition 
to Fayetteville's persistent campaign to secure the perma-
nent capital unless that region fell into proper line politically. 
Secondly, a whispering campaign charging Steele with hav-
ing strong bias toward Hamilton and aristocratic leanings was 
begun by Montfort Stokes, a delegate from Wilkes County 
and a front man for the determined Martin interest. 66 Thus 
Steele, whose Federalist proclivities were becoming increas-
ingly apparent, was defeated by a combination of those 
forces-political provincialism and suspicion of the federal 
administration-most inimical to the creation of an effective 
statewide organization by the friends of government. Pro-
Federalist fortunes in North Carolina seemed bleak by the 
end of Washington's first term. 
By the end of 1793, North Carolina notwithstanding, 
friends of government were well established in loosely 
organized but easily recognizable political interest groups 
with some influence in three of the four southern states. 
The membership of these interest groups was, almost with-
out exception, raised from the ruling classes in the region-
the great land speculators of Georgia and Virginia, the 
wealthy planters, and the merchants and lawyers in the 
small cities of Virginia and South Carolina, in addition to 
some influential newspaper editors in Georgia, North Caro-
lina, and Virginia.n• The measurable public support they 
6n Davie to Steele, from Halifax, December 16, 1792, in Kemp P. Battle, 
ed., "Letters of 'Villiam R. Davie," ]ames Sprunt Historical Monograph, 
No. 7 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Historical Society Publications, 1907), 
24-27. 
67 Abraham Hodge, editor of the State Ga;:;ette of North Carolina, the 
state's leading paper, had been closely aligned with the Davie-lredell-
!\laclaine faction since the late 1780's. Davie to Iredell, from Halifax, 
December 19, 1788, Iredell Papers. Throughout the early 1790's, Hodge 
remained a strong Federalist, as the issues of January 16, February 1:3, 20, 
September 24, 1790, March 11, 25, April 8, 1791, indicate, and also had 
some patronage dealings with Iredell at this time. See Hodge to Iredell, 
from Edenton, December 1, 1791, in McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 336. After the 
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were able to attract was meager, but in Virginia in 1793 the 
friends of government were able to organize large public 
meetings in several plantation counties near routes of trade 
and communication as well as in the commercial towns. 
Despite their strong elitist political orientation, many 
friends of government in the South nonetheless energetically 
attempted to become a powerful influence in their respective 
states on behalf of the national government. As a result, 
they must be credited with three significant achievements as 
early as 1794. First, they helped to break down the political 
provincialism of the southern electorate, simply by relating 
their activities to issues of national importance. Created 
and sustained by the national executive department in 
the distant capital, Federalist groups in the South never 
abandoned their orientation toward national politics; and 
their contacts with the electorate inevitably centered around 
an implicit or explicit search for a mandate for existing 
national policy. Second, friends of government in Georgia, 
to some extent, and in Virginia, to a marked degree, began 
the process of energizing the political grassroots. In their 
partisan campaigns, they helped to focus popular attention 
upon national policy and to win a portion of the electorate 
to their specific goals. These two achievements are necessary 
prerequisites to the development of a democratic tradition 
and temperament within any nation, old or new. 
By their efforts to reverse the tide of unfavorable public 
spring of 1791 Hodge softened his Federalism for a time, doubtless in 
deference to the strong anti-Hamilton feeling among his readers; but in 
the later 1790's his defense of the Federalist party and its national policy 
again became pronounced. Valentine Davis' Virginia Gazette and General 
Adcertiser at Richmond revealed a strong Federalist bias in the wake of the 
neutrality campaign of 179.3. By the time of the Adams administration, the 
Gazette had become a strong party organ. See issues of October 9-30, 
November 27, 179.3, and also "Old Virginia Editors," William and Mary 
Quarterly, Series l, VII ( 1899), 16. 
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opinion in the South and to gain political power, Federalists 
in Virginia and Georgia also hastened the development of 
another crucial factor underlying sustained popular interest 
in politics-the formation of counterforces and the beginning 
of a partial polarization of state and local politics around 
national issues. In neither state prior to the beginning of 
formal political activity by friends of government had the 
rising opposition to the policies of the national government 
been expressed by an organized faction. After 1791 in 
Georgia and 1793 in Virginia the lines between friends and 
opponents of the national government were quite firmly 
drawn. 68 
For all their partisan activity the Federalists continued to 
denounce the "violent and disgusting party business which 
now prevails," a fact which has led even the most recent 
students of Federalism to conclude that its members were 
incapable of significant, cohesive organization prior to 1800. 
But with the Federalists, as with many men and organiza-
tions before and since, what was said did not always reflect 
what was done.69 
The achievements of southern Federalists by 1794 repre-
sented only a modest beginning toward the building of a 
68 The development of the Republican party in Virginia in the early 1790's 
is traced in Harry Ammon, "The Formation of the Republican Party in 
Virginia," journal of Southern History, XIX (August, 195.'3), 28:3-.'310. 
69 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, October 9, 1793. Fischer 
strongly intimates that George Cabot's unwillingness to admit a "legitimate 
role for a political party" was a belief widely shared among friends of gov-
ernment of the old school both above and below the Potomac. Fischer 
stresses that Cabot and other Federalists of the old school "recognized no 
legitimate role for a political party. Extra-constitutional machinery, mass 
meetings of the people, semi-permanent committees of correspondence 
smacked of subversion and the spirit of faction." Fischer, Revolution of 
American Conservatism, 5. Yet the organization of mass meetings, the 
establishment of semi-permanent committees of correspondence, and the 
creation of small but cohesive factions were precisely what the Federalists 
successfully set out to accomplish in several southern states between 1790 
and 1793. 
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modern party force. Acting on the initiative of administra-
tion leaders in Philadelphia, self-conscious friends of govern-
ment below the Potomac had erected informal, skeletal 
partisan structures and had become public defenders of 
administration policies at the grassroots. At the same time, 
however, no systematic attempts were made to build up 
consistent mass followings in the South, nor was any at-
tempt made to give to the people a sense of participation 
in the political decision-making process. Federalist partisans 
employed techniques of mass appeal only when administra-
tion policies were in imminent danger of public repudiation, 
and even then the people were asked to ratify policies which 
they had no part in formulating. Moreover, these partisan 
appeals constituted the only form of communication be-
tween Federalist policymakers at Philadelphia and their 
allies in the South, on the one hand, and the southern people, 
on the other. Indeed, the very weakness of formal in-
stitutional structures among friends of government in the 
South in the early 1790's attests to the fact that the Fed-
eralist partisans were meant to serve exclusively as agents 
of administration propaganda, rather than as conductors 
of a dialogue between rulers and ruled, out of which might 
come a government oriented toward reflecting the will of 
the majority. 
Because of their hesitancy in attempting to capture the 
emotional loyalties of the electorate, southern Federalists 
in the early 1790's failed to develop any of the other elements 
of true party organization. They did not achieve any sig-
nificant range, density, or stability of popular support. They 
did not develop any consistent perspectives and ideologies 
to stir the southern voting public into a spirited defense of 
their policies. And they did not perform many of the 
critical functions of the modern party organizer and leader, 
conspicuously refusing to undertake any broad nominating 
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and electioneering activity. 70 Except during the Wayne-
Jackson campaign in Georgia in 1791 and the election for 
United States Senator involving John Steele in North Caro-
lina the following year, a reading of contemporary cor-
respondence and the press indicates that only one other 
southern election between 1791 and 1794 was tinged with 
the partisanship of the emerging Federalist-Republican 
struggle. This election, which occurred in North Carolina 
in 1791, involved Timothy Bloodworth, an ex-Antifederalist 
and currently an ally of James Madison in the House, and 
William Barry Grove, who was in the process of moving to 
a staunch proadministration position; Grove defeated Blood-
worth by nearly a two to one margin.71 Even in these three 
elections there was no hint of party organization behind any 
of the candidates. The idea of mounting sustained and co-
ordinated partisan campaigns for national offices, backed 
by suitable organization and propaganda, still lay well be-
yond the ken of southern Federalists and their opponents 
at the beginning of 1794. 
Events in the succeeding two years, moreover, under-
scored how fragile and apparently ephemeral were the 
achievements of southern Federalists in the area of partisan 
organization, as the elitist temperament, with its fatal pro-
clivity for independent political action, reemerged at a time 
of developing crisis in both domestic and foreign affairs. 
Not until 1797, when the sudden worsening of relations 
between France and the United States presented them with 
a favorable issue and an impetus to act, did southern Fed-
eralists resume their slow and never fully completed march 
toward party status. 
70 A sophisticated discussion of party as opposed to factional organization 
and activity is in William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: 
The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 45-48. 
71 Fayetteville Gazette and North Carolina Chronicle, December 13, 1790-
February 7, 1791. 
I I I. Crises and Collapse, 
1795-1796 
In the years 1795 and 1796 southern Federalists faced their 
first set of profound challenges, and they failed to resolve or 
to overcome any of them. The attempted purchase of the 
Yazoo lands in Georgia permanently linked the Federalist 
interest in that state with wholesale political corruption. 
The mass reaction against Jay's Treaty, which swept the 
South, carried with it Federalists as well as Republicans, 
especially in South Carolina, and divided the friends of 
government from their northern colleagues and from each 
other, gravely weakening their influence and effectiveness 
for many months. Soon after that crisis came the election 
of 1796, which further exacerbated the deeply rooted but 
previously suppressed sectional antagonisms existing within 
the national Federalist interest. 
The Yazoo scandals in Georgia occurred within the con-
text of incessant conflict between the state and the national 
government over the ultimate responsibility for the control 
of the vast southwestern lands and the pacification or ex-
tinction of the Creek nation, which stretched like a barrier 
across the western frontier of the state. From 1790 to 1793, 
despite the vigorous protests of the people of Georgia 
against it, the Treaty of New York had brought peace of 
a sort to the southwestern frontier. This was largely a result 
of the honest efforts of Alexander '\1cGillivray, the half-
breed Indian chief, to restrain the more warlike Creeks while 
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resisting equally strong pressure from the Spanish gover-
nor at New Orleans to resume hostilities against the Ameri-
cans. But in the spring of 1793 McGillivray died, and the 
southwest once again was plunged into crisis. 
General Andrew Pickens of South Carolina, an old Indian 
fighter, predicted renewed hostilities between Georgia and 
the Creeks. "The death of Mr. McGillivray," he wrote, "is 
a very unfavorable event, as he constantly used his influence 
to maintain peace, but Galphia, his successor, is hostilely dis-
posed." The following week, Creeks and whites clashed at 
a plantation in Liberty County.1 
Georgians quickly seized the opportunity to resolve the 
Creek issue finally in their own way. As soon as he had been 
informed of McGillivray's death, Governor Telfair acted 
upon his own initiative. In a General Order dated April 6 to 
Generals Twiggs and Clark of the second and third divisions 
of the Georgia militia, the Governor ordered into immediate 
service all necessary personnel in the event of an "invasion" 
by the "savages."2 Telfair then informed the President of 
what he had done. In a cabinet meeting of May 29 federal 
officials decided to allow Georgia to raise two hundred 
militia purely for defense,3 while throughout the following 
summer Washington pondered the wisdom of sending an 
expedition under Pickens to subdue the refractory part of 
the Creek nation. Congress, however, refused to support the 
President, and the initiative passed to Georgia. 
Having been given some power, Telfair and his allies 
proceeded to take much more. By late October, "A Querist" 
could publicly demand: "Who consulted the General Officers 
of this state, to have their opinion whether the instructions 
of the President of the United States [of May 29] authorized 
1 Georgia Gazette, May 9, 16, 1793. 
2 Ibid., October .'31, 1793. 
3 :\femo, \Vashington Papers, Vol. 260. 
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an offensive war against the Creek Nation, and finding they 
did not think so, did nevertheless determine to raise 5,000 
men, that he might exhibit his awkward figure as a General 
at the head of them?"4 "Querist" was not referring to Telfair 
when he spoke of an "awkward figure" at the head of the 
state militia, but to James Jackson, who in March had been 
placed in charge of the militia and who shared the Gover-
nor's eagerness to be rid of the Indian problem once and 
for alP In July, some of Jackson's militia had killed several 
Creeks who were bringing to the state officials messages 
indicating willingness on the part of the Creek nation to 
make restitution for prior depredations and, in general, to 
seek peace.() This misfortune could not be attributed directly 
either to the Governor or to the general, yet that both 
actively wanted war with the Indians is quite obvious from 
Telfair's orders and from Jackson's many letters. 
Telfair's decision to use McGillivray's death and the re-
sultant fears of a Creek invasion as the pretext for an armed 
attack upon the Indians had immediate and widespread 
repercussions. Certainly Georgia's relations with the fed-
eral government worsened perceptibly. By January, 1794, 
Secretary of War Knox forwarded to Washington "with 
great pain" the first official letters "giving an account of an 
infamous violation of the peace with the Creeks by some of 
the violent frontier people of Georgia."7 On the next day 
4 Georgia Gazette, October 31, 1793. 
ti Jackson to Telfair, March 18, 31, 1793, in Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "Letter 
Book of James Jackson, 1788-1796," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXVII 
(March-December, 1953), 222-23, 225-26. 
6 Jackson to anonymous (probably Brigadier General Morrison), from 
Savannah, July 21, 1793, ibid., 305; Washington to Governor William 
Moultrie, August 28, 179.3, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of 
George Washington, ( 39 vols.; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1931-1944), XXXIII, 73-74. 
7 Memo, Knox to Washington, January 27, 1794, Washington Papers, 
Vol. 265. 
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Knox and the other cabinet members recommended that all 
relevant papers and letters from Georgia be laid before 
Congress together with a presidential message "stating the 
importance of Congress taking into their immediate con-
sideration the measures requisite to prevent a repetition of 
and to provide adequate punishment for, such atrocious 
actions."8 Washington did as suggested,9 but Congress, 
absorbed with Madison's proposed discrimination law against 
British commerce, did nothing. 
The situation soon worsened. Telfair had been replaced 
by George Matthews, who had promptly upheld the calling 
out of the state troops. Clashes on the frontier between the 
Creeks and the Georgians became a daily occurrence from 
the late autumn of 1793 onward, and the cabinet was di-
vided over the proper course of action. Hamilton recom-
mended that the federal government grant no further 
supplies to the state militia, while Knox merely urged that 
the President direct Matthews to reduce Georgia's forces 
to the number agreed upon in the instruction of the previous 
May 29.10 Washington hesitated for ten long weeks. He 
then issued an order substantially incorporating Knox's 
recommendations, but it was too late. Even as Washington 
was signing the order, Agent James Seagrove returned to the 
Indian country determined to achieve peace. A meeting 
was arranged, but while Seagrove and the chiefs were in 
conversation, one hundred and fifty Georgia militiamen 
swept down on the camp and scattered the IndiansY 
The persistent conflict between Georgia and the national 
8 Memo, Knox to Washington, January 28, 1794, ibid. 
9 "Message to the Senate and House of Representatives," January 30, 
1794, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXIII, 258-59. 
10 Georgia Gazette, October 1-31, November 7, 14, 1793; Hamilton to 
·washington, with enclosure, February 12, 1794; Knox to Washington, 
February 19, 1794, Washington Papers, Vol. 265. 
11 Washington to Knox, May 3, 1794, ibid., Vol. 266; Virginia Herald and 
Fredericksburg Advertiser, June 12, 1794. 
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government over Indian relations was complicated further 
in the spring of 1794 by the activities of General Elijah 
Clark, who mounted a filibustering expedition against 
Spanish and Indian territories on the Georgia frontier. The 
United States and Spain were at peace at this time, and this 
made Clark's activities doubly embarrassing. Knox im-
mediately wrote to Matthews, ordering him to resist Clark, 
but Matthews refused to moveP By early June the dual 
crises caused by Clark's filibuster and the Georgia militia's 
activities against the Creeks threatened to plunge the United 
States into a full-scale war with the Indians and the Span-
iards, and reports from Georgia invariably were grim.13 
Washington once again asked his cabinet for advice after 
cease-and-desist orders were issued to Clark. The cabinet 
agreed on the need to stop Clark, but it was divided over the 
best means of doing so, should he persist. Disagreement 
was especially strong concerning the role Georgia should 
be allowed to play in the affair.14 Then in August the ad-
ministration's immediate attention shifted to the Whiskey 
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. In the meantime, Sea-
grove's persistent attempts to recontact the Creeks had met 
with some success; and he told Jackson that prior incidents, 
coupled with the proposed establishment of several frontier 
posts in apparent Creek territory, were driving the Creeks 
toward outright war. Jackson wrote to the commander of 
the posts in question ordering him into inactivity for a time. 
A month later, while United States dragoons were fighting 
those Creeks who had broken the Treaty, Clark surrendered 
to the judges of the Indian court in Washington County. He 
12 Washington, Message to Congress, May 20, 21, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, 
ed., Washington, XXXIII, 373-74; Knox to Matthews, May 14, 1794, Sea-
grove to Knox, from Savannah, June 4, 1794, Washington Papers, Vol. 267. 
13 Knox to Washington, June 1, 1794, ibid. 
14 Memos of Alexander Hamilton, July 13, 1794, Henry Knox, July 14, 
1794, and Edmund .Randolph, n.d., ibid., Vol. 268. 
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was tried immediately for breaking the treaty laws of the 
United States, but the local jury acquitted himY' 
Despite some successes by the dragoons, Clark's folly led 
to a perpetual skirmishing on the frontier during the fall of 
1794.16 In November, with the whiskey rebels finally crushed, 
the administration again turned its attention to the South 
and endorsed Seagrove's efforts for one final attempt at 
peace. 17 Before such an attempt could be undertaken, how-
ever, the entire situation was altered by news of the Yazoo 
sale, which simplified the frontier situation for a time, 
even as it brought overt party conflict into sharp focus within 
the state. 
The Yazoo purchase in December, 1794, and the subse-
quent exposure of fraud culminated nearly five years of 
steady strife between the state and federal governments and 
between the rival political factions in Georgia. The leading 
figures in the Yazoo incident apparently have left no records 
of their exact motives in seeking the purchase. But there 
were several compelling economic and political reasons for 
them to move at the time they did. Economically, the re-
sumption of hostilities between France and Great Britain in 
1793 reawakened interest in the rich supply of naval stores 
available for exploitation in the Yazoo region, while the idea 
of controlled settlement under the direction of private land 
companies had not lost its appeal.18 
Political considerations also must have been influential, 
for every important member of the Federalist faction in 
13 James Jackson to James Armstrong, from Savannah, July 24, 1794, 
James Jackson Papers; Edward Telfair to John \Vereat, from Burke County, 
August 23, 1794, Telfair Papers; Georgia Gazette, September 4, 1794. 
1H Georgia Gazette, October 9, November 6, 1794. 
17 Knox to Washington, November :3, 1794, Washington Papers, Vol. 269. 
1H George Ogg reported to John Gray Blount from Augusta on August 
24, 1793, that there was a "pine barren [land] fever" currently raging 
throughout the state. Alice Barnwell Keith, ed., The John Gray Blount 
Papers (2 vols.; Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1952), 
II, 302. 
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Georgia was deeply involved in the sale and, perforce, the 
corruption which preceded it. Prior to 1860-1861 the rela-
tions between Georgia and the federal government were 
never worse than in 1793-1794 when the state consistently 
disrupted every attempt by the national administration-and 
by the Creeks-to bring peace to the frontier. James Gunn 
and his followers probably reasoned that if the western lands 
could be bought from the state by a private company whose 
members were sympathetic to the national government's 
Indian policies, everyone except the Jackson-Telfair interests 
would benefit. The state's treasury would be replenished, 
the Indians presumably would be dealt with as the national 
government wished, and the potentially rich timber and 
agricultural lands of the Yazoo country would be available 
for exploitation by the purchasers. 
As early as January, 1794, Seaborn Jones, United States 
Representative Thomas P. Carnes, and James Gunn had 
met informally to seek their own solution "for the effectual 
protection of our distressed frontier citizens." By the next 
November they and their associates had formed a Georgia 
Yazoo Company and were ready to approach the legislature. 
When they arrived at the bar of the House, however, they 
found that several other land companies-including one from 
South Carolina headed by Albert Gallatin and Alexander 
James Dallas, both strong Republicans-had preceded 
them.19 The pretensions of these two companies were 
brushed aside in the final sale, and Republican politicians 
thus escaped any identification with the ensuing fraud. 
The agent for these outside companies was revealed to 
19 Thomas Carnes to Seaborn Jones, from Philadelphia, January 20, 1794, 
Seaborn Jones Papers; James Gunn to Judge Wilson, from Augusta, Novem-
ber 28, 1794, Old Congress file, Case 1, Box 6, Gratz Collection, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; "State of FACTS shewing the Right 
of Certain Companies to the LAND Lately Purchased By Them from the 
State of Georgia," Boston, 1795, pamphlet in the Henry E. Huntington 
Library, San Marino, Calif. 
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be Edward Telfair,20 who soon afterward presented a peti-
tion of his own, cosigned by such prominent state political 
figures as William Few, John Wereat, and John Twiggs. In 
this petition Telfair and his colleagues offered to buy the 
Yazoo lands for a half-million dollars and to take responsibil-
ity for extinguishing all Indian claims to it. This offer proved 
the most favorable that the legislature had yet received, but 
it was turned down. Governor Matthews immediately was 
petitioned for an explanation, but he remained silent. The 
legislature then passed a most sinisterly ambiguous act 
which, in fact, granted the Yazoo tract to the group headed 
by James Gunn.21 
At first the Governor refused to sign the act, citing eight 
objections to it, including opposition to the comparatively 
small sum offered by the Georgia Company, the small 
quantity of land in the tract reserved for the citizens of the 
state, the monopoly of landholding that would result, and 
the secretiveness of the sale.22 Matthews' initial resistance 
encouraged the Telfair group, which on January 1, 1795, 
made still another proposal to the legislature to purchase 
the western tract. 23 Once more they were rebuffed, and 
Matthews then succumbed to persistent legislative pressure 
and signed the act of sale, though he later denied that he 
had any personal interest in the transaction.24 Thus, on 
January 5, 1795, the vast Yazoo tract fell into the hands of 
the Georgia Company. 
20 Telfair to A. J. Dallas, from Augusta, January 5, 1795, Telfair Papers. 
21 "Petition of John Twiggs, et al.," December 11, 1794, ibid.; Samuel B. 
Adams, "The Yazoo Fraud," Georgia Historical Quarterly, VII ( 1923), 156. 
22 "A True Copy of the Dissent to the Act Entitled An Act etc. etc. to 
the Honorable the Speaker and Gentlemen of the [Georgia] House of 
Representatives," December 29, 1794, George Matthews Papers, Duke 
University Library, Durham, N. C. 
23 "Petition of John Wereat," January 1, 1795, Telfair Papers. 
24 "Annual Message of the Governor," January 13, 1796, in "Journal of 
the State Senate of Georgia," in William Sumner Jenkins, ed., Records of 
the States of the United States (Microfilm, University of California Library, 
Berkeley). 
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Gunn soon was required to give public proof of his Fed-
eralist beliefs, and he did not fail. Along with Jacob Read 
of South Carolina, he was the only southern senator who 
voted for the ratification of Jay's Treaty.25 The other leading 
members of the Georgia Company also for years had been 
known as strong friends of government. They included 
Lachlan Mcintosh, who had played such a significant role 
in the sale of 1789; Matthew McAllister, Anthony Wayne's 
ally in 1791; and Nathaniel Pendleton, the United States 
District Judge for Georgia and the organizer of the meeting 
and dinner in January, 1794, at which more than one hundred 
leading merchants of the state had proclaimed publicly 
their support of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. In 
addition, one of the largest shareholders in the company 
was the budding young Federalist from South Carolina, 
Robert Goodloe Harper.26 
The legislature's rigid determination to sell to the Georgia 
Company naturally had raised public suspicion that a 
sinister plot against the integrity of the state existed. Even 
before Governor Matthews signed the Yazoo bill, young 
William H. Crawford, just beginning his political career, 
joined other citizens of Columbia County in a remon-
strance against the sale, which was sent to Augusta.27 The 
next month the Grand Jury of Chatham County (Savannah) 
~5 Georgia Gazette, July 16, 1795. 
26 A list of the leading members and shareholders of the Georgia Com-
pany of 1795 may be found in \Valter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair 
Clarke, eds., American State Papers: Documents. Legislative and Executive, 
of the Congress of the United States, I, Public Lands ( \Vashington, D. C.: 
Gales & Seaton, 1832), l40ff. Additional evidence of Harper's close relations 
with the Yazoo faction may be found in Harper to Seaborn Jones, from 
Philadelphia, January 4, 1797, Seaborn Jones Papers; Harper to Jones, 
March 1.'3, 1797, "War of 1812" file, Dreer Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
27 Charles Homer Haskins, "Yazoo Land Companies," Papers of the 
American Historical Association, V (January and April, 1891), 418; Ulrich B. 
Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Washington, D. C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1901), 39-40. 
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also publicly opposed the sale on roughly the same grounds 
first expressed by Governor Matthews and congratulated 
the minority in the legislature which had opposed the sale.28 
So far the only objections raised to the sale had been 
based upon its secretiveness and flagrant favoritism, but on 
~larch 15 a sensational new development altered the scope 
of the affair. Clement Lanier, a member of the House during 
the previous session, swore in a legal deposition that Wil-
liam Longstreet, state representative from Richmond Coun-
ty, had attempted to bribe him with land certificates from 
Gunn's Georgia Company while the Yazoo bill was being 
debated in the House.~!) From then on, evidence swiftly 
was uncovered which revealed that a majority of the legis-
lattue had been corrupted by the Georgia Company. The 
astounding extent of the bribery was matched by its crudity, 
and the public's fury was quickly roused. By the end of the 
month \ladison, in Philadelphia, was aware of the magni-
tude of the fraud and of its political significance. After 
naming the two federal judges Wilson and Nathaniel Pendle-
ton as "known adventurers" in the frauds, Madison added: 
"The two Senators Gun [sic] & Jackson are now pitted agst 
each other, and the whole State is in convulsions."30 
The revelation of corruption placed the entire Yazoo trans-
action in jeopardy, and members of the Georgia Company 
immediately counterattacked. Never had the tendency of 
the elitist-minded to shade into contemptuous authoritarian-
ism when confronted by an angry populace been more 
explicit than in the major defensive essay which now ap-
peared in the leading organ of the Yazoo interest, the 
Georgia Gazette. Disdaining to deny the charge of cor-
ruption, members of the Georgia Company claimed that the 
people had no right to contemplate rescinding the sale, since 
~R Georgia Gazette, February .3, 1795, 
29 Ibid., March 5, 1795. 
30 Madison to Monroe, March 27, 1795, Madison Papers, Vol. 18. 
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they had vested their political power wholly in the legis-
lature, and the legislature had a constitutional right to sell. 
The essayist dismissed the susceptibility of the people's repre-
sentatives to corruption as irrelevant, and called the popular 
preoccupation with this matter "strange sophistry!" He 
maintained that, as a result, there was ground neither for 
popular reversal nor legal redress. The members of the 
Georgia Company then reminded the people that their state 
had been enriched materially by the sale and that a certain 
portion of the tract would be set aside by the purchasers 
for use by Georgians. The defense then strongly intimated 
that Georgians should be satisfied with these advantages 
and not question certain aspects of public business which 
were none of their concern.31 
Implicit in this argument was the concept of sanctity of 
contract that John Marshall invoked in his final decision on 
the case in 1810 and that Hamilton stressed from 1795 until 
his death.32 Federalist defenses of the Yazoo sale thus were 
consistent and undeviating throughout. 
The charge of shoddy sophistry certainly was not irrele-
vant when applied to the Yazoo faction's argument, and 
opponents of the sale were quick to point this out. It was 
rightly maintained that total legislative independence of 
the kind assumed by proponents of the sale posed a direct 
and eternal threat to the liberties of the people if taken as 
a guide to future behavior by the General Assembly of the 
state.33 There was no reply to this argument. 
A despised and isolated element in the state, the Yazoo 
faction next sought sanction for its acts from a presumably 
higher authority. As early as March 20, Gunn and Carnes 
requested aid from the federal government in arranging 
talks with the Creeks in an attempt to end Indian claims 
31 Letter of "Candidus," Georgia Gazette, April 2, 1795. 
32 Haskins, "Yazoo Land Companies," 433. 
33 "A Planter's Reply to Candidus," Georgia Gazette, April 9, 1795. 
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to the Yazoo country. Though doubtlessly grateful for 
Gunn's current support in the Jay Treaty crisis, Washington 
and his new Secretary of War, Timothy Pickering, wisely 
refused the request; they realized that if the request were 
granted, the national government might find itself at war 
not only with the Creeks and the Spaniards, but with Georgia 
as well, although this was never stated publicly.34 
The anti-Yazoo faction, in the meantime, proceeded with 
plans for a rescinding act. Their first opportunity came at 
the constitutional convention in May, hut the advantage 
was not pressed, probably because the anti-Yazoo forces, 
though excited, lacked effective leadership. James Jackson, 
however, was determined to play the role of the avenging 
angel. He attempted to return to the state in March, but 
poor weather kept him from reaching Savannah, and he was 
forced to fret in Philadelphia for several months longer while 
"the wicked triumph." He eventually arrived in Georgia in 
late October and promptly was approached by "a respectable 
committee from a considerable portion of the citizens of 
Chatham County," asking him to lead the anti-Yazoo faction. 
Jackson readily accepted, resigning the four remaining years 
of his Senate term to enter the Georgia legislature. He ex-
plained to Madison in justification of his action that Georgia 
was in fact a superlative arena in which to battle those 
speculative interests which had preyed on the democratic 
rights of the people ever since the introduction of the fund-
ing act.35 The Republicans had lost a staunch friend in 
Congress, but they soon were to have the almost undivided 
loyalty of an entire state in compensation. 
Despite open threats of assassination, Jackson began 
34 Pickering to Governor Matthews, reprinted in ibid., April .'30, 1795. 
3G Jackson to Edward Langworthy, from Philadelphia, June 10, 1795, 
James Jackson Papers; Georgia Gazette, November 5, 1795; Adams, "Yazoo 
Fraud," 157; Jackson to Madison, from Savannah, November 17, 1795, 
Madison Papers, Vol. 18. 
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collecting affidavits to support formal charges of corruption 
-a task which was almost routine to him by this time. He 
was so thorough that when the House considered the sale 
in January, 1796, some twenty "proofs relating to the fraud 
and corruptions practiced to obtain the act for the disposal 
of the western territory of the state" were produced im-
mediately. These proofs, some truly hair-raising, established 
beyond doubt that Gunn, Pendleton, William Longstreet, 
and several others had successfully bribed a majority of the 
past 1egislature.36 The Federalist-Yazoo party in Georgia was 
disgraced completely by the evidence which Jackson pro-
duced, and public humiliation was added to the popular 
enmity which it already had incurred. 
The immediate political effects of the Yazoo fraud were 
immense. James Jackson, by superb leadership during the 
1796 session, emerged as the undisputed leader of a political-
ly homogeneous citizenry determined to protect state rights 
and property from outside encroachments from any source. 
Jackson personally led the parade of citizens and lawmakers 
which on February 9 symbolically burned the now expunged 
act of sale. Later in the session, "by general consent," Jack-
son offered a bill appropriating part of the unlocated terri-
tory of the state for the payment of the state militia. Jackson 
later moved, and the legislature swiftly agreed, to demand 
that the Governor request federal assistance against the 
Creeks. Jackson was determined to insure, however, that 
as far as possible the necessary evil of federal troops be 
mitigated by the existence of a friendly administration at 
Philadelphia. At the same time, therefore, he introduced a 
set of resolutions-again easily passed by the tractable legis-
lature-providing for a revision of the electoral laws of the 
state so that the presidential electors might be popularly 
36 "Journal of the Georgia House of Representatives," January 25, 1796, 
in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
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chosen. Finally, Jackson readily induced the legislature to 
pass a resolution condemning Jay's Treaty in the harshest 
terms as a servile surrender of American rights.37 By the 
time that its General Assembly ended the session of 1796, 
Georgia was thoroughly and unequivocally Republicanized, 
and Jackson was its spokesman and the keeper of its public 
virtue. 
Throughout 1795 and 1796 the Yazoo supporters continued 
to write angry letters to the press, but their political power 
had been destroyed. Only in "the little speculating town 
of Augusta" could Gunn, Pendleton, Carnes, Jones, and 
their allies find active support. As one contemporary noted, 
only seven members of the more than one-hundred-man 
legislature, three in the House and four in the Senate, op-
posed the rescinding act. "Nineteen-twentieths of the people 
throughout this state reprobate the iniquitous sale, and ap-
prove the proceedings of the Legislature in annulling the 
usurped act."38 As for the individual members of the Yazoo 
faction, Carnes had the temerity to run for Congress once 
again in 1796, with the active aid of Seaborn Jones, but 
he was beaten by John Milledge, a young protege of Jackson 
and later Jackson's successor as governor. Nathaniel Pendle-
ton became quiescent and moved to New York by 1798 or 
1799 at the latest.39 As for James Gunn, the legislature which 
he had helped to corrupt had elected him for another term in 
the United States Senate, but his power base in the state 
definitely was destroyed. In later years he bound himself 
closer to the leaders of the national administration, ignoring 
as much as possible the politics and politicians of his state, 
until the expiration of his term in March, 1801. 
37 Ibid., January 22, February 8, 21, 1796; Georgia Gazette, February 25, 
1796. 
38 Georgia Gazette, March 10, 1796. 
39 Carnes to Jones, from Greensboro, September 18, 1796, Seaborn Jones 
Papers; Pendleton to Charles Harris, from New York, June 28, 1799, 
Personal Miscellany File, Library of Congress. 
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The Yazoo frauds brought a promising Federalist move-
ment to an untimely end. But Georgia was not the only, nor 
even the major, area of concern of the friends of government 
in the South as an increasingly unfavorable political climate 
developed in the winter and spring of 1795. 
The resumption of the Anglo-French war early in 1793 
had altered decisively the course of American politics, and 
the problem of defining national policy toward these two 
great powers shaped the course of political strife in the 
country for the remainder of the decade. By the summer of 
1796, Federalists and Republicans throughout the nation 
were clearly divided over the problem. 
As their activities in Virginia in the fall of 1793 revealed, 
the supporters of Jefferson and Madison were displeased 
with Washington's policy of neutrality; but in their uncertain 
status they gradually, though grudgingly, accepted it. How-
ever, there was room for maneuver within this broad policy, 
and the Republicans took up the challenge willingly. In 
1789 and again in 1794, Madison attempted to direct Con-
gress toward a policy of commercial discrimination against 
Great Britain. In 1789 his view was an expression of personal 
judgment and prejudice, but by 1794 it was an expression 
of party policy and probably represented, as one recent 
historian has maintained, the first attempt by the Republican 
faction in Congress to take the political offensive.40 
Neutrality was, of course, the expressed policy of the 
Federalist party. It was practiced, however, amidst a back-
ground of increasing commercial depredations on the part 
of Great Britain and an interference with American interests 
in the Ohio Valley in 1794 by the Governor-General of Can-
ada and the Indian allies of the Crown.41 Thus, to many 
neutrality seemed to represent a de facto preference for the 
40 Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (Williams-
bnrg, Va.: The Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956), 95. 
41 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Adcertiser, December 18, 1794. 
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policies and interests of Great Britain over those of France. 
In the South the year 1794 proved to be disastrous for 
the friends of government, as their once influential interests 
in Virginia and South Carolina either declined into apathy 
or were torn apart over issues relating to Anglo- and Franco-
American diplomacy. In Virginia, Wilson Cary Nicholas 
gradually shifted to the Republican point-of-view as British 
seizures of American merchantmen mounted; and even 
Henry Lee wavered for a time, at one point contemplating 
the acceptance of a proferred commission as Brigadier-
General in the French Army. 42 Lee's Federalist tendencies 
and his belief in the rectitude of neutrality were reconfirmed, 
however, by the flattery of political allies and by firm familial 
admonition not to stray from the path of political constancy. 
He later served effectively against the whiskey rebels in 
western Pennsylvania and was highly popular with his 
troops, despite attempts of the opposition to smear him 
with charges of incompetence and cowardice.43 
Hamilton's resignation as Secretary of the Treasury and 
the increasingly vigorous activities of the Republicans in 
Virginia embittered and disheartened the friends of govern-
ment, producing in them a growing lethargy that contrasted 
sharply with the able and energetic activities they had 
undertaken the year before. Carrington, for example, wrote 
to Hamilton and begged him not to step down simply be-
cause he had been publicly criticized in some quarters. 
Significantly, a week after Carrington's letter, an essay 
signed by "A FRIEND TO MERIT'' appeared in the Virginia 
Gazette, resentfully demanding to know why the anti-
42 Carrington to Nicholas, from Richmond, March 2, 1794, Nicholas Papers; 
William Lee to Henry Lee, from Green Spring, April 20, 1793, Lee Family 
Papers, Brock Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif. 
43 Lee to Hamilton, from Richmond, March 6, 1794, from Shirley 
Hundred, January 5, 1795, Hamilton Papers, Vols. 22, 23; Virginia Herald 
and Fredericksburg Advertiser, December 25, 1794. 
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Hamilton forces had been gratified with a publication of 
Giles' Resolutions while the results of the subsequent in-
vestigation which had thoroughly exonerated Hamilton 
never had been printed.44 Throughout the summer, friends 
of government in Virginia were alarmed that "the faction" 
which opposed them could only make use of "calumny and 
misrepresentation" in their attacks upon the government, 
attacks which nevertheless had succeeded in bringing "into 
popular disrepute and even into popular odium some of the 
wisest and best characters in the U. States." Federalists 
admitted freely that as a result of these attacks "the cause 
of Virtue and Talents" had been eclipsed in the state.45 
Such concern can be justified only if it leads to increased 
vigor on the part of the besieged. But as late as December, 
Virginia Federalists remained inactive. Fully agreeing with 
Hamilton's observation upon "the deplorable increase of a 
disorganizing spirit" throughout the Union, Carrington could 
only "heartily re-echo your opinion, that good men should 
come forward and set their faces against the ills which await 
us, and trust it will ere long be the case in Virginia."46 Thus, 
only vague hope rather than active recruitment of followers 
and leaders sustained the friends of government in Virginia 
during their months of trial. 
Though lethargic and despite some defections, Virginia 
Federalists at least retained their cohesion throughout 1794. 
In South Carolina the previously solid lowcountry oligarchy 
was shattered into three distinct, antagonistic factions during 
the year. The collapse of Federalist cohesion was caused 
by both lofty disagreements over principle and sordid con-
tests for public office. Internal division was preceded by the 
44 Carrington to Hamilton, July 9, 1794, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 22; 
Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, July 16, 1794. 
45 Francis Corbin to Hamilton, from Buckingham, Middlesex County, 
July 20, 1794, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 23. 
46 Carrington to Hamilton, December 12, 1794, ibid. 
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withdrawal from the Federalist interest of two important 
leaders whose actions merit some notice, since both later laid 
implacable siege to the ideology and dominant position of 
the lowcountry oligarchy. 
Pierce Butler could have remained as a valuable member 
of the Federalist lowcountry oligarchy. He had married into 
the native merchant aristocracy of Charleston and as a result 
had attained social distinction and had come within sight of a 
handsome fortune. However, the fiery Irishman unsuccess-
fully clashed with Cotesworth Pinckney on at least two 
occasions, and the resulting frustration had produced in him 
a deeply felt malice against Pinckney and the entire Charles-
ton group. Sometime in the mid-1780's, Pinckney had 
blocked Butler's attempts to realize a quick profit by selling 
his wife's en tire holdings of slaves in Georgia. In 1792, 
Butler and Cotesworth Pinckney clashed again over the 
ironclad will of a Charleston lady, a part of whose fortune 
Butler had hoped to obtain. Instead, the fortune went to 
Butler's children, and, to prevent the fortune from falling 
into Butler's greedy hands, the will provided that Ralph 
Izard and Cotesworth and Thomas Pinckney were to act 
as executors until the children became of age.H For these 
and other reasons, Butler withdrew from the Charleston 
ruling elite as early as 1789 and identified himself with the 
backcountry, voting in that year for the removal of the 
capital to Columbia.48 After 1790 he was a strong and con-
sistent Republican. 
"A spoilsman in party politics," Charles Pinckney's with-
drawal from the Federalist circle seemed to represent Wash-
47 "Excerpts from the Recollections of John Francis Fischer, written in 
1864," Pierce Butler Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; 
Cotesworth to Thomas Pinckney, from Charleston, July 14, 1792, Pinckney 
Family Papers, Box 3. 
48 "South Carolina House of Representatives Journal," January 23, 1789, 
in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
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ington's greatest patronage blunder in the South. Charles 
Pinckney quite possibly could have obtained one of South 
Carolina's seats in the United States Senate in 1789; but 
personal and family affairs kept him tied to South Carolina, 
and he was forced to be content for a time with the governor-
ship. In October, 1792, however, he wrote Washington in 
rather peremptory tones declaring that as his gubernatorial 
term was coming to a constitutional close he would gladly 
accept a post in the national government if the President were 
disposed to offer it. "If the entire confidence and approbation 
of my public conduct of the State I live in may be recom-
mendation," Pinckney said, "I think I may venture to say 
and I believe you fully know, I possess it." Despite such 
bold solicitation, Pinckney was not offered a national post.49 
He retired from public life for a time and upon his return 
became identified with Butler and the backcountry and 
later the Republican interests in the state. 
The initial division within the Federalist clique itself in 
South Carolina occurred in January, 1793, when Jacob Read, 
an ambitious Charleston lawyer of the second rank, de-
termined to challenge incumbent William Laughton Smith 
in the forthcoming Congressional elections. This was strictly 
an internal struggle, as Read's Federalism had never been 
in doubt since 1784 and never was to be.50 Read faced a 
serious challenge, for at the time the ties between the 
Pinckney-Rutledge faction and the Izard-Smith group were 
quite firm. From 1789 on, Smith and Rutledge were in 
49 Ulrich B. Phillips, "The South Carolina Federalists," American His-
torical Review, XIV ( 1908-1909), 739; Charles Pinckney to Rufus King, 
from Charleston, January 26, 1789, in Charles R. King, ed., Life and Cor-
respondence of Rufus King ( 6 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894-
1900), I, 359; Pinckney to Washington, from Charleston, October 14, 1792, 
Washington Papers, Vol. 257. 
50 Read to Washington, from Annapolis, August 1.'3, 1784, Washington 
Papers, Vol. 231. In 1795 Read, along with James Gunn, voted for the 
ratification of Jay's Treaty. Seep. 9,'3 above. 
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close contact whenever Congress was in session, and Smith 
worked assiduously to keep Rutledge informed about public 
business.31 When Smith was challenged, therefore, Rutledge 
placed all of his considerable influence at the younger man's 
disposal. Read began circulating a series of unspecified 
"base and baseless charges" against Smith, which Rutledge 
successfully ridiculed, and Read was beaten. Smith was 
profuse in his thanks to Rutledge, and the core of the Fed-
eralist alliance in South Carolina remained firm. 52 
The Rutledge-Pinckney forces clashed with Read again in 
the legislative session of 1794. The first order of business 
involved the perpetual conflict between the coast and back-
country interests, as young Robert Goodloe Harper from 
Ninety-Six district led the usual upcountry attack upon the 
unequal representation in the legislature. Harper proposed 
a plan which would have "granted suffrage according to 
numbers without regard to color," but this scheme was 
rejected-by a bare five-vote margin-by the lowcountrymen 
as too much of an "innovation." The second important issue 
was the election of a governor and a United States Senator 
to replace Izard, who was retiring. Pinckney and Rutledge 
brought forward a Colonel Vanderhorst in a field of three 
candidates, including Read. On the first ballot Vanderhorst 
received a plurality but not a majority. On the second ballot 
Read, whose "chagrin was conspicuous" threw his votes to 
Vanderhorst, but he determined to salvage some influence. 
In so doing he gravely threatened the integrity of the low-
country interest, for in the Senate race the defecting Charles 
Pinckney represented the backcountry, while Cotesworth 
Pinckney and Rutledge brought forward Dr. David Ramsay 
as the ostensible lowcountry candidate. Ramsay, however, 
;"\J Between 1789 and early 1794 Smith wrote thirty-eight long, informative 
letters to Rutledge in Charleston. Smith-Rutledge Correspondence. 
"~ Smith to Rutledge, from Philadelphia, November 22, 1792, February 
27, 1793, ibid. 
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was a known abolitionist, and while the two Charleston 
lawyers were upstairs extracting from him a promise that he 
never mention the subject within the borders of the state, 
the lowcountry rice planters nominated Read. Read and 
Ramsay, therefore, split the lowcountry vote on the first 
ballot, with Charles Pinckney close behind Read. Knowing 
Read's sleepless ambitions for office, Rutledge and Cotes-
worth Pinckney wearily threw their support to him on the 
next ballot to preserve lowcountry dominance, but they were 
not pleased with his conduct. A sense of antagonism is 
implicit in Cotesworth Pinckney's description of the affair.":1 
The sudden break which occurred between the Smith-
Izard and Rutledge-Pinckney forces in South Carolina was 
far more serious than the recurrent conflicts of both these 
groups with the Read faction, because it reflected the grow-
ing anti-British feeling among many influential southern Fed-
eralists. This development eventually put many friends of 
government in the South at odds with their pro-British 
Yankee and Yorker colleagues and, of course, with admin-
istration policy. By 179.5 and 1796 the Rutledges and the 
Pinckneys had almost deserted the administration over for-
eign policy, depriving it of inestimable power and influence 
in the one state that was considered to be the keystone of 
the Federalist arch in the South. 
There are several possible explanations for this develop-
ment of anti-British sentiment within ruling circles in the 
southern states. As is well known, southern planters were 
in a constant state of debt to British merchants because of 
the extension of long-term credit. On the other hand, am-
bitious native southern merchants, such as the Blounts in 
North Carolina, had strongly desired the reopening of trade 
r.:1 Pinckney to Ralph Izard, December 20, 1794, Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C.; John Brown 
Cutting to Thomas Pinckney, from Columbia, December 19, 1794, Pinckney 
Family Papers, Box 6. 
106 I Prologue to Democracy 
with the West Indies as early as 1784 and had supported the 
Constitution with that end in mind. Subsequent frustration 
on this point, added to an increase in British seizures and 
impressments, produced a strong dislike of the British com-
mercial system in the minds of John Gray and Thomas 
Blount, both of whom became enthusiastic supporters of 
Madison's plan of commercial discrimination in 1794.54 But 
the intense Anglophobia shown by the Rutledges and the 
Pinckneys at the time of the Jay Treaty apparently was 
unique and likely stemmed from a growing distrust of the 
rising commercial and political power of the British merchant 
class in Charleston. 
No group in the United States worked more strenuously 
or with greater effect at the end of the Revolution to rapidly 
reestablish the channels of trade with England than did 
South Carolina's lowcountry oligarchs. In the process they 
opened the city of Charleston not only to British shipping, 
but also to the swarm of British merchants and factors who 
pressed for legal residence there.55 The resultant structure 
of commercial relations in South Carolina from 1783 onward 
thus was markedly different from what it was in New Eng-
land and New York, for the resident British factors-a group 
largely absent from the northern seaports-soon engrossed 
a large proportion of South Carolina's trade and inspired 
a situation of perpetual conflict with the native merchants 
in which patriotism and self-interest were inextricably en-
twined.56 
54 Thomas to John Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, January 16, 23, 
March 7, 1794, in Keith, John Gray Blount, II, 344, 351, 372-73. 
55 George C. Rogers, Jr., William Laughton Smith af Charleston; Evolu-
tion of a Federalist, 1758-1812 (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Car-
olina Press, 1962), 99-105. 
5 6 Contemporary statements of the influence of British commerce and 
merchants upon the economies and societies of South Carolina, Virginia, 
and Georgia may be found in the debates over Madison's 1789 proposal for 
a commercial discrimination against England. Annals of Congress, I, 192-93, 
253-54. 
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Prior to 1789, anti-British sentiment in South Carolina 
could be measured along fairly well-defined class lines. The 
native merchants and at least most of the city's artisans and 
mechanics, plus most of the backcountry, bitterly resented 
the presence of the British factors and their influence in the 
local economy.57 These were the groups which had pro-
vided much of the force for the abortive movement led by 
Commodore Gillon in 1783-1784 to drive the English busi-
nessmen from the city. On the other hand, the British were 
protected by the powerful and cohesive oligarchy. 
Sometime in the 1780's or early 1790's, however, the 
Rutledges and the Pinckneys began to echo the anti-British 
feelings of the lower classes in the state, and in 1791 they 
informed Jefferson of their enthusiastic support of Madison's 
plan of commercial discrimination against British trade.58 
The motives which underlay this change are obscure; neither 
Edward Rutledge nor Cotesworth Pinckney expressed di-
rectly the reasons for the several shifts in his sentiments 
in the decade and a half after the Peace of Paris. Yet growing 
indications of anti-British sentiment within the Rutledge-
Pinckney faction did coincide with the increasing political 
activities of the British factors of Charleston. And on the eve 
of the Jay Treaty, the Rutledges and Pinckneys openly 
challenged the political power of their former ally and the 
Congressional representative of the British commercial 
group, William Laughton Smith. 
As Aedanus Burke indicated in his long letter outlining 
in detail the problems of Antifederalism in South Carolina 
in 1788, the British merchants and the local representatives 
of the British government first successfully demonstrated 
their political power in local American politics during the 
crisis over the ratification of the Constitution. After 1789 
57 Ibid., 267. 
58 Edward Rutledge to Jefferson, 1791, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 59. 
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the British merchants of Charleston openly helped to place 
Smith in the United States House of Representatives and to 
keep him there for four terms. 
As the political power of the local British merchant com-
munity grew in the early 1790's the Rutledges and the 
Pinckneys became ever more favorable toward Revolution-
ary France. But their idealism was so strongly influenced 
by self-deception as to suggest that hatred of the British 
rather than any real commitment to the French Revolution 
shaped their attitudes. Cotesworth Pinckney, in the fashion 
of the eighteenth-century elitist, spoke of "French Liberties" 
but never mentioned the Revolutionary ideal of equality, 
much less fraternity. In fact, Pinckney said he hoped that 
his nephew "so long in France" would "return a good Re-
publican."59 Pinckney and his followers were equally ap-
proving in their initial reception of Genet, saying the young 
ambassador was "a very sensible, intelligent Man" when 
Genet arrived in Charleston in April, 1793.60 Despite Genet's 
later contretemps, Pinckney and Rutledge remained loyal 
to France. 
Their loyalty to France-though not to its Revolutionary 
ideals-increased not only in proportion to the growing 
power of the local British merchants, but in proportion to 
the increase in British commercial depredations as well. 
Cotesworth Pinckney had become so incensed by the spring 
of 1794 over "the wanton depredations of Great Britain" that 
he said openly that he hoped for further "brilliant successes" 
by French arms to bring Britain "to her senses." By June 
he noted the revival in South Carolina of "that military glow 
which fired our hearts in 1775," and he expressed despair 
59 Cotesworth to Thomas Pinckney, from Charleston, January 7, 1793, 
Pinckney Family Papers, Box 4. 
flO Cotesworth to Thomas Pinckney, April 16, 1793, James Ladson to 
Thomas Pinckney, July 1793, ibid. 
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concerning the Americans' ability to remain aloof from the 
Anglo-French conflict. "1 
The rising political power of the British merchants at 
Charleston and the increasing instances of harassment of 
American commerce at sea by the Royal Navy seemed to 
indicate a malevolent British plot to subvert the new com-
mercial and political independence of her former colonies. 
In a letter to his brother on June 10, Pinckney cited several 
instances of preparation in the Charleston area against a 
possible British military invasion. In the following autumn 
Pinckney and Rutledge at last took the offensive against 
Britain's apparent political invasion of the state through the 
resident British merchants. 
Overt conflict between the British merchants and the 
Rutledge-Pinckney forces was not necessarily inevitable. 
The two groups had cooperated in the past to advance Fed-
eralist principles, and an uneasy truce between them might 
have been maintained for some time. At the same time that 
Pinckney and Rutledge began openly to condemn Great 
Britain, though, Smith and his father-in-law, Ralph Izard, 
expressed equally strong views about the danger of the 
French Revolution and the need to maintain a neutrality 
which in practice would be favorable to England. 
Izard seriously doubted the wisdom of South Carolina's 
slaveholders' embracing too ardently French Revolutionary 
dogma. "Doctrines are propagated, & attempted to be estab-
lished in that Country which I believe to be erroneous, 
destructive of all good government & tending to make Man-
kind of all descriptions unhappy," he wrote. "South Carolina 
would be one of the first victims to the principles contained 
in the Rights of Man, which are applicable, without distinc-
Hl Georgia Gazette, November 21, 179:3; Cotesworth to Thomas Pinckney, 
from Charleston, March 29, June 10, 1794, Pinckney Family Papers, 
Boxes 5, 6. 
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tion, to persons of all Colors." Revealing his acuteness and 
his characteristic honesty, Izard hinted strongly that demo-
cratic ideals and a slave system could not exist in the same 
nation. The endemic fear of a slave rebellion, rather than 
any intimation of eventual civil war, clearly was motivating 
Izard's thinking; and although he admitted that in 1793 few 
shared his fears, 62 after 1796 many in South Carolina would. 
Soon afterward Izard's son-in-law, William Laughton 
Smith, began to express anti-French sentiments in his letters 
to Rutledge. As spokesman and defender of the administra-
tion's neutrality policy, Smith was incensed that despite 
Genet's recent humiliation, "yet a party still adheres to him, 
among whom are men, called by some, virtuous, respectable 
& the best friends of the people:-Miffiin, Dallas, Madison, 
Giles, Taylor Munroe [sic] &cc associate with him or dine 
at his house, and thus countenance his measures." Rutledge's 
reply, if any, is unrecorded. It must have been cool and may 
well have been angry, for in April, 1794, in the last extant 
letter which he ever wrote to Rutledge, Smith defended him-
self vigorously from Cotesworth Pinckney's charge that he 
had favored the British political system, and he charged 
Madison's plan of discrimination with being "founded on 
prejudice & ignorance & injurious to us."63 
The break between the British merchant interest backed 
by Smith and Izard and the Rutledge-Pinckney group be-
came public in the autumn of 1794 when Rutledge and 
Pinckney brought forward young John Rutledge, Jr., in an 
unsuccessful contest for Smith's Congressional seat. Like 
the clashes with Jacob Read, this contest too was between 
gentlemen who were at least nominally friends of govern-
ment. Cotesworth Pinckney rejected suggestions to support 
62 Ralph Izard to Thomas Pinckney, from Boston, August 12, 1793, 
ibid., Box 4. 
63 Smith to Rutledge, February n.d., February 15, April 28, 1794, Smith-
Rutledge Correspondence. 
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Thomas Tudor Tucker and a Mr. Fayssoux, as he did not 
consider the sentiments of either to be "sufficiently federal." 
He hinted at the extent of the British merchants' active 
involvement in the state's politics when he observed that 
"the British Merchants & Old Tories are doing all they can" 
to obtain Smith's election "once more."64 A month later 
Madison also commented on the Smith-Rutledge election. 
With young Charles Pinckney temporarily out of public life, 
it is possible that Madison received his information from 
Pierce Butler. He may, however, have received it from his 
friend and supporter, Edward Rutledge. In any case Madi-
son reported that the political influence of the British mer-
chants at Charleston during the election was not confined 
to the city, and the merchants"& their debtors in the country" 
worked to put Smith over once again.65 
A note of caution should be injected at this point. Many 
of the comments concerning the political activities of the 
British merchants at Charleston came from Republicans, and 
it can be argued that they represented nothing more than 
partisan propaganda. Yet two facts argue against such an 
interpretation. First, contemporary correspondence of both 
Federalist and Republican leaders reveals no other explana-
tion than anger about British commercial depredations and 
the political activities of the British merchants at Charleston 
for the gradual shift of the Rutledge-Pinckney forces to a 
quasi-Republican position by 1794. Secondly, neither 
Edward Rutledge nor Cotesworth Pinckney seem to have 
recognized any immediate political gain from their Republi-
can leanings other than the opportunity to oppose openly 
the British merchant faction, whose activities both men 
obviously considered a threat to the political and economic 
64 Cotesworth to Thomas Pinckney, from Charleston, October 5, 1794, 
Pinckney Family Papers, Box 6. 
n5 Madison to Jefferson, from Philadelphia, November 6, 1794, Madison 
Papers, Vol. 17. 
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structure of Charleston within which they had built their 
power and influence. 
From the experiences of the Rutledges and the Pinckneys 
in Charleston it would seem that the presence of the political-
ly influential British merchant class in the southern seaports, 
and its corresponding absence from port cities in other 
regions of the country, was a crucial variable in shaping the 
differing attitudes of southern and northern Federalists to-
ward England in the early and mid-1790's. Other significant 
factors in the southerners' sterner attitude toward England 
were the issues of trade with the British West Indies, 
planters' debts to England, and growing British commercial 
depredations. 
Northern and southern Federalists shared a concern for 
nationalism, as the events of the later 1790's would show, 
but friends of government in New England and New York 
could take a more detached view of British interference with 
American commerce because of the overall advantages they 
enjoyed from the close commercial ties and, because they 
did not have to contend with politically active resident 
British merchants, as did the southerners. Implicit in Cotes-
worth Pinckney's remarks during 1794-and those of Madison 
as well-is the bitter view that Americans could not call their 
commerce and their local politics their own so long as the 
British chose to intrude. The explosive reaction of the 
Rutledge-Pinckney circle, along with most of low and up-
country South Carolina, to the Jay Treaty the following 
year was a sign of Charleston's steadily rising Anglophobia. 
This concern was directed expressly at those provisions of 
the Treaty in which it seemed Great Britain undertook to 
further control the commercial and political life of South 
Carolina to her own ends. 
In North Carolina, Washington's determination to main-
tain peace with Great Britain, even at the risk of doing 
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damage to Franco-American relations, may actually have 
strengthened the Federalist cause. It is true that by 1794 
the powerful Blount family ostentatiously opposed national 
foreign policy, but William Barry Grove and his constituents 
in the upper Cape Fear area entered the Federalist camp 
during the early months of the year and consistently sup-
ported Federalist policies during Grove's remaining nine 
years in Congress. 
Apparently Grove was sincerely angered by the sudden 
attempt of the Republican forces, led by the Virginia delega-
tion, to seize the legislative initiative during the opening 
days of the Third Congress. He fought vigorously, but vainly, 
against Madison's plan of commercial discrimination against 
England and grew increasingly incensed at the Republicans' 
arrogant assumption that those who did not support them 
100 percent perforce must be opposed to them to the same 
degree. Grove's displeasure reflected the reaction of the 
independent gentleman of elitist proclivities, angered at 
having his and his friends' honor questioned. He defended 
Steele's reputation vigorously, and if he did not leave the 
budding Republican party, it assuredly left him. 66 Grove 
was certainly no Anglophile. He admitted to John Haywood 
that Britain's conduct toward the United States "has indeed 
been uncommonly tyrannical and perfidious." Along with 
Smith of South Carolina, however, Grove thought that only 
a policy of neutrality could keep the country from being de-
stroyed by one or the other of the great powers, and he held 
high hopes for the success of the Jay mission. 67 Although 
disappointed in these hopes, Grove became independent of 
the Republican interest and leaned increasingly toward 
66 Grove to Steele, from Philadelphia, April 2, 1794, in Henry M. Wag-
staff, ed., The Papers of John Steele ( 2 vols.; Raleigh: North Carolina 
Historical Commission Publications, 1924), I, 105-106. 
67 Grove to Haywood, April 24, 1794, from Philadelphia, Haywood 
Collection. 
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Federalism, becoming an ever stronger supporter as the 
years passed. 
The outcome of the Jay mission, it appeared, would clarify 
public policy and political division throughout the country 
and, especially, the South. Jay's mission was followed eagerly 
and its results anticipated keenly. His strongly-worded note 
to Lord Grenville in November concerning the illegal seizures 
of American ships and seamen by the Royal Navy was given 
prominent space in some southern newspapers and further 
raised the hope, especially among Federalists, of a resultant 
treaty highly favorable to American commercial and frontier 
interests. 68 Though he did not know it, Thomas Blount was 
nearer the eventual truth when he condemned Jay's note to 
Grenville as a weak document which paved the way for a 
wholesale surrender of American rights. Blount mourned 
that "the Dignity, Honor & Interests of our Country have 
been entrusted to the care of such a pusillanimous wretch."69 
With the publication of the Treaty by Republican interests 
in June, 1795, Blount's fears about the mission were borne 
out, and the friends of government immediately were faced 
with a crisis. During July and August, 1795, anti-Treaty 
meetings were held in every major port city from Boston to 
Savannah, and the President's desk was piled high with anti-
Treaty resolutions. Jay's handiwork contained twenty-eight 
articles; scarcely one escaped wrathful criticism. 
The Treaty particularly discriminated against southern 
interests, as a comparative examination of the various resolu-
tions reveals. The Boston and New York meetings admitted 
the perniciousness of Articles XII and XVII and deplored 
08 Virginia Gazette and General Adcertiser, April 30, September 18, 
October 16, November 20, 1794; Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg 
Advertiser, November 6, 1794; William R. Davie to Richard Bennehan, 
from Halifax, February 27, 1795, Cameron Family Papers. 
G!J Thomas to John Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, November 5, 1794, 
in Keith, ed., john Gray Blount, II, 454. 
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the lack of any mention of the return to southern planters 
of Negroes taken away by the British in the late war. None-
theless Yankees and Yorkers seemed most concerned with 
those articles dealing with the evacuation of the western 
posts and were especially critical of those clauses which 
guaranteed British citizens equality in the western trade.70 
The criticisms tended to be general, and there was no at-
tempt at a detailed article-by-article criticism. 
Charlestonians, led by John and Edward Rutledge, ob-
jected to the Treaty on far broader grounds, at greater length, 
and in greater detail. The articles upon which they con-
centrated and the tenor of their criticisms suggest that they 
saw the Treaty not so much as a single work which bartered 
away certain basic rights for questionable benefits, but 
rather as the culmination of a sustained effort by the British 
to reimpose domination over the commerce and the public 
life of the South. To be sure, Charlestonians condemned 
the provision of the Treaty that aided the recovery of debts 
by British creditors, and they complained bitterly of the 
lack of a provision requiring the return of the Negroes taken 
away by the British during the late war. But they made 
other and more penetrating criticisms which went far beyond 
what Charles Beard once suggested were the major sources 
of southern discontent. 71 
Most scathingly attacked were the two articles pertaining 
to the residence of British citizens in America-which, 
practically speaking, meant British factors-and to the carry-
ing trade of the southern states. Charlestonians complained 
that Article II in effect "either establishes a British colony 
within our limits, with peculiar privileges, or, in case the 
7° "Resolutions of the meetings of the Citizens of Boston on the Late 
Treaty," July 1:3, 1795; "Resolutions of the meeting of New York," July 20, 
1795, in Washington Papers, Vol. 273. 
71 Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 191.5), 268-98 passim. 
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inhabitants of such colony choose to become citizens of the 
United States, it gives the privileges of citizens of these 
States to a number of men, who have been" the "most bitter 
and irreconcilable enemies" of the United States. The prej-
udices of John and Edward Rutledge against the local British 
merchant community had developed considerably since 
1783. The two lawyers also examined Article XII carefully, 
perceiving not only the obvious restrictions upon trade with 
the British West Indies, but other restrictions upon southern 
carrying trade. "We are made to surrender the right of 
exporting in our own vessels," the resolution read, "to any 
part of the world, molasses, sugar, coffee and cocoa, whether 
productions of the British Isles or any other place; whilst 
the British, and all other foreign powers, have a right to 
send these very articles, in their own vessels, from our 
ports." Moreover, American shippers even were prevented 
from exporting cotton in their own vessels, that right also 
being reserved to the British by treaty.'2 
By the end of 1795, Georgia and the Carolinas seemed 
wholly lost to Republicanism. In South Carolina the Com-
mittee of Fifteen, which drafted the harsh Charleston Reso-
lutions, reflected the entire political composition of the state, 
except, of course, the British merchants. Included within the 
meeting were Edward and John Rutledge, Cotesworth 
Pinckney, John Rutledge, Jr., Christopher Gadsden, Aedanus 
Burke, and Thomas Tudor Tucker. This committee in turn 
became the central forum for expression of popular opinion 
throughout the state, and anti-Treaty resolutions were sent 
to its members, as well as to the President, from the chair-
men of meetings in Georgetown, Columbia, and Fairfield; 
St. John's, Christ Church, St. George, and even St. James 
Goose Creek parishes; and from Cheraw district. 73 For 
72 "Resolutions of the Charleston Committee of Fifteen, July 19, 1795," 
Washington Papers, Vol. 27.'3. 
73 These resolutions are all in ibid., Vols. 273, 274. 
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nearly the first time, the sectional division of the state was 
bridged, a circumstance which in the future would be favor-
able to the friends of government but which for the moment 
left them at the nadir of their power and influence. 
Smith and Izard were silent in the face of this impres-
sive expression of popular will, as was Jacob Read. Read, 
however, had publicly agreed to the Treaty in the Senate, 
and members of his faction naturally kept a closer and more 
hopeful watch on the course of public opinion. By Decem-
ber, William Read was telling his brother, then in Phila-
delphia, that it seemed as if "old E[dward] R[utledge]" had 
come around to a moderate course and was seeking to miti-
gate the actions of "the violent" members of the legislature, 
who were contemplating passage of an official resolution of 
censure against the Treaty. However, William had no kind 
words for young John Rutledge, Jr. "He, too, has appeared 
among the partizans against the President-at a committee 
of officers lately he taking his [glass] the President being 
toasted, said 'we will drink his health. He has been of some 
service to us.' -arrogant puppy! If the services of his whole 
Race & that of Washington's were put into the opposite 
scales, how quickly would their scale kick the Beam.'' While 
William Read obviously enjoyed releasing political frustra-
tions in private correspondence, he apparently could not 
bring himself to confront the Committee of Fifteen. Later 
in the month Read wrote gleefully that Edward Rutledge 
had lost more ground than he had gained in an entire life-
time because of the stand he took on the Treaty. Read 
agreed with Henry DeSaussure's impression that a great 
reaction had occurred among many South Carolinians who 
believed that the state had gone too far in opposing the 
Treaty.74 As events of the following year revealed, however, 
H \Villiam to Jacob Read, from Charleston, December 18, 29, 1795, 
Jacob Read Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S. C. 
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such opinions reflected hearsay and hope rather than reality. 
North Carolina's native merchants were as violent in 
opposing the Treaty as was the Charleston commercial circle. 
In addition, speculators and many landholders in the state 
feared that under Article IX the large Grenville Tract, which 
had been sequestered during the war and opened later by 
the state for purchase and speculation, might be returned 
to the original holders.'~ In this overwhelmingly hostile 
atmosphere, only a few friends of government dared speak 
in favor of the Treaty. Grove apparently was silent, and 
Steele already was dickering for a government post which 
during the coming year would remove him from the state 
to become Comptroller of the national treasury. 76 William 
R. Davie, however, condemned "the leaders of anarchy and 
faction" in Congress who opposed the practical implementa-
tion of Jay's document, while at least one influential news-
paper and one usually firm North Carolina House Republican 
supported the Treaty and defended the administration.77 
In Georgia, too, the Treaty received its share of damna-
tion, despite the current preoccupation with the Yazoo 
frauds. A large anti-Treaty meeting in Savannah was 
chaired by Lachlan Mcintosh, while Seaborn Jones and 
Thomas P. Carnes signed a set of anti-Treaty resolutions 
drafted in Richmond County which singled out Article XII 
for special condemnation.78 The anti-Yazoo forces were not 
fooled, however, and promptly warned the public about the 
75 North Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1795; Absalom Tatom to John 
Haywood, from Philadelphia, May 9, 1796, Haywood Papers. 
76 Wagstaff, ed., John Steele, I, 142-43. 
77 Davie to John Haywood, from Halifax, December 24, 1795, Haywood 
Papers; North Carolina Gazette, July 11, 1795; Alexander Martin to William 
Laughton Smith, from Philadelphia, June 27, 1795, William Laughton 
Smith Papers, Library of Congress. 
78 "Resolutions of a Meeting of the Citizens of Savannah," August 1, 
1795; "Resolutions of a Meeting of Richmond County," September 1, 1795, 
in Washington Papers, Vols. 274-75. The citizens of Burke County also 
drew up a set of anti-Treaty resolutions. See ibid., Vol. 275. 
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plot of the Yazoo men to use the condemnation of the Jay 
Treaty as a means of "currying favor at the next Election."79 
Georgians heeded the alarmed cries of the Jackson men and 
maintained their Republican consensus. 
Salvaging some influence and respect for Federalist 
policies in the South was left to the friends of government 
in Virginia. As early as the spring of 1795 there were some 
indications that Virginia's Federalist faction was finally real-
izing the need to solicit directly the support of the electorate 
if they and their friends in Philadelphia were to stay in 
power. Madison at that time reported that the two dis-
tricts in the state in which the Congressional elections 
"turned on political rather than perso1Ull considerations" 
were those including the towns of Alexandria and Win-
chester-the latter located in the northern area of the Shen-
andoah Valley-a source of Federalist strength in 1788. 
Henry Lee stood for the Alexandria seat and General Daniel 
Morgan for Winchester. Called by biographer J. E. Norris 
"the Stonewall Jackson of the Revolution," Morgan was a 
fiery military figure who had led the state militia under 
Henry Lee against the whiskey rebels; he was also a staunch 
supporter of President Washington. He was the first active 
recruit of notable stature whom Virginia Federalists en-
listed after 1793, and his continual efforts in 1795 and beyond 
made him a valuable agent in the Winchester area. Both 
Lee and Morgan were defeated soundly, but they apparently 
gave a good account of themselves to the electorate since 
the opponents claimed that they left "no fraud ... untryed." 
Robert Rutherford, Lee's opponent, claimed that one 
"Sharper" voted eight times under feigned names, and 
Rutherford assured his correspondent that of the five hun-
dred votes for Light Horse Harry, no more than two hundred 
could be considered legal. Rutherford admitted with charm-
79 Georgia Gazette, September 10, October 1, 8, 15, 1795. 
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ing candor that his own support was "neare mostly legal."80 
The popular reaction against Jay·s Treaty threatened to 
destroy even this modest beginning. Every commercial 
center in Virginia except Alexandria held meetings which 
condemned Jay's diplomacy, generally reflecting the same 
criticisms displayed at Charleston.81 Jefferson told Madison 
that at Richmond "it is said not even Carrington undertook 
to defend it." Madison replied that in his knowledge only a 
Mr. Hopkins "and one of the Marshalls, openly espoused the 
treaty."82 The nearly unanimous opposition of the Federalists 
in the commercial towns extended into the countryside. 
Burgess Ball wrote the President from near Leesburg that 
"the last Federalists and friends to government are pointedly 
oppos'd to the treaty." Norfolk citizens feared that British 
merchants would be able to reestablish immediately a 
monopoly of the West Indies trade under the provisions of 
the Treaty.83 Only in the western counties of the state did 
the Treaty receive significant support, possibly because of 
its provisions regarding subsequent British evacuation of 
the Ohio Valley posts, and certainly because of its later tie-in 
with the highly favorable Pinckney Treaty in Congress.84 
By the early autumn of 1795, however, a decided Fed-
eralist recrudescence began to be apparent in Virginia. 
Jefferson noted unhappily that although "the merchants 
were certainly (except those of them who are English) as 
so J. E. Norris, History of the Lower Shenandoah Valley (Chicago: A. 
Warner & Co., Publishers, 1890), 143-46; Madison to Monroe, from Phila-
delphia, March 27, 1795; Rutherford to Madison, from Berkeley County, 
March 30, 1795, Madison Papers, Vol. 18. 
81 The resolutions are in the Washington Papers, Vol. 274. 
82 Jefferson to Madison, from Monticello, August, 1795; Madison to 
Jefferson, August 6, 1795, Madison Papers, Vol. 18. 
83 Ball to Washington, July 28, 1795, Washington Papers, Vol. 274; 
Daniel Bedinger to anonymous, November 22, 1795, Caroline Danske 
Dandridge Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. 
84 Arthur Campbell to Madison, from Washington County, January 24, 
1796; Madison to J elfers on, from Philadelphia, April 18, 1796, Madison 
Papers, Vol. 19. 
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open-mouthed at first against the treaty as any," the 
enormous wave of popular indignation had "alarmed them 
for the strength of the government. They have feared the 
shock would be too great, and have chosen to tack about 
& support both treaty & government, rather than risk the 
government."85 In early December some Federalists actually 
counterattacked with an ad hoc county meeting to condemn 
the opponents of Jay's Treaty.86 Before this movement got 
fully started the General Assembly met, and an overt trial 
of party strength soon followed. 
On November 20 the Republicans introduced a resolution 
in the lower chamber which expressed approval of the con-
duct of the state's senators in voting against Jay's Treaty; it 
passed by a 100 to 50 majority. The next day the Federalists 
reacted by submitting a resolution stating that the Virginia 
House of Delegates approved entirely Washington's motives 
in signing the Treaty after the Senate had ratified it. The 
Republicans amended this resolution to say that while the 
House approved of the senators' conduct in refusing to 
ratify the Treaty, this by no means implied a censure of 
Washington's determination to sign. This resolution passed 
89 to 56. Once this passed, the Federalists again pressed 
the issue by introducing a counterresolution which stated: 
"That the President of the United States, for his great 
abilities, wisdom and integrity merits and possesses the un-
diminished confidence of the House." To the shock of many 
at the time and since, the motion lost 59 to 79, and Virginia 
stood on record as having publicly rebuked her most 
illustrious citizen.87 
The vote, which at first glance seems to have been a clear-
85 Jefferson to Madison, from Monticello, September 21, 1795, ibid., 
Vol. 18. 
86 "Resolutions of a Meeting of Citizens of Frederick County, Virginia, 
Daniel Morgan, Chairman," December 5, 1795, in Washington Papers, 
Vol. 276. 
87 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, November 25, 1795. 
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cut repudiation, is actually somewhat ambiguous. Certainly 
it revealed that Virginia was strongly Republican, so much 
so that a majority of its representatives were willing to place 
themselves on public record as opposing a man who sup-
posedly was above partisan politics and symbolized national 
integrity at its finest. Yet the friends of government had 
done little, and Republicans, with many immediate ad-
vantages, had done much to capture the popular mind. In 
many ways the Federalists were fortunate that there existed 
as strong, though usually silent, support for their leader as 
there appeared to be. The geographical distribution of the 
recorded vote showed potential Federalist strength at once 
extensive and thin throughout the state. Delegates from 
forty counties and two boroughs could be counted upon to 
support Washington, yet in twenty-five of the forty counties 
the Federalist member was opposed by one or two Republi-
cans. Federalism seemed to have a solid majority in the 
towns of Richmond and Williamsburg (Alexandria was not 
yet incorporated), as well as in a large area of the Tidewater, 
up the Potomac as far as Leesburg, and inland through the 
northern Piedmont and valley to Frederick County. The two 
counties surrounding Richmond, Henrico and Hanover, as 
well as some scattered counties in the valley and in the 
extreme southwestern portion of the state, also contained 
some Federalist strength.88 
Thus, while they were definitely in the minority, the 
friends of government in Virginia nonetheless held the 
potential for a rapid expansion of their influence. Realiza-
tion of this potential, however, would require an active cam-
paign for popular support. So far, except in times of im-
HH The geographical distribution of this vote was determined from the 
list of names published in ibid., correlated with Earl G. Swem and John W. 
Williams, A Register of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1776-1918, and 
of the Constitutional Conventions (Richmond: Davis Bottom, Superintendent 
of Public Printing, 1918), 43-45. See Appendix, Table 1. 
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mediate crisis, and then only fitfully, the Federalists had 
shown a marked disinclination to mingle with the com-
monalty for political advantage. The presidential and Con-
gressional elections of 1796 offered them another opportunity 
to do so, but it was an opportunity unseized. In Virginia and 
throughout the South the Federalists' influence continued 
to decline as the elitist tendency toward preoccupation with 
men rather than measures, intrigue rather than hard politick-
ing, continued to undermine party efficiency and influence. 
A major problem was to decide whom to support for the 
presidency, and it was never resolved. Adams was mis-
trusted and disliked universally in the South. In 1792 several 
anti-Adams letters and essays had appeared in the Virginia 
press, most implying he was an avid monarchist.89 In the 
election of that year Clinton, the Republican nominee, swept 
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia, while Adams won 
only in South Carolina.90 This election revealed the existing 
configuration of party strength in the South at that time, but 
by 1796 it seemed highly unlikely that Adams could gain 
support anywhere in the region. Yet with Pennsylvania and 
New York uncertain, Federalists were keenly aware of the 
need to muster some strength in the South. To do this they 
either had to find a suitably attractive southerner as a 
running mate for Adams or ease Adams himself out of the 
running and seek a new candidate. The intense mutual dis-
like between Hamilton and Adams led the New Yorker to 
explore quietly the second alternative before reluctantly 
accepting the first. 
Sometime early in April, 1796, Hamilton's ally, Rufus King, 
wrote John Marshall at Richmond asking him to sound out 
Patrick Henry on the possibility of leading the Federalist 
89 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, November 28, December 5, 
1792. 
90 Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 
(Boston: Houghton, Miffiin Co., 1928), 39. 
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ticket that autumn. Marshall's reply was properly circum-
spect. He told King that he did not know Henry well enough 
to sound him out in a letter. Moreover, he said "I am not 
positively certain what course that Gentleman might take. 
The proposition might not only have been rejected but 
mentioned publicly to others in such manner as to have 
become an unpleasant circumstance." Marshall thus re-
vealed the current extent of his loyalty to Hamilton. Had 
the Adams supporters discovered Hamilton's plot, the Fed-
eralist party would doubtless have come to an immediate 
end. Marshall added that "Genl Lee corresponds familiarly 
with Mr. H. & is in the habit of proposing offices to him." 
Lee, therefore, would sound Henry out first, and Marshall 
promised to speak to Henry when the latter was next in 
Richmond. "I trust it will not then be too late to bring 
forward to public view Mr. H. or any other gentleman who 
may be thought of in his stead," Marshall concluded.n1 
Henry's political attitudes had changed considerably since 
1789. His long-time political enemy, Thomas Jefferson, 
claimed that he was "brought over to the new constitution 
by his Yazoo speculation." Jefferson charged that when the 
Georgia legislature declared the 1789 sale null and void, 
Henry faced ruin, as he had sunk his entire resources into 
depreciated state paper which the legislature would not 
accept. Henry was fortuitously saved from bankruptcy and 
even realized a modest fortune when "Hamilton's founding 
[sic] system came most opportunely to his relief."92 J effer-
son's interpretation of Henry's political loyalty in economic 
terms is intriguing. Yet it is likely that the estrangement of 
Madison and Jefferson from the administration was sufficient 
to induce Henry to view the friends of government favorably. 
Henry's feuds with Jefferson and Madison dated from the 
!ll Marshall to King, from Richmond, April 24, 1796, Hamilton Papers, 
Vol. 28. 
92 Quoted in Haskins, "Yazoo Land Companies," 412. 
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early 1780's and involved not only profound differences over 
specific policies, but also Jefferson's mistrust of what he 
considered Henry's dictatorial ambitions.ua Henry's duel 
with Madison in the state ratifying convention of 1788 
confirmed their mutual dislike. 
When it became apparent early in 1795 that the Jay Treaty 
struggle was to offer the Republicans their greatest op-
portunity to gain popular favor, Jefferson astutely made one 
gesture of conciliation toward Henry, but was summarily 
rebuffed.94 Several months later Henry determined to make 
public his Federalism and wrote to Henry Lee assuring Lee 
of his respect and veneration for the President. The letter 
was swiftly forwarded to Philadelphia, where Washington 
decided to make immediate use of Henry's services.95 
Henry's motives in this instance are obscure. He could 
have been either Secretary of State or Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, but turned down both offers.9n Presumably, 
he was looking toward the presidency in 1796. Hamilton 
thought he might be and thus began arranging a droll al-
liance that defied every test of logic save political ex-
pediency. But Henry ultimately turned down Hamilton's 
offer, though just when or how is unclear. The Federalists 
had gained an ally of enormous influence, but neither they 
nor he evidently knew quite how to exploit the alliance in 
1796. 
With Henry apparently uninterested, Hamilton and his 
na Dumas Malone, jefferson the Virginian (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1948), 382. 
9 4 J effcrson to Archibald Stuart, April 18, 1795, quoted in William Wirt 
Henry, Patrick Henry: Vfe, Correspondence and Speeches ( 2 vols.; New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), II, 549-52. 
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1795; Henry to Washington, October 16, 1795; Henry Lee to Henry, 
December 26, 1795, in Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and 
Speeches, II, 554-56, 558-59, 562-6.3; Carrington to Washington, from 
Richmond, October 13, 1795, Washington Papers, Vol. 275. 
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followers reluctantly accepted Adams' candidacy, but they 
still sought a suitable southerner to keep Adams from the 
executive chair. They soon began to speak of Thomas 
Pinckney, who was returning after extremely successful 
negotiations in Madrid, which had resulted in a treaty 
guaranteeing American access to the Mississippi. Pinckney 
was certainly a most available candidate and was perfectly 
acceptable to the Adams supporters as a running mate. 
Hamilton, however, had other, more ambitious plans for the 
still absent Pinckney. "I am entirely of opinion that P. H. 
declining ~1r. P.--ought to be our man," he wrote to King 
in response to the latter's enthusiastic endorsement of the 
South Carolinian. "It is ever an idea of which I am fond in 
various lights-indeed on latter [sic] reflection, I rather 
wish to be rid of P. H. that we may be at full liberty to take 
up Pinckney."97 
In contemplating a maneuver to slip Pinckney into the 
presidency ahead of Adams, Hamilton was playing with 
fire. Such an intrigue was sure to split the party in the 
face of a formidable Republican opposition-a fact which 
Hamilton seems never to have considered. Also, it would 
aggravate implicit sectional tensions, which already existed 
in full measure within the Federalist ranks. Southerners 
plainly were unhappy with Adams' candidacy and might well 
support Pinckney. New Englanders, on the other hand, were 
deeply embittered by the defection of Charleston and the 
rest of South Carolina in the Jay Treaty crisis.9 H If South 
Carolina and the rest of the South should abandon Adams 
or subordinate him to Pinckney, the Federalist interest might 
never be reintegrated. Finally, if Adams were able to muster 
117 King to Hamilton, from Philadelphia, May 2, 1796, Hamilton to King, 
May 4, 1796, from New York, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 28. 
HH Elias Boudinot to Samuel Bayard, from Roschill, October 17, 1795, 
History Note Card File, Independence Hall National Park Office, Phila-
delphia. 
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some support in the South, the Federalist interest would be 
threatened with confusion and demoralization in that sec-
tion, as supporters of Pinckney and Adams would be certain 
to clash. Hamilton was not to be dissuaded, however; he 
was determined to run Pinckney. 
Unfortunately for the Federalist interest, others in the 
South were equally determined to champion their own can-
didates, and during the year four men were advanced as 
possible nominees. The Federalist faction at Richmond and 
its allies, as well as some of the older friends of government 
in North Carolina, hoped that the President eventually 
would be willing to seek a third term. Washington's battle 
with House Republicans over the voting of sufficient funds 
to carry the Jay Treaty into effect rekindled the fires of 
nationalism, loyalty, and affection to their chief in the hearts 
of many Federalists in the Richmond faction and through-
out the state. By February they were carefully assessing 
public opinion to determine the support which might be 
expected for the President in Virginia, should he find it 
necessary to clash openly with the forces of Madison and 
Livingston.90 At the same time the President's birthday 
brought forth the usual Federalist banquets and fervent calls 
for Washington to continue at the helm of state. "Your elec-
tion," wrote one, "of which there can be no doubt, will 
demonstrate to all America that the sentiments of the people 
of Virginia are not understood by the temper of their repre-
sentatives either in Congress, or in the State Legislature."100 
During this election year Federalist activity in Virginia 
was at its peak in early spring. The President had come 
under sharp attack in the House for his refusal to submit 
un Henry Lee to Washington, December, 1795; Gabriel Jones to Wash-
ington, from Rockingham County, February 8, 1796, Washington Papers, 
Vol. 277. 
IOO H. Young to \Vashington, from King and Queen County, March 2, 
1796, ibid. 
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to it the relevant papers regarding Jay's negotiations, and 
Hamilton and other Federalists determinedly organized an-
other petition campaign, similar to that staged in the summer 
of 1793 in support of the neutrality policy. Although the 
campaign was restricted largely to the commercial centers 
of the North, where it was highly effective/01 Virginia and 
North Carolina also strongly supported it. Marshall initially 
was pessimistic about its chances of success in Virginia. He 
deliberately held off calling a meeting at Richmond "so long 
as a hope remained that the house of representatives might 
ultimately consult the interest or honor of the nation." But 
with the passage of Thomas Blount's resolutions on April 6, 
which Hatly declared the right of the House to debate the 
expediency of putting the treaty into effect, Marshall acted 
quickly. He called a meeting in the capital, which, to his 
obvious surprise, "was more numerous than I have ever 
seen at this place." Resolutions were passed by a "decided 
majority," which declared "that the welfare & honor of the 
nation required us to give full effect to the treaty negotiated 
with Britain."102 
Carrington informed Washington a few days later of his 
alarm over the current state of public opinion, pledging him-
self to work actively to change it. "There never was a crisis 
at which the activity of the Friends of Government was more 
urgently called for," he said. "Some of us here have en-
deavored to make this impression in different parts of the 
Country. The events of a few days will show how success-
fully." The Federalists' efforts yielded surprising results, 
101 In New York City, for example, the Federalists went down to the 
docks and actually solicited the signatures of merchants and sailors on the 
spot to pro-Treaty petitions. This thoroughness of coverage and willingness 
actively to seek out popular support was never systematically attempted by 
any southern Federalists prior to the election of 1800. See Rufus King to 
Hamilton, from New York, April 20, 1796, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 28. 
102 Marshall to Hamilton, from Richmond, April 25, 1796, ibid. 
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and resolutions endorsing the President's refusal to release 
the Jay papers to Congress were sent to the House from 
meetings in Fairfax and Frederick counties, fronting the 
upper Potomac, both counties on the eastern shore, Fauquier 
in the northern Piedmont, Berkeley in the northern valley, 
and King William County in the Tidewater area, as well as 
from Richmond, Williamsburg, and Petersburg. The Peters-
burg meeting, Carrington remarked, was attended not only 
by British merchants, but by planters and farmers as well. 
Earlier that week Daniel Morgan informed William Laugh-
ton Smith of his success in calling a pro-Treaty meeting at 
Winchester.103 The Richmond Federalists clearly had tapped 
a rich vein of progovernment sentiment too often ignored 
by them in the past. In the process they deeply alarmed their 
Republican opponents.104 
In North Carolina, too, the apparent determination of the 
Republicans in the House to humiliate the President brought 
forth renewed pledges of support for the federal administra-
tion from Samuel Johnston and William R. Davie, both of 
whom feared for the future integrity of the Union if the 
opposition should persist in its obstructionist course. At 
least one meeting was held in the state-in April at New 
Bern-which publicly endorsed the President's "firm and 
independent temper" in his conflict with the House.105 
The unremitting Federalist attack reached the press as 
well. From March to May a war of essays flared intermittent-
103 Carrington to Washington, April 27, May 9, 1796, Washington Papers, 
Vol. 278; Morgan to Smith, from Winchester, April 21, 1796, William 
Laughton Smith Papers. 
104 Edmund Randolph to James Madison, from Richmond, April 25, 1796, 
Madison Papers, Vol. 19. 
105 Samuel Johnston to Iredell, from Philadelphia, April 28, May 6, 1796, 
Iredell Papers; Davie to John Haywood, from Halifax, March 7, 1796, 
Haywood Collection; "Address to the Han. the President of the United 
States from the Citizens of New Bern, N. C.," April 19, 1796, Washington 
Papers, Vol. 278. 
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ly in the pages of the Virginia Gazette. The Federalists 
charged their opponents with threatening the safety of the 
Union and contemplating "the overthrow of the Constitu-
tion itself," an accusation without foundation but one which 
may have carried some weight with an impressionable and 
obviously excited populace.106 
At its height the Federalist campaign in Virginia and 
North Carolina on behalf of the President was halted 
abruptly by Washington's announcement of his irrevocable 
determination to retire. Silence suddenly descended on the 
Richmond faction; the friends of government in North 
Carolina did not stir. The pages of the Virginia Gazette and 
Abraham Hodge's State Gazette of North Carolina were 
suddenly empty of Federalist campaign essays. Marshall, 
Carrington, Johnston, Davie, and the others apparently re-
fused to commit themselves publicly to Adams or Pinckney-
whether through disappointment or bewilderment or both is 
uncertain. All that is clear is that in North Carolina, Adams 
received one of the state's electoral votes-that cast by the 
elector from William Barry Grove's district of Fayetteville.107 
In Virginia friends of Patrick Henry campaigned under 
the Federalist banner. Leven Powell, an Alexandria mer-
chant and former Antifederalist ally of Henry, first suggested 
Henry's candidacy publicly in early September when he 
sent a circular letter around Loudoun and Fauquier counties. 
Powell expressed a willingness to support Adams and 
Pinckney as things then stood, but added: "It is now said 
Mr. PATRICK HENRY, of Virginia and Mr. Pinckney of South 
Carolina, will both be on the nomination. -Should it be so, 
I must declare that I feel at present disposed to vote for 
Mr. Henry." Powell stressed then and later that Henry's 
IOH Virginia Gazette and General AdJ;ertiser, March 16, May 25, 1796. 
107 Henry M. Wagstaff, "Federalism in North Carolina," The ]ames 
Sprunt Historical Studies, Vol. IX, No.2 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Publications, 1910), 28n. 
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candidacy would unite the country and would "do away 
that spirit of contention which at present rages with so 
much violence amongst us, and threatens destruction of the 
Union."108 Three weeks later Charles Simms, declaring him-
self as candidate for elector representing Prince William, 
Stafford, and Fairfax counties, joined Powell in supporting 
Henry ahead of Adams, and both ahead of Jefferson.109 No 
other candidates seem to have attempted to solicit any of 
the state's other nineteen electoral votes in behalf of the 
Federalist interest. 
Powell waged a quixotic campaign. By October, despite 
his strenuous efforts, a popular enthusiasm for Henry had 
not materialized. Instead of redoubling his efforts to pop-
ularize his candidate Powell turned on Adams and circulated 
a vicious rumor that Fisher Ames, on a recent trip to Virginia, 
had commented upon the Vice President's marked partiality 
for Great Britain and the consequent need to bring Patrick 
Henry forward as an alternate candidate. The charge was 
hotly denied by an anonymous defender of the Vice Presi-
dent, and the populace was thus treated to a public battle 
within Federalist ranks.U 0 
Powell's motives in placing Henry's name before the public 
remain a mystery. There is no evidence that either he or 
Simms was in any way tied to the Richmond faction, and 
Henry had earlier turned down Hamilton's offer of consider-
able support on a national scale. Whatever his reasons, 
Powell quickly attempted to repair the damage he had 
caused to party unity by inserting a strong pro-Adams essay 
in the Virginia Gazette at almost the same time that his anti-
Adams essay appeared at Philadelphia. Also, some weeks 
108 This letter was reprinted in the Virginia Gazette and General Ad-
vertiser, September 14, 1796. 
109 Norfolk Herald, October 8, 1796. 
no North Carolina Minerva and Fayetteville Advertiser (quoting the 
Gazette of the United States, n.d.), October 22, 1796, hereinafter cited as 
North Carolina Minerva. 
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later a pro-Jefferson writer charged Powell with promoting 
Henry's candidacy only as a means of splitting the Republi-
can vote, thereby throwing the state to Adams. The ob-
scurity of Powell's tactics could not materially have aided 
the Federalist cause. Henry refused to take public notice 
of the campaign being waged on his behalf until several 
days before the election, when he submitted a brief notice 
asking that his name be withdrawn. Powell made no com-
ment on Henry's decision, but quietly cast his vote for 
Adams, one of the only two the Vice President received in 
the South in 1796. Simms was defeated. 111 
John Marshall was disgusted by the low quality of the Fed-
eralist efforts in Virginia. He informed Iredell in a retro-
spective critique in mid-December that the friends of gov-
ernment were totally disorganized during the recent cam-
paign. Marshall clearly favored Adams over Jefferson, but 
did little himself to advance Adams' popularity in the state, 
while the Federalist candidate for presidential elector from 
the eastern shore was so confident of victory that he did not 
bother to campaign and was defeated as a result. Apparently 
the friends of government had high hopes of capturing the 
Norfolk-Princess Anne district too, but they miscalculated 
the sentiments of their candidate for elector, who ended 
by voting for Jefferson. Such miscalculations and campaign 
apathy were indicative of the low level of the Federalists' 
statewide party organization, if any at all existed.112 
The friends of government in Virginia were far more 
certain of whom and what they were against than whom 
they were for. Their silence about the relative merits of 
Federalist candidates did not preclude an energetic cam-
paign against Jefferson, which became scurrilous in the 
111 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, October 12, November 9, 
1796; Norfolk Herald, November 2, 1796. 
112 Griffith J. McRee, ed., Life and Correspondence of ]ames Iredell, 
(2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1947), II, 425. 
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extreme. They charged Jefferson with political timidity 
and lack of personal courage, and so persistent were the 
Federalists in recalling to the electorate Jefferson's odd be-
havior as Governor during the British invasion of the state 
in 1781 that he was forced to procure affidavits in the middle 
of the campaign defending his earlier conduct.113 Jefferson 
was also charged with deserting a republic in peril in 1793 
to conduct a personal vendetta against the President. The 
Federalists also claimed that he was deeply in debt to 
British subjects and therefore a fair target for manipulation. 
Finally, Federalist propagandists maintained that Jefferson 
was no Christian and that "no man ought to be President 
who does not profess the Christian Religion."114 
The Republicans countered by attacking Adams' alleged 
monarchism and urging that the people of the state protect 
themselves from domination by the "eastern interests" by 
retaining the presidency in the hands of a Virginian. These 
points proved far more effective, not only with the people 
of Virginia, but with the majority of North Carolinians as 
well. The results of the election indicated that the Re-
publican bases of power were firmly anchored in these two 
states. 
Georgia also remained firmly Republican in 1796. The 
Federalists, to be sure, had little chance to poll a large vote, 
but what opportunity they might have had was crushed 
by the actions of the commissioners sent down from Phila-
delphia in the summer of 1796 to readjust and redefine the 
border between Georgia and the lands belonging to the 
Creek nation. From the summer of 1795 on, even with the 
popular preoccupation with the Yazoo frauds, the people of 
Georgia had coveted the rich upland region which lay within 
11:l Affidavits from John Blair et a/. may be found in the Jefferson 
Papers, Vol. 100. 
114 Virginia Ga;:;ette and General Adcertiser, October 12, 1796. 
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the Creek country between the Oconee and Ocmulgee 
rivers.115 A state delegation, led by James Jackson and re-
inforced by the militia, therefore accompanied the United 
States commissioners and a body of dragoons to the con-
ference grounds in July, 1796. To the rage of Jackson and 
his followers, however, the commissioners flagrantly favored 
the Indians, supported their determination not to sell, kept 
the Georgia militia away from the conference, and then 
upon their return to Savannah publicly lectured the people 
of the state on the need to deal justly with the Creeks in 
future years. Jackson did not miss the opportunity to trans-
late this insult into partisan political terms, and in the fall 
elections only three of the state's twenty-four counties-all in 
the backcountry region around or near Augusta116-gave 
slim majorities to Adams. (Two others recorded tie votes.) 
The Yazoo faction had thus founded a small Federalist 
pocket, pledged to the support of a Massachusetts lawyer 
and aristocrat, in, of all places, frontier Georgia. However, 
the pocket was small, and its existence was precarious. 
South Carolina politics in 1796 were ambiguous. The 
state went to Jefferson by a comfortable margin, but this 
apparently signified not a profound, enduring conversion to 
Republicanism, but simply a desire to see the presidency 
remain in the hands of a southerner-any southerner-in 
the wake of Jay's Treaty. 
The Rutledge-Pinckney faction, which continued to 
dominate South Carolina politics through 1796 and beyond, 
still flirted with the federal administration though not with 
llG Seaborn Jones to Joseph Jones, from Augusta, July 8, 1795, Joseph 
Jones Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. 
116 The struggle between the United States Commissioners and the 
Georgia interests may be traced from the published apologia of both sides 
in the Columbian Museum and Savannah Advertiser, August 12, 1796; and 
the Augusta Chronicle and Gazette of the State, August 27, 1796; Phillips, 
Georgia and State Rights, 91. 
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local Federalists. Not long before the presidential campaign 
opened, Cotesworth Pinckney at last surrendered to the 
repeated pleas of the President to take a high national office 
and sailed for Paris to assume the critically important French 
ambassadorship. 117 At the same time Edward Rutledge 
began to shape his political strategy for the coming cam-
paign, once he had been assured that Washington would 
not seek a third term. A letter which he wrote to his son 
in mid-July bristled with sectional consciousness and open 
animosity toward the "Eastern interests," which recently 
had tried to block Tennessee's admission to statehood and, 
thus, the equal political growth of the southern states within 
the Union. Rutledge apparently had made up his mind to 
secure a Jefferson-Pinckney victory in South Carolina to 
retain the presidency in southern hands for another four 
years. In this and a subsequent letter in mid-October, Rut-
ledge indicated plainly that he wished to see Pinckney in 
the presidency with Jefferson as Vice President, excluding 
both the northern Republican, Clinton, and the northern 
Federalist, Adams.llH Apparently he never deviated from this 
fixed plan during the campaign. 
Young Robert Goodloe Harper was also active in South 
Carolina during the weeks preceding the 1796 election. As 
he represented Hamilton's interests, Harper also wished to 
see Pinckney brought home first. But Hamilton's public 
defense of the Jay Treaty and Edward Rutledge's equally 
public condemnation of it, precluded close contact and open 
alliance between Harper and Rutledge to push Pinckney into 
the first spot. 
The Smith-Izard faction composed the third political 
117 Fitzpatrit:k, ed., Washington, XXXV, 129-31n. 
118 Edward to Henry l\licldleton Rutledge, from Charleston, July 21, 
Odobcr 20, 1796, Hutleclge Papers, Dreer Collection, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
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alignment in South Carolina in 1796. Its members supported 
the thinking of party regulars, staunchly standing by the 
ticket of Adams and Pinckney, in that order. 
Notably absent from South Carolina in this year was a 
distinct Republican interest pledged to support Jefferson and 
Clinton. Because the Rutledge-Pinckney faction maintained 
obvious contacts with the administration and refused to 
support Jefferson for the presidency, South Carolina in 1796 
still must be considered a Federalist-dominated state, one 
which nonetheless divided its loyalty between Pinckney and 
Thomas Jefferson. 
The friends of government in South Carolina may have 
been severely divided in 1796, with some skirting close to 
Republicanism, but, unlike their colleagues in Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Georgia, they carried on an intense 
campaign and reawakened popular excitement over national 
political issues-including, for the first time, the presidential 
race. Harper and Rutledge could agree on one point: 
Pinckney was the ideal compromise candidate between 
Adams and Jefferson. While Harper hoped to use this 
argument as a means of inducing the Adams men to sub-
ordinate their candidate to Pinckney, however, Rutledge 
wished to see a Pinckney-Jefferson ticket and worked with 
ultimate success to advance the candidacies of both.119 The 
only loser in this three-way battle could be Adams. 
Izard and Smith did all they could for him. Edward 
Rutledge mentioned in the letter of November 1 to his son 
that "Great efforts" were being made in the state "by 
119 Harper to Ralph Izard, from Raleigh, November 4, 1796, in Ulrich B. 
Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Correspondence," American His-
torical Review, XIV (July, 1909), 783-84; Edward to Henry M. Rutledge, 
from Charleston, November 1, 1796, Rutledge Papers; Charleston City 
Gazette and Daily Advertiser, November 26, 1796, hereinafter cited as 
Charleston City Gazette. The anti-Adams essay of this date hammered on 
the old theme of the New Englander's partiality for monarchy. 
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certain Gentlemen for Mr. Adams." In early November, 
Smith sent his father-in-law, Ralph Izard, a pamphlet con-
taining the "Phocion" letters, with the admonition that 
"Every man must lend his aid to save the Country at this 
important juncture." The younger man hoped that Izard 
would go to Columbia to exert his considerable influence at 
the right moment.120 
Campaigning for the legislature, which was to choose 
the state's presidential electors, became brisk during the final 
month, and for the first time produced in the South an im-
portant facet of party development-the growth of ticketmak-
ing. Numerous tickets were sent to the press from, among 
others, "A Merchant," "A Voter," "no party man," and "a 
great many MECHANICKs." One anonymous correspondent, 
in submitting his choices, noted how much it had become 
"the fashion to present the public with new lists for members 
of the [state] house [of representatives]." Another com-
plained of being bombarded with such lists.121 
The profusion of tickets was an indication both of the 
successes and failures of the various competing political in-
terests in South Carolina in 1796. On the one hand, the 
Rutledge-Pinckney group, in particular, had been successful 
in arousing the grassroots. By 1796, Rutledge had established 
powerful support in the backcountry regions and along the 
coast. This aided his victory in the legislature that year and 
subsequently, with the support Harper added, made Fed-
eralism a statewide political force in the later 1790's.122 
On the other hand, the very number of popular tickets, 
some of them varying in composition by only a name or two, 
reveals that the bitter divisions within South Carolina's rul-
120 Smith to Izard, from Philadelphia, November 3, 1796, in Phillips, ed., 
"South Carolina Federalist Correspondence," 781-82. 
121 South Carolina Gazette and Timothy's Daily Advertiser, September 22, 
1796; Charleston City Gazette, September 27, 29, October 4, 7, 8, 10, 1796. 
122 Edward to Henry Rutledge, November 1, 1796, Rutledge Papers. 
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ing gentry produced much popular confusion as well as 
excitement. The two competing electoral slates appearing 
in the legislature in December, 123 both containing the names 
of men who considered themselves loyal supporters of the 
federal administration, emphasized the unsettled state of 
South Carolina politics at the end of Washington's presi-
dency. Federalist unity in the lowcountry and dominance 
of the state was for the moment at an end, but as yet there 
was no sign of a faction unequivocally devoted to Jeffer-
sonian republicanism. In South Carolina the lowcountry 
oligarchs and the electorate alike seemed suspended be-
tween the emerging national parties after the election of 
1796, but the chances for an immediate reunification of the 
Federalist interest seemed remote. 
After the 1796 election it seemed indeed that across the 
South the small, but apparently active and influential, Fed-
eralist factions established earlier by Hamilton and Wash-
ington were either disbanded or dormant. Elitist political 
organizations so far had been incapable of expanding the 
interests of the friends of government. A fast-rising and 
vigorous, though still poorly organized, Republican interest 
seemed in firm control throughout most of the region. The 
way back to power, superficially at least, seemed long and 
hard for southern Federalists, and elitist political tradition 
offered little guidance and no consolation. 
1 ~3 On December 10, 1796, the Charleston City Gazette reprinted the 
vote for presidential electors in the legislature as follows: 
"Jefferson's Ticket" "Adams' Ticket" 
Edward Rutledge, Sen. 113 votes A. Vanderhorst 
Genl. Pickens 112 H. W. DeSaussure 
Judge ~Iatthews 112 Genl. Barnwell 
Colonel Taylor 110 Genl. [William] Washington 
Capt. Simkins 110 David Ramsay 
John Rutledge, Jr. 109 Rohert Barnwell 
John Chesnut 109 Nathan Russell 











In the years after the election of 1796, Federalist leaders 
in the South began to rally their forces and move toward 
true party organization while making active efforts to enlist 
popular support. Their partisan politicking proved so suc-
cessful that by the midterm Congressional elections of 1798 
they had achieved nearly a parity of power and influence 
with their Republican opponents in many sections of the 
South. This sudden burst of political energy cannot be 
attributed to any discernible change in the temperament 
or the values of leading Federalist spokesmen in the South, 
but to two profoundly important developments during the 
final year of Washington's presidency. 
The first was the increasingly rapid rise of the Republican 
party in and out of Congress. The campaign in the House 
to cripple Jay's Treaty, though in the end not successful, 
nonetheless frightened many Federalists. "Though the 
anglomen have in the end got their Treaty through," Jeffer-
son remarked as the Fourth Congress prepared to rise, 
and so far have triumphed over the cause of republicanism, yet 
it has been to them a dear bought victory. it [sic] has given the 
most radical shock to their party, which it ever received; and 
there is no doubt they would be glad to be replaced on the 
ground they possessed the instant before the nomination extra-
ordinary. they [sic] see that nothing can support them but the 
colossus of the President's merits with the people and the moment 
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that he retires, that the successor, if a :Monocrat will be over-
borne by the republican sense of his constituents.1 
Adams' poor showing in the South the next fall seemed 
to support Jefferson's prediction of the eventual defeat of 
the "Monocrat" interest. In April the Republicans had lost 
their bid by only three votes to destroy the Treaty in the 
House; the following December they lost their attempt for 
the presidency by the same margin. The Federalists could 
count only two persistent supporters of Jay's Treaty among 
the southern delegations in the House during the spring; 
early the following winter their presidential candidate re-
ceived but two southern electoral votes.2 Federalist in-
fluence in the South was obviously in danger of being com-
pletely destroyed by the close of Washington's presidency. 
If it were thoroughly shut out of the South, Federalism was 
certain to perish eventually as a purely sectional interest in 
opposition to a national party. 
Appearances were somewhat deceiving, however, and 
the political situation below the Potomac at the end of 
1796 was neither sufficiently clear nor so disheartening as 
to discourage later efforts by the friends of government to 
gain popular favor. Despite notable victories, the Republi-
cans had been hesitant to wage full-scale warfare against 
the administration, both in and out of Congress. In early 
1 Jefferson to Monroe, July 10, 1796, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 100. 
2 The two southern Federalists to uphold staunchly the Treaty in debate 
and during the crucial divisions over the Livingston and Thomas Blount 
resolutions were Harper and Smith of South Carolina. In the final vote on 
the Treaty, which was carried 51 to 48, only 4 of the 51 votes came from 
the southern delegations, while of the 48 representatives voting against the 
Treaty, no less than 3.3 were from the South, plus 2 more from the frontier 
state of Kentucky. Annals of Congress, IV, 438-44, 457-64, 495-500, 514, 
530, 747-60, 782-83, 1289-91; Robert Goodloe Harper to his Constituents, 
May 2, 1796, in Elizabeth Donnan, ed., "Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796--
1815," Annual Report of the American Historical Asso,ciation, 1913 ( 2 vols.; 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), I, 21. 
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1796, Madison admitted uneasiness about the wisdom of 
continuing agitation in Congress against the Jay Treaty. 
He stated that his reluctance stemmed in part from strong 
counterreaction in favor of ratification in the northern and 
middle states.3 
Madison's wish to avoid a showdown with the President 
and with a large portion of the electorate in the northern 
states obviously was shared by many of his colleagues. The 
results of Hamilton's pro-Treaty petition campaign in the 
northern and middle states and in Virginia began to flood 
congressmen's desks at the same time that the President's 
message of refusal was being considered; and as a conse-
quence the Republicans revealed a tendency to panic and 
collapse. 4 Though the Republicans earlier had obtained 
majorities of twenty-five and twenty-two, respectively, on 
the Livingston and Blount resolutions, which assured the 
right of the House to consider controversial treaties, the 
party's fragile discipline disintegrated enough to allow the 
necessary funds for the Treaty to be voted. 
During the presidential campaign Republican leaders 
once again refused to wage partisan warfare, and they 
placed national tranquility, personal honor, and friendship 
above party and section. When, for example, Jefferson 
perceived that he and Adams might tie in the Electoral 
College, he warned his supporters to prepare to shift their 
votes to the New Englander as "he has always been my 
Senior."5 Moreover, even as late as 1796 the Republicans 
had not begun to exploit fully the vast power of public 
3 Madison to Monroe, from Philadelphia, December 20, 1795, to Jefferson, 
from Philadelphia, December 27, 1795, January 26, 1796, Madison Papers, 
Vols. 18, 19. 
4 Harper to his Constituents, May 2, 1796, in Donnan, ed., "James A. 
Bayard," I, 21. 
5 Quoted in Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency af John Adams: The 
Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, 
Inc., 1961), 200. 
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opm10n and discontent which was at their disposal. Al-
though it sincerely disliked aristocracy and "monocracy" 
and was determined to reshape American institutions and 
values along more democratic lines, the party of Madison 
and Jefferson also had emerged from the elitist tradition of 
eighteenth-century Anglo-American parliamentary politics, 
where the emphasis was upon personal self-interest and 
loose, shifting factional coalitions. The party's eventual 
triumph as a truly creative political force in the United 
States came only after years of effort to free itself from the 
tight bonds of political custom. In 1796 that effort was less 
than half complete. Stephen Kurtz' close examination of 
that year's presidential campaign indicates that more often 
than not the results of the election in any one state were 
determined on the Republican-as on the Federalist-side 
by political factions dominated by members of the tradi-
tional ruling circles. Only Pennsylvania proved to be a 
clearcut exception. o; After 1796, therefore, the friends of 
government did not need to feel that regaining political 
power in the South was an impossible task. Nor did they 
yet feel-as many did after 1800-that the whole political 
climate of the country had changed so radically because 
of Republican triumphs as to exclude them forevermore 
from a meaningful voice in the conduct of public affairs. 
If the results of the presidential election in the South 
emphasized the Republicans' strong hold over the electorate, 
they also tended to mask the remaining pockets of Federalist 
authority within the region. The 1796-1797 Congressional 
elections told a different story. In Virginia, for example, 
the outspoken Federalist, Daniel Morgan, was elected to 
Congress by the citizens of Winchester district in the north-
ern Shenandoah Valley, while in North Carolina, William 
Barry Grove was reelected from Fayetteville. Nor was 
!i Ibid., chapters 7-9. 
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South Carolina a total loss for the Federalists, which it 
seemed to be from a perusal of the state's vote in the Elec-
toral College. William Laughton Smith retained his Con-
gressional seat from Charleston, while young Robert 
Goodloe Harper swept to an impressive victory over the 
older and popular Pierce Butler in the backcountry district 
of Ninety-Six. 7 Southern Federalists thus possessed a very 
slim but active cadre in public life on which they could 
rebuild their power when the opportunity arose. 
Though many southern Federalists showed an amazing 
political ineptitude during the time of the Jay Treaty de-
bate and the election of 1796, it is nevertheless true that 
they suffered from wretched political luck in the early 
1790's. They repeatedly were identified with, and often 
forced to defend, policies which deeply outraged public 
opinion. But in December, 1796, an event in Paris gave 
the southern friends of government their first opportunity 
to exploit an issue that evoked favorable public interest. 
Earlier in the year Cotesworth Pinckney had reluctantly 
agreed to accept the French ambassadorship, thereby 
identifying himself with the administration's foreign policy. 
When Pinckney was brutally if civilly rebuffed by the 
Directory as he sought to press his credentials, friends of 
government in the South were at last handed an issue which 
could be used to identify Federalism with the defense of 
national honor and rights. A new spirit of aggressive self-
confidence swept through the southern wing of the Fed-
eralist party after Pinckney's unhappy experience, and its 
effects were as quickly felt in Philadelphia as in Virginia 
and the Carolinas. 
Pinckney's rebuke resulted from the French reaction to 
Jay's Treaty. According to an essay from Paris published 
in a North Carolina newspaper in February, 1798, France's 
7 Charleston City Gazette, October 12, 25, 1796. 
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objections to Jay's Treaty centered about two points: first, 
the Americans had no right, under the existing Franco-
American Treaty of 1778, to conclude a treaty with an 
enemy of the Republic; and secondly, current American 
trade with Great Britain, which Jay's Treaty formalized 
and organized, was in direct opposition to Article XII of 
the 1778 Treaty. 8 With these complaints as a justification 
for action, the French as early as January, 1796, began to 
seize American vessels, particularly in the West lndies.9 
The American government promptly protested to the Di-
rectory over the new policy of commercial harassment, but 
the President had concluded by mid-1796 that his complaints 
were having no effect because of the mutual admiration 
and affection existing between Ambassador Monroe and the 
Directory. As a result, Pinckney was sent to France as 
Monroe's successor, but, upon arrival, he found that he would 
not be received until the Directory was given a satisfactory 
explanation for Monroe's recall. Pinckney acted with cool-
ness during his dealings with intermediary agents of the 
Directory; but his papers were not accepted, and he eventu-
ally was forced to leave Paris for Holland, where he immedi-
ately informed his government of the incident.10 
News of Pinckney's rejection could not have reached 
Philadelphia at a worse time. Adams' administration had 
been in office less than a week, and doubts still existed in 
the minds of many whether a Federalist President from New 
England and a Republican Vice President from Virginia 
would be able to work in sufficient harmony to ensure the 
H State Ga;:,ette of North Carolina, February 1, 1798. 
!I Hamilton to \Vashington, from New York, January 19, 1796, Washing-
ton Papers, Vol. 277; J. \V. G. Prescott to John Gray Blount, from Kingston, 
Jamaica, January 19, 1796, in \Villiam Henry Masterson, ed., The John 
Grau Blount Papers, Vol. III (Raleigh: North Carolina State Department of 
History and Archives, 196.5), 8--9. 
w Memo of Secretary of \"'ar McHenry to Washington, May 14, 1797, 
\Vashington Papers, Vol. 281. 
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continuation of the Union.U Moreover, many other prob-
lems plagued the new President, including relations not 
only with political enemies of the other party, such as 
Jefferson, but with antagonists in his own party, notably 
Hamilton. 
Hamilton's position in the party at this time was at best 
equivocal. It was commonly known that he had tried to 
run Pinckney ahead of Adams the previous fall, 12 and even 
his staunchest ally in the House, Smith of South Carolina, 
had been opposed to him on this issue. By April the Hamil-
ton-Smith collaboration seems to have been restored, as 
Hamilton was gratuitously offering Smith ideas, and per-
haps polished speeches as well, on the current state of af-
fairs. The alliance between the two doubtless had been 
weakened by Smith's apostasy in 1796, however, and Hamil-
ton during 1797 turned more and more to Secretary of War 
James McHenry of Maryland as a competent aide who 
could be trusted to introduce Hamiltonian ideas into the 
Adams cabinet.13 
Beyond the problem of dealing with real and potential 
enemies, the President also felt restrained by his lack of 
support in the South. Several weeks before his inauguration 
Adams told Elbridge Gerry that "information will not be 
easy for me to obtain especially from the Southern States, 
where my Friends are generally So old and so disinclined 
to interfere, if not so indolent, that I shall be obliged to 
receive it frequently from Enemies or at least from Cold 
11 Jefferson to Madison, from Monticello, January 1, 1797, Jefferson to 
T. M. Randolph, from Philadelphia, March 11, 1797, Jefferson Papers, 
Vol. 101. 
12 John Adams to Abigail Adams, from Philadelphia, January 9, 1797, 
Adams Papers, Reel 383. 
13 Hamilton to Smith, from New York, April 5, 1797, William Laughton 
Smith Papers; Hamilton to McHenry, March 22, 1797, in Bernard C. 
Steiner, Life and Correspondence of fames McHenry (Cleveland: The 
Burrows Brothers Co., 1907), 212-13. 
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Friends." Also, the recent election still was an open wound. 
At the end of March, Adams confided to Knox his bitterness 
about what might have been. Had Jay or some others been 
the opponents in question, things might have been different, 
"but to see such a Character as Jefferson, and much more 
such an unknown being as Pinckney brought over my head 
and trampling on the Bellies of hundreds of other men 
infinitely his Superiors in Talents Services and reputation, 
filled me with apprehensions for the safety of us all, it 
demonstrated to me that if the project Succeeded our Con-
stitution could not have lasted four years."14 Clearly, a pro-
found rift existed between the President from New England 
and the southern states as his administration began. This 
sense of a New England-southern political cleavage was 
not confined to Adams' mind alone. A fellow citizen of 
Massachusetts wrote to the President in May of his fears 
that "French politics may have contaminated the true prin-
ciples of government" in the South. In late April, just before 
the special session of Congress met, Timothy Pickering 
wrote to Hamilton concerning the propriety of including 
Cotesworth Pinckney in a proposed three-man mission to 
France which Hamilton was pressing on the cabinet. Picker-
ing saw Pinckney as at best a "neutral character" who might 
hold the balance if a Republican and a Federalist were 
nominated alongside him. He was in no way considered a 
staunch friend of governmentY Such was the legacy of 
Hamilton's electoral scheme of 1796. 
The President and others who might have foreseen the 
sectionalization of the Federalist party as a result of the 
election of 1796 did not, however, sufficiently reckon with 
the various pressures within southern politics at the time, 
14 Adams to Gerry, from Philadelphia, February 20, 1797, to Knox, from 
Philadelphia, March 30, 1797, Adams Papers, Reel 117. 
1" Joseph Ward to Adams, from Newton, i\lay 5, i797, ibid., Reel 384; 
Pickering to Hamilton, April 29, 1797, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 30. 
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nor did they comprehend the enormous anti-French reaction 
which Pinckney's rebuff generated among southern political 
leaders. Only when Congress met in special session in mid-
May to deal with the growing crisis with France, topped 
by the Pinckney affair, did it become obvious that a new 
sentiment favorable to Federalism was beginning to rise 
in at least three southern states. 
Congress convened on May 16 and immediately heard a 
presidential message describing Pinckney's humiliation, a 
French decree of March 2 aimed at American commerce, 
and Adams' recommendation of a comprehensive plan for 
defense. Adams' plan included the creation of a navy and of 
coastal defenses, as well as the enlargement of the artillery 
and cavalry branches of the present army. The President 
also asked Congress to consider the establishment of a 
provisional army. 16 
The Federalist cause in the subsequent session was aided 
by Republican stupidity. Because of the insult to Pinckney 
and the commercial decree, Republicans would only have 
been following common sense had they attenuated their 
vociferous loyalties to France. Quite the opposite occurred, 
however, and, cheered on by the Vice President, the Re-
publicans in Congress had the temerity to tack an amend-
ment to the representatives' reply to Adams' speech, ex-
pressing a desire that the French be placed on a most-
favored-nation basis commercially. While the motion passed 
52 to 47, which Jefferson at the time believed was an 
adequate reflection of relative party strength, the first 
division appeared in the previously solid Virginia Republi-
can delegation. Thomas Evans, from the district composing. 
York and Mathews counties and Williamsburg, voted with 
the minority to deny France equal commercial privileges. 
The following day, when the motion was reconsidered, 
16 Kurtz, Presidency of John Adams, 230-31. 
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James Machir, from the northwestern frontier counties of 
the state, also defected from Republican ranks and voted 
with Evans and Daniel Morgan, the Federalist from Win-
chester.17 
In the following days the names of South Carolina Fed-
eralists began to appear in Jefferson's correspondence, as 
Harper and Smith led the eventually unsuccessful fight in 
the House to allow the arming of American merchantmen.18 
Insofar as the South Carolina delegation was concerned, 
however, the most significant development of the session 
was the conversion of John Rutledge, Jr., from a Republican 
to a Federalist position. 
Rutledge's conversion was not the result of a passing 
fancy or of suave but firm pressure exerted by professional 
politicians on an impressionable novice. It resulted from 
agonized deliberation in an atmosphere of assumed crisis. 
John Rutledge, Jr., as well as his uncle, had in fact had 
very close relations with Jefferson in the past. While on a 
grand tour in 1788, Rutledge had stopped in Paris, where 
he had been warmed by Jefferson's kindly solicitude. The 
American ambassador had even prepared travel notes for 
Rutledge and his companion, Thomas Lee Shippen, Jr., and 
later had sent the young men useful letters of introduction. 
At the same time the two apparently had been received with 
some coolness by John Adams, for in April, 1788, Eliza 
Rutledge had written her son, advising him to "never let 
trifles affect your spirits-! mean such as John Adams in-
solence."19 
Young Rutledge's generally Republican loyalty remained 
17 Jefferson toT. M. Randolph, June 1, 1797, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 101. 
18 Jefferson to Madison, from Philadelphia, June 8, 1797, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 20. 
19 Travel notes and letter of Jefferson to John Rutledge, Jr., from Paris, 
Summer, 1788; Jefferson to John Rutledge, Jr., March 25, 1789; Eliza 
Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Charleston, April 6, 1788, John 
Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. 
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intact throughout the early 1790's, aided no doubt by his 
uncle's cordial correspondence with Jefferson; and of course 
he had unsuccessfully opposed Hamilton's lieutenant, Wil-
liam Laughton Smith, in 1794. When he went north in 
early May, 1797, to take his seat in Congress, there seemed 
little doubt of his strong Republicanism, and his uncle sent 
along with him an almost adulatory letter to the Vice Presi-
dent.20 
As a newcomer, nonetheless, the young man was bound 
to be courted by both sides. William Laughton Smith's 
correspondence at this time reveals a sudden and unpre-
cedented surge of party spirit within the Congressional 
delegations caused by the alarming news from France and 
the threat of the first full-scale war the American Union 
ever had faced. Southern congressmen of rival political 
persuasions never would again amiably share a phaeton or 
stagecoach from their homes to Philadelphia, as Thomas 
Blount and William Barry Grove had done as late as De-
cember, 1795.21 For the first time the question of who 
lived and dined with whom became of crucial importance. 
A politician's boarding house became his castle, from which 
he sallied forth every morning to do battle with the enemy. 
Rivals within the walls were to be converted at all costs, 
ignored if conversion failed, and opposed if they had the 
temerity to proselytize. According to Smith, the Republicans 
put Rutledge on the House select committee to reply to 
Adams' May 16 speech, and then "every manoeuvre was 
practiced to seduce Rutledge and bring him over on the 
Comm."" to vote for Venable's [Republican] draft, but he 
stood out and was decidedly for a high-toned report." Pre-
~0 Edward Rutledge to Jefferson, from Charleston, May 4, 1797, Jefferson 
Papers, Vol. 10 l. 
21 Thomas to John Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, December ll, 1795, in 
Alice Barnwell Keith, ed., The john Gray Blount Papers (2 vols.; Raleigh: 
State Department of Archives and History, 1952, 1959), II, 617. 
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sumably, Rutledge was subjected to the same partisan 
barrage over the evening wine and in the House during the 
day that Smith reports was the fate of his namesake, Major 
William Smith, upon his arrivaP2 
Despite these high-pressure tactics, however, Rutledge 
remained unimpressed. As he wrote to his "Uncle Ned," 
"the flattery & artfulness of S & H [Smith and Harper] can 
make no more impressions on me than the pressure of my 
little Daughters little finger would upon the Pillars of 
Saint Philips Church."23 In this letter young Rutledge un-
loaded his contempt impartially upon not only Smith and 
Harper, but also Gallatin, Nicholas, and Livingston. All five 
"always write their Speeches and give them to the Printers," 
Rutledge reported scornfully. 
What did impress and enrage Rutledge at this time was 
the attempt by the "red hot democrats" to defend Monroe 
at Cotesworth Pinckney's expense, saying Pinckney's in-
competence was justification for his refusal by the French. 
If nothing else, this blind _determination of the Republicans 
to defend the defamers of his uncle's closest friend must 
have caused Rutledge profound unhappiness. In fact, he told 
his uncle that "I had a long conversation with our friend 
Mr. Jefferson last Sunday about much of this business," but 
it was an unsatisfactory session. Adams had just decided 
to make one more attempt at negotiations with the French 
and had submitted Cotesworth Pinckney's name as one of 
the three commissioners. The Virginia and North Carolina 
Republican senators voted solidly in the minority against 
Pinckney, which deeply shocked Rutledge-and his entire 
state when the news was received. When Rutledge tried 
22 William Loughton Smith to Ralph Izard, May 23, 29, 1797, in Ulrich B. 
Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Correspondence," American His-
torical Review, XIV (July, 1909), 786-88. 
23 June 27, 1797, Rutledge Papers. 
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to draw Jefferson out on the matter, the Vice President 
agreed to write an explanatory letter to Charleston. Rut-
ledge closed his letter with the ominous observation that 
while Jefferson was a great and good man, "the severe 
prosecution [sic] he has lately undergone ( & which con-
tinues) has occasioned a little French bias."24 
Like many others, young Rutledge also found himself 
incensed over the depredations of French cruisers and 
favored a stamp tax to implement the President's proposed 
defense system. By this time, early July, 1797, his Feder-
alism was gradually emerging. An occurrence soon after-
wards assured his conversion. 
During the debate in the House on the President's 
message, Harper implied that Monroe had been a tool of 
the Directory while in France. The excited Republicans 
immediately concluded that Monroe had become a martyr, 
and when he arrived from France several days later, an 
ostentatious public dinner was arranged in his behalf. John 
Rutledge, Jr., who disliked Monroe because of his perhaps 
unintentional involvement in Pinckney's rebuff by the Di-
rectory, reported sadly that Jefferson had attended the 
dinner. The aristocratic disdain of a haughty young low-
country oligarch is evident in Rutledge's secondhand 
description of the dinner: "Here you saw an American dis-
organized &c. there a blundering wild Irishman-in one 
corner a banished Genevan [an obvious allusion to Gallatin] 
& in another a french spye-on one side a greasy butcher & 
on another a dirty cobbler."25 By etching his portrait of the 
dinner in venom, Rutledge severed all links with the Re-
publicans. Fundamentally, by mid-1797 his quarrel with that 
party was over two issues: first, a fear-possibly justified-
that the Republicans were preparing to sell out American 
24 Ibid. 
25 John Rutledge, Jr., to Edward Rutledge, July 4, 1797, ibid. 
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interests to the Directory, and second, rage at the implied 
humiliation meted out to Cotesworth Pinckney by Republi-
can senators and others in the name of friendship for France. 
The conversion of John Rutledge, Jr., to Federalism 
boosted the party's power in the southern Congressional 
delegations. The South Carolina delegation now consisted 
of three powerful Federalist members, Smith, Harper, and 
Rutledge. Smith soon departed for Lisbon as American 
ambassador to Portugal, but he was replaced, at John 
Rutledge, Jr.'s insistence, by Thomas Pinckney, whose equally 
staunch Federalism was rapidly acknowledged, even by the 
frequently vindictive Adams clan.26 
The Virginia delegation during this session included three 
Federalists of average abilities but strong loyalties, James 
Machir, Daniel Morgan, and Thomas Evans.27 Within the 
North Carolina delegation Grove continued to represent 
the Federalists in the upper Cape Fear River valley. Thus, 
by the opening of the first regular session of the Fifth Con-
gress in October, 1797, Federalism had staged a spectacular 
revival of strength within southern Congressional delega-
tions. This was especially true of South Carolina, whose 
lowcountry representatives helped to reconstruct the old 
Federalist Congressional alliance of New England, New 
York, and coastal South Carolina. Moreover, Harper, Rut-
ledge, and Smith, and later Pinckney, were men of ability. 
All four energetically and effectively upheld the Federalist 
cause in the House during the later years of the decade, 
~o; John Rutledge, Jr., to Edward Rutledge, from Philadelphia, July 7, 
17B7; Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Charleston, August 23, 
1797, ibid.; Thomas Simons to Jacob Read, from Charleston, August 10, 
1797, Jacob Read Papers; Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, from 
Philadelphia, April 13, 1798, Adams Papers, Reel 388. 
27 All three voted with the other Federalists on the two bills of greatest 
importance considered during the session, those calling for the construction 
of six frigates and for the creation of a stamp tax to raise revenue for their 
construction. Annals of Congress, VII, 385-434. 
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and, in fact, in Harper and Rutledge the Federalists found 
their most effective floor men. 
During the spring and summer of 1797, the suddenly 
revitalized southern wing of the Federalist party in Con-
gress moved to reestablish cordial patronage communica-
tions with the President. William Laughton Smith quickly 
ingratiated himself with Adams during the special session 
of 1797 and increasingly sat at the President's dinner table. 
Considering Adams' earlier comments about his ignorance of 
southern politics, Smith presumably volunteered to en-
lighten the President about who in that region could be 
trusted and who could not. James Gunn, who had no sig-
nificant support in his own state, made himself available 
as a patronage agent of the President and on at least one 
occasion cooperated with Henry Lee of Virginia in seeking 
an appointment for a deserving but obscure Savannah Fed-
eralist, Colonel Arrnstrong.28 
The strongest evidence of increasing southern influence in 
Federalist patronage matters, however, carne in June, 1797, 
when Adams made one more attempt to negotiate American 
differences with France. He decided, after consulting the 
cabinet, to send a three-man mission to Paris. Of the three 
chosen, two were southerners-Cotesworth Pinckney and 
John Marshall. The Republicans were not alone in opposing 
Pinckney. Pickering, it will be recalled, also had grave 
reservations about the correctness of the general's views. 
Most likely Smith or Rutledge set the President's mind at 
rest about this, which must have pleased the South Carolina 
Federalists-and Edward Rutledge. 
Adams' selection of John Marshall was a signal victory 
for the Federalists of Virginia. Charles Lee had been in 
28 Smith to Ralph Izard, from Philadelphia, June 2, 1797, Phillips, ed., 
"South Carolina Federalist Correspondence," 790; James Gunn to John 
Adams, from Savannah, May 1, 1797, Adams Papers, Reel 384. 
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the administration as Attorney General since 1795, and 
with Marshall in an important post, friends of government 
in Virginia could feel that they once again enjoyed a sensible 
influence in national affairs. Adams and Marshall had not 
met prior to the latter's arrival in Philadelphia in prepara-
tion for his journey to Paris. However, the two quickly 
established a cordial, trusting relationship which endured 
on an official level until 1801. Writing to Gerry in early 
July, the President remarked that "Pinckney & marshall [sic] 
are able and honourable and virtuous men." After his dis-
cussions with Marshall the President was even more en-
thusiastic. "General Marshall took leave of me last night," 
the President informed Gerry; "he is a plain man, very 
Sensible, Cautious, guarded & learned in the Law of Nations 
-I think you will be pleased with him." Marshall, in turn, 
was pleased and impressed with Adams' character and 
abilities.29 From that time on, Marshall's talents and in-
fluence were assured of prominence over a wider area than 
Richmond or Virginia. 
While southern Federalists reestablished influence within 
their state Congressional delegations and restored patronage 
contacts with the administration, friends of government 
in the South on state and occasionally even local levels 
moved slowly toward party organization. 
In Virginia, 1797 was a year of growth and consolidation 
for the Federalists. It opened with friends of government 
in an ugly mood over the results of the recent election and 
determined to do anything to alter their unfavorable posi-
tion. Specifically, David Stuart initiated a movement to 
deprive "any emigrant to this Country to have the right of 
voting or being voted for at an election-They were by far 
~n Washington to Gerry, July 7, 17, 1797, Adams Papers, Reel 117; Mar-
shall to Mrs. Marshall, from Philadelphia, July 2, 1797, in "Letters of John 
~Iarshall to His Wife," William and Mary Quarterly, Series 2, III (April, 
1923), 73. 
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the most zealous among us, and the most influential." As 
early as December, 1796, Stuart was writing to friends in the 
Virginia Assembly hoping to get such a law passed by that 
body.30 The seeds of alien and sedition legislation thus were 
sown early on Virginia soil. 
Talk among Virginia Federalists of mounting a legislative 
offensive aimed at the presumed sources of Republican 
power was matched by a growing intimacy between Rich-
mond and Philadelphia Federalists by the turn of the year. 
Randolph, who had defected to the Republicans after his 
disgrace as Secretary of State in the Fauchet affair, informed 
Madison in early January that the area of Virginia around 
Richmond "is very little more ... than a colony of Phila-
delphia. No conversation, no object political commercial, 
and in many instances, legal, can occur, without looking up 
to that city as the standard. . . . Whatever is said in favor 
of the government is circulated under franks from the 
treasury &c. But not a Virginia eye has seen Gallatin's 
pamphlet, Dwight's address to the President, &c. &c."31 
Despite Federalist attempts to make at least the Rich-
mond area a closed society, politically speaking, the spring 
elections went against them as usual, though the voters did 
send three Federalists to Philadelphia, something never 
before accomplished. According to Marshall, the Republi-
cans were able to convince many voters that current tensions 
with France were a result solely of the Jay Treaty. Despite 
the election results, however, there was strong indication 
that by this time Marshall and others of like philosophy 
throughout the state were preparing to combat actively the 
current Republican predominance. In separate letters to the 
Attorney General, Marshall and his political ally, Jonathan 
ao Stuart to Washington, from Hope Park, December 18, 1796, Wash-
ington Papers, Vol. 282. 
31 Randolph to Madison, January 8, 1797, from Richmond, Madison 
Papers, Vol.-20. 
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Hopkins, exhibited detailed knowledge of political affairs 
and of sources of Federalist loyalty in most of the counties 
east of the Blue Ridge and north of the James. Hopkins, 
moreover, was well aware of the Federalist leanings of 
Evans, Machir, and Morgan even before the three reached 
Philadelphia. 32 
Beyond the Richmond Federalists' increasing preoccupa-
tion with political affairs throughout the state, there were 
indications of widespread Federalist activity prior to the 
spring elections. Republicans freely admitted this. In the 
Congressional district of Louisa, Spotsylvania, and Orange 
counties, for example, rival candidates were in constant 
attendance at the courts and places of public meetings, "pay-
ing their respects to the freeholders so that neither will 
ascribe their disappointment to his indolence." Moreover, 
for the first time leading Republicans worried about the 
outcome of elections to both Assembly and Congressional 
seats. It is clear from contemporary correspondence that 
the rapid development of Republican party organization in 
Virginia at least was partially a reaction to a corresponding 
growth of Federalist spirit, harmony, and effectiveness there 
during and after 1797.33 
Virginia Federalists did not cease their activities after 
the elections; they simply shifted the emphasis of their at-
tack. In June, Federalist judges at Richmond "courted 
presentments" from their grand jury that deplored any 
criticism of federal officials. According to one incensed 
Republican, these presentments were calculated to check 
freedom of speech, and there seems to be litttle doubt that 
the Virginia Federalists at this time were attempting to 
promote a popular sense of unquestioned loyalty to the 
:l:! John ~arshall to Charles Lee, from Richmond, April 20, 1797; Hopkins 
to Charles Lee, from Richmond, April 21, 1797, Adams Pap~rs, Reel 384. 
:l:l Joseph Jones to ~1adison, from Charlottesville, February 5, 1797, and 
from Fredericksburg, ~larch 8, 27, 1797, Madison Papers, Vol. 20. 
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national administration, using the growing crisis with France 
as the excuse.34 
The next and most important step by Virginia Federalists 
to expand and strengthen their party apparatus came in the 
fall. According to one Republican observer, little formal 
party spirit existed in western Virginia even at this date, 
as party battles continued to be confined largely to "the 
great Towns" east of the Blue Ridge.a:; Therefore, it would 
be a great advantage if the Federalists in Virginia could 
unite the active supporters of Patrick Henry in 1796, who 
seemed to be centered in the Alexandria area, with the 
members of the Richmond Federalist faction. By mid-
October this had been accomplished in a manner typical 
of Virginia Federalism: Leven Powell's relative and business 
agent, Burr Powell, was cut in on the spoils accruing from 
the :Marshall-Lee Fairfax purchase.:ln Thereafter a Rich-
mond-Alexandria Federalist axis in Virginia, led by John 
Marshall and Leven Powell, respectively, functioned 
harmoniously. When in June, 1798, Powell decided to run 
for Congress, he immediately informed Charles Lee of his 
decision and received Lee's pleased approbation in reply.37 
The year 1797 did not bring a similar rejuvenation of 
Federalist fortunes in North Carolina. Davie, Johnston, and 
:H Uriah Honest to John Adams, from Georgetown, June 2.'3, 1797, Adams 
Papers, Reel 384; Peregrine Fitzhugh to Jefferson, from Washington County, 
~1aryland, June 20, 1797, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 102. 
3~ Arthur Campbell to Jefferson, from \Vashington County, Virginia, 
September 30, 1797, ibid. 
:w Leven Powell to Burr Powell, November 21, 1790, January 30, 1791, 
in \Villiam E. Dodd, ed., "Correspondence of Leven Powell," The John P. 
Branch llisttJrical Papers of Randolph-Macon College (Richmond: Everett 
\\1adding Co., 1901), I, 224-29; agreement between Burr Powell and Charles 
i\Iarshall representing James and John Marshall and Henry Lee, Marshall 
Family Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va. James 
~lachir was also brought into the Fairfax group sometime during the late 
1790's. Sec indenture between John Marshall and wife and James Machir, 
dated May 15, 1799, ibid. 
:n Lee to Powell, from Philadelphia, June 6, 1798, in Dodd, ed., "Leven 
Powell," 230. 
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other veterans remained in retirement from politics, and 
the Blounts were now solid Republicans, apparently much 
to the anger of many friends of government in the state.38 
Early in the year Davie commented bitterly upon the 
Blounts' apostacy and also expressed uneasiness about ever-
worsening Franco-American relations. "These madmen," 
he said of the French, "possess nothing upon which you 
can certainly calculate; no moral principle, no fixed political 
data; they seem to have no system but anarchy, no plan 
but plunder and military tyranny."39 Johnston also was 
enraged by French conduct. "Nothing can be more odious 
and despicable than that Republican pride and haughtiness 
which they affect on all occasions," he wrote to Iredell in 
the spring.40 Yet apparently the two did not transfer their 
anger into effective political action. According to Johnston, 
politics were scarcely mentioned at the spring term at Hali-
fax Court, and the public storm which had swept through 
the nation seems to have passed North Carolina by. In late 
May, Iredell delivered a fiery, partisan charge to the District 
Grand Jury at Richmond, which resulted in presentments 
against those in any way critical of public officials. Samuel 
J. Cabell promptly wrote a reply, and Iredell followed just 
as quickly with a defense. The judge was encouraged in 
his struggle by both Johnston and Davie, but again, the two 
went no further in defense of Federalism.41 
Though North Carolina's nominal Federalist leaders were 
38 John Gray Blount to Capt. J. L. B. Monyard, from Washington (N.C.), 
February 8, 1797, in Masterson, ed., John Gray Blount, III, 132-33. The 
Blounts' adherence to the Republican interest by 1796 assured that group 
of the undivided loyalty of the new state of Tennessee, which was virtually 
owned by William Blount. See ibid., 63n.; and William to John Gray 
Blount, from Knoxville, November 7, 1797, ibid., 175-76. 
39 Davie to Iredell, from Halifax, February 1, 1797, Iredell Papers. 
40 Johnston to Iredell, May 3, 1797, from Williamstown, in Griffith J. 
McRee, ed., Life and Correspondence of James Iredell (2 vols.; New York: 
Peter Smith, 1947), II, 503. 
41 Ibid., 507-15. 
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publicly silent and inactive during the first year of Adams' 
administration, North Carolina's newspapers were not. In 
such a decentralized political society as that of North Caro-
lina a vigorous, united press was the most important, co-
hesive element in public life. As early as the winter of 1797 
the established newspapers began to move toward a position 
of moderate Federalism that they held throughout the presi-
dency of John Adams and the election of 1800. Abraham 
Hodge's Minerva led the way. Hodge had been a staunch 
friend of government in the early 1790's, until he was ap-
parently silenced by the huge weight of anti-administration 
opinion in the state. The simultaneous growth of Franco-
American tensions and the intense Republican opposition to 
the Jay Treaty, however, reactivated his Federalist loyalties. 
In January, 1797, he ridiculed the French for allegedly 
making war on the United States as a means of chastising 
the Americans for their refusal to elect the tool of French 
interests, Thomas Jefferson. Toward the end of the year 
Hodge concentrated his editorial fire on the Republicans 
alone, charging them in what would soon become con-
ventional party rhetoric with being "an abandoned, despic-
able and unprincipled faction."42 
News of Pinckney's rebuff was enough to send the other 
North Carolina editors hurrying after Hodge. Allamand 
Hall's Wilmington Gazette reprinted material from the Fed-
eralist printer, Peter Porcupine, which sought to arouse 
American patriotism against the French. 43 In Edenton the 
State Gazette of North Carolina attempted to stir the public's 
anger as early as February by reprinting every available 
scrap of information about French seizures of American 
shipping, and in September reprinted rumors of secret en-
listments by French agents from among the backcountrymen 
42 North Carolina Minerva, January 21, November 4, 1797. 
43 Wilmington Gazette, April 20, 1797. 
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of South Carolina.44 At New Bern, Alexander Martin,s North 
Carolina Gazette, in addition to publishing accounts of 
French commercial depredations, delivered a long tirade 
against the French and the party of Thomas Jefferson based 
upon the filibustering expedition with which William Blount 
was identified. Blount always had voted with the "French in-
terest" in Congress and had been "intimate with Jefferson, 
Giles, Nicholas, Venable, the French minister and consul, 
and in fine with all the agents of the French republic." 
Could it not be concluded, then, that his ill-starred journey 
was part of a plot laid in Paris to establish a new French 
Republic in America? Evidence indicated that Blount had 
first approached the British ambassador with his scheme of 
a western conquest and the establishment of a new state in 
the Southwest, but the British ambassador had discouraged 
him. Evidently the French had not. Moreover, "it is said 
that the late president received accurate information from 
an authentic source in France, as long ago as the year '90 
or '91 even before the death of the King, that a deep laid 
and well digested plan had been formed by the government 
of that country to establish a republic in America, to rival 
and balance that of the United States." The essay suggested 
that the Whiskey Rebellion "if not created, was at least 
fostered by French influence" a further reference to the 
Federalists' current favorite figure of scorn, Albert Gallatin.45 
Such an outpouring of contempt toward the Republicans 
must be balanced against the traditional Anglophobia of 
many North Carolinians and indeed many southerners. No 
editor or politician was prepared to embrace England simply 
as a result of rejecting France. Even the staunchest Fed-
eralist essayists pointed out that Americans should be "alive 
44 State Gazette of North Carolina, February 16, March 2, September 14, 
1797. 
45 North Caroli1Ul Gazette, February 4, March 25, August 5, 1797. 
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to insults and injuries, from any foreign nation whatever."46 
Attacks upon French insolence and provocations were de-
signed to reveal that at this stage of international politics, 
France was no better than England. Such an attitude was 
best expressed by "A Citizen of N. Carolina," who wrote in 
Hall's Wilmington Gazette on the eve of elections for the 
state Assembly. As in Virginia and elsewhere, the Franco-
American crisis was forcing many North Carolina politicians 
to take a public stand on the issue of what the response of 
the individual and of the nation should be to France. "In 
this conjuncture of circumstances," the "Citizen" said, "it 
behoves [sic] us as a deliberate people to be prudent in the 
exercise of our rights as electors-to call up as our Repre-
sentatives in Legislation true Americans, only Americans in 
heart and principle-Persons of known integrity and patriot-
ism, whose interest is intimately connected with our own; 
and who disclaiming all foreign influence and partizanning 
will unite in their councils." The citizen emphasized that 
when he spoke of eliminating all with a tinge of foreign 
influence from the conduct of public policy, he meant all. 
Citizens of Great Britain, no matter how long their residence 
in North Carolina, had not been relinquished by their gov-
ernment, "and they cannot liberate themselves." At the 
same time "let us determine to exclude from our Legislative 
Councils as well the restless and vivacious Frenchman 
(though we are under never to be forgotten obligations to 
his country) for he may be a partizan: as the haughty and 
insolent Englishman, whose friendship to America we 
know; whose tender mercies to us have been cruelties."47 
Such were the beginnings in 1797 of a distinct Fed-
eralist ideology in the South, which if not Hamiltonian and 
pro-British in tone, was certainly anti-French in emphasis. 
46 North Carolina Minerva, November 4, 1797. 
47 Wilmington Gazette, August 24, 1797. 
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It advocated a middle course between J acobinism, on the 
one hand, and Anglomania, on the other. Its orientation 
was toward the development of a distinctive American 
consciousness and patriotism characterized by loyalty to 
indigenous institutions and leaders who had purged them-
selves of any allegiance to foreign doctrines and govern-
ments. Increasing anti-Gallican sentiments were a natural 
outgrowth of a preoccupation with the loyal defense of 
American interests. 
This ideology of unreflective patriotism, coupled with a 
somewhat sinister hint of the need for a purge of all disloyal 
elements within the state, could not help but ultimately at-
tract a significant amount of public support at a time when 
the country at large came to believe increasingly in the 
imminence of war.48 Because it was espoused honestly, such 
an ideology was all the more potent. 
Throughout 1797 and into 1798, as the crisis with France 
slowly mounted, it appeared that the Federalist editors and 
essayists in North Carolina were making little impression on 
public opinion within or beyond the borders of the state. 
At the same time North Carolina Republicans followed the 
lead of their colleagues elsewhere in maintaining an un-
wavering public loyalty to the French Republic.49 Once the 
XYZ affair became public knowledge, however, the teach-
ings of Hodge, Hall, Martin, and other Federalist ideologists 
in North Carolina began to take hold. The electorate re-
sponded to the demand that it view with malice any at-
tempts from any quarter to subvert American honor or 
independence, and thus Federalist strength in North Caro-
lina and throughout the South enjoyed an astonishing 
revival. 
48 Thomas to John Gray Blount, January 25, March 10, 1798, in Master-
son, ed., John Gray Blount, III, 198, 199, 215. 
49 Thomas to John Gray Blount, March 10, 1798, ibid., 215. 
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Federalism's fortunes in South Carolina in 1797 largely 
revolved about the growing estrangement of the powerful 
Rutledge faction from the person and policies of Thomas 
Jefferson. Edward Rutledge's trust in his nephew remained 
unshaken throughout the year, surviving even the young 
congressman's open break with Jefferson and his party. 
Moreover, the elder Rutledge admired the President's firm 
but prudent conduct, admitting that Adams' speech of May 
16 was "substantially sound."50 Still, his correspondence 
with John Rutledge, Jr., revealed a lingering hope that 
"harmony and Union with the French Republic might be 
maintained," and that resultant divisions in Congress might 
be closed.51 In the latter part of the year, however, two 
incidents bound Rutledge in firm allegiance to Federalism. 
In late October a French privateer boldly penetrated the 
Charleston harbor and burned a British ship at anchor. 
Later this privateer also captured two American ships off 
the port. One of the captured merchantmen was from 
Charleston itself, the other from Savannah.52 
In November a far more alarming incident occurred, 
one which certainly terrorized South Carolinians of all po-
litical persuasions in all regions of the state. A conspiracy 
to stage a bloody uprising in the lowcountry was uncovered 
among Charleston slaves. According to one of Jacob Read's 
acquaintances, the conspiracy was suppressed at the last 
moment as a result of information supplied to the whites 
by local Negroes. The general consensus in Charleston was 
that the conspiracy had originated among "French Negroes" 
who had come from the West India islands where unrest 
50 Edward Rutledge to Henry M. Rutledge, May 31, 1797, Rutledge 
Papers. 
51 Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Charleston, May 19, 
June 2, 9, 1797, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers. 
:;2 Affidavit of Governor Charles Pinckney, October 22, 1797, Adams 
Papers, Reel 385. 
164 I Prologue to Democracy 
among slaves was becoming endemic. Both Edward Rut-
ledge and Read's correspondent emphasized this point.53 
Here was chilling evidence to support Ralph Izard's earlier 
warning that French democratic ideology constituted a di-
rect threat to the interests and even the lives of slaveholders, 
not only in the lowcountry, but, increasingly, in the back-
country as well. 
The foiled conspiracy made a convert of Edward Rut-
ledge. In the legislative session in December he led the 
forces clamoring for a strong defense budget that would 
include provisions for the defense of the harbor at Charles-
ton and the fitting out of a number of galleys for coastal 
defense. When the fight proved unsuccessful, Rutledge 
turned to his nephew at Philadelphia for aid. When this 
also failed, the elder Rutledge wrote sadly of finding so 
little inclination in Congress to defend the country. "We are 
in fact a much altered people," Rutledge admitted, "and 
are no more like what we were some twenty years ago [the 
date of the Franco-American Treaty] than the Italians are 
like the Romans."54 Until his death two years later Edward 
Rutledge never again strayed from the Federalist fold. 
Only in Georgia did the Federalists fail to regain strength 
in 1797. The public did not forget the Yazoo scandal, in 
which Federalist politicians were implicated deeply. Also, 
Georgians did not forgive the administration for its blunder-
ing activities in the summer of 1796 concerning the state's 
attempts to purchase large tracts of western lands from the 
Creeks. 
i>3 J. Alison to Jacob Read, from Charleston, December 5, 1797, Read 
Papers. Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Charleston, November 
21, 1797, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers. 
i>4 Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Columbia, December 13, 
1797, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University 
of :'\orth Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.; Edward Hutledge to John Rutledge, 
Jr., from Charleston, January 23, 1798, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Duke 
University Library, Durham, N. C. 
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Moreover, Georgians were not thoroughly convinced that 
the Jay Treaty actually had removed the British threat. The 
presence of warships of the Royal Navy off the southern 
coast of Georgia and rumors that they intended a landing 
at St. Augustine did nothing to calm jumpy nerves in the 
border state. " ... perhaps it may appear at a future day 
that we had better have had no Treaty," James Habersham, 
a nominally Federalist Savannah merchant, wrote at the end 
of ~1arch. He feared that any partiality shown to Spain, 
France, or Great Britain by the United States would upset 
the uneasy balance of power existing between the three 
pertaining to Florida and Louisiana. Any breach of the 
peace in this area could only harm Georgia. In such an 
atmosphere most of the old Federalists were disinclined to 
carry on party warfare. Lachlan Mcintosh claimed that he 
had gone "every length" to restore "what we lost by the 
last election," but he had received little aid; and James 
Gmm's unwillingness to work actively to revive Federalist 
fortunes in Georgia left Mcintosh embittered and politically 
impotent.55 
Despite the continued hostility of Georgia, Federalist 
strength in the South by the beginning of 1798 had improved 
amazingly since the election of 1796. In South Carolina 
and Virginia, the two most economically powerful and 
politically active southern states, increasingly effective Fed-
eralist factions had reemerged, composed of alert personnel 
and enjoying wide contacts within traditional local govern-
ing circles. In North Carolina a popular press, generally 
favoring Adams' brand of Federalism, was telling the elec-
torate of the need to place American interests and honor 
r.r; James Habersham to Joseph Habersham, March 30, 1797, Preston Davie 
Papers; Lachlan ~lclntosh to Elisha B. Hopkins, from Louisville, Geor1,>ia, 
February 6, 1797, in Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "Papers of Lachlan ;\lclntosh," 
Collections of the Georgia Historical Society (Savannah: Georgia Historical 
Society, 1957), XII, 161-62. 
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above narrow partisanship or vague allegiance to a liberal 
ideal of political behavior. Considering the existing political. 
situation, such an attitude could only benefit the Federalist 
cause. Within a matter of months southern Federalists 
would be handed an unparalleled opportunity to employ 
their rapidly developing skills and to exploit further popular 
dissatisfaction in a strong bid for dominance in the region. 
V. ~the Flood, 
1798 
In 1798 Federalism reached the apex of its influence in the 
southern states. State organizations were somewhat ex-
panded in size, a large influx of more or less active followers 
entering Federalist ranks on county and local levels as a 
result of popular agitation over the XYZ crisis. Moreover, 
relations with the electorate were maintained on a broader, 
more direct and intense basis. And southern Federalists 
at Philadelphia participated fully and effectively in the 
party's struggle for national supremacy over the Jeffer-
sonian Republicans. Of greatest importance and signifi-
cance, however, was the emergence of a distinct and un-
mistakably favorable Federalist image in the southern mind. 
The disclosure of the XYZ affair further escalated Franco-
American tensions, and Americans were aware that they 
were living in a time of extreme national peril. The earlier 
efforts by the friends of government to emphasize on local 
and state levels patriotic devotion to current national in-
stitutions and leaders now began to sway public opinion 
noticeably. The President's continued efforts to seek friend-
ly relations with the Directory commensurate with the 
demands of national honor also had its effect, and Federal-
ism came to symbolize responsible political conservatism in 
the minds of a growing number of southerners. 
The revelation of the XYZ affair in March, 1798, excited 
public opinion in America more than any incident since the 
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publication of Jay's Treaty some three years before. A 
traveler passing through central North Carolina the follow-
ing July noted that in Raleigh, Fayetteville, Rockingham, 
and Louisbourg, "an unanimity of sentiment prevailed 
among all circles of the people with regard to our difference 
with France. All seem to regret our misunderstanding, but 
are ready to take up arms in defense of their country in this 
time of necessity." Weeks before Abigail Adams had 
written to her son in the same vein. Never before had her 
love for the people shone with such clarity and her respect 
for their wisdom been so clearly expressed as at this moment 
when they declared their unequivocal support for her hus-
band's conduct. "The immense addresses which are raining 
in from all quarters," the President's lady wrote, were "like 
a flood from North Carolina to the province of Main [sic]. 
They breath [sic] one spirit, they speak one language, that 
of Independent Freemen, approving the measures of Gov-
ernment, and expressive of a full confidence in the wisdom, 
virtue and integrity of the Chief Magistrate."1 
In truth, Federalists throughout the South moved swiftly 
to consolidate the immense advantage which Messrs. X, Y, 
and Z had so unwittingly handed them. Once again they 
used the ad hoc urban and county public meeting to stress 
their position as rightful spokesmen for the popular tem-
perament. In Virginia, 306 persons signed a petition cir-
culated at a meeting in Richmond, while a similar assembly 
in the Tidewater county of Westmoreland produced 416 
signatures. As in 1795, the friends of government had 
tangible support outside the towns and older planter-
dominated counties of the Tidewater and Potomac River 
areas. The President received petitions of support and 
approbation from citizens in Botetourt County in the south-
1 North Carolina Minerva, July 7, 1798; Abigail Adams to John Quincy 
Adams, from Philadelphia, May 26, 1798, Adams Papers, Reel 388. 
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ern Shenandoah Valley and from Harrison County in the 
extreme northwestern portion of the state. In all there 
are extant addresses from citizens' meetings in Alexandria, 
Portsmouth, Norfolk, Petersburg, Richmond, and from nine 
counties scattered throughout Virginia; and in all probabil-
ity Adams received some others.~ 
Virginia Federalists, by and large, were pleased with their 
efforts. Washington indicated his satisfaction with the ap-
parent volte face in popular opinion in the state, despite 
receiving a few unpleasant resolutions, notably from 
Fredericksburg. "All the upper most populace and hardy 
yeomanry of this State have come, and are coming forward, 
with strong addresses to the Executive," Washington re-
ported. He also underscored the growing concern of many 
Federalists with mustering as many expressions of popular 
support as possible when he complained of the lack of ef-
fective local leadership in many counties in the central por-
tion of Virginia. Washington claimed that such lack of 
efficient Federalist leadership on the local level in this area 
prevented the impressive display of popular consensus from 
becoming unanimous.'! 
If the petition campaign of the spring, summer, and 
autumn of 1798 is any indication, the most surprising shift 
in public opinion toward the President and his party in the 
South was in North Carolina. The Adams Papers and the 
North Carolina press of that day contain separate addresses 
from eight counties and two towns, Raleigh and Fayette-
ville.4 As in the case of Virginia, however, the extant peti-
tions probably represent only a fraction of those Adams 
received from that state, for the public support which he won 
2 Norfolk Herald, May 3, 8, 10, 12, 1798; Adams Papers, Reels 119, 388. 
3 Washington to Hamilton, from Mount Vernon, May 27, 1798, Hamilton 
Papers, Vol. 30. 
4 Adams Papers, Reels 119, 388~89; North Carolina Minerva, May 19, 
June 16, 1798; Wilmington Gazette, August 30, 1798, April 4, 1799. 
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in the North Carolina General Assembly the following De-
cember was striking in its breadth and depth. 
In South Carolina the XYZ disclosures accelerated the 
already existing trend toward Federalism. A meeting held 
in May at Charleston resulted in a pledge of support to the 
Constitution, the government, and the independence of the 
nation and castigated France for imposing "the most humil-
iating demands" upon the United States.5 At the same time, 
however, the participants expressed displeasure at the tardi-
ness of the national government in providing defenses for 
the city's unprotected harbor. Soon thereafter a committee, 
headed by Edward Rutledge, was formed to investigate 
the possibility that South Carolina might do for herself 
what the federal government refused to do. The President 
concurrently received further assurances of support from 
public meetings in St. Luke's Parish and Kershaw County 
and from the general meeting of South Carolina's Cincinnati 
Society.6 
Federalist prospects revived only modestly in Georgia as 
a result of the XYZ affair. The prior partiality of the frontiers-
men of the state to the Yazoo faction had not yet disappeared, 
and there is evidence that in 1798 the upcountrymen were 
encouraged by certain members of the federal government 
to oppose the leadership of James Jackson. Adams first 
received petitions of support from meetings in Augusta and 
the small village of Washington in Wilkes County, which 
had voted Federalist in the previous presidential election.7 
Somewhat later, meetings in St. Mary's, Glynn, and Mcintosh 
counties expressed similar sentiments, and a traveler in the 
backcountry at the time observed that the entire western 
portions of Georgia and Tennessee supported the President's 
"Undated address, Adams Papers, Reel 388. 
u Ibid., Reels 388, 389, 391; Charleston City Gazette, October 11, 1798. 
7 Adams Papers, Reels 119, 388; Augusta Chronicle, August 11, 1798. 
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foreign policy. Here was no instinctive expression of a con-
servative temperament, but rather a heartfelt appreciation 
for a carefully chosen course of action designed to warn 
France and her Spanish ally against taking too many liberties 
with American honor and rights. H 
One Georgia Federalist attempted to capitalize on this 
sentiment. As a high-ranking member of the Georgia militia, 
James Gunn pressured all units under his command during 
the middle months of 1798 to send approbatory addresses 
to the President.9 Gunn's motives, however, apparently 
were highly personal. He seems not to have coordinated 
his activities with Mcintosh, Jones, or the other surviving 
members of the earlier Federalist faction in the state; rather 
he was concerned with demonstrating his own loyalty and 
efficiency to the party leaders at Philadelphia. 
James Jackson sensed growing danger from another 
quarter, however. Since 1796 John Stith had led a group 
of Federalist-oriented "aristos" in Augusta in steady opposi-
tion to the Jackson Republicans in the legislature. By the 
autumn of 1798, Jackson indicated that Georgia's reaction 
to the XYZ issue had encouraged the members of this small 
group to make a concerted campaign to challenge Republi-
can control of Georgia. Thus, it appeared that Stith and his 
allies might be the agents through which two-party politics 
would be reestablished within the state.10 
There is no indication that Federalist leaders in Phila-
delphia carefully criticized the contents of the addresses 
from the southern states which arrived in such profusion 
after the news of the XYZ affair. In the summer of 1798 
8 Augusta Chronicle, September 15, 1798. 
9 Gunn to Timothy Pickering, from Savannah, October 1, 1798, Adams 
Papers, Reel 391. 
10 James Jackson to John Milledge, November 14, 1798, April 2, 1801, 
in Harriet Milledge Salley, ed., Correspondence af Governor john Milledge 
(Columbia, S. C.: State Commercial Printing Co., 1949), 58, 71. 
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their party was riding an unprecedented crest of popularity, 
and they apparently surrendered to the very human propen-
sity not to examine the reasons for their success. Yet the 
tone of these petitions was unmistakably singular and should 
have warned party leaders against taking controversial steps. 
Southern citizens duly execrated French corruption and 
arrogance and expressed a sanguine determination to defend 
American honor and rights by force of arms, if necessary. 
Almost without exception, however, the petitioners also 
strongly hoped that war would not be necessary and im-
plicitly sought to pressure the President into further negotia-
tions with the Directory. The usual assumption in these 
petitions was that this in fact would be his future course of 
action. The emerging Federalist orientation of many south-
erners-as of many in the northern states-in 1798 was 
actually a fragile temperament requiring careful cultivation 
if it were to last. 
There was as yet little direct indication of Federalist 
imprudence by the time of the off-year Congressional elec-
tions in the Carolinas and Georgia in the late summer and 
autumn. In North Carolina, where the decidedly pro-
government bias of the press was of inestimable aid, the 
Federalists' popularity had continued unabated. Published 
letters from members of the state's Congressional delegations 
helped to maintain a sense of crisis after the XYZ dis-
closures, and astute Federalist editors printed all the wild 
rumors and gossip available to add to the excitement. 
Allam and Hall of the Wilmington Gazette was especially 
assiduous, and in August he reprinted a story from New 
York City, a Federalist stronghold, concerning ostensible 
French hopes of an uprising against the national government 
which was to be led by Chancellor Livingston. Frenchmen 
in Guadaloupe, it was further stated, were 9penly claiming 
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"that there were enough Frenchmen in this country [referr-
ing to the United States] to BURN ALL OUR CITIES AND CUT THE 
THHOATS OF ALL THE INHABITANTS-that we should therefore 
be afraid to do any act that might risque a war with 
France."11 Such thinly veiled and vicious attacks upon the 
Republican opposition became more explicit later in the 
year when news of George Logan's private mission to the 
Directory was uncovered. Logan's embassy immediately 
was labeled an act of treason.12 
Washington's appointment in July to command the newly 
created provisional army offered North Carolina Federalist 
editors the opportunity to exploit further the ideals of 
patriotism and nationalism which had brought the party 
its current popularity. The editor of the State Gazette of 
North Carolina was delighted at the news of Washington's 
return to public life. "Every American heart must leap with 
joy at the above nomination," he wrote. "wASHINGTON, the 
saviour of his country! wASHINGTON the brave, the great, 
who, after having, through toils, fatigues and dangers, given 
liberty and independence to America, and raised [her] to 
a rank among the nations of the earth, flew to enjoy, in the 
bosom of Vernon's shades, the peace he had so nobly won, 
is yet willing to leave those happy scenes, again to lead the 
armies forth." Following this strenuous exercise in reverence 
for the Father of his Country, the Federalist editor went 
on to admonish his readers to exert themselves in no less 
a degree: 
If there is a single son of Columbia who now feels not his whole 
soul roused to energetic activity, whose bosom does not glow 
with the holy flame, let him contemplate the noble conduct of 
our Hero, and then, if he can suffer his musket to rust, or his 
11 Wilmington Gaz(;fte, May 31, August 30, 1798. 
12 Ibid., November 15, 1798. 
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trusty blade to remain undrawn in its mouldy scabbard, let him 
do so, but let him also resign the honorable title of American.n 
Appeals such as the above did little to boost enlistments 
in the new army, which never obtained its full quota of 
volunteers during its brief period of existence. As calls for 
support of the national government, however, such exhorta-
tions undoubtedly helped to produce tangible political bene-
fits for Federalism, for the next year Jefferson found it 
politically necessary to set up Joseph Gales and his Re-
publican press at Raleigh in an effort to break Federalism's 
stranglehold on North Carolina's newspapers. 
By the time of the Congressional elections the Federalists 
could count upon the backing of an outspoken partisan 
press and popular support, not only in all of the diverse 
geographic areas in the state, but within nearly every 
socioeconomic interest group as well. The elections indi-
cated that Federalism enjoyed still another immeasurable 
advantage in North Carolina. Its ranks were being infused 
with young blood. Indeed, some of the older party mem-
bers indicated a positive disinclination to stand for high 
public office in this year of triumph. Johnston refused Ire-
dell's request to seek a Congressional seat, though he later 
performed valuable service in the General Assembly.14 
Davie found himself under strong pressure from Grove and 
others to run for the governorship, but consented only 
grudgingly, though he eventually won. He indicated more 
interest in finding a high position in the provisional army. 
Eventually, however, Davie was able to satisfy his martial 
ambitions to some degree while fulfilling the desires of his 
friends. As governor, he became a dependable agent and 
13 State Gazette of North Carolina, July 18, 1798. 
14 Johnston to Iredell, July 5, November 28, 1798, in Griffith J. McRee, ed., 
Life and Correspondence of ]ames Iredell (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 
1947), II, 531, 537-38. 
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adviser to Hamilton and Cotesworth Pinckney, helping them 
to staff the officer corps of the army. 15 
While older friends of government in North Carolina 
were seeking to evade the burden of national public office, 
an ambitious group of novices eagerly sought it. Soon after 
the results of the elections were released, one newspaper 
claimed seven of the state's ten representatives for Federal-
ism. Grove himself expressed pleasure with the outcome in 
all districts save Hillsboro. 16 It appeared certain that the Fed-
eralists, at least initially, could now count upon the firm 
allegiance of William Barry Grove, as well as upon the 
newcomers, Joseph Dickson, William H. Hill, Archibald 
Henderson, David Stone, and Willis Allston. Three of the 
new men, Dickson, Hill, and Henderson, represented west-
ern districts. Henderson, especially, proved to be a valuable 
acquisition. Operating out of his home in Salisbury, which 
had been Steele's center of influence some years before, 
Henderson worked strenuously to increase Federalist in-
fluence in the western part of the state. His efforts in the 
Congressional campaign brought victory not only to him-
self, but to Dickson and Hill as well.17 
I:i \Villiam Barry Grove to James McHenry, from Fayetteville, August 
20, 1798, James McHenry Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. 
It may well have been, moreover, that Davie had something to do either 
with successfully implicating Thomas Blount in fraudulent land specula-
tions in 1798 or at least with fonning the opposition to Blount and with 
making the issue of Blount's alleged involvement in the land frauds a 
central focus of the Federalist campaign that year. See Thomas to John 
Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, March 10, June 21, 1798, in William 
Henry Masterson, ed., The John Gray Blount Papers, Vol. III (Raleigh: 
North Carolina State Department of History and Archives, 1965), 216, 2.'37. 
16 North Carolina Journal, October 1, 1798; Grove to McHenry, August 
20, 1798, McHenry Papers. 
17 Archibald Henderson, "A Federalist of the Old School," The North 
Carolina Booklet, XVII (July, 1917), 1.'3. Richard Dobbs Spaight, though 
often considered to have had Federalist inclinations at this time, actually 
appears to have been an independent with strong leanings toward the 
Blount clan. Sec Spaight to John Gray Blount, from New Bern, June 26, 
October 18, 1798, in Masterson, ed., John Gray Blount, III, 2.'39-40, 259. 
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The extent to which national party issues had penetrated 
to local levels in North Carolina by 1798 and the degree to 
which Federalism had captured the allegiance of the state's 
electorate became evident in that year's General Assembly 
session. Governor William R. Davie immediately gave the 
state legislature all the relevant material pertaining to the 
XYZ affair. On December 24, Samuel Johnston, as the head 
"of a committee to prepare an Address to the President of 
the U.S.," presented a draft praising Adams' moderate con-
duct throughout the months of crisis with France and de-
fended the policy of American neutrality toward European 
politics. The address condemned, in bitter and injured 
tones, recent conduct of the French government toward the 
United States and concluded with the pledge that North 
Carolinians "will not patiently suffer any foreign interference 
with our national concerns" and would "with our lives and 
fortunes to the last extremity, support maintain and defend 
all the Constitutional measures of our Federal Government." 
Except for the final clause, which should have served as 
a warning to radical Federalists, the address was decidedly 
favorable to the administration. Its passage by a 51 to 38 
count was a clearcut triumph for the friends of government 
in the state and afforded them the opportunity to assess the 
sources of their current strength.18 
The fifty-one Federalist votes came from thirty-six of the 
fifty-eight counties represented in the General Assembly 
that year, fourteen of which were in the western part of 
the state, immediately surrounding the town of Salisbury. 
In 1788 this area had been thoroughly Antifederalist, and 
from 1790 onward it had been strongly Republican. The 
sudden emergence of Federalist support among the yeoman 
18 "Journal of the House of Commons of the State of North Carolina," 
December 11, 24, 1798, in William S. Jenkins, ed., Records of the States 
of the United States (Microfilm, University of California Library, Berkeley). 
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farmers of the west was only the most striking feature of an 
impressive trend, for the friends of Adams received strong 
support from representatives of the entire geographic and 
socioeconomic spectrum of the state, including the planters 
of the Roanoke River valley and the Albemarle and Pamlico 
Sound regions. Surprisingly, assemblymen from the upper 
Cape Fear area either voted against this resolution or ab-
stained, indicating that at least on this one issue there was 
little correlation between "old Tories" and the Federalist 
party in North Carolina in 1798. However, the member from 
Fayetteville voted with the Federalists on this issue, as did 
the representative from Salisbury, while the representatives 
from Hillsboro and Edenton voted against the address, and 
those from Halifax, New Bern, and Wilmington abstained.1n 
For all of the new faces, the favorable press, and the 
significant breadth of popular support, Federalist successes 
in 1798 were gravely compromised by a continued lack of 
firm party organization. As was traditional, many who ran 
as Federalists entered public life at the express wish of the 
electorate. Henderson, for all his work on behalf of the 
party of order, left retirement only after being "urgently 
petitioned" by his personal friends to present himself as a 
candidate, a "step not a little contrary to his natural inclina-
tions." Though he had never run for high public office 
previous to this time, Henderson was known throughout 
the state as a Federalist supporter.~0 Henry William Har-
rington of Richmond County was another "ardent" friend 
of government who in 1798 successfully campaigned for 
the state senate at the express desires of his constituents.~ 1 
But there was no formal political machine to urge a candi-
19 Ibid., see Appendix, Table 4. 
20 Henderson, "Federalist of the Old School," 8-13. 
21 Henry M. Wagstaff, ed., "The Harrington Letters," ]ames Sprunt 
Historical Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1914), 16--17. 
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date on and to support him with funds and friends once he 
had "reluctantly" embarked upon his campaign. 
Even so, several of the younger Federalists did run for 
Congress under the patronage of individual party elders. 
Willis Allston, for example, was the candidate of Abraham 
Hodge, who threw the entire weight of his several news-
papers behind Allston's campaign. Allston defeated Thomas 
Blount after a filthy campaign in which the Federalists, of 
all people, righteously and successfully condemned Madison's 
lieutenant with a charge of fraud in various land specula-
tions.22 According to the gleeful Hodge, Blount had had a 
majority of more than 1,200 votes in 1796, but in 1798 he 
was defeated by more than 1,700 ballots, as all four of his 
opponents were professed Federalists. This fact in itself 
attests to the continued disunity of party organization 
among the friends of government in North Carolina, even 
where powerful patrons were present to aid individual can-
didates.23 
Even the backing of traditional party leaders was not a 
sufficient guarantee that a candidate's Federalism was firm 
and unequivocal. A prime example was David Stone of 
Bertie County. Stone had read law in Davie's office and 
was "warmly supported by the leading Federalists" of 
Edenton district in his bid for a Congressional seat/4 but 
Stone's public announcement of his candidacy mentioned 
no discernible political principles. The impression he sought 
to convey was that he was being pushed forward against 
his will, agonizingly aware that his candidacy might offend 
and alienate some good men. 23 By 1801 Stone had become 
a Republican. 
22 The decline of Thomas Blount's political fortunes in 1798 as a result 
of implication in land frauds within the state is traced in Masterson, ed., 
John Gray Blount, III, xv, 22n., 80n., 115, 224-59 passim, 582-85. 
23 North Carolina ] ournal, August 6, 20, 1798. 
:!4 McRee, ed., Iredell, II, 530n. 
25 North Carolina journal, August 13, 1798. 
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Although Federalism had had an astonishing revival in 
North Carolina in the two years following Cotesworth 
Pinckney's rebuff by the Directory, the resurgence was more 
one of spirit than of form. A single set of issues revolving 
about Franco-American relations and sedulously cultivated 
by the partisan Federalist press had aroused fervent public 
patriotism which could only benefit those in power. Friends 
of government, however, could not expect to sustain their 
influence for any length of time on this one issue. A per-
manent, alert, energetic, effective, and tightly knit political 
organization was necessary to keep the conservative and 
nationalistic Federalist image and philosophy alive-not 
only in the minds of the North Carolina electorate, but also 
among the younger politicians, many of whom, it soon ap-
peared, were pro-Federalist in 1798 largely because of the 
pressure of current public opinion. Such an organization, 
however, had not even begun to be perfected at the close 
of the 1798 Congressional campaigns. Instead, the Fed-
eralist style of politicking retained its traditional elitist 
orientation. Partisan leaders still presented themselves as 
reluctantly acquiescing to run for office only because of a 
popular draft or the backing of an influential patron. In 
addition, there was a conspicuous lack of communication 
and cooperation between friends of government in North 
Carolina and administration leaders at Philadelphia.26 Be-
cause a permanent and effective party structure still was 
lacking, Federalist strength in North Carolina in 1798 was 
built on a foundation of sand. 
In South Carolina also the Congressional elections of 
1798 brought new power to the Federalists. The collapse 
26 For example, the efforts of Hodge and Allston to destroy the reputation 
of Thomas Blount were compromised by the willingness of Federalist 
leaders in Congress-including Harper, Bayard, and Sitgreaves-to attest 
publicly that the Republican representative was not implicated in the 
treasonous activities of his elder brother. Masterson, ed., John Gray Blount, 
III, 246. 
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of the XYZ negotiations heightened the sense of panic 
among many about the state's generally defenseless situation. 
By midsummer Charlestonians and the residents of "the little 
town of Beaufort" were busily engaged in soliciting their 
own funds for the construction of coastal fortifications and 
naval vessels.~• Indications are, however, that not all citizens 
of Charleston shared in an equal feeling of loyalty to the 
administration. In early June, Pickering held conversations 
with Jacob Read in which Read confirmed Pickering's 
suspicion that some Charleston merchants were forcing their 
captains to take "deceitful oaths" concerning the nature of 
cargoes to French ports to make large profits in contraband.2 H 
Nevertheless, such instances seem to have been the excep-
tion, not the rule, for no mention of them appears in other 
correspondence of the day. Since Congress' failure to under-
take comprehensive national defense could be blamed on 
the Republican faction, the Federalists had a readymade 
local issue. 
As the autumn elections approached, it became clear that 
Federalists and Republicans in South Carolina were equally 
matched in talents, morale, and determination. As in North 
Carolina, however, the friends of government in South Caro-
lina conspicuously lacked an elaborate party structure. 
Edward Rutledge, from his home in Charleston, became 
the center of Federalist strength and activity and found 
great demands placed upon him in the absence of young 
John Rutledge and Robert Goodloe Harper. Both ;Rutledge 
and Harper chose to remain with new-found friends in the 
North during the crucial election year rather than under-
take the hazardous, fatiguing journey home to fight for their 
~• James Simons to Oliver \Yolcott, from Charleston, April 10, 1798, 
Adams Papers, Reel :388; John Rutledge, Jr., to Benjamin Stoddert, from 
Newport, August 21, 1798, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, South Caroliniana 
Library, Columbia, S. C. 
!!H Pickering to Hamilton, June 9, 1798, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 31. 
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seats. Sometime in August or September, Edward Rutledge 
learned that his nephew would be challenged in the Orange-
burg-Beaufort district by Pierce Butler. Rutledge then 
drafted a long "campaign letter," which he assiduously 
circulated throughout that district to every politically in-
fluential and significant public figure he knew and whom 
"my man \Viii" could reach.~!> 
Rutledge's letter deserves examination, because it con-
tained all of the partisan appeals and persuasions which 
southern Federalists had been shaping in the two years 
since Pinckney's humiliation in France. Rutledge first de-
fined his nephew as a young man of honor, industry, and 
integrity, who was continually jealous of the national honor 
"and the Interest of this particular Country [South Caro-
lina]." Moreover, Congressman Rutledge was described as a 
man who was always alert to outside threats of any kind 
to the rights of either the nation or the state. Edward 
Rutledge then recalled that his nephew had been a long-
time friend of France and of French republicanism and had 
been alarmed at the efforts of the other European countries 
to subvert the French nation and the cause which it had 
espoused. But "when he saw her [France] over running 
innocent Countries-maintaining her armies by plunder, 
seducing the people from their Government; reviling this 
very Country, calumniating our Ministers of peace . . . 
searching our vessels without cause, imprisoning our sea-
men, & threatening to divide our Citizens from the Govern-
ment, which had been fairly established by a Majority-he 
took fire-he manfully took his part and acted up to it."~o 
In his concluding sentences Rutledge revealed the extent 
to which Southern Federalists by 1798 were capable of 
~~~Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., from Charleston, October 16, 
19, 1798, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. 
:w Rutledge to Captain Dunbar, n.d., John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 
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enunciating an insinuating form of that demagoguery which 
they condemned in their opponents. After remarking upon 
the predilection of the French to attack, conquer, and 
plunder every nation "where the people were divided," he 
ended with a plea to South Carolinians: "If we keep in 
those who will support the Constitution & Government of 
our own Country," he said, the French 
will have no reason to expect a successful attack, should they 
make it; but if they find that the Members who have supported 
the Measures of the present Congress are to be turned out, to 
make room for others, what will be the natural conclusion in their 
Minds? it [sic] will be this, that the People in this State Disap-
prove of those Measures of Congress which have been taken 
against France-that they approve of the Measures France has 
taken against this Country; and that this is the spot [i.e., South 
Carolina] on which they are to erect their Standard, because this 
is the spot on which their Friends are to be found-And should 
that be the case, adieu to all the happiness of life whilst they are 
here. 
Given the recent history of slave conspiracy and the current 
lack of military defenses in the state, the purely emotional 
impact of Rutledge's dark warnings may easily be imagined. 
Rutledge was not alone in warning South Carolinians of 
the dangers inherent in a pro-French attitude during a 
time of undeclared war. Harper may have been away from 
his backcountry constituents for too long a period, but he 
nonetheless sought to arouse popular fears and to shape 
them to partisan political advantage, just as Rutledge was 
doing in the lowcountry. Prior to the summer of 1798, 
Harper managed to keep his firm Federalist bias in check 
while writing his long expository letters home. He seemed 
to be more interested in explaining the meaning of measures 
and policies than with indoctrinating his constituents with 
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the party line. Indeed, Harper's letters often assumed an 
implicit Federalist sentiment among his constituents which 
did not need further cultivation. The exposure of the XYZ 
affair, however, ended his restraint, and in a letter home in 
July, 1798, he allowed himself the luxury of a five-page 
fulmination against French tyranny.:n 
Despite the lack of a mature political organization and 
the consequent reliance upon correspondence and essays 
to arouse public opinion, the Federalists were not prevented 
from ultimately infusing excitement and purpose into the 
1798 campaign in South Carolina. The elections were held 
in early October. As late as the end of August, Charleston 
newspapers-of which none are apparently extant for Sep-
tember-showed no signs of strenuous politicking. However, 
by the middle of September the Georgetown press was 
Hooded with campaign material, much of it contributed by 
friends of government. "An Old Patriot" urged in the 
strongest terms the election only of those unalterably op-
posed to "the present system of the French Government," 
and a correspondent from Camden publicly admonished a 
friend in Charleston to "continue to send a good man from 
your city" to Philadelphia. These statements show a far 
stronger preoccupation with national, and specifically Con-
gressional, rather than state politics. This assumption is 
supported when the issues of the Charleston papers are 
once again available. In the last days before the election 
the City Gazette was filled with tickets submitted by many 
persons, whose signatures identified them only as individuals 
from both parties who were determined not to distinguish 
themselves from the mass of the commonalty. These tickets 
were not uniform. Each party obviously agreed within itself 
31 July 2:3, 1798, in Elizabeth Donnan, ed., "Papers of James A. Bayard, 
1796-1815," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1913 
(2 vols.; Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), I, 64-69. 
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whom it supported in the Congressional races, but there 
was no party regularity in support of state and local 
officers. 32 
A highly interested contemporary observer was also im-
pressed by the lack of rigid party divisions with respect to 
purely state politics at this time, as compared with New 
England. John Rutledge, Jr., who knew well the local politics 
of both sections by this time, wrote to Harrison Gray Otis, 
asking him to inform the President "that the political line 
of demarcation which separates parties here [he was writing 
from Newport, Rhode Island] does not extend to So. Carolina 
-that in this respect we have more liberality than our Eastern 
friends & that with us the applications for the [Republican] 
Governor's [patronage] recommendation ... is a respect 
generally paid to the office of the Chief Magistrate without 
adverting to the politics or private character of the person 
occupying it."33 
Taking the results of the Congressional elections as a reli-
able barometer of public opinion, the friends of government 
could be said to dominate South Carolina once more by the 
end of 1798. The senatorial delegation was split, with Jacob 
Read representing the Federalists, and Charles Pinckney, 
the Republicans. In the House, John Rutledge, Jr., was re-
turned from the Orangeburg-Beaufort district, Benjamin 
Huger won in Georgetown, and Thomas Pinckney, despite 
a grave illness that often prevented him from doing any 
significant campaigning, was reelected in Charleston. Thus, 
firm and outspoken friends of government controlled the 
lowcountry Congressional seats in the Sixth Congress. In 
3~ Georgetown [South Carolina] Gazette, September 18, 21, 28, 1798; 
Charleston City Gazette, October 5, 1798. 
33 John Rutledge, Jr., to Harrison Gray Otis, August 14, 1798, John Rut-
ledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 
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the backcountry Harper again was victorious in Ninety-Six. 
Abraham Nott from Columbia attempted to maintain a 
neutral position during the succeeding Congressional ses-
sion, and DeSaussure complained at this time that he was 
no party man, but during the era of Jeffersonian democracy 
he proved to be a strong, though often silent, Federalist.34 
Only Thomas Sumter could be classified as a true Republi-
can. 
Federalists also predominated in the state legislature 
during the 1798 session. Led by Robert Barnwell in the 
House and General William Washington in the Senate, the 
friends of government sought to perpetuate the sense of crisis 
that during the previous summer had gripped even Republi-
can leaders by introducing and pushing through bills pro-
viding for further defense measures. The Republicans, 
who had regained their composure by November, tried to 
block them. Three important divisions occurred, the most 
representative of which concerned the purchase by the state 
of an additional stand of 5,000 arms to be resold to the 
state militia. This imaginative proposal by the friends of 
government effectually destroyed the issue of the provisional 
army vs. the state militia while keeping alive the sense of 
imminent danger. It passed by a 55 to 40 vote. Federalist 
support came overwhelmingly from the lowcountry parishes 
and from the city of Charleston. Of Charleston's fourteen 
representatives, eleven voted for the measure and three 
abstained. But the friends of government also attracted a 
thin film of support across the arc of the backcountry, from 
Darlington, through Chester, Spartanburg, Pendleton, and 
Abbeville. If the firm hold over the lowcountry could be 
retained along with the thin but representative support 
H4 David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The 
Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1965), 405. 
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from the backcountry, the Federalists could not only domin-
ate South Carolina indefinitely, but they could reasonably 
claim to speak for all segments of its population. Thus, 
as in North Carolina, Federalism in South Carolina pre-
vailed over a wide geographic region and within diverse 
socioeconomic groups at the close of 1798.35 Its supporters 
had appealed successfully to backcountrymen as well as 
lowcountry planters and urban elements. But South Caro-
lina's Federalists had ridden to power on the strength of 
a single issue which could not long remain unresolved. 
Whether the friends of government could retain such dis-
parate support once the crisis had eased was not clear. 
Their lack of a disciplined party organization and their 
dependence upon an influential few was not encouraging 
for the future. 
In Georgia the Augusta Federalists overcame formidable 
odds and registered significant political gains at the expense 
of Jackson's machine. So thorough was Jackson's dominance 
of the press that even the Georgia Gazette was silent. Until 
just prior to the fall elections nothing relating to party poli-
tics appeared in Georgia newspapers, despite recent demon-
strations of support for the President's conduct from many 
backcountry areas. Then on the eve of the balloting the 
Jackson supporters flooded at least one highly influential 
newspaper, the Augusta Chronicle, with a series of essays 
warning the people to beware of supporting candidates fav-
orable to the discredited Yazoo faction of 1795.36 
The friends of government nonetheless campaigned effec-
tively without newspaper support. Commenting upon the 
newly elected legislature, Jackson told his young lieutenant, 
John Milledge, that "the Senate is not strong" and that John 
:Jr. "South Carolina Journal of the House of Representatives," December 
17, 1798, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. See Appendix, Table 6. 
au Augu>ta Chronicle, November 3, 1798. 
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Stith's presence there posed a definite threat to Jacksonian 
effectiveness. "A majority in the House is of the right side," 
Jackson added, only "if the assiduity of the T[reasur]y de-
partment and a coalition which I am told is formed with the 
Augusta lads by it does not too much prevail." But whatever 
promising alliance might have been forged in 1798 between 
government officials in Philadelphia and the energetic Au-
gusta "aristos" seems never to have materialized with suffi-
cient force to significantly shake Jackson's hold over the state. 
In consequence, whatever Federalist predilections the new 
Georgia congressmen, Benjamin Taliaferro and James Jones, 
may have had were never expressed publicly. Both men 
voted consistently Republican during the Sixth Congress, 
faithfully reflecting the dominant political opinion in their 
state. The J acksonians experienced a brief flutter of nerves 
again in the autumn of 1800 when contemplating the con-
tinued existence of the Federalist faction at Augusta. But 
the aristos were again apparently throttled without effort, 
and Georgia continued to be steadily Republican.37 
Virginia's state and Congressional elections did not take 
place until the spring of 1799-six months after those in the 
other southern states-by which time the political climate 
throughout the nation had changed drastically. The grave 
effects upon civil liberties of the Federalists' recently passed 
Alien and Sedition Acts and the unfortunate influence of the 
Federalist-created provisional army on that party's relations 
with the southern electorate are discussed in a later chapter. 
It should be noted at this point, however, that along with 
their compatriots in the Carolinas, Virginia Federalists de-
rived great and apparently lasting benefit from the xyz 
issue. To some degree friends of government in Virginia 
37 Jackson to Milledge, from Louisville, Georgia, November 14, 1798; 
Milledge to Charles Harris of Savannah, September ll, 1800, in Salley, ed., 
John Milledge, 58, 68. 
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used their newly found popularity to engage in public con-
flict with the Republicans in the spring elections. At the 
same time they were constantly spurred on by administra-
tion officials in Philadelphia who were the prime movers in 
shaping a Federalist party ticket for the campaign. Thus, 
despite a mounting burden of identification with unpopular 
national policies, Virginia Federalists did their part to main-
tain the steady rise of party fortunes in the South as another 
presidential election year approached. 
The XYZ disclosures, of course, encouraged Virginia's Fed-
eralists as much as those in other states. Adams' subsequent 
cautious policy proved to be popular with many Virginians, 
and the Federalists were able to exploit this popularity for 
their own ends. Robert Beverly informed young Rutledge 
in late spring, 1798, that even in Culpeper County, which 
was Jefferson's political backyard, the recent measures of the 
administration "have numerous and zealous advocates."38 
By mid-autumn Virginia's Federalists had begun an active 
campaign among themselves to find a full slate of candidates 
for the forthcoming elections. Attorney General Charles Lee 
worked assiduously from Philadelphia to impress upon in-
fluential friends at home the need to stand for public office 
in a time of national peril. Lee approached Leven Powell as 
early as June, a full ten months before the election, and the 
Alexandria Federalist eventually entered the race. Marshall 
was urged by Washington to stand for Congress in Rich-
mond and Henrico County, though this conflicted with his 
own desires; and the former Chief Executive also success-
fully persuaded Patrick Henry to abandon private life to 
bolster Federalist forces in the forthcoming General Assem-
bly. By late September, Charles Lee informed Judge Iredell 
of the completion of a fairly comprehensive Federalist ticket 
38 April, 1798, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 
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in the state.39 Thus, Federalist activities in Virginia in many 
ways continued to be supervised closely from Philadelphia. 
Since the party was active and united on the national level 
such supervision undoubtedly was a boon to the state party; 
but by the same token, when irreconcilable schisms ap-
peared within the party hierarchy at Philadelphia, they were 
almost certain to divide the friends of government in Vir-
ginia as well. 
Such divisions, however, had not emerged clearly prior 
to Adams' decision in February, 1799, to reopen negotiations 
with the Directory. In consequence, Federalist morale in 
Virginia remained high during the autumn of 1798. By 
mid-October party conflict in the state was "ardent," and 
Washington, for one declined to predict its outcome.40 The 
general deplored the fact that no measure was left untried 
by the "democrats" to affect adversely the Federalist in-
terests. However, the friends of government, in righteous 
wrath, were at that moment seeking to exclude all who pro-
fessed loyalty to the Republican party from any direct con-
nection with the defense programs of the administrationY 
In this atmosphere of incessant party warfare, the in-
creasing evidence of popular aversion to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts and the provisional army inevitably were ex-
39 Charles Lee to Leven Powell, June 6, 1798, in William E. Dodd, ed., 
"Correspondence of Leven Powell," The John P. Branch Historical Papers 
of Randolph-Macon College (Richmond: Everett Wadding Co., 1901), I, 
230-31; to James Iredell, from Alexandria, September 20, 1798, Iredell 
Papers; "John Marshall's Autobiographical Sketch," Marshall Papers; Wash-
ington to Henry, January 15, 1799; Henry to Washington, February 12, 
1799, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings af George Washington 
(39 vols.; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931-
1944), XXXVII, 87-90, 90n. 
40 Marshall to Pickering, from Richmond, October 1, 1798, Marshall 
Papers; Washington to Pickering, from Mount Vernon, October 15, 1798, 
in John C. Hamilton, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (7 vols.; 
New York: John F. Trow, Printer, 1851), V, 367-68. 
41 B. Henry Latrobe to Jefferson, from Richmond, September 22, 1798, 
Jefferson Papers, Vol. 104. 
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plaited by the followers of Jefferson when the General As-
sembly convened in late November. The result was the 
passage of Jefferson's Virginia Resolutions early the next 
year, along with another resolution which declared the 
Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional. A third proposal, 
which was considered but not passed during this session, 
provided that state judges could set free any person arrested 
under the two laws.42 
It is not surprising that such legislation was considered 
and passed in a state which the friends of Jefferson and 
Madison had dominated for five years. Nor was the Virginia 
General Assembly in fact risking its existence in rejecting 
the Alien and Sedition Acts. The fears expressed by Virginia 
Republicans that Hamilton's army would be marched 
against them should controversial legislation be passed 
seems more than a bit farfetched, since Hamilton had not 
even begun to recruit the enlisted ranks for the proposed 
army. 43 More significant is the amount of opposition which 
these pieces of legislation aroused. The resolution which 
declared the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional, for 
example, passed by a comfortable but not overwhelming 
margin of 100 to 63/4 thus indicating that Federalist strength 
in this supposed stronghold of Republicanism was not 
insignificant. 
The friends of government found support in forty-two of 
the state's ninety-seven counties, or two more than they 
had in 1795 in the vote on the censure of Washington's 
conduct relative to the Jay Treaty. At that time the Presi-
42 John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom; The Alien and Sedition Acts 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 170-71. 
43 Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of john Adams: The Collapse of 
Federalism, 1795-1800 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1961), 
.'337--38. 
44 "Virginia General Assembly, Journal of the House of Delegates," 
December 21, 1798, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States; Virginia Gazette 
and General Advertiser, January 1, 1799. 
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dent's supporters had mustered fifty-nine votes-four less 
than Adams' supporters attracted three years later. Of the 
forty-two counties exhibiting Federalist strength in 1798, 
twenty-nine had also shown at least some Federalist ten-
dencies in 1795. From the time of Jay's Treaty until the 
vote on the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
the friends of government completely lost measurable sup-
port in twelve counties and picked up new support in 
thirteen. A decisive shift in the geographic and social bases 
of Federalist support in Virginia is apparent during the 
middle and later years of the d.ecade. Of the twelve counties 
which moved away from Federalism between 1795 and 
1798, seven were in the Tidewater region, and two others, 
Hanover and Henrico, surrounding the town of Richmond, 
bordered that area. In other words, the friends of govern-
ment lost significant support in the old plantation area of 
the state. But at the same time, of the thirteen counties which 
wholly or in part shifted allegiance to the Federalist party, 
ten were in the area south and west of the James which had 
been the former stronghold of ~1adisonian Republicanism. 
Only one county in the Tidewater-New Kent-shifted some-
what in sentiment from Republicanism to Federalism in 
these years. In sum, of the forty-two counties which indi-
cated entire or partial Federalist sentiment in 1798, only 
five were in the Tidewater region, two were on the eastern 
shore, four bordered the Potomac River, sixteen were in the 
broad area south and west of the James out to the frontier, 
one was in the Piedmont region directly north of the James, 
ten were in the Shenandoah Valley, and four were in the 
frontier area of the northwest around the present-day cities 
of Charleston and Morgantown, West Virginia.45 
The dramatic shift in the core of Federalist strength from 
the counties of the Tidewater and Potomac River region to 
45 See Appendix, Table 2. 
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the counties of the Shenandoah Valley and the area south 
and west of the James River needs some examination. Can 
this change be explained by alteration of political loyalties 
on the part of influential political leaders? Certainly the 
transplanting of Patrick Henry's political loyalties must have 
carried great weight with the western yeomen, whose in-
terests he ostentatiously had reflected and defended in 
previous years. This may well have been a decisive factor, 
but it must be remembered that by 1798, Henry had been 
out of active public life for nearly a decade, while new 
issues and younger men had dominated state and national 
politics. His reputation, while still impressive, might not have 
carried quite the same weight with the farmers of southern 
and western Virginia as it had ten years before. Another 
probable influence was the sectional struggle between west-
ern and Tidewater counties for control of the General 
Assembly. Professor Kurtz has discovered some indications 
that during the 1796 election Federalist writers in the 
Northern Neck area used the issue of sectional representation 
as a bludgeon against the Republicans, who were accused 
of promoting the continuation of an unjust sectional imbal-
ance in the state legislature even while prattling of democ-
racy and popular rights.46 The Federalists may have been 
supported as a negative reference group by some in the west 
who identified Madison, Jefferson, and other Republican 
leaders with the despised older ruling group of the Tidewater. 
Three facts argue against accepting the issue of sectional 
representation as a major explanation of Federalist strength 
in Virginia, however. First, the most prominent Virginia 
Federalists usually were content to take their identification 
and their issues from the party leadership in Philadelphia. 
There is no indication that Marshall, Carrington, Heth, Lee, 
or others in Virginia exploited the issue of sectional repre-
46 Kurtz, Presidency of John Adams, 165--66. 
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sentation for the benefit of the Federalist interest. Secondly, 
had this issue played a significant role in determining the 
patterns of partisan allegiance in the state, it might have 
been expected to influence the vote on Washington's con-
duct in the 1795 Assembly and the outcome of the 1796 
election. Yet at neither time did the friends of government 
appear to obtain significant support either in the counties of 
the Shenandoah Valley or in those below and to the west 
of the James River. Finally, many of the counties below the 
James, where Federalist sentiment was strong in 1798, were 
in the eastern and central portions of the state and would 
naturally be identified, and probably aligned themselves, 
with the "Tidewater" interest on questions of sectional 
representation. 
The conversion of many yeoman farmers of southern and 
western Virginia to the Federalist party in 1798 can be 
viewed meaningfully only as part of the larger trend which 
ran through the entire southern backcountry during that 
year. There is much room for conjecture, but little concrete 
evidence available, for an exact evaluation of the sources 
of this major shift. 
Certainly, one important factor was the rise of an active 
cadre of Federalist leaders throughout the area, including 
Henry in Virginia, Archibald Henderson in North Carolina, 
and Robert Goodloe Harper in South Carolina. Also note-
worthy in South Carolina was the growing interest shown 
by the lowcountry's Federalist-oriented oligarchs in binding 
the backcountry area to the coast politically as well as 
economically, an interest first displayed during the Jay 
Treaty controversy in 1795. 
Another possible explanation for the shift of the southern 
backcountry to Federalism in 1798 relates to ethnic politics. 
The region was settled heavily by Germans and Scots-Irish 
during the middle decades of the century. It might be as-
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sumed that these groups remained comparative strangers in 
the land and that their social distinctiveness bred a political 
particularism which manifested itself in 1798 in extreme 
patriotism-representing an eager attempt by first- and 
second-generation immigrants to prove that their "Ameri-
canism" was as legitimate as that claimed by the longer 
established Anglo-Saxon groups around them. This ex-
planation loses much of its force in light of the recent find-
ings of the historical geographer, Harry Roy Merrens, who 
concludes from a study of eighteenth-century North Carolina 
that Protestant Germans and Scots-Irish, unlike later im-
migrants to the United States, were quickly and easily as-
similated into the social structure of North Carolina and 
that, indeed, it is extremely difficult even to trace any dis-
tinct settlement patterns for these folk. 47 
A final, more satisfactory explanation is simply that a 
peculiar convergence of circumstances caused backcountry-
men from Georgia to Virginia to fear physical attack from 
the "savages" around them should war with France come. 
This fear explains their excitement, their willingness to take 
up arms, and yet their urgent desire that Adams would main-
tain his position of armed watchfulness with hopes of an 
eventual settlement with the Directory. The "savages" from 
whom the backcountry residents feared violence and atrocity 
were the Negro slaves and the Indians. The South Carolina 
upcountry, as has been noted, began to import large num-
bers of Negroes during the middle and later years of the 
decade, and the social structure of the region had begun to 
take on a cast similar to that of the lowcountry slave-planta-
tion region. By 1798, it would seem that many upcountrymen 
would be as susceptible to fears of a French invasion and a 
resultant slave rebellion as their brethren along the coast. 
47 Harry Roy Merrens, Colonial North Carolina in the Eighteenth Century 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 55-76. 
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In backcountry Virginia and Georgia, white settlers feared 
not the Negro slaves, of whom there were comparatively few, 
but the Indians. The tense situation with the Creeks in 
Georgia remained unresolved, while in southwestern Vir-
ginia, Indian massacres of isolated families and individuals 
were a part of very recent history.48 A French war, which 
Adams seemingly had averted by his prudent response to 
the XYZ incident, might prove catastrophic. Should the 
French actually invade the South, as Washington thought 
they would, then they might contact and rouse the Indian 
tribes of the southwest to the same pitch of barbarity as 
earlier French governments had done with many of the 
tribes of New York and New England throughout nearly a 
century of colonial warfare. Even without an actual invasion 
of the coastal South, the French might work through the 
pliant Spanish and their empire in Florida and Louisiana. 
All of these factors doubtless played a part in reshaping 
markedly the political response of the southern backcountry 
in 1798, and, along with the simple emotional response to an 
insult to national honor, gave the Federalists an unparalleled 
opportunity to make inroads into a formerly hostile region. 
In 1798 partisan newspapers and ad hoc public meetings 
-the traditional agencies of Federalist contact with the 
grassroots-were vigorously utilized by the friends of gov-
ernment to emphasize further the new, favorable public 
image of the national administration. In particular, the Fed-
eralist press in North Carolina went far beyond previous 
efforts; even earlier than the emergence of the XYZ affair, 
North Carolina editors began formulation of a simplistic, con-
servative political ideology, stressing unreflective patriotism 
and unquestioned loyalty to the existing political leadership 
and institutions. In the remaining period of Federalist pop-
4 8 Lewis Preston Summers, Annals of Southwest Virginia, 1769-1800 
(Abingdon, Virginia: Lewis Preston Summers, 1929), 1495--1513. 
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ularity this ideological theme became a touchstone of the 
party's campaigns for the loyalty of the southern electorate. 
At the same time it appears that newly active partisans of 
the federal administration were behind many, if not all, of 
the mass meetings which were called on local and county 
levels throughout the South to affirm public allegiance to 
the national government after the insulting attempt to bribe 
the American mission. Beyond these traditional means of 
contact with the people, in Virginia there was growing 
evidence that by the latter half of the year a few Federalist 
leaders were at last contemplating a united partisan cam-
paign for public office. Such campaigning surely would 
entail some active solicitation of popular support; eventually 
it might even result in the establishment of a meaningful 
two-way communication between local spokesmen of the 
federal administration and the southern grassroots. 
Despite these achievements, Federalism's apex of pop-
ularity in the South in 1798 was more the result of a single 
favorable issue, which was exploited well by partisan leaders 
and a partisan press, than of a notable expansion of party 
organization. By the end of the year the reconstruction of 
Federalist organizations in the South had reached a level 
first achieved in 1793, but it proceeded little further. The 
very number of ad hoc county and town meetings called to 
applaud Adams' foreign policy argues that under the impact 
of the maritime crisis with France, the Federalists in the 
South had attracted a growing number of active followers 
on local and county levels. It is equally clear, however, that 
these new and active recruits received little sustained encour-
agement or direct supervision from older Federalist leaders. 
Moreover, contact with the electorate continued to be main-
tained only through the traditional elitist channels of indoc-
trination-the partisan newspaper and the public meeting-
while party organization remained loosely structured, cen-
tering on informal factions composed of a select few gentle-
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man politicians who seldom worked in close cooperation or 
attempted to coordinate policy. Virginia seemed an excep-
tion only because the national party leadership took the 
initiative and exercised a strong, persistent influence upon 
the Federalist factions at Richmond and Alexandria. 
Burdened by continuing organizational weaknesses, south-
ern Federalists soon began to feel the effects of another dis-
turbing development in national affairs. As the year waned, 
there were increasing signs that Federalist harmony on the 
national level was breaking down and that at least one of 
the emerging factions was pursuing policies radical enough to 
destroy the Federalist image as a party of prudence and 
preservation in the southern mind. Not until this develop-
ment reached disastrous proportions on the eve of the presi-
dential election of 1800, however, did many friends of gov-
ernment at the southern grassroots make a desperate at-
tempt to organize a modern party system to save themselves 
from political ruin. 
During the Congressional session of 1797-1798 there had 
been little indication that the Federalist party was in the 
process of destroying its popularity. As in the southern states, 
the Federalist interest in Congress rode the crest of succes-
sive triumphs which seemed to assure the perpetuation of 
the party on a national level for years to come. 
Congressional Federalists entered the year 1798 as a 
united, though somewhat apprehensive, phalanx. Southern 
Federalists reported that the persistent lack of news from 
the three-man mission which Adams had dispatched to Paris 
had set Congressional nerves on edge.49 On January 30 
49 Thomas Pinckney to Edward Rutledge, November 24, 1797, January 
6, 1798, Thomas Pinckney Letterbook, 1791-1798, South Caroliniana 
Library, Columbia, S. C.; Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, from 
Philadelphia, January 11, February 15, 1798, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 102; 
John Rutledge, Jr., to Bishop Smith, from Philadelphia, January 3, 1798, 
John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 
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tensions exploded momentarily in the House as a result of 
"one of the most Savage Acts that ever disgraced any 
Publick Body.""" The resolution of the Lyon-Griswold feud, 
in which a Republican representative had spat in the face 
of a Federalist opponent and had in turn been caned, be-
came the initial test of party unity and loyalty in the First 
Session of the Fifth Congress. While Jefferson unhappily 
noted the absence of several leading members of the Re-
publican party, the Federalists, led by Harper and Sewall, 
managed to have Lyon expelled by a 52 to 44 count." 1 The 
Federalists gained an important new recruit at this juncture; 
appearing in the list against Lyon, along with Harper and 
Rutledge of South Carolina, Grove of North Carolina, and 
Evans, Morgan, and Machir of Virginia, was Josiah Parker, 
representative from Norfolk, one of Madison's earliest and 
staunchest allies and the only Republican representative of 
Virginia's urban interests.~·~ Parker's vote marked the be-
ginning of his and Norfolk's shift to Federalism and meant 
that for a time the friends of government could claim 
dominance in every urban center in Virginia. 
With the news of the failure of the XYZ mission and the 
subsequent Republican blunder in wishing to know the 
exact reasons for its collapse, the Federalist party in Con-
gress, led by able southern members, attacked vigorously. 
According to Jefferson, South Carolina's two Federalist repre-
sentatives, "Mr. Harper and Mr. Pinckney pronounced bitter 
phillipics against France, selecting such circumstances & 
aggravations as to give the worst picture they could present." 
Jefferson added acidly that Pinckney "on this, as in the affair 
50 James Gunn to Seaborn Jones, from Philadelphia, January 30, 1798, 
History Note Card File, Independence Hall National Park Office, Phila-
delphia; Thomas to John Gray Blount, from Philadelphia, February 8, 16, 
1798, in Masterson, ed., fohn Gray Blount, III, 206, 209-10. 
51 Madison to Jefferson, from Orange, March 4, 1798, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 20. 
52 Annals of Congress, V, 1008-1009. 
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of Lyon and Griswold, went far beyond that moderation he 
has on other occasions recommended." So deep was Jeffer-
son's bitterness against Pinckney that by early April the 
Vice President was accusing him of being at the head of a 
distinctly pro-Hamilton faction in Congress.53 In the mean-
time, all of the "waverers" in the House went over to the 
Federalist side, while the demoralized Republican interests 
disintegrated, with five members immediately departing for 
home. "We now expect to lose every question which shall 
be proposed," the Vice President mourned.r.4 By late May 
he was in despair. "The war-men," he reported, "have been 
indefatigable in the use they have made of [the XYZ dis-
patches] with the people, who are not in the habit of 
analyzing things of that kind.""" 
The Federalists pressed their advantage cruelly. Between 
May 17 and July 10, 1798, they passed what may be called 
the first positive legislative program of a well-defined poli-
tical party in American history. Included in this program 
were the Alien and Sedition Acts, a bill to suspend all com-
mercial intercourse with France, and legislation to create a 
provisional army of ten thousand men-though the original 
figure proposed was twenty thousand-and to increase the 
navy to a respectable size. Of equal importance to the 
friends of government was the overwhelming defeat on July 
3 of a motion proposed by Edward Livingston requesting 
the House to address Adams on the desirability of Gerry's 
remaining at Paris to negotiate further with the French gov-
ernment."n On all of the crucial divisions southern Fed-
53 Jefferson to Madison, from Philadelphia, March 29, April 5, 1798, 
l\ladison Papers, Vol. 20. 
:a Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, from Philadelphia, April 19, 26, 
1798, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 103. 
r.r. Jefferson to T. M. Randolph, from Philadelphia, May 24, 1798, ibid., 
Vol. 104. 
r.n Annals of Congress, V, 1553, 1769-70, 1772, 1831, 1865-66, 2028-29, 
2086--87, 2171. 
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eralists showed disciplined fidelity to party interests.57 
However, sectional and factional tensions were never 
absent from Federalist councils, even during the party's 
months of greatest national supremacy. The failure of the 
American mission to Paris prompted many friends of gov-
ernment to fear imminent armed conflict and to desire to 
establish an efficient war cabinet. Jefferson informed Madi-
son that if war should take place, Federalists were agreed 
on the need to dispose of the notoriously inefficient Secretary 
of War, James McHenry. The party was sharply divided 
over Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, however, whose 
distrust of southern Federalists had not abated. According 
to the Vice President, the solid bloc of New England Fed-
eralists was determined that Pickering be retained, while 
the resurgent southern wing of the party was equally de-
termined to be rid of the Secretary of State, whose suspicions 
were corroding party harmony.58 
Thus, the interests and prejudices of the President and of 
the members of his party's southern wing converged during 
the spring and summer of 1798. Adams' steadily ripening 
mistrust of the military ambitions of Hamilton and his allies 
-who included Pickering-found support among leading 
southern Federalists who wanted to purge their party of 
those possessed of dangerous passions. 
In October the growing estrangement between members 
of the high Federalist faction and more moderate southern 
Federalists was dramatized in an exchange of letters between 
Pickering and John Marshall. Marshall had returned to 
New York in mid-June, apparently hoping to dampen the 
war spirit in the United States until further indications of 
m Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1953), has analyzed exhaustively the voting behavior of each repre-
sentative during the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses. (Appendix III, 
288-326.) 
58 Jefferson to Madison, March 15, 1798, Madison Papers, Vol. 20. 
At the Flood, 1798 I 201 
French enmity rendered the crisis insoluble. According to 
the ubiquitous Vice President, Edward Livingston met Mar-
shall when he landed and received assurances that France 
had no desire for war at the moment. Once Marshall 
reached Philadelphia, however, he was engulfed by the 
hawks, with the Secretary of State at their head. Bells were 
rung in the capital upon the Virginian's arrival "& immense 
crouds [sic] were collected to see & make part of the shew, 
which was circuitously paraded through the streets before 
he was set down at the city tavern." Jefferson's alarm at the 
uses made of the envoy's person by the excited high Fed-
eralists was obvious. "Since his arrival I can hear of nothing 
directly from him," the Vice President wrote, "while they 
are disseminating through the town things, as from him, 
diametrically opposed to what he said to Livingston."5n 
Marshall never again allowed himself to be used in such 
a fashion by the Hamiltonian Federalists. When four 
months later Pickering and other high Federalists sought 
to blacken Gerry's name and to stimulate patriotic ardor 
and enlistments in the new army, they asked Marshall to 
write an inflammatory essay on the entire XYZ affair. In 
his two replies, Marshall was cordial but stubbornly evasive. 
He made clear his anti-French bias and his unhappiness 
with Gerry's conduct in remaining in Paris to negotiate with 
Talleyrand. But he turned down the request, pleading the 
press of personal business and his apprehension at the possi-
bility of being dragged into "news paper altercations."60 
Pickering clearly was displeased, but there was little he 
could do to budge the stubborn Virginian. Adams thus 
could expect no hindrance from Marshall in his attempts 
to further conciliate the Directory. In fact, as the rift be-
59 Jefferson to Madison, June 21, 1798, ibid. 
60 Pickering to Marshall, from Trenton, October 4, 18, 1798; Marshall 
to Pickering, from Richmond, October 15, 22, 1798; ~Iarshall to Elbridge 
Gerry, from Richmond, November 12, 1798, Marshall Papers. 
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tween Adams and the pro-Hamilton Federalists widened, 
Marshall identified himself completely with the President 
and his foreign policy. 
By the end of the year all indications pointed to a firm 
alliance between the President, a large bloc of moderate 
supporters among the southern electorate, and the southern 
wing of the Federalist party, against the militaristic am-
bitions of the high Federalist faction, on the one hand, and 
the naked Francophilism of the Republican opposition, on 
the other.61 
The next year most southern Federalists began to deviate 
somewhat from the moderate policies pursued by the Presi-
dent. Under the steady pressure of Republican opposition, 
many of them defended the Alien and Sedition Acts; many 
more eagerly participated in the recruitment of a suitable 
officer corps for the provisional army, which was viewed as 
a bulwark against all threats to the government from within 
and without. Such discrepancies in temperament between 
the President and his southern followers, however, were not 
of major importance in the long run. They did not signal a 
break in relations nor should they be taken as an indication 
that most southern Federalists finally approved Hamilton's 
Ul Although implicated in the military ambitions of the high Federalists, 
\Vashington himself cogently expressed the mature development of this 
moderate strain in Federalist thinking which appealed to so many southern-
ers. He wrote bluntly to Lafayette in December, 1798: "That there are 
many among us, who wish to see this Country embroiled on the side of 
Great Britain, and others who are anxious that we should take part with 
France against her, admits of no doubt. But it is a fact on which you may 
entirely and absolutely rely, that the Governing powers of the Country, and 
a large part of the people, are truly Americans in principle, attached to 
the interest of it; And unwilling under any circumstances whatsoever to 
participate in the Politics or Contests of Europe: Much less since they have 
found that France, having foresaken the ground she first took, is interfering 
in the internal concerns of all nations, Neutral as well as Belligerent, and 
setting the world in an uproar." From Mount Vernon, December 25, 1798, 
in Fitzpatrick. ed., Washington, XXXVII, 69. 
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bizarre schemes for the eventual use of the army. With the 
exception of Attorney General Charles Lee, who could not 
escape its implications, southern Federalists generally waited 
watchfully and remained independent in the acrid struggle 
between Adams and the high Federalist faction within the 
party. Not until the President abruptly dismissed his Secre-
taries of State and War in March, 1800, did southern Fed-
eralists feel any intense pressure to make an explicit choice 
of sides. Although the conflict between Adams and the high 
Federalists became profound and bitter, especially after 
February, 1799, from the perspective of southern Federalism 
it seems to have been largely a battle at court, to be evaded 
by those that were there and to be regarded as a conflict 
fought in a distant capital by those who were not. 62 The 
few further Federalist gains in the South in 1799 were 
largely unequivocal victories. Those who won them ap-
parently were willing to support any self-professed friend 
H2 John Rutledge, Jr., seems to have been the only southern Federalist 
to align himself publicly with Hamilton's clique. In December, 1799, he 
noted caustically that Adams' recent dispatch of yet another peace mission 
to the Directory and the President's "modus rei ... have laid the roots 
of bitterness firm and deep" within the Federalist faction in Congress. 
Harper's circumspection was far more representative of the attitude of 
most southern Federalist congressmen. "I always thought the mission an 
ill-judged and unlucky measure," he wrote in August, "but having been 
adopted, I think that the policy and dignity of the Government equally 
require, that it should be pressed in the spirit of firmness and good faith." 
Josiah Parker, the Norfolk Federalist, chose another way of expressing 
ostentatious neutrality during the troublesome months when the conflict 
between the President and the high Federalists came to a climax. He 
closed a letter to Hamilton's lackey, McHenry, with the bland request that 
the Secretary of War should send his warmest regards on to the President 
upon the next meeting! John Rutledge, Jr., to Bishop Smith, from Phila-
delphia, December 7, 1799, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.; Harper to 
McHenry, August 2, 1799, Harper Papers, LC; Josiah Parker to McHenry, 
from Norfolk, April 29, 1799, in Bernard C. Steiner, ed., "Correspondence of 
James McHenry," William and Mary Quarterly, Series 1, XIII (October, 
1904), 102-107. 
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of government, be it Hamilton, Adams, or an agent of one 
or the other, against the hated Republican leaders. Prior to 
the spring of 1800, therefore, Federalist triumphs in the 
South served to emphasize party unity and strength rather 
than deep internal divisions. 
VI. 'lJefinse ancl 'lJiversion, 
1799 
From the close of 1798 until the end of 1799 a perceptible 
decline in Federalist activity was discernible at the state 
and local levels throughout much of the South. In Virginia, 
Federalists did register some gains both in popular strength 
and in modest expansion of organization and activity during 
the period. Federalists throughout the South now were 
willing to bow to the demands of party regularity as they 
energetically, if not always brilliantly, defended the con-
troversial legislative programs passed by their congressmen 
the previous summer. There are strong indications, more-
over, that the friends of government in the South did not 
suffer a precipitate drop in popularity because of their 
determined support of party policy. 
At the same time many Federalists, especially in the 
Carolinas, allowed their energies to be diverted from the 
problems of expanding their political organization by the 
endless difficulties involved in the organization of the pro-
visional army, and this proved to be a serious mistake. The 
army, either as an institution or an issue, would do the 
Federalists little good in the presidential campaign of 1800. 
In choosing to turn away from their constituents and im-
merse themselves in an enterprise far removed from popular 
favor or interest, many southern Federalists built a barrier 
between themselves and the people, thus contributing to 
their ultimate downfall. 
Directly upon its passage into legal existence the pro-
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visional army took fatal hold over the attentions of far too 
many friends of government in both the North and the 
South, whether or not they were personal allies of Hamil-
ton. Both Adams and Washington were determined that 
southern Federalists should play a key role in the formation 
of the provisional army, and they met a ready response. 
When the President submitted to Washington his con-
troversial list of candidates for the three-man general staff 
in the summer of 1798, four of the fifteen men mentioned 
were southerners. Three were from Virginia-Daniel Mor-
gan, Henry Lee, and Edward Carrington. The other was 
Cotesworth Pinckney.1 Washington, too, was aware of the 
importance of retaining the loyalty of his fellow southerners, 
and his determination to give them a fair place in the 
hierarchy of command led to a minor crisis in military and 
party politics. 
Immediately after his appointment Washington frankly 
informed one of Hamilton's most fervent allies, Secretary of 
State Pickering, that Cotesworth Pinckney must, if he wished 
to take it, be given the powerful number two post of In-
spector General. If the French should be so mad as to at-
tack the United. States directly, Washington remarked, 
I conceive there can hardly be two opinions respecting their 
Plan and that their operations will commence in the Southern 
quarter-!. because it is the weakest.-2. because they will expect, 
from the tenor of the debates in Congress, to find more friends 
there.-3. because there can be no doubt of their arming our own 
Negroes against us-and 4. because they will be more contiguous 
to their Islands; and to Louisiana, if they should be possessed 
thereof. 
Washington added that Pinckney "is an officer of high mili-
tary reputation-fond of the profession, -spirited, -active, 
l Adams to McHenry, July 6, 1798, Adams Papers, Reel117. 
Defense and Diversion, 1 799 I 201 
-and judicious-and much advanced in the estimation of 
the Public by his late conduct as Minister and Envoy at 
Paris." This being the case, Washington was "morally 
Certain" that Pinckney-then still in Europe-would not ac-
cept a position junior to Hamilton. If he were forced to it, 
the general hinted at unpleasant political repercussions. 
"Disgust would follow, and its influence would spread where 
most to be deprecated, as his connections are numerous, 
powerful, and more influential than any other in the 3 
Southern States." The conclusion was obvious. "It would 
be impolitic, and might be dangerous" to force Hamilton's 
pretensions ahead of those of Pinckney.2 
When Hamilton and his allies nevertheless refused to 
end their incessant conspiring, Adams joined Washington in 
demanding that Pinckney be given the first chance at the 
post of Inspector General. 3 Washington never showed the 
same consideration for Adams' anti-Hamiltonian prejudices 
as he did for Pinckney's pretensions, however. Most likely 
Washington at this time deeply feared an imminent French 
invasion of the South-a fear which some southern Federal-
ists sought to keep alive as much as a year later.4 
By August, 1798, therefore, profound schisms within the 
Federalist party already were becoming apparent. Hamil-
ton was besieged. Knox already had refused to take a 
subordinate role to the former colonel from New York, 
despite Hamilton's strong insistence that he must.5 Now it 
appeared that some southern Federalists as well might turn 
aside in bitterness. Fortunately for the army faction and 
~Washington to Pickering, from Mount Vernon, July 11, 1798, Hamilton 
Papers, Vol. 31. 
3 Adams to McHenry, from Quincy, August 14, 1798, Adams Papers, 
Reel 118. 
4 Jacob Read to James Jackson, from Philadelphia, March 22, 1799, Jacob 
Read Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S. C. 
5 Hamilton to Washington, from New York, August 20, 1798, Hamilton 
Papers, Vol. 31. 
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the future of party harmony, Pinckney chose not to provoke 
existing antagonisms further. He had had hatred of France 
driven deep into his soul by his unhappy experiences in Pans 
during the previous two years. He returned to Philadelphia 
in October, highly abusive of any further attempts at 
reconciliation and quickly agreed to accept a position on 
the general staff subordinate to Hamilton.n 
With the Pinckney crisis resolved, and with Adams' sub-
sequent attempts to block Hamilton's accession to the 
Inspector Generalship frustrated, southern Federalists will-
ingly helped to recruit a suitable officer corps. In the Senate, 
James Gunn of Georgia, cut off from all hope of further 
political influence after March 1801, led the Federalist 
forces who wanted to establish an effective army rapidly. 
Gunn had been a well-known military leader during the 
Revolution, and Hamilton sought him out as a potential ally 
when Congress reconvened in December. Gunn quickly 
agreed. When the new Inspector General wrote expressing 
a desire ultimately to see the Georgia senator in a field 
command, Gunn responded with flattery. "I am persuaded 
it can be no part of your plan merely to execute the feeble 
arrangements of other men," he wrote. After observing that 
Hamilton would have charge of running the army in the 
absence of actual war, Gunn implicitly committed himself to 
help the Inspector General find "the Legislative aid neces-
sary for the Support of that department."7 
By late January, Gunn had more than fulfilled his com-
n Pinckney to McHenry, from Trenton, October 31, 1798, in John C. 
Hamilton, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (7 vols.; New York: 
John F. Trow, Printer, 1851), VI, 373; "Personal Memo," January 14, 
1799, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 105. 
7 Hamilton to Gunn, from New York, December 16, 1798; Gunn to 
Hamilton, from Philadelphia, December 19, 1798, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 
33; Hamilton to Gunn, December 22, 1798, in Bernard C. Steiner, The Life 
and Correspondence of James McHenry (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers 
Company, 1907), 360-61. 
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mitment. Working through McHenry, he sponsored supple-
mentary bills to the army legislation in the Senate with such 
haste and enthusiasm that at one point Hamilton complained 
he could not keep up with Gunn's demands for the drafts of 
fresh bills or amendments to existing ones. 8 
Robert Goodloe Harper was another nationally prominent 
Federalist from the South who did not attempt to disguise 
his eagerness to seek "the bubble reputation, even in the 
cannon's mouth." In the summer of 1799 he applied both 
to McHenry and to Cotesworth Pinckney for permission to 
raise a brigade in the South Carolina backcountry. McHenry 
sent Harper's letter on with the remark that the South Caro-
lina congressman's talents "are splendid, and he has usefully 
employed a fund of information, and solidarity of argument 
in our public councils." Pinckney, however, turned Harper's 
request aside for the moment with the observation that 
raising private military units was not authorized under ex-
isting legislation until an invasion actually took place.9 
Harper's ambitions later were satisfied by his appointment 
as Washington's aide-de-camp, a post which would not 
interfere with his Congressional duties except upon the 
outbreak of actual hostilities.10 
In the southern states the practical job of recruitment was 
begun in the winter of 1798-1799 and was undertaken by 
friends of government prominent on both national and local 
levels. Overall direction was delegated to Cotesworth Pinck-
ney and Brigadier General William Washington of South 
8 Hamilton to McHenry, January 14, 1799, ibid., 366; Gunn to Hamilton, 
January 23, 1799, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 33. 
9 Harper to McHenry, from Baltimore, July 29, 1799, Robert Goodloe 
Harper Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S. C.; Cotesworth 
Pinckney to Harper, from Charleston, June 1.'3, 1799; McHenry to Harper, 
from Philadelphia, August 7, 1799, Harper Papers, LC. 
IO Stephen G. Kurtz, The Pres'dency of john Adams: The Collapse of 
Federalism, 1795-1800 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1961), 
330. 
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Carolina and William R. Davie of North Carolina.11 In 
Virginia, Washington himself handled recruitment with the 
aid of Daniel Morgan, Henry Lee, John Marshall, William 
Heth, and Edward Carrington; the entire hard-core Virginia 
Federalist faction of earlier years openly identified itself 
with the armyP 
In the matter of actual recruitment Virginia Federalists 
were as careful to insure the political reliability of poten-
tial officers as were Federalists in New England and the 
middle states. In May, 1799, John Nicholas, unsuccessful 
Federalist Congressional candidate from Madison's district, 
assured the Secretary of War that he was aware ofthe 
propriety of the govt's giving incouragement [sic] to fed-
eralism in this quarter of the Union, where its sparks, I am 
sorry to say, are too rare." In this spirit, Nicholas added, he 
called the volunteer corps of riflemen of Albemarle County 
for active service.13 William Heth reopened his formerly 
close contact with Hamilton concerning the choice of a 
suitable aide-de-camp for the Inspector General. Certainly 
he and Carrington were quite aware of Hamilton's privately 
expressed wish "of appointing friends of the government to 
military stations."14 
In North Carolina, William R. Davie was given some aid 
in his recruiting drive by William Barry Grove.15 Davie 
11 Washington to Davie, from Mount Vernon, December 28, 1798, Wil-
liam H. Davie Papers; Washington to Brigadier General William Washing-
ton, from l\lount Vernon, December 28, 1798, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 
The Writings of George Washington (39 vols.; Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), XXXVII, 74. 
13 \Vashington to .\lcHcnry, from Mount Vernon, May 13, 1799, in Fitz-
patrick, ed., Washington, XXXVII, 207. 
13 Nicholas to McHenry, l\lay 13, 1799, in Steiner, Life and Correspon-
dence of McHenry, 388. 
H Heth to Hamilton, from Petersburg, July 8, 1798, Hamilton Papers, 
Vol. 31; Hamilton to McHenry, February 6, 1799, in Steiner, Life and 
Correspondence of McHenry, 368. 
IG Grove to McHenry, from Raleigh, September 5, 1799, James McHenry 
Papers. 
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seemed as determined as his Virginia colleagues to weed out 
politically questionable candidates. In December, 1798, he 
forwarded to Washington "the names of those Gentlemen of 
whose character I was fully satisfied and whose willingness 
to serve had been ascertained."H> 
Little is known of military patronage in South Carolina; 
of Georgia, nothing except that, in Pinckney's words, "merely 
a Colonel of Infantry" was to be appointed.17 Patronag~ in 
South Carolina was under the direct supervision of Pinckney 
and William Washington, however, which undoubtedly 
meant that eager, loyal young Federalists from the area were 
given every consideration. In early 1800, Hamilton ap-
pointed young Captain Izard as one of his aides, thereby 
enlisting a powerful South Carolina name, if not personality, 
to the Federalist cause.18 
Some friends of government in the South indicated less 
enthusiasm for the Alien and Sedition Acts, which had been 
initiated and drafted largely at the instigation of Senator 
Lloyd of Maryland and Representative Harper of South 
Carolina.19 Soon after the Sedition Act passed Congress, 
Edward Rutledge informed his nephew John, who had voted 
for the bill, that in his opinion the provisions of the act "are 
carried . . . much too far." The older man admitted, how-
ever, that in South Carolina "so anxious are we for Union 
& the Benefits of self-government, that those who see, or 
think they see the Errors of the Bill . . . discuss the propriety 
of it with the calmness of Philosophy rather than with the 
ardor of Politicians."20 In Virginia, John Marshall fell under 
16 December 3, 1798, from Halifax, William R. Davie Papers. 
17 Pinckney to Harper, June 13, 1799, Harper Papers, LC. 
18 Hamilton to William Laughton Smith, from New York, March 11, 1800, 
in Hamilton, ed., Works of Hamilton, VI, 432. 
19 John C. Miller, The Federalist Era, 1789-1801 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1960), 229-30. 
20 Edward to John Rutledge, Jr., July 29, 1798, John Rutledge, Jr., 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel 
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personal attack because of popular agitation over the laws 
and chose to condemn them publicly, though his private 
attitude apparently was somewhat different.21 The North 
Carolina House of Representatives condemned the laws with 
the same breath used to praise the President's conduct to-
ward France, certain proof of the decidedly moderate nature 
of the Federalist impulse in the state. The vote was a 
crushing 58 to 2!.22 
Yet many southern Federalists chose to defend the laws, 
thus indicating that the party continued to generate measur-
able enthusiasm throughout the region. Twenty-one North 
Carolina representatives did go on public record in defense 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts, while at the same time the 
upper house of the legislature contemptuously tabled the 
Kentucky Resolutions when they were introduced by a 
Republican senator. One observer added that "in the 
temper" the North Carolina Senate was in, it "might easily 
have been prevailed on to throw them in the fire."23 
In the early months of 1799 leading Republicans believed 
that South Carolina was coming under their influence once 
Hill, N. C. In the spring of 1799, Timothy Pickering and the South Caro-
lina Federalists, led by Cotesworth Pinckney and Henry William De-
Saussure, attempted to use the so-called "tub plot," wherein the French 
were alleged to have sent agents to Charleston to stir up further slave 
unrest, as a means of reconciling the people of the state to the Alien and 
Sedition laws. The Federalists bungled the affair, however, and the Re-
publicans were able to prove that the "plot" had been a partisan fabrication. 
Cotesworth Pinckney and John Marshall suffered personal ridicule as a 
result. The entire affair is discussed in John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: 
The Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 
14fh50. 
21 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, January 1, 1799; Albert J. 
Beveridge, Life of John Marshall ( 4 vols.; Boston: Houghton, Miffiin Com-
pany, 1916-1919), II, 389. 
22 "Journal of the North Carolina House of Commons," December 24, 
1798, Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the United States (Microfilm, 
University of California Library, Berkeley). 
23 Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, December 23, 1798, in Griffith J. 
McRee, ed., Life and Correspondence of ]ames Iredell ( 2 vols.; New York: 
Peter Smith, 1947), II, 542. 
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more as a result of the Alien and Sedition Acts. In January, 
Thomas Sumter reported to Jefferson that "the republicans in 
S.C. has [sic] gained 50 per cent in numbers since [the state] 
election which was in the moment of the XYZ fever."24 But 
the following December the friends of government in the 
South Carolina Senate were able to suppress a Republican 
attempt to introduce the Kentucky Resolutions for debate 
on the floor by a vote of 14 to 11, which reflected roughly 
the same proportion of party strength as the votes on pre-
paredness in the lower house the year before. 25 
A modest public defense of the laws was evident even in 
Savannah, where the Georgia Gazette briefly resumed its 
partisanship by republishing Timothy Pickering's famous 
lengthy reply to the hostile address of the citizens of Prince 
Edward County, Virginia.26 
The Alien and Sedition Acts received their stoutest and 
most uncompromising defense in Virginia, where they be-
came the central issue in the state campaign, which raged 
from autumn, 1798, to the elections in April, 1799. The 
Republicans' successful crusade against the laws in the Gen-
eral Assembly of 1798-1799 provoked an immediate response 
from the friends of government. Fifty-eight of the sixty-
three assemblymen who voted against the Virginia Resolu-
tions in January signed an address to the people by the 
"Federal members" of the state legislature. Theodore Sedge-
wick, the New England Federalist, observed that the ad-
dress, which he claimed was the work of John Marshall, one 
of the fifty-eight, was "able and elegant and eloquent."27 
24 Jefferson to Madison, from Philadelphia, January 30, 1799, Jefferson 
Papers, Vol. 105. 
25 "Journal of the Senate of South Carolina," December 24, 1799, 
Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. There were no significant party divi-
sions in the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1799. 
26 Issues of October 25, November 1, 1798. 
27 Sedgewick to Hamilton, from Philadelphia, February 7, 1799, in Ham-. 
ilton, ed., Works of Hamilton, VI, 392-93. 
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Actually the effort was labored, vituperative, repetitive, and 
short on logic. 
The friends of government based their entire defense of 
the laws-and of the provisional army as well-upon the as-
sumption that by 1798 "we had but to choose between sub-
mission to the will of a foreign nation, and the maintenance 
of our independence." The Alien Act was thus an obvious 
necessity and was constitutionally justifiable, since Congress 
already had acted upon this assumption and had assumed 
such warmaking powers as the granting of letters of marque 
and reprisal, the formation of rules regarding captures upon 
land and water, and the establishment of defenses to protect 
the states from invasion. The Federalists were unable to 
find justification for the Sedition Act in a strict reading of 
the main body of the Constitution. Undeterred, they blandly 
claimed that the general language of the preamble and the 
necessary and proper clause in Article I, Section 8, provided 
ample legal basis for the law. They asserted that in times 
of crisis the people had the right to prevent vile attacks 
against public figures and government officials. The friends 
of government did not mention the obvious fact that "the 
people" had little to do with the initiation or the passage 
of the legislation and nothing to do with its enforcement, 
which rested largely with partisan judges. None of these 
arguments were new; there was no hint of the imaginative 
political logic which had inspired the Virginia Resolutions. 
But although they were weak, they were presented with 
great force. 28 
A second pamphlet of note in refutation of the Virginia 
Resolutions was issued anonymously by Henry Lee the fol-
lowing month. Lee, too, was unable to serve his cause with 
28 "Address of the Fifty-Eight Federal Members of the Virginia Legis-
lature to their Fellow Citizens in January, 1799," Augusta, Maine, Peter 
Edes ( n.d.), in Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif., 
especially 11, 17-18, 23-33. 
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notable intelligence and tried to make up for the loss 
through tedious repetition. Attempting to rebut Jefferson's 
theory of a federal compact, Lee merely reiterated the usual 
Federalist arguments that the national government was ever 
the superior and indivisibly sovereign body in the Union. 
He argued in crude style his belief that it was the duty of 
the central government to transcend and to protect the 
interests of the states wherever necessary.29 
A third and somewhat earlier pamphlet apparently was 
written in defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts by 
Thomas Evans, the Federalist congressman from the Wil-
liamsburg district. Washington read it, and his correspon-
dence indicates that he assumed others had as well.3° Fed-
eralist sentiments on the controversial laws thus seem to 
have been given the widest possible exposure in Virginia. 
It was not clear in the spring of 1799 that the remarkable 
adherence to party regularity shown by nearly all southern 
Federalists would redound to their political credit. The 
condemnation of the Alien and Sedition Acts by the North 
Carolina House of Representatives, the passage of the Vir-
ginia Resolutions, and the many indications of public apathy 
or outright opposition to the army, all seemed to indicate 
that the Federalists in the South had hastened their political 
oblivion by public adherence to party policy.31 But the state 
~~~ "PLAIN TRUTH, Addressed to the people of Virginia by a Citizen of 
Westmoreland County, February 1799," in Henry E. Huntington Libnrry, 
San Marino, Calif. 
~0 Washington to Bushrod Washington, from Mount Vernon, December 
31, 1798, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXVII, 81. 
:n Concerning the army, Washington reported to McHenry as early as 
October, 1798, that the "spirit and enthusiasm which were inspired by 
the Dispatches from our Envoys" was "evaporating fast." By the next 
February, Washington was near despair. Measures to build up the army, 
he reported, were "not only viewed with indifference, but deemed un-
necessary by that class of people whose attentions [were] being turned to 
other matters." This being the case, "the officers, who in August and Sep-
tember, could, with ease, have enlisted whole companies of them, will find 
it difficult to recruit any." It was at this point also that Hamilton and the 
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elections in Virginia gave the Federalists another opportun-
ity to appeal for public support and to prove that their in-
fluence in the South was not yet ended. 
Virginia Federalists were not disheartened by recent 
events, but accepted them as a challenge to be met and 
overcome. Party members campaigned and organized on 
three distinct levels. At the highest level were the great 
figures of the party's past, who lent their prestige and talents 
to the cause in a limited degree. In the final year of his life 
Washington reappeared as a valuable, though unreflective, 
party leader. In addition to his complete identification with 
the army, he openly defended the Alien and Sedition Acts 
and demonstrated his unhesitating adherence to the worst 
Federalist shibboleths concerning the presence of "aliens 
... who acknowledge no allegiance to this Country, and in 
many instances are sent among us (as there is the best 
Circumstantial evidence to prove) for the express purpose 
of poisoning the minds of our people and to sow dissensions 
among them, in order to alienate their affections from the 
Government of their Choice."a!! 
Washington's greatest influence, however, was over his 
own party and its relationship with the political opposition. 
The general's bitterness toward the Republicans was pro-
found by this time. When imparted in correspondence to 
high Federalists thought they saw in the Virginia militia a plot to resist the 
Alien and Sedition Acts by force. The Inspector General, in commenting 
on this plot, hinted darkly that "public opinion has not been ameliorated; 
sentiments dangerous to social happiness have not been diminished; on the 
contrary, there are symptoms which warrant the apprehension that among 
the most numerous class of citizens, errors of a very pernicious tendency 
have not only preserved, but extended their empire." Washington to 
:\1cHenry, from Mount Vernon, October 14, 1798, in Steiner, Life and 
Correspondence of McHenry, 337; Washington to Hamilton, February 25, 
1799, Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton, 1799, in Hamilton, ed., Works of 
Hamilton, VI, 383-84, 401. 
a2 Washington to Alexander Spotswood, from Philadelphia, November 22, 
1798, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXVII, 23-24. 
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fellow Federalists, it stirred their emotions, thus contribut-
ing to that atmosphere of implacable malevolence within 
which the party campaigns in Virginia were conducted.33 
Washington unleashed a typical outburst of anger when writ-
ing to William Vans Murray at the end of the year. "The 
Alien and Sedition Laws," he remarked, "are now the 
desiderata in the Opposition. But any thing else would 
have done; and something there will always be, for them to 
torture, and to disturb the public mind with their unfounded 
and ill favored forebodings.":H When George Logan made 
the brave error of attempting to acquaint the general with 
the motives for and outcome of his private mission to the 
Directory, Washington coldly and deliberately ignored him, 
turning the meeting into an exercise in studied effrontery. 3" 
Patrick Henry was another popular hero who became an 
asset to the Federalist cause. Upon Washington's solicita-
tion he had agreed to run for the General Assembly from 
Charlotte and was successfuP6 But the once fiery orator 
indicated his growing sense of fatigue and age in his reply 
to Washington's request.a• Although he wrote letters in 
support of Marshall's Congressional candidacy, Henry "hand-
:33 During the legislative session of 1798-1799, Jefferson remarked that 
he had never seen such party bitterness, and there is evidence that gentle-
men from rival parties simply could not live or eat together-or even pass 
each other on the street-in Richmond. For example, at one point when 
Assemblyman James Cureton, a Federalist of Prince George County, entered 
a Republican tavern, a fight quickly broke out whose outcome remains un-
recorded. "Party Violence, 1790-1800," Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, XXIX ( 1921), 174. See also the Virginia Federalist, May 14, 
1800, for an example of the continuation of this trend through the presi-
dential election year. 
:H Washington to Murray, December 26, 1798, in Fitzpatrick, cd., Wash-
ington, XXXVII, 72. 
BG "Memorandum of an Interview," November 13, 1798, ibid., XXXVII, 
18-20. 
3H Earl G. Swem and John W. Williams, A Register of the General Assem-
bly of Virginia, 1776-1918, and of the Constitutional Conuentions (Rich-
mond: Davis Bottom, Supt. of Public Printing, 1918), 53. 
:n Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXVII, 90n. 
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somely" declined to add the luster of his name to the final 
three-man mission which in February Adams determined 
to send to France.38 By June, Henry was dead, a fact sincere-
ly lamented by the friends of government.39 
On the second and far more intense level of party activity 
stood the tried and true members of the old Richmond fac-
tion, now reinforced by recruits from the state's Con-
gressional delegation and from within the various counties. 
After February Lee and his friends abandoned the fight 
against the Virginia Resolutions and those who had spon-
sored them and turned their attentions to the Congressional 
and General Assembly campaigns. Yet the Virginia Resolu-
tions and the defense of the army were not forgotten, for 
the Republicans had indelibly stamped these issues upon 
the campaigns. Neither side let the citizen of Virginia for-
get that when he cast his ballot he was granting a mandate 
not only to men but to measures as well. 
Both interests professed optimism over the probable out-
come of the April elections. In February, after observing the 
flood of public letters and pamphlets written to prove that 
the United States suffered more from Great Britain than 
from France, Jefferson professed serenity. "The materials 
now bearing on the public mind," he wrote, "will infallibly 
restore it to its republican soundness in the course of the 
present summer."40 The Federalists were no less energetic 
and optimistic, but their optimism contained a vindictive 
tone. Referring once again to the Virginia Resolutions, one 
friend of government, writing in March, claimed that "the 
38 William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches 
(2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), II, 591-94, 598; Adams 
to Pickering, from Quincy, May 8, 1799, Adams Papers, Reel 119. 
:w Washington to Marshall, from Mount Vernon, June 16, 1799, in 
Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, XXXVII, 235-36; Virginia Federalist, Decem-
ber 18, 1799. 
40 Jefferson to Monroe, February 11, 1799, to David Stuart, February 
1:3, 1799, Jefferson Papers, Vol. 105. 
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authors of this execrable work are sinking fast into contempt. 
There let them forever rest. To this end it is not sufficient 
that we content ourselves with the victory, it must be fol-
lowed up until every germ of faction be destroyed."41 
The Federalists had laid the groundwork the previous 
fall for their hoped-for war of extirpation against the Re-
publicans when Charles Lee, working from Philadelphia, 
had drawn up a Federalist ticket of moderate size for the 
Congressional campaign. Individual members of this ticket 
apparently were given whatever aid was necessary from 
Philadelphia in the weeks preceding the election. Josiah 
Parker, for example, since he represented the Norfolk dis-
trict, appeared personally vulnerable to Republican charges 
that the Federalists were far more interested in raising an 
army for the purpose of intimidation than in building a navy 
for honest defense. An anonymous partisan in Philadelphia 
wrote a long letter to Parker's hometown newspaper several 
weeks before the elections, pointing out Parker's record as 
a persistent and energetic advocate of adequate defenses for 
his city.42 
Most Federalists in Virginia apparently campaigned ac-
tively for Congressional and Assembly seats. The Norfolk 
Herald reported in late March that political excitement was 
sweeping the state. Moreover, the Federalists were becom-
ing less arrogant and less aloof in their relationships with 
the electorate. A spirit of liberal innovation began to take 
hold of the Federalists as the campaign progressed, and they 
even went so far in some instances as to recruit their local 
officeseekers from the ranks of the plain folk. 43 
41 Norfolk Herald, March 19, 1799. 
42Jbid., January 26, March 12, 1799. 
43 "Great efforts are making in order to change the Membership at the 
next session of the Assembly," one Federalist correspondent observed, "so 
that an alteration of MEASURES may take place." The correspondent added, 
however, that "it is feared that whilst an opposition can be made to the 
word Government, error and political intemperance will remain in status 
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As the campaign built toward its climax and popular re-
sentment of the army continued, both Marshall and Lee al-
most completely severed their connections with the recruit-
ing program.44 Firmly committed to the government in a 
time of peril, the Virginia Federalists willingly modified 
their elitist standards for the sake of immediate public sup-
port. 
A willing liberalization of elitist values regarding the 
wishes of the electorate was only one surprising feature in 
the Federalists' campaign in Virginia in 1799. Anonymous 
friends of government also began publicly urging fellow 
party members to make a determined bid to wrest control 
of the upcoming General Assembly from the Republicans.45 
Such a proposal had never before been made by a reputable 
member of the Federalist interest, yet it apparently was 
carried out with marked success. 
Party activity on both sides reached down to a third level 
in Virginia by 1798-1799. Mobism and vigilantism, directly 
attributable to party animosities, flourished on the popular 
level throughout the state. As early as July, 17~8, the stu-
dents at Republican-oriented William and Mary College 
paraded with a representation of the President receiving a 
"Royal Address" and searching through a bundle of ready-
made answers for a reply. At the same time those excitable 
Federalists at Richmond and Petersburg who were possessed 
of more than modest means began raising private militia 
quo. As a striking instance arising from this reflection, it is fit to mention 
the Federal County of Mathews. The principle of equality and equal 
respectability is there understood; but in order to innovate, some industrious 
persons lately proposed to START (as it is termed) the JAILOR, as their 
next representative in the House of Delegates; but he had no sooner set 
out on his canvass, than he was objected to, as a man TOo MUCH attached 
to GOVERNMENT." Ibid., March 21, 1799. 
44 Washington to McHenry, June 6, 1799, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington, 
XXXVII, 224. 
4 5 Norfolk Herald, March 19, 1799. 
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units for the express purpose of terrifying "the sans culottes." 
Somewhat later in the year rival political mobs were formed 
at Fredericksburg. The Federalist mob chained an effigy of 
Gallatin to the public stocks for two days. The Republicans 
acted a bit later when John Marshall came through town. 
Marshall was insulted publicly in the town theater by the 
Republican rabble, which declared that he should receive 
the same treatment accorded to Matthew Lyon by Federalist 
rowdies at Trenton and New Brunswick.46 
Conflicts revolving around emotional commitments to 
rival party images and ideals did not abate as the year 
ended. The Republican legislature purchased large quanti-
ties of arms and established a state armory at Richmond for 
the ostensible purpose of protecting the state from an in-
vasion by the federal army coming to enforce the Alien and 
Sedition laws and to expunge the Virginia Resolutions. The 
pronounced Federalist sympathies of regular army officers 
stationed in the Richmond-Manchester area and their veiled 
threats against the editor, Thomas Callender, gave the Re-
publicans' hysteria some basis in fact. As the state elections 
drew near, the Federalists intensified their campaign of fear 
and uneasiness on the popular level. Reports once again 
were circulated widely that war with France was imminent, 
despite the President's recent decision to dispatch still an-
other mission to the Directory.47 However reprehensible 
such activities by local Federalist leaders and followers may 
have been, they indicate clearly the beginnings of local party 
cadre, as yet undisciplined, untrained, and irresponsible, but 
capable of becoming in time an able and respectable party 
force. If the friends of government in Virginia had at-
46 "Party Violence," 171-76; Daniel Anderson to Duncan Cameron, from 
Petersburg, Virginia, July 23, 1798, Cameron Family Papers. 
47 Ebenezer Stolt to Richard Bennehan, from Petersburg, March 24, 1799, 
Cameron Family Papers. 
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tempted to lure these local partisans into responsible party 
activity, the Federalists might have become firmly en-
trenched in the politics of the state for years to come. 
The outcome of the elections in Virginia shocked the Re-
publicans. Jefferson reported in dismay that "the Virginia 
congressional elections have astounded everyone . . . how 
long we can hold our ground I do not know."4 s While there 
was little danger of a Federalist majority in the Congres-
sional delegation, more outspoken friends of government 
had been sent to Philadelphia by the Virginia electorate 
than at any time since the emergence of the Republican 
party. Of the state's twenty-one representatives, eight 
eventually were identified as Federalists. Parker of Norfolk, 
Evans of Williamsburg and York, Marshall of Richmond 
and Henrico, Henry Lee from Westmoreland, and Leven 
Powell representing the Spotsylvania district and the town 
of Alexandria, were considered friends of government from 
the start. By late 1800, Robert Page of Frederick County, 
Edwin Gray of Southampton, and Samuel Goode of Chester-
field, also were denounced by the Virginia Republicans as 
Federalists. Yet the Federalists suffered a decided reverse as 
well when James Machir, representing the counties of the 
state's northwestern frontier, was overthrown by George 
Jackson, a firm Republican. 4 !J 
One of the most significant advances in Federalist party 
activity in Virginia occurred soon after the spring elections 
of 1799. John Stewart of Accomac County apparently pro-
vided the decisive backing for the first overt Federalist party 
newspaper in Virginia, and during the last week in May 
48 Jefferson to Tench Coxe, from Monticello, May 21, 1799, Jefferson 
Papers, Vol. 105. 
49 Norfolk Herald, April 27, 1799; Washington to Marshall, from Mount 
Vernon, May 6, 1799, Marshall Papers; George Jackson to Madison, from 
Harrison County, l\Iay 14, 1799, Madison Papers, Vol. 21; Virginia Argus, 
December 19, 1800. 
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the Virginia Federalist-a biweekly-made its appearance 
in Richmond under the editorship of W. A. Rind. 50 Ten 
months later Rind, in a front page statement of editorial 
policy, laid down the reasons for the newspaper's establish-
ment and some of its expected achievements. "It was to be 
regretted," Rind wrote, 
that in the Metropolis of the important and extensive State of 
VIRGINIA, no Federal Printer had appeared, whose Press had been 
conducted in a manner which editorial consistency would seem 
to require on the one hand; and the Friends of Order and the 
General Government, certainly had a right to expect on the 
other. 
The object of the VIHGINIA FEDERALIST is to remedy this evil-
Professing our admiration of the manly measures pursued by the 
General Government; seeing the beneficial effects which have 
already been experienced, and considering them as an evidence 
of their wisdom, that speaks plainly to the understanding of us 
all, and happily disproves the gloomy predictions of those who 
advised a contrary policy;-professing a deep-rooted hostility to 
foreign influence of every kind, our efforts will be unceasing to 
maintain harmony among the States; and point the public mind 
to UNION, as the best means of securing individual happiness, and 
the only all-efficient Guardian of National Independence. 51 
Rind was as good as his word. Soon after the paper was 
started, the Federalist had entered into the mainstream of 
the party's growing nationwide system of newspapers. Rind 
boasted in the spring of 1800 that the paper enjoyed wide 
circulation both within and beyond Virginia; and from the 
beginning he reprinted much material from Federalist news-
papers in the North and from the several regional head-
quarters of the provisional army, as well as partisan essays 
by Federalist writers within the state. He also quickly 
;;o "Party Violence," 176; the first extant issue of the Virginia Federalist 
is of June 1, 1799. 
r.1 Virginia Federalist, May 7, 1800. 
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entered into a bitter war with James Thomas Callender, 
the psychotically partisan editor of the pro-Republican Rich-
mond Examiner, and he urged the establishment of other 
Federalist newspapers in Virginia, notably at Petersburg."~ 
One of the first tasks which the editor set for himself 
was to promote in Virginia the ideology of patriotism first 
developed by Federalists in North Carolina two years be-
fore. Rind often prefaced partisan essays with lurid ac-
counts of the murder of captured American seamen by 
French naval and privateer captains and with a reminder 
to the reader that the Republican party and its press con-
stantly attempted to explain away such atrocities. The long 
essay which followed recalled unwarranted French meddling 
in American domestic affairs and with American rights, and 
concluded by stressing again the allegedly consistent at-
tempt by the Republicans to rationalize these acts. One such 
essay dwelt upon the XYZ humiliation and the Republicans' 
"treasonable" reaction to it. American envoys went to Paris 
"clothed in the robes of peace," one essayist wrote. 
In both hands they presented the olive. And how were they 
treated? With derision and contempt. . . . Surely this was a 
time when every nerve of patriotism must have vibrated! Cold-
ness would have been treason and moderation a veil for coward-
ice. National spirit, like a lion fresh from his slumbers, must have 
roused to vengeance. But what said our patriots the Jacobins[?] 
The leaders in Congress endeavored to suppress the dispatches. 
Did they hope to annihilate insult by smothering it, or to heal the 
wounds of national honor by keeping them concealed? ... But 
the fortune of America prevailed; and the dispatches were pub-
lished. With joy I declare it, they electrified our Country, Amer-
ica seemed to send forth a general shout; the shout of indignant 
freemen, resolved to continue free. But what said our patriots the 
Jacobins? Look into their prints. They first affected to doubt, 
then strove to palliate, and at last raised a clamor against their 
52 Ibid., August 3, 14, 17, 24, September 11, October 5, 1799. 
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own government to drown the reproaches which were bursting 
out against France. This, then, is patriotism! This is sensibility 
to national honor and sympathy in the insults of our Country! 
But the Jacobins have not stopped even here. So far from feeling 
indignation they give us ;oy for having "escaped so well." This, 
sir, is too much to be borne with patience .... We should have 
sacrificed every prejudice of party on the altar of our Country. 
We should have pardoned those errors which necessarily adhere 
to every human government. One great object, our Country 
should have filled our souls; one great sentiment, patriotism have 
absolved all the rancour of party. 5:1 
Having labeled all opposition to the government as unpa-
triotic and the Republican opposition, in particular, as traitor-
ous, Rind continued to publish a flood of essays and addresses 
embellishing and expanding this theme. Included in this out-
pouring was Governor Trumbull's address to the Connecticut 
legislature which "harmonizes with our own political opinion 
in all its parts." Trumbull prefaced some lengthy remarks 
about the need to sustain a sense of patriotism in the face 
of continuing crisis with France by urging that "our general 
policy should be American, not European." There was a 
continuing need, he said, "to guard with vigilance against 
the arts and intrigues of the general enemies of the union 
whose insidious influence will be particularly extended to 
individual states, seeking to produce division and disunion, 
thereby to weaken and enervate our general exertions."54 
The Federalists' cult of patriotism at this point was 
appealing and pertinent to current political conditions. But 
friends of government in Virginia could not long resist the 
temptation to expand their ideological offensive to include 
expressions of unabashed hostility to the doctrines of equality 
and democracy and to demand that a suitable patriotic 
temperament also include a stout defense of traditional elitist 
53 Ibid., August 17, 1799. 
G4 Ibid., October 26, 1799. 
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political values and norms. One Federalist essayist, for 
example, tried to prove through "historical analysis" that 
"whenever the revolutionary mania has prevailed" -as with 
the French and, as friends of government alleged, among the 
Republican opposition in America as well-"confusion and 
conspiracy have been the symptoms of the disease and 
massacre its crisis." He wrote of "the fickle climate of 
democracy" which the Republicans embraced while pur-
suing an "implacable principle of opposition, which has 
hitherto directed the virulence of our leading demagogues 
against everything that is American, either in religion or 
laws."55 
The determination of friends of government to identify 
their ideology of Americanism with the interests of the 
traditional ruling gentry in Virginia and in the nation was 
made explicit in a long editorial in the Federalist late in the 
summer of 1799. The elite of Richmond had formed an 
association to drive James Callender out of town, and one 
of Callender's inebriated supporters had boasted openly in a 
tavern that if the Federalists succeeded in their aim, he 
would raise an army of three thousand to tear down the 
fashionable part of the city brick by brick. Rind immediately 
leaped to the defense of the wealthy inhabitants of "brick 
row," who, he claimed, were "generally, if not without 
exception friends to the Constitution and government of our 
country." The Federalist editor claimed the opposition of 
brick row not only to the party of Jefferson, but also to all 
political movements which might encourage the rise of 
democracy and the ideal of equality at the expense of the 
gentry. Referring to the residents of brick row, he wrote, 
"It must, of course, be very galling to our modern Republi-
cans who are all friends to equality, that men of this descrip-
tion should possess the very finest parts of the city. More-
fiu Ibid., August 24, 1799. 
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over, they are no enthusiastic admirers of all the tyranny 
of the French Directory, and therefore this brick row will 
be too happy if, one day or other, it does not experience the 
fate of the city of Lyons."56 
Virginia Federalists were thus highly active in the year pre-
ceding the presidential campaign of 1800. The founding of 
the Virginia Federalist under a vigorous and outspoken 
editor marked a significant advance toward a modern party 
organization. But whether such activity was effective in 
obtaining or retaining popular support for the federal admin-
istration is another matter. Rind and his fellow journalists 
projected a powerful and possibly erroneous image of a 
besieged, apprehensive Federalist gentry, grimly opposing 
the Jeffersonian Republicans because of their identification 
with liberal democratic change. Writers in the Federalist 
honestly defended the politics of conservatism and portrayed 
all change in prevailing political practices and values as 
tantamount to revolution and anarchy. Thus, Federalist 
journalists prepared the way for a stark conflict between 
profoundly divergent political philosophies in Virginia dur-
ing the election of 1800. 
Despite the emergence of an active, though still small, 
Federalist interest in Virginia during the latter half of 1799, 
the political composition of the General Assembly when it 
met in December was difficult to assess in terms of party 
preference. The spring elections had alarmed many Republi-
cans, who were fearful of a growing Federalist influence in 
several electoral districts in the state. As a consequence, 
they pushed through the legislature a General Election Law 
providing that in future presidential elections the state's 
electoral vote would be cast in a bloc reflecting majority 
sentiment. This was as flagrant a piece of party legislation 
as Virginia had yet seen, and it passed by a scant five votes, 
56 Ibid., August 14, 1799. 
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78 to 73.57 It is tempting but doubtless erroneous to assume 
that all seventy-three who voted against the General Election 
Law were firm Federalists. To determine with any precision 
just how many who voted "anti-Republican" on this measure 
were Federalists, it would be necessary to answer the unan-
swerable: how extensive were partisan feelings, and how 
deep did party discipline extend into the Virginia legislature 
by December, 1799? Or, to put the question another way: 
had the increasingly violent party battles in Virginia over 
the past five years wholly driven the old ideal and sense of 
political independence forever from the minds of gentleman 
legislators? Even at this comparatively late date in party 
conflict, an affirmative answer to the latter question would 
be a bold supposition. 
Nonetheless, it seems safe to say that the vote indicated a 
great deal of dissatisfaction with the Republicans' crude 
conduct, a dissatisfaction which might be capable of effective 
exploitation by an alert, energetic Federalist minority. The 
opponents of the General Election Law, who might be 
considered either Federalist or strongly open to Federalist 
persuasion, came from all geographic subdivisions of the 
state. They represented the yeoman farmer and the emerg-
ing planter classes below the James, the commercial agri-
culturalists of the upper valley, and the frontiersmen in the 
extreme northwestern and southwestern counties. They also 
represented, of course, the Tidewater and Potomac River 
planters and urban groups which had united to send 
Marshall, Parker, Evans, Lee, and Powell to Congress.58 
Apparently the Federalist party in the South experienced 
mixed gains and losses rather than the decline that tradi-
tionally is suggested for the final year of the eighteenth 
57 "Virginia General Assembly, Journal of the House of Delegates," 
January 17, 1800, Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
58 See Appendix, Table 3. 
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century. In Virginia, where they were forced to seek a 
mandate from an aroused and often hostile populace, the 
Federalists expanded their influence into the countryside, the 
legislature, and the press, to an extent which alarmed their 
opponents. They also extended their organizational network 
over much of the state and broadened it to embrace an ever-
wider segment of the voting public. On the eve of the 1800 
election Virginia Federalists at last firmly grounded their 
organizational structure-as they had their earlier occasional 
appeals for support-in the grassroots. 
For the friends of government in the Carolinas, however, 
1799 was a year in which partisan political activity was 
neglected, explaining at least in part the corresponding 
decline of their influence. In North Carolina Federalism had 
experienced a sharp decline with the division in the House 
over the Alien and Sedition Acts, although the twenty-one 
assemblymen who publicly supported those laws did repre-
sent, in drastically reduced form, the same wide geographic 
and socioeconomic interests which had earlier supported the 
President's policies concerning the Directory.59 The vote in 
the South Carolina Senate in December, 1799, to reject a 
Republican motion for consideration of the Kentucky Resolu-
tions is not wholly traceable. The constituencies of five of 
the fourteen senators who voted for rejection do not appear 
in the Senate Journal. Yet at least one of the nine whose 
constituencies are ascertainable represented the backcountry 
district of Spartanburg. 60 On the other hand, a Republican 
representative from South Carolina told a North Carolina 
Federalist in February, 1800, that the lower house of his 
state legislature had taken on a "highly Republican" cast 
as a result of the state elections the previous autumn.61 
59 See Appendix, Table 5. 
60 See Appendix, Table 7. 
61 Robert Williams to Duncan Cameron, from Philadelphia, February 10, 
1800, Cameron Family Papers. 
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The reverses which the friends of government suffered in 
North and South Carolina were not irredeemable when 
viewed within the broad context of contemporary party 
development. As late as January, 1800, Republican political 
organizations in the southern states did not differ markedly 
from those developed by the friends of government. Indeed, 
the Republicans often seemed content to duplicate existing 
Federalist organizational forms rather than to develop their 
own broader structures. In South Carolina, for example, 
neither side had formal party structures throughout the 
election year. The Republican leader, Charles Pinckney, 
grappled with Henry DeSaussure, not as the head of a 
popular party reflecting the will of the people, but as a rival 
political boss. The struggle for South Carolina in 1800 was 
not to be fought between two rival party organizations, but 
between two influential individuals and their personal follow-
ings, each representing one of the two national political 
parties.6~ Even in Virginia, as of January, 1800, "there was 
no formal [Republican] party machinery," according to Noble 
Cunningham. In fact, the Republican hierarchy had not even 
achieved the degree of cohesion attained by the Federalists' 
Richmond and Alexandria factions some years before. Re-
publican "party organization was to be found in the informal 
cooperation of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and other Repub-
lican leaders" who, to be sure, already had "given much 
system to the Republican efforts."63 
Despite some setbacks, Federalists in Virginia and the 
Carolinas entered the election year of 1800 with organiza-
tions and influence roughly parallel to that of their oppo-
nents. The Republicans, however, were utterly determined 
G2 Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation 
of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press, 1957), 160-61. 
63 Ibid., 149. 
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to seize presidential power in 1800, and with dramatic 
abruptness they expanded their organizational structures and 
their popular contacts to cover their commitment. The 
friends of government meanwhile became increasingly di-
vided and embittered over the questions of party leadership 
and suitable candidates for the presidency. It is no exaggera-
tion to say that the vote in the South defeated the Federalists 
in the election of 1800. But even as they slipped from power 
-or from their identification with power-the friends of 
government below the Potomac continued to make signifi-
cant contributions to the growth of the first American party 
system. 
' VII. The Violent Spirit of Party': 
The election of 1800 
The election year opened with a series of somber develop-
ments for the Federalist party. First was the reemergence 
of sectional conflict within Federalist ranks in December, 
1799, over the election of a Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, which the party then controlled by a fairly com-
fortable margin. The open rivalry between Theodore Sedge-
wick and John Rutledge, Jr., was also in part an implicit indi-
cation of the emerging struggle between the high Federalists 
and the President for dominance within the party. Sedge-
wick was wholly subservient to Hamilton; Rutledge had 
proven skillful in evading classification. While he clearly 
had been unhappy over Adams' decision to seek further 
negotiations with France, he retained his close friendship 
with the President's chief supporter in New England, Har-
rison Gray Otis, with whom he often vacationed in Newport 
during the later 1790's.1 The fact that John Marshall handled 
Rutledge's campaign for House Speaker is also significant. 
Rutledge nonetheless saw the struggle in purely sectional 
terms. 
The election of a Speaker [has] puzzled & perplexed the federal 
party of the House more than any of the difficulties it has hereto-
fore had to struggle with. The southern & middle States Delegates 
thought, that as the government was very much in eastern hands, 
& as there had been one Speaker from New England, & two from 
the Middle States, it would be wise & proper to elect a southern 
gentleman to the chair, & they nominated me. 
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He indicated, however, that after three futile caucuses he 
and his supporters were at last forced to give in to the 
adamant New Englanders, and that having made the sub-
mission in good grace, sectional harmony returned for a 
time to the Federalists' Congressional phalanx.2 
A second unhappy development, whose origins also went 
back to 1799, was the rapid emergence of ultimately irrepres-
sible conflict within the party hierarchy between Hamilton 
supporters and the President. Hamilton's followers in Con-
gress and the cabinet had delayed for months the dispatch 
of the President's latest-and as it turned out, final-mission 
to Paris. Only after insistent pressures from his own fol-
lowers, including Attorney General Charles Lee of Virginia, 
had Adams left his Quincy home and his ailing wife to rush 
to Philadelphia and see personally to the departure of the 
embassy and the thwarting of the hopes of the militarists 
in and out of his cabinet.:1 Although the President had not 
yet determined to move against his enemies in the Executive 
Department, he knew fully who they were, and their in-
trigues left him deeply embittered. By the early winter of 
1800 he had begun to speak openly of forming a third party 
composed of moderates recruited from both Federalist and 
Republican ranks.4 At the same time Hamiltonian Federalists 
spoke with an equally deep bitterness, born of frustration, 
of deserting the President and of throwing their support 
behind either King or Ellsworth in the forthcoming cam-
paign. Upon reaching Philadelphia and hearing that news, 
1 H. G. Otis to John Rutledge, Jr., from Boston, November 12, 1799, John 
Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
~John Rutledge, Jr., to Bishop Smith, from Philadelphia, December 3, 
1799, ibid. 
3 John Spencer Bassett, The Federalist System, 1789-1801 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1906), 249-50. 
4 Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of 
Federalism, 1795-1800 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1961 ), 
393. 
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Marshall informed his brother sadly "that the situation of 
our affairs with respect to domestic quiet is much more 
critical than I had conjectured." Significantly, Marshall 
placed the source of opposition to Adams with "the eastern 
people," not the southerners. 5 
Prior to the President's abrupt dismissal of Pickering and 
McHenry in mid-May, however, both wings of the party 
worked in uneasy tandem. In January, Adams' chief agents 
in the House, John Marshall of Virginia and Harrison Gray 
Otis of Massachusetts, publicly defended the provisional 
army. And Marshall, who was lauded for his abilities, later 
voted against Republican attempts to reduce the size and 
power of the army. At the same time Josiah Parker of 
Norfolk initiated a correspondence campaign on Adams' 
behalf to reach southern political leaders of both parties. 
Parker's correspondence campaign deeply alarmed at least 
one prominent Congressional Republican. 6 Hamilton gave 
his blessing to efforts to preserve a united front in and out 
of Congress, indelicately but aptly summing up his senti-
ments on the matter only a week before the Secretaries of 
State and War were fired. Support of the President then and 
in the forthcoming campaign "is the only thing that can 
possibly save us from the fangs of Jefferson," he said.7 The 
Inspector General's concern was justified, because another 
series of unpleasant events in the winter and early spring 
confirmed Federalism's declining prestige. 
;; Marshall to James Marshall, December 16, 1799, Marshall Papers. 
li Elizur Goodrich to David Davenport, from Philadelphia, December 7, 
1799, January 3, 1800, History Note Card File, Independence Hall National 
Park Office, Philadelphia; William H. Hill to Duncan Cameron, from 
Philadelphia, February 11, 1800, Cameron Family Papers; Nathaniel Macon 
to Andrew Jackson, from Philadelphia, February 13, 1800, in J. S. Bassett, 
ed., "Some Unpublished Letters of Nathaniel Macon," Historical Society of 
Trinity College Publications, VI ( 1906), 58. 
7 Hamilton to Theodore Sedgewick, May 4, 1800, in John C. Hamilton, 
cd., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (7 vols.; New York: John F. Trow, 
Printer, 1851), VI, 436. 
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In the South the party's already-thin network of influential 
leadership was weakened by the deaths of George Washing-
ton and Edward Rutledge within a month of each other at 
the turn of the year. In purely political terms neither loss 
could be measured. Washington's death was not only a 
deep blow to Federalist influence in Virginia and the South; 
it also meant the removal of the last symbol of unity from 
the party. lntraparty conflicts revolving about the formation 
of the army had indicated that a word from Mount Vernon 
still often carried decisive weight in party councils.8 Now 
that no final decisions were to be forthcoming from Wash-
ington, the way was open for the free exercise of intrigue 
and the indulgence of personal and sectional animosities 
within the party hierarchy. 
The death of Edward Rutledge marked the beginning of 
the decline of Federalist influence in South Carolina. The 
Charleston lawyer-governor of the state at the time of his 
death-might have eliminated by the sheer force of his 
influence the grave organizational weaknesses which inhib-
ited the South Carolina Federalists. His death created a 
temporary vacuum in the state's party leadership, since both 
Pinckneys, young Rutledge, and Harper all were involved in 
national service. The Charleston financier Henry William 
DeSaussure stepped into the breach; but while he filled 
Rutledge's post with energy and ability, he could not match 
his predecessor in prominence and authority. 
Adding to the Federalists' problems at this time was the 
sudden erosion of their former power in New York and in 
many key areas of the South. Rutledge's election to the 
governorship in South Carolina had been won despite firm 
8 Adams at one point in 1798 wrote to Washington in evident unease: 
"If the Constitution and your convenience would admit of my changing 
places with you, or of my taking my old Station as your Lieutenant Civil, 
I should have no doubts of the ultimate prosperity and Glory of the 
Country." June 25, 1798, Adams Papers, Reelll7. 
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Republican control of the lower house of the state's legisla-
ture.9 Representative Robert \Villiams in his letter to Duncan 
Cameron had remarked that reports circulating in Philadel-
phia claimed Republican dominance of the legislatures of 
Georgia and the frontier states of Kentucky and Tennessee 
after the autumn elections of 1799. This was to be expected, 
but in Virginia the following spring many of the old corps 
of Federalist supporters were turned out of the General 
Assembly, despite some spirited campaigning by members 
of the Richmond Federalist faction, including James Mc-
Clurg. Monroe reported that at least twenty-five Federalists 
had been replaced by staunch Republicans in the April 
elections for state officeY1 Only in North Carolina did the 
Federalists apparently retain some influence during the early 
months of the election year. 11 
The loss of the New York City elections and the successive 
Federalist defeats in the South filled party leaders with 
foreboding. Hamilton told Sedgewick that the city elections 
were a key to party strength throughout the state, and the 
marked partiality of the urbanites for Republicanism seemed 
to make it "too probable that the electors of President for 
ll Robert Williams to Duncan Cameron, from Philadelphia, February 10, 
1800, Cameron Family Papers; Aurora (Philadelphia), January :30, 1800. 
10 Monroe to Jefferson, from Richmond, April 26, 1800, Stanislaus Murray 
Hamilton, ed., Writings of ]ames Monroe (7 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1898-190.3), III, 175-76; Abraham Baldwin to Joel Barlow, from 
Philadelphia, May 14, 1800, History Note Card File, Independence Hall 
National Park Office, Philadelphia (original in Baldwin Collection, Yale 
University Library). 
11 A correspondent writing to the Gazette of the United States in late 
January claimed that the North Carolina legislature "is truly Federal," 
as evinced by the gubernatorial election within that body and also by the 
appointments to fill the officer corps of the militia. On the latter point the 
correspondent remarked with evident rt•lish that "all those" whom "the 
Jacobins ... have offered for militia officers have failed." Obviously, North 
Carolina Federalists continued to pin their hopes of retaining power upon 
continued control of the military, including both state and national units. 
January 2.3, 1800. 
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this State will be anti-federal."12 It was against this unhap-
py background that Hamilton issued his call for party har-
mony. 
Even as Hamilton admonished his followers, a decided 
decline in Federalist strength in Congress was apparent, 
paralleling the deterioration of Federalist prestige in New 
York and the South. \Vhen Congress had convened in No-
vember, 1799, there had been forty-one new members in the 
lower house, all elected during the height of the XYZ fever 
the previous year. According to Jefferson, the Federalists 
confidently counted upon a House majority of twentyY 
However, one of the new representatives, Robert Williams 
of North Carolina, assured a reader that in fact he and his 
colleagues originally were "in search of a middle way" 
and revealed "an indifference to party." Yet neither party 
by this late date was content to accept the old ideal of 
gentlemanly independence. \Ian is a social animal, \Villiams 
added philosophically, and as a result the new members were 
"at length forced into one or the other of those fashionable 
Climes, this tends to prove how short [is] the knowledge of 
even the best informed, not immediately within this political 
Circus, as to the extent of party at this place."14 
The friends of government found themselves ill~prepared 
to campaign to retain the loyalties of this crucially important 
swing group in the House. First, they lacked a dominating 
floor leader. .Marshall apparently came the closest to filling 
this role, but at least one of the new representatives felt that 
I~ Hamilton to Scdgewick, ~lay 4, 1800, in Hamilton, ed., \Vorks of 
Hamilton, VI, 4.'36. 
Ia Jefferson to ~ladison, from Philadelphia, May 12, 1800, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 21. 
H \Villiams to Duncan Cameron, from Philadelphia, February 10, 1800, 
Cameron Family Papers; Abraham Baldwin to Joel Barlow, from Philadel-
phia, March 6, 1800, History Note Card File, Independence Hall National 
Park Office, Philadelphia (original in Baldwin Collection, Yale University 
Library). 
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Gallatin overshadowed him. 15 Secondly, the Federalists in 
the House were as deeply divided over party policy as were 
those in the executive branch. "In our councils, there is no 
fixed plan," Hamilton wrote. "Some are for preserving and 
invigorating the navy and destroying the army. Some among 
the friends of government for diminishing both on pecuniary 
considerations ."16 
By the middle of May, Jefferson reported triumphantly 
that the Federalists clearly had lost the balance of power in 
the House. The "new & moderate men" quickly had seen 
through to "the true character of the party to which they had 
been well disposed while at a distance" and had abandoned it. 
The initial majority of about twenty counted by the friends 
of government had been erased, and "the federalists have 
not been able to carry a single strong measure in the lower 
house the whole session."17 In the closing days of the session 
the Republicans took the offensive in Congress for the first 
time since the summer of 1796 and managed to abolish the 
hated provisional army. 18 
In early May the Federalist party at last collapsed from 
within, as Adams turned out the high Federalist obstruction-
ists in his cabinet. Whether this action alone would have been 
sufficient to destroy politically the President and the image 
of the party which nominally he still led is open to question. 
The high Federalists have never been described as a popular 
group, but persistent sectional jealousy and mistrust among 
many southern Federalists subsequently gave Hamilton and 
his followers an influence over many friends of government 
which they normally would not have had. In 1798 the 
15 William H. Hill to Duncan Cameron, from Philadelphia, February 11, 
1800, Cameron Family Papers. 
16 Hamilton to Rufus King, from New York, January 5, 1800, in Hamilton, 
ed., Works of Hamilton, VI, 417. 
17 Jefferson to Madison, May 12, 1800, Madison Papers, Vol. 21. 
18 Annals of Congress, VI, 403. 
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southern Federalists had been the President's bulwark against 
the emerging militaristic wing of the party. Two years later 
many of them, influenced by sectional suspicion in an elec-
tion year, finally fell under Hamilton's sway, persuading 
themselves of the need to subvert New England and Adams 
to Hamilton and his southern ally, Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney. This blending of sectional with personal rivalry 
within the Federalist party ensured its destruction as the 
ascendant political force in the nation. 
Sectional harmony within the Federalist party was in 
constant jeopardy from December, 1799, onward. The spec-
ter of sectional conflict, apparently interred since 1797, had 
been raised once again in the struggle between Sedgewick 
and Rutledge for the post of Speaker of the House. It was 
inevitable with Adams in the presidency and Hamilton again 
politically active that the revived sectional jealousies would 
become crucial in the conflict between the two. In 1796, 
Adams electors in New England had thrown away some 
votes pledged to Thomas Pinckney to assure the ascendancy 
of their candidate. As the campaign of 1800 would indicate, 
southerners had never forgiven Adams for his apparent 
countenance of such a move. Hamilton and his men, on the 
other hand, had staunchly supported Pinckney; and by 1799 
another and even more prominent member of that family 
was backing Hamilton. If Adams was to retain the significant 
support he had built up in the South in 1798 and had held 
substantially the following year, it was necessary for him to 
avoid an open break with Hamilton. For the President was 
powerless to prevent a recurrence of suspicion of his motives 
and a revived sense of betrayal among the southern elec-
torate. The fact that he would accept, or even urge the 
necessity of, a southern running mate was no guarantee of 
his eventual faithfulness to southern interests. Only if the 
problem of sectional suspicion was subverted thoroughly by 
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party harmony and clearcut agreement could the President 
hope to avoid disastrous loss of support in the South. 
Adams preserved the image of party unity as long as 
possible. As late as April, 1800, southern Federalists con-
fidently predicted his reelection, and while the choice of his 
southern running mate reflected the below-the-surface strug-
gle between his followers and those of Hamilton, there was 
as yet no indication that Adams would not be supported 
for the presidency in the South.19 The persistent intrigues 
of the high Federalists at last forced the President's hand, 
however, and with his dismissal of Pickering and McHenry 
in May, the party was shattered, not only on the national 
level, but at least in one crucially important southern state 
as well. 
Reaction to the dismissals among most southern Feder-
alists was reserved. William H. Hill's comments were 
typical. "You will have observed that great changes have 
been made in the administration by removal and resignation 
of several of the officers in the high departments," he wrote 
to a North Carolina correspondent. "The causes are not fully 
and clearly developed-a variety of conjectures are in circu-
lation but from too uncertain a medium of information to 
trouble you with."20 Hill's remarks seem to indicate either 
a lack of close contact between the Executive Department 
and a majority of southern Federalists in Congress or, more 
19 John Marshall to Reuben George, from Philadelphia, March 16, 1800, 
History Note Card File, Independence Hall National Park Office, Philadel-
phia (original in Virginia State Library, Richmond); Joseph Dickson to 
William Lenoir, March 28, April 20, 1800, Lenoir Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. Both Marshall 
and Cotesworth Pinckney were widely talked of within Federalist ranks as 
vice presidential candidates as early as December, 1799. Jonathan Dawson 
to Madison, from Philadelphia, December 12, 1799, Madison Papers, Vol. 
21. From Hamilton's statements in early May concerning Adams and 
Pinckney, it would appear that the Federalist caucus in Congress had 
agreed to this ticket by then. 
~o Hill to John Haywood, from Chester, May 15, 1800, Haywood 
Collection. 
'The Violent Spirit of Party': The Election of 18oo j 241 
likely, a deliberate determination by southerners to remain 
aloof from the schisms in the cabinet. 
The Federalist press in the South could not afford to be 
detached. Obviously something had to be said about the 
open disruption of party harmony at the highest levels. From 
the beginning, however, southern Federalist editors simply 
followed the official party line on the dismissals as laid 
down at Philadelphia by John Fenno and his Gazette of the 
United States. Fenno initially admitted the existence of a 
sharp break between Pickering and the President "on politi-
cal grounds." Sometime later a Federalist newspaper in 
Boston carried an embarrassingly candid account of the 
reasons behind Pickering's departure which also reached the 
progovernment press in the South. But by early June, Fenno 
had recovered his wits sufficiently to try to present the affair 
in the best possible light, and his highly imaginative, though 
totally false, portrait of restored party harmony duly ap-
peared in the southern Federalist papers. 
According to Fenno, "Mr. Pickering on hearing that gen-
eral Marshall had accepted his late berth, expressed the 
highest satisfaction, and publicly declared, he did not think 
that the Department had ever been so well filled." Fenno 
followed this remarkable account of Pickering's unaccus-
tomed outburst of modesty and magnanimity with another 
revelation which must have surprised-if it did not wryly 
amuse-the angry and estranged principals when they read 
it. "It is also much to the credit of both Mr. Adams and 
Mr. Pickering," Fenno wrote, "that they still speak in the 
handsomest terms of each other; by which those secret 
enemies who endeavored to widen the breach have com-
pletely missed their aim."21 
One southern Federalist, however, who unequivocally had 
aligned himself with Hamilton, did not attempt to hide his 
n Quoted in the Virginia Federalist, l\1ay 21, 31, June 7, 1800. 
242 I Prologue to Democracy 
bitterness over the President's decision to banish the hawks 
within the cabinet. James Gunn enlightened the absent 
John Rutledge, Jr., on the affair and included in his summary 
the latest gossip concerning changes in the upcoming presi-
dential race. As a result of the dismissals, Gunn claimed, 
"Mr. Adams and his Dear friend Mr. Jefferson have been 
twice closeted together, Since Saturday last, and it is gen-
erally understood to be agreed on between them that Genl 
Pinckney is not to be the President-A declares Mr. J the 
only man in America qualified to fill the appointment, Ex-
cept himself-"22 
Gunn was not the only serpent to whisper of certain sec-
tional betrayal in young Rutledge's ear. Representative 
James A. Bayard of Delaware, another Hamilton supporter,23 
also hinted at it. "The point of understanding subsisting 
between him [Adams] and Mr. Jefferson it is scarcely possible 
to ascertain," Bayard told the young South Carolinian in 
June. Bayard added, however, "it is confidently stated, that 
if Mr. J. should be elected President and Mr. A. Vice Presi-
dent, that Mr. A. will serve under Mr. J. in his ancient 
capacity. But this condescension is not expected in case Mr. 
P. should be the successful candidate."24 Rutledge was enjoy-
ing a brief and enforced vacation at home in South Carolina 
when he received both of these letters.25 Their very contents 
~~James Gunn to John Rutledge, Jr., May 12, 1800, John Rutledge, Jr., 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, N.C. 
~:l Bayard to Hamilton, August 18, 1800, in Elizabeth Donnan, ed., "Papers 
of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815," Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association, 1913 ( 2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1914), I, 113. 
~~Bayard to Rutledge, June 8, 1800, from Wilmington, ibid., 111. 
~;,Rutledge nearly became one of the first victims of his own party's 
Sedition Law. He had aeted as Bayard's second in a political duel with 
Congressman \Villiam Champlin of Connecticut in which Champlin was 
injmed. Governor McKean of Pennsylvania and District Judge Coates, both 
staunch Republicans, threatened to arrest and try both Federalist congress-
men on a charge of treason against a member of the United States Congress. 
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indicate that they must have enjoyed wide circulation among 
the young congressman's Federalist colleagues in the low-
country. A deep suspicion of the President's motives and 
future moves was implanted in the minds of South Carolina 
Federalists by the poisonous insinuations of the Hamilton-
ians. The practical effect ultimately proved disastrous to 
party fortunes both in the state and in the nation. 
As the Federalist party was being torn to pieces by its 
friends on the national level, party machinery and effective 
techniques of mass appeal continued to be perfected in all 
of the southern states except Georgia. The Federalist party 
in 1800 was in fact a paradoxical political movement. On 
the national level party leaders divided bitterly and struggled 
implacably for power in the face of a formidable political 
opposition; many friends of government on the local levels, 
where the hard tasks of vote-getting and office-seeking had 
to be performed, continued their quiet reception to pro-
gressive political change. It is this dichotomy between Fed-
eralist party activities on the national and local l~vels that 
has eluded historians of the period. Beginning with the re-
vival of Federalist strength in 1797, a cadre of state and 
local party figures gradually had been recruited. These 
people were not concerned primarily with the making of 
high party policy nor embroiled in the personal rivalries 
between party leaders, but concentrated upon the advance-
ment of the party on a state or local level. This was a new 
and distinct breed of political animal, composed of what 
might be called two species. The managers included such 
loyal workers on the county level as Duncan Cameron of 
North Carolina and Bushrod Washington of Virginia and 
Both Bayard and Rutledge fled to their homes, though Rutledge had 
returned to Newport by July. John Rutledge, Jr., to Bishcp Smith, from 
Poplar Grove Plantation, May 24, 1800, from Newport, July 25, 1800, John 
Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; Virginia Federalist, May 21, 1800. 
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such state political bosses as Henry William DeSaussure and 
Leven Powell. The expositors, the political editors, included 
such influential figures as Abraham Hodge in North Caro-
lina and W. A. Rind in Richmond. As has been known and 
emphasized, the Republicans had an abundance of such 
men in 1800. The history of southern politics in the later 
1790's shows that the Federalists had them too, and in many 
ways they reached a peak of activity and competence during 
the election year of 1800. 
Federalist party activity in the South in 1800 took three 
forms, which actually varied little in content but often 
greatly in effectiveness from the Republican opposition. 
First, Federalists in the South continued to perfect and to 
extend their formal party organization-or their informal 
channels of communication where formal organization was 
lacking or deemed unnecessary, as in South Carolina. Sec-
ond, the friends of government concentrated upon the de-
velopment of a vigorous and articulate partisan press. Each 
of the three southern states where Federalist activity was 
evident in 1800 contained at least one newspaper committed 
to propagandizing the Federalist cause. The day of the 
political editor had arrived for both sides. Finally, the Fed-
eralists in many areas of the South carried their campaigns 
to the people with an intensity and an effectiveness never 
before shown. Unfortunately, they became increasingly 
burdened, and their efforts were increasingly compromised 
by the growing schisms within the national party leadership. 
Eventually, this burden became too great for many of them 
to bear and they fell into confusion and apathy allowing 
their more vigorous and united Republican opponents 
ultimately to win the southern states and national power. 
The chief blame for the failure of the southern Federalists 
rests to a great extent with the national hierarchy which 
served them so poorly. The essence of the Federalist col-
'The Violent Spirit of Party': The Election of 18oo I 245 
lapse in 1800 was the overwhelming of the party's many 
progressive impulses by a reactionary national leadership. 
Southern Federalists began to assemble for the coming 
state, Congressional, and presidential campaigns as early 
as January, 1800. In Virginia, the apparently well-organized 
friends of government were jolted into action by their Re-
publican opponents, who met at Richmond early in the year 
to form a ticket and to establish committees of correspon-
dence in each county. Soon after, the Federalist members of 
the legislature held a caucus and reorganized and expanded 
their party structure in the state to duplicate that of the 
Republicans. A general committee was formed at Richmond, 
and county committees were duly created, charged with 
meeting at certain intervals to formulate strategy.26 The ease 
and rapidity with which the Federalists were able to match 
their opponents' elaborate organization demonstrates that 
the friends of government enjoyed wide and sympathetic 
contacts throughout Virginia before 1800. The subsequent 
rapid formation of a statewide electoral ticket reinforces 
this impression. "The American Republican Ticket," as it 
was called, unabashedly pleaded for the support of those 
who possessed "a sacred regard for the constitution and all 
those blessings of which it is the source."27 A full slate of 
26 Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation 
of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1957), 152-53, quoting the Virginia Argus, March 28, 1800; Virginia 
Federalist, May 28, 1800. The Federalists apparently did not inform the 
people of the state of the establishment of a statewide network of party 
county committees in late March, but rather let the opposition press speak 
for them. 
27 A handbill copy of this ticket and its accompanying address to the 
people may be found in the Charles William Dabney Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
The ticket and the address also were reprinted in each issue of the Virginia 
Federalist between May 28 and August 2. When he first printed the ticket, 
Rind urged "our federal typographical brethren throughout the state to give 
it a conspicuous place in their invaluable Gazettes; and to remember that 
they cannot republish it too expeditiously-nor continue it too long." 
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electors was prepared, most of them obscure political figures. 
The Federalists thus placed themselves in a position in terms 
of organization to battle their opponents across the state. 
Formulation of statewide political machinery in North 
Carolina was a far more difficult task for the Federalists 
since, unlike in Virginia or South Carolina, friends of govern-
ment in North Carolina had never established any central 
organization. And the unwillingness of the more prominent 
Federalist leaders to give their attention to party organization 
and the retention of popular support during the final year of 
the century proved a decisive factor in reshaping the Fed-
eralists' political practices in North Carolina in 1800. The 
neglect of practical political problems by the traditional lead-
ers induced local party workers themselves to organize and 
campaign on a limited scale. Such grassroots activity in 
the absence of central direction proved to be a boon to 
Federalist fortunes in North Carolina. For whether planned 
or not, party activities were soon conducted along a more 
democratic course than southern Federalists had been will-
ing to follow so far. In being forced to concentrate initially 
upon party activity on the county and local levels, the friends 
of government in North Carolina thus were brought into the 
mainstream of political change in America. 
As early as January various "Federalist persons" in the 
state began to make plans for the coming campaign.~8 The 
Hillsboro merchant, planter, and lawyer, Duncan Cameron, 
for example, saw to it that various partisan publications, 
notably Porcupine's Gazette, and doubtless the Virginia 
Federalist as well, were given the widest possible dissemina-
tion through his section of the state. His sources of supply 
for these publications were the British merchants of Peters-
burg, which strongly indicates that Federalists in this Vir-
28 Duncan Cameron to Charles Harris, from Hillsboro, January 21, 1800; 
John Maddell to Cameron, from Newfield, January 8, 1800, Cameron Family 
Papers. 
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ginia commercial center, at the head of the trade routes from 
central and western North Carolina, were involved deeply 
in the maintenance of Federalist influence on local levels in 
those regions.~n Charles Harris, a Halifax lawyer, also be-
came active in party matters. He and Cameron began to 
sound out the several "victorious & patriotic Gentlemen" in 
the various counties "who are exerting their best talents 
and using their most zealous endeavours to save our sinking 
Country by developing the views of the factious demo-
crats."Ho Cameron already knew of "four persons in each 
of the Counties of Chatham, Wake & Orange whom I think 
you can rely on for firmness and zeal." He was unable to 
conceal from Harris his deep pessimism concerning the 
future of Federalism in North Carolina despite the state's 
apparent current partiality for the party. He was determined 
to campaign actively for Federalism to an end that he felt 
was sure to be bitter. "Nothing now remains for us," he 
wrote, "but to make a last exertion." Should that fail, "we 
shall find a rich consolation in having done the duties of 
citizens striving to promote the real interests of the Country." 
These early efforts of Cameron, Harris, J olm Maddell, and 
others to construct a firm Federalist machine stretching 
across the state received encouragement from North Caro-
linians then at Philadelphia. In March, Congressman William 
Hill warned Cameron that "Mr. Adams reelection de-
pends on the powerful exertion of the friends of govern-
ment-and unless this is assiduous and well directed we have 
reason to fear the worst ... from the unremitting & extensive 
application of the Jacobins ... pervading every part of the 
Union."31 
2!l R. Anderson to Cameron, January 14, 1799; Daniel Anderson to 
Cameron, August 11, 1800, James Anderson to Cameron, October 24, 
1800, ibid. 
:Jo Cameron to Harris, from Hillsboro, January 21, 1800, ibid. 
Hl Hill to Cameron, March 22, 1800, ibid. 
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By June a Federalist in Halifax reported that the "general 
attention as to public affairs is set upon the election of presi-
dent and vice-president." By this time, too, both parties had 
almost completed the formation of statewide electoral tickets 
and had made rather firm assessments about the state of 
public opinion. Federalist hopes frankly were high. 32 
In South Carolina formal party organization, such as it 
was, existed already among the Federalists. DeSaussure, 
Harper, Thomas Pinckney, and young Rutledge all enjoyed 
a wide range of contacts throughout the state which could 
be activated for the cause. These gentlemen composed an 
informal, but nonetheless potent and reasonably cohesive, 
central committee. The presidential campaign in South 
Carolina was fought strictly between two sets of elitist-
oriented political factions; the Federalists were led by Henry 
William DeSaussure and Thomas Pinckney, while Charles 
Pinckney and Pierce Butler directed the Republicans.33 
Next to party organization, an energetic and outspoken 
partisan press proved to be an integral part of the Federalist 
campaigns. At Richmond the Virginia Federalist continued 
its active service throughout the early part of the year. In 
January, W. A. Rind expanded the size of the paper to allow 
"that our Fellow-Citizens should be accurately informed of 
the true situation of affairs of the United States." The follow-
ing May the paper's front page for the first time was thrown 
open to the strident defenders of administration policies, a 
practice that broke with a hallowed tradition of Anglo-
American journalism which dictated that local business and 
advertisements should take precedence over hard news and 
32 Dr. Charles W. Harris to Robert Harris, June 20, 1800, in Henry M. 
\Vagstaff, ed., "The Harris Letters," ]ames Sprunt Historical Publications, 
Vol. XIV, No. 1 (Durham, North Carolina: The Seeman Printery, 1916), 
7.'3-74; Virginia Federalist, May 31, 1800. 
33 Monroe to Madison, November 7, 1800, Hamilton, ed., Writings of 
Monroe, III, 219. 
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competitive politicking. 34 In an age when the press exerted 
an especially powerful influence over daily lives, this steady 
intensification of partisan political journalism obviously 
stimulated further the growing interest in public affairs 
among the electorate. It also placed a heavy burden of 
competence upon partisan writers. 
In 1800, Federalists everywhere were faced with the 
problem of recasting party ideology after Adams' dispatch of 
the three-man mission to Paris the previous November. As 
members of the high Federalist faction were agonizingly 
aware, the President's action robbed the party's simplistic 
patriotic ideology of most, if not all, of its force. Too many 
friends of government allowed themselves the fatal luxury 
of blind hatred against the President as the result of his 
decision for peace, but many others went to work to shift 
the party's ideological appeal to what they considered a 
more durable base. This was especially true in Virginia, 
where Federalist journalists rather quickly reconstructed 
party philosophy around a stout and uncompromising de-
fense of traditionally legitimate political and religious norms. 
Virginia Federalists and their allies in North Carolina 
proudly labeled themselves "the friends of religion and of 
the present government.":~;; Defenders of order and of estab-
lished social institutions and practices, they stood opposed 
unalterably to "Gigantic discord, the foe of liberty, in the 
garb of Republicanism."36 Federalist writers who urged the 
people to cleave to the teachings of the Bible, which specifi-
cally included piety and faithfulness, were given prominent 
space in Rind's paper. The right of a well-known Episco-
palian priest to enter the political lists in Virginia in behalf 
of Federalism was upheld vigorously by friends of govern-
34 Virginia Federalist, January 18, May 28, 1800. 
35 Ibid., June ll, 1800, quoting the North Carolina Minerva ( n.d.). 
36 Ibid., May 7, 1800, quoting the London Observer ( n.d. ). 
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ment who saw themselves as the sole champions of estab-
lished political and religious institutions.37 Histories of the 
Washington and Adams administrations, structured and 
written in the Biblical style and presenting leading figures 
in government as Old Testament heroes, were conspicuously 
displayed in Rind's paper. 38 
Closely tied to the idolatry of contemporary government 
officials in the Federalist press of Virginia was the steady 
development of the cult of Washington. The general's death 
was exploited suitably for partisan ends, and a series of essays 
immediately appeared which recalled his many services for 
the country and his connection with the Federalist party.39 
In February, 1800, his birthday was celebrated ostentatiously 
by detachments of the provisional army; and various eulogies, 
which also included pleas for the continuation of orderly 
government, were spoken throughout the state.40 The most 
striking attempt by the friends of government to capitalize 
upon Washington's towering reputation among the people 
was the publication of "wASHINGTONIANA: A Collection of 
Papers Relative to the DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GENERAL 
GEORGE WASHINGTON," that appeared in April and was ad-
:!7 Ibid., March 19, 1800, quoting the Baltimore Federal Gazette (n.d.), 
April 20, 1800. 
~s One such history, concerned with the decision to form a provisional 
army and to recall Washington to lead it, ran as follows: 
"16. And they appealed unto ADAMS with one heart & with one voice, & said, 
'well done thou good and faithful servant, thou hast merited well of 
thy country.' 
"17. And the Rulers of the people said, we will now call forth the men of 
Valour, who fought for the liberty of Columbia, of old time, and the 
young warriors also. 
"18. And they said unto Adams, appoint from amongst the mighty men of 
valour such as have approved themselves faithful and firm in the day 
of battle. 
"19. And Adams wrote a letter unto Washington, and sent it by the hands 
of the Chief man of war. ... " 
Ibid., June 11, 1800. 
~9 Ibid., December 11, 1799-January 18, 1800. 
40 Ibid., March 5, 19, 29, 1800. 
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vertised prominently in the Virginia Federalist. This col-
lection seems to have included many previously unpublished 
private papers, including the generars last will and testa-
mentY The tasteless American practice of displaying the 
private lives of recently deceased popular heroes before an 
overcurious public was thus begun by those who thought of 
themselves as the better, more sophisticated class in society. 
Possibly the Federalists might have derived some tangible 
political benefit from their identification with Washington, if 
not from their outspoken conservative defense of entrenched 
religious and political institutions and practices. However, 
the Federalist spokesmen also were forced to defend the 
existing policies of the national administration; and worse 
still, they deliberately chose to couple their identification 
with entrenched interests to a virulent, unrelenting attack 
upon democracy and the principles of social and political 
equality. 
Virginia Republicans had effectively attacked the Alien 
and Sedition Acts on several counts. They had revived the 
charge of Adams' tendencies toward monarchy, they claimed 
that Fries' Rebellion resulted solely from unwise military 
and taxation policies by the national administration, and 
they passed a general election law which threatened to limit 
the political influence which Federalists held in several por-
tions of the state. The Federalist response to this onslaught 
was shrill, but largely unimaginative. According to one 
writer, "Fries and his adherents ... merely attempted to 
execute what was planned in Philadelphia" by a subversive 
Republican cabal headed by the Vice President. Insofar as 
the Alien and Sedition Acts were concerned, the right of 
any government to punish abuses of freedom was energetic-
ally maintained: "The freedom of citizens consists in their 
41 Ibid., April 19, 1800. 
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subjection to the Constitution and laws." As for the charge 
that Adams wanted to introduce monarchy into America 
through these acts, "the unreasonable discontents and op-
position of the J acobins have made more converts to mon-
archy in ten years than all the ambitions of our rulers." How-
ever, for the convenience and edification of the people, a 
Federalist partisan somewhat later synopsized Adams' De-
fense of the American Constitutions to prove that the Presi-
dent entertained no monarchist sentiments.4~ 
Occasionally, an essay of superior quality appeared in 
Rind's newspaper. In late May, Alexander Addison presented 
a cogent argument against the Virginia Resolutions, asserting 
that the state legislature unwarrantably had arrogated to 
itself judicial power over the acts of the federal government. 
He warned of inevitable chaos if such usurpation was per-
mitted to go unchallenged. Several weeks later "A Citizen 
of Halifax," in a forceful essay, pointed out that the people 
had had no direct influence over the legislature's passage of 
the Resolutions. Hence, he argued, the Resolutions repre-
sented a tyrannical attempt by the Republican majority in 
the Virginia legislature to obtain a stranglehold over both 
the politics of the state and the administration of the national 
government without consulting the people in any way or at 
any time.43 
Very few of the essayists whose work appeared in the 
Federalist proved as adept as Addison and the "Citizen" in 
blending intelligent criticism with partisan attack-a fact 
appreciated by the editor, who, in recommending the 
"Citizen's" essay to his readers, commented, "five such men 
as the Citizen of Halifax would save our modern Sodom 
from sinking." 
The image of a "sinking Sodom" as applied to current 
4~ Ibid., May 14, 1800, quoting the Philadelphia Gazette ( n.d.), June 28, 
1800. 
43 Ibid., May 28, June 18, 1800. 
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politics reflected the openly expressed despair of Federalists 
throughout the nation about the tide of democracy which 
seemed to be rising about them. "The histories of all the 
Republics of the world are before us," wrote one typically 
disillusioned friend of order. "While they admonish-they 
teach us that in all of them LIBEHTY has been destroyed and 
DESPOTISM established by discontented hot-heads, flattered 
and spurred on by artful and ambitious demagogues. A 
deluded and fanatic MOB have made an moL of their LEADEn 
and he, in turn has made himself their TYRANT-Such are the 
Causes which have produced the JULIUS CEASARS, [sic] the 
CHOMWELLS, and the BUONAPAHTES of the REPUBLICS." "Have 
your employers," he concluded, addressing the Jeffersonian 
Republicans, "yet determined who shall subvert the LIBERTIES 
OF AMERICA?" In usual elitist fashion, Federalist writers ex-
pressed enraged astonishment that their opponents would 
seek through "lies and slander" to convince the electorate 
"that WASHINGTON and ADAMS and CONGRESS, have been 
either knaves or fools, and that wisdom and virtue had taken 
up their abode with the minorities in Congress."41 
In essays and letters Federalist writers asserted that "in-
fidelity and political innovation go hand in hand" and that 
"man remains unaltered, and will never yield to the reform-
ing mould of sanguine imaginations."4 " They continued to 
reflect the philosophy of a numerically small, entrenched 
elite, deeply mistrustful of the political capabilities of the 
common man. At the same time, though, the Federalists 
tried to win a continued mandate to rule from the public. 
Whether such a mandate could be obtained depended greatly 
upon the degree to which a democratic temperament had 
taken hold among Americans living south of the Potomac. 
In South Carolina the friends of government established 
H "Letter from Litchfield, Connecticut to three Richmond Republicans," 
ibid., !\lay 28, 1800. 
45 Ibid., June ll, 1800, quoting the Baltimore Federal Gazette ( n.d.). 
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their own Federal Carolina Gazette at Charleston, which 
was issued from the office of the already established South 
Carolina Gazette and Timothy's Daily Advertiser. The paper, 
under the direction of Benjamin F. Timothy with aid from 
Thomas Shepard and later Andrew McFarlan, printed a 
steady stream of pro-Adams essays and editorials during its 
year or so of existence.4n Federalists in these two critically 
important states also received notable support from other 
papers. Valentine Davis' Virginia Gazette was, in effect, the 
Federalists' informal party sheet in the Old Dominion and 
remained a zealous supporter for the government cause 
throughout the yearY Davis republished important speeches 
of Virginia congressmen at Philadelphia, whipped up anti-
Republican and anti-French sentiment in general-especially 
after Gabriel's uprising in October, which was attributed to 
French democratic influence-and in the last days of the 
presidential campaign opened up his pages to Federalist 
essays.4s In South Carolina by 1800 the Charleston City 
Gazette had slipped from moderate Federalism to neutrality, 
but throughout the year its pages were open to essayists and 
letterwriters of both persuasions. 
In North Carolina the Federalist press was as vigorous 
as in Virginia in defending religion and the current ad-
ministration. The arrival of Joseph Gales as Republican 
printer broke the Federalists' monopoly over North Caro-
46 Clarence S. Brigham, History and Bibliography of American News-
papers, 1690-1820 (2d ed.; 2 vols.; London: Archon Books, 1962), II, 1032; 
Federal Carolina Gazette, November 13, December 25, 1800. 
47 Davis in fact held a federal postmastership under Adams. Dice Robins 
Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the Politics of Virginia and the 
Nation from 1790 to 1830 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing 
Company, 1914), 91. 
48 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, May 2, July 18, December 
26, 1800. The Virginia Gazette for the autumn months of 1800 is no longer 
available, but the Norfolk Herald usually reprinted party essays and letters 
from the former. Norfolk Herald, October-November, 1800. See also John 
to Duncan Cameron, from Lunenberg, September 22, 1800, Cameron Family 
Papers. 
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lina's press, and an implacable newspaper war broke out 
early in the year and was carried on until the results of the 
presidential election were known in late November. The 
battle had grown intense as early as July, causing one 
weary reader to complain to Gales. "Having an opportunity 
of seeing a number of newspapers," wrote the correspon-
dent, who signed himself "HERMIT," "I cannot but regret the 
violent spirit of Party which pervades many of them and 
which has so manifest a tendency to destroy domestic 
happiness and shake the foundation of public tranquility."49 
Later in the year allies of Gales and the Federalist editor 
William Boylan, respectively, entered into a public brawl 
which certainly did upset the public tranquility of the state 
and further focused popular attention upon the currently 
raging party battles. 
The tone of the partisan essays which appeared in 
Abraham Hodge's North Carolina Minerva did not differ 
from those found in the Virginia Federalist. Defenders of 
the administration openly deplored the existence of "extreme 
party spirit" which divided the country and forced friends 
and opponents of the national administration alike to 
organize and proselytize. They asked rhetorically what 
caused such extreme party spirit and answered: "it is the 
consequence of extreme liberty, and a higher degree of 
liberty cannot exist without endangering the whole. The 
reason why it cannot exist is that the nature of man will not 
admit of it; his pride and ambition require very powerful 
restraints; therefore, all those who teach the doctrine of 
modern liberty and equality are false teachers; they are 
deceivers, or are deceived themselves." In spite of such 
openly expressed contempt for human nature, in general, 
and the political capacity of the common man, in particu-
4H Raleigh Register and North Carolina Weekly Advertiser, July 22, 1800, 
hereinafter cited as Raleigh Register. 
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lar, the friends of government in North Carolina could 
no more refrain from publishing essays which were in-
tended "to rouse the Federal party from this sleep, and when 
roused, to stimulate them to counteract the baneful plots of 
Jacobins" than could their colleagues in Virginia. Other 
Federalist essayists urged the citizens of North Carolina to 
cultivate an attachment to the national government "as 
necessary to our general happiness and as the best security 
against oppression," while portraying John Adams as the 
leading figure in the American impulse toward liberty in 
1776 and Jefferson as "only a secondhanded varnished 
Deist."50 However, the intensity of these latter essays could 
not obscure the fact that the friends of government presented 
the people with an ambiguous platform at best with respect 
to popular political and civil rights. 
Federalists and Republicans in the South were both well 
organized for the partisan battles of 1800, but the crucible 
of sustained campaigning eventually exposed the weaknesses 
and disorders within Federalist ranks. For all of their 
flexibility and activity, friends of government in the South 
eventually allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered by their 
opponents in those areas and states where local victory for 
one side or the other held the key to the ultimate national 
victory. Southern Federalists were well aware in 1800 of 
the importance of the outcome of local campaigns, but their 
exclusivist ideals prevented them from matching fully the 
competence of their opponents in the game of democratic 
politics. 
Southern Federalists ran their strongest and most success-
ful campaign of 1800 in North Carolina. Throughout the 
summer, political excitement in the state was high. In early 
July, Charles W. Harris told his brother that the toasts drunk 
at various Fourth of July celebrations were viewed by the 
50 North Carolina Minerva, August 13, 1800. 
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friends of government as "a kind of key to the political 
sentiments of the most reputable class of citizens." He 
added that "Federalism and its opponent become daily more 
distinctly divided by districts, counties, towns or neighbor-
hoods," a sure indication of the profound effect which the 
activities of both parties were having on the common 
people. Rumors also swept the state, including one that 
Jefferson had died unexpectedly. 51 
Local Federalist cadre repeatedly indicated that they 
viewed the coming election in apocalyptic terms. John 
Osborn of New Bern complained of being assaulted 
by ranting Democrats who vapour for Jefferson & Liberty. I 
cannot but hope that before the election arrives some change 
may take place in the minds of our misguided fellow citizens, if 
not, we may sing a requiem over our liberty and Independence, 
& expect distractions and confusion, which may result in the 
disunion of the States if not worse-God of heaven avert such an 
event. 52 
Spurred on by such visions of the imminent dissolution 
of the social and political fabric, North Carolina Federalists 
in practice abandoned whatever restraints the elitist tradi-
tion might have imposed and tenaciously battled their 
opponents for public favor. In August Osborn once again 
wrote his friend, this time asking him to obtain a copy of 
Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia," as "they may be useful for 
some purpose. Our politics are as when you were here."53 
The next month Osborn used Simpson as an agent in the 
dissemination of party propaganda. 
I send you some copies of Sheppard's Circular Letter [Sheppard 
was the Federalist candidate for elector for New Bern] & will 
51 Charles W. Harris to Robert Harris, from Shockoe Springs, July 11, 
1800, in Wagstaff, ed., "Harris Letters," 76-77. 
52 Osborn to Samuel Simpson, June 18, 1800, Simpson-Bryan Papers. 
53 Osborn to Simpson, August 7, 1800, ibid. 
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thank you to distribute them in the manner you shall think best 
calculated to secure the general cause-the advertisements you 
can dispose of in the manner you approve.-The period is now 
arrived, when it is important that the friends of the independence 
of our Country should exert themselves for its preservation. You 
will direct the Letters & send them to those persons in your 
Vicinity who you may suppose may make a beneficial use of 
them. 54 
Osborn's persistent fears for the future of American liberty 
if the Republicans should win revealed the extent to which 
Federalist leaders viewed the campaign of 1800 from the 
perspective of 1798. Any indications of the old ideal of 
political independence were viewed in the harshest terms. 
The determination of Judge John Haywood, Federalist candi-
date for elector from Halifax, to defend a leading Republican 
accused of land fraud angered Dr. Harris. "He is wavering 
and undetermined," the doctor grumbled, "and his conduct 
of late has not only ruined his own popularity but injured 
the cause which we expected he would promote."55 
The circumstance which produced a special sense of 
excitement and measure of venom in the party battles in 
North Carolina was the rivalry between the Federalist 
editor, Abraham Hodge, and the recently arrived Republican 
printer, Joseph Gales. Prior to 1800, Hodge had enjoyed 
the undisturbed benefit of the public printing, despite the 
frequently Republican orientation of the North Carolina 
legislature. When Gales arrived in the state as the first 
outspoken Republican editor, however, Nathaniel Macon and 
Thomas Blount soon attempted to separate Hodge from his 
lucrative post. Thus, Hodge and his paper became the 
rallying point for Federalist activity in North Carolina 
during the late summer of 1800. Active lines of communica-
;-,4 Osborn to Simpson, September 20, 1800, ibid. 
""Charles \V. to Robert Harris, from Warrenton, July 29, 1800, in 
'Vagstaff, ed., "Harris Letters," 78. 
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tion, information, and propaganda eventually flowed to 
Hodge who placed the Minerva and its press completely 
at the disposal of the party. In addition to publishing the 
paper, Hodge printed and distributed a number of tracts, 
essays, and addresses, some of which he wrote himself, 
and copies of Federalist newspapers from out of state, most 
notably Porcupine's Gazette.56 
Despite the Federalists' strenuous efforts, however, the 
General Assembly elections in August went badly for them. 
Their fears that Gales would win the post of public printer, 
combined with humiliation at their setback, led one of them 
-William Boylan, Hodge's nephew and coeditor of the 
Minerva-to provoke a notorious brawl with Blake Baker. 
Baker was Attorney General of the state and the Republican 
candidate for United States Senator in the upcoming General 
Assembly. His beating at the hands of Boylan on a dusty 
Raleigh street salved the wounded feelings of some friends 
of government and apparently also ended his political ca-
reer.57 
It was in this setting of violence and excitement that the 
results of the state's Congressional elections became known. 
The Federalists suffered a decided loss of power. Two years 
before they had claimed seven members of the state's ten-
man delegation as supporters of Adams. In 1800 it is doubt-
ful if the friends of government could have counted on 
support from more than four members of the state's delega-
tion-Grove, Henderson, Hill, and John Stanly. Two of those 
reelected, Hill and Henderson, represented the yeoman 
farmers of western North Carolina. 
u6 The entire course of the Hodge-Gales rivalry and its impact on 
Federalist pol:tics in the summer and autumn of 1800 may be found in the 
letters of Charles W. to Robert Harris, August 3, 29, September 18, 1800, 
ibid., 79-84. 
57 For further Federalist reaction to the Boylan-Baker match, see R. 
Bennehan to sister, from Chapel Hill, September 5, 1800, Cameron Family 
Papers. 
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After a brief pause in campaigning in September, Fed-
eralists and Republicans toward the end of the month 
resumed their battle for the state's electoral vote.58 Some 
weeks later, with the election but a few days off, Boylan 
told Cameron that he expected "hot work here on the day 
of elections." Already Republican spokesmen were "spouting 
to every collection of Men" they could find "in street, store 
or grog shop."59 Boylan's distaste for the crudest forms of 
politicking was shared by his colleagues. On election day 
they worked not to cajole and persuade, but rather to control, 
the populace. In Fayetteville, for example, "the Scotch" 
were sent "flocking in from all quarters-Several hundred 
came parading in town following the bag pipes and nothing 
but piping was heard in several parts of the town all the 
morning-this scene was truly mortifying to the Jacobins." 
Such intimidatory tactics were successful, but they were 
probably unnecessary in such a traditionally safe district 
as the upper Cape Fear. But in Wake County the "great 
exertions, indeed" made by six or seven friends of govern-
ment proved unavailing as the party was defeated, though 
by a surprisingly narrow margin.60 
The Federalists nonetheless were rewarded for the tenacity 
and flexibility which they had shown during the campaign. 
Voting for electors was in the hands of the people in the 
twelve districts of the state. In 1796 the Federalists had 
captured one of these districts; four years later they won 
four of them. Complete returns from five of the twelve 
districts and partial returns for a sixth were published in 
Gales' Register, and the Virginia Argus somewhat later 
published the party affiliations of the successful candidates. 
The Federalists carried two of the six districts in which 
58 P. Broune to Duncan Cameron, from Halifax, September 24, 1800, ibid.; 
Raleigh Register, September 30, October 21, 28, 1800. 
59 Boylan to Cameron, October 31, 1800, Cameron Family Papers. 
60 Boylan to Cameron, from Raleigh, November 5, 1800, ibid. 
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partial or complete returns are available, and their overall 
strength in these six districts amounted to 43 percent of the 
popular vote. Of the four out of twelve districts in which 
Federalism predominated, two were in the eastern coastal 
area, Wilmington and Edgecombe, one was in the upper 
Cape Fear, Fayetteville, and one surrounded the western 
commercial center of Salisbury. Available statistics also 
indicate that the Federalists had not lost completely their 
hold over the yeomen of the far west. In Morgan district 
Archibald Henderson won a decided majority in Lincoln 
County. In addition, the Federalists barely lost in New 
Bern district, as the Federalist candidate Sheppard actually 
won four of six counties, but was so badly beaten in one that 
he lost the district by less than two hundred votes.61 
Federalist activity in Virginia seems to have been at first 
nearly as intense as in North Carolina, and the friends of 
government had the added advantage of an established 
central organization. 
The elections for state offices were held in the spring, and 
the friends of government made the recently passed General 
Ticket Law the focus of their attack. The law would handi-
cap the people in November, forcing them to vote for at 
least nineteen or twenty strangers, rather than choosing 
from among several candidates in their local electoral district, 
all of whom they were likely to know well. The formation 
of party tickets by Federalists and Republicans was designed 
to provide the confused voter with some partisan focus. It 
also would hasten the polarization of political attitudes and 
loyalties around the two well-defined national party organi-
zations in the state. The Federalists, however, were con-
vinced that the General Ticket Law had generated much 
ill-will which they determined to exploit. 
Gl Raleigh Register, November 11, 18, 1800; Virginia Argus, November 25, 
1800. 
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During the spring elections and throughout the year the 
Federalists hammered at the iniquity of the general ticket 
plan and attempted to turn popular opinion against it. The 
law was presented to the voting public as part of a plot to 
"attempt to influence your votes" which "upon the truest 
interests of republicanism" the friends of government wished 
to see "remain free and unbiased." The fact that the Republi-
can majority in the Assembly had "compelled you to vote 
for twenty one Electors, dispersed through every district of 
the state, all of whom, except the resident in your own district 
must be generally unknown to you" also was emphasized, 
and again as part of a broad plot by the Republicans to 
"direct your choice" in matters political. On this latter point 
Congressman Thomas Evans, near the end of the presidential 
campaign, noted that one of the effects of the plan was to 
stimulate broad, sophisticated party organizations. Evans 
added that the law was 
an experiment perfectly in the Jacobinical style, rendering laws, 
when passed, perfectly inefficacious, if not aided by a central 
committee, who create and direct the affiliated committees in a 
manner concealed from public view throughout the Country. 
Govt., if such measures may so be called, thus becomes the 
property of a few, daring characters, whilst ancient forms, for a 
while, remain, tho's they cannot possibly be more than forms.';~ 
The tone of Evans' remarks suggests strongly that while the 
Federalists themselves had established a hierarchical party 
structure, including a central committee and local commit-
tees of correspondence, in their hearts they knew such organi-
zations to be wrong in terms of traditional political practices. 
6~ "AN ADDRESS to the Voters for Electors of President and Vice President 
of the United States, in the State of Virginia," broadside in Dabney Papers; 
Virginia Federalist, March 5, 19, July 9, 1800; Thomas Evans to Leven 
Powell, from Accomac, October 30, 1800, in William E. Dodd, ed., "Cor-
respondence of Leven Powell," The John P. Branch Historical Papers of 
Randolph-Macon College (Richmond: Everett Wadding Co., 1901), 54-55. 
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The Federalists thus projected a strong and clear image 
of themselves in the spring elections. They stood solidly for 
the traditional rights of the individual gentleman freeholder, 
the strongest of which were his independent character and 
his Yote. They deplored the machinations of well-organized 
political parties which sought to control or manipulate for 
purely partisan ends the "hitherto unlimited freedom of 
election" enjoyed by the individual citizen. They spoke out 
strongly against "innovation" and turned sharply away from 
"the eager desire for change" in political customs. 
At the same time, however, the friends of government-
as they implied in their address to the people-were forced 
into broad organization, ticket formulation, and wide appeals 
for support to make their influence and ideology known. 
The Republicans, in passing the General Ticket Law, had 
forced the Virginia Federalists into a corner, and the friends 
of government either could bend with the prevailing political 
wind and fight the campaign battles the way their opponents 
had dictated, or they could simply retire in frustrated 
impotence. 
Madison reported determined Federalist politicking on the 
eve of the state elections. "Considerable exertion is used 
to raise prejudices agst the measures of the last Session of 
Assembly," he wrote, "especially the ... mode of appointing 
Electors." Federalist leaders seemed aware of the need to 
tighten discipline within the party during the campaign. 
Leven Powell, for example, complained of the stubborn 
determination of two Federalists who were still personal 
enemies to run against each other for an Assembly seat. 
The retiring Alexandria congressman also urged his followers 
to choose an acceptable Federalist candidate to take over his 
seat at Philadelphia before "some antifederal candidate will 
get the start."u3 
113 Madison to Jefferson, April 20, 1800, Madison Papers, Vol. 21; 
Leven Powell to anonymous, April 6, 1800, Personal Miscellany File, LC. 
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The Republicans had maintained from the beginning that 
the General Ticket Law was generally popular,64 and the 
results of the spring elections bore them out. The Federalist 
decline, once begun, could not be stopped. When John 
Marshall vacated his Congressional seat to become the 
Secretary of State after Pickering's dismissal, the Republicans 
filled it in a special election in August, despite a strong 
campaign by the Federalist candidate, Colonel John Mayo. 
"With Candour" Mayo informed the people of his determina-
tion to support the political status quo, including the current 
administration. His heavy defeat, therefore, was a clear 
indication that the great majority of the electorate in his 
district welcomed the profound change in the character and 
conduct of state and national politics. Mayo's setback caused 
the leader of the Richmond Federalist faction to lament 
that there was "a tide in the affairs of nations, of parties & 
of individuals. I fear that of real Americanism is on the 
ebb."65 At about the same time Henry Lee's close friend in 
Congress, James A. Bayard, wrote to Hamilton that "Virginia 
is sold and past all salvation." Evidently, most friends of 
government outside the state shared this view from the 
beginning of the year. Three separate predictions on the 
outcome of the presidential race appeared in the Virginia 
Federalist; all gave the state to Jefferson without comment.66 
In Virginia the palpable decline of Federalist influence 
with the electorate during the spring and summer quite 
naturally led to deterioration of morale and activity within 
the party. In late June, W. A. Rind placed on the front page 
of the Federalist an address from Russell's Commercial 
Gazette in which "the supineness of the great body of the 
64 J. Barbour to Jefferson, from Richmond, January 20, 1800, Jefferson 
Papers, Vol. 106. 
65 Virginia Federalist, July 9, 1800; Marshall to Harrison Gray Otis, from 
Washington, August 8, 1800, Marshall Papers. 
66 Bayard to Hamilton, August 18, 1800, in Donnan, ed., "James A. 
Bayard," ll3; Virginia Federalist, May 28, June 7, July 9, 1800. 
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friends of government in the United States" was noted and 
mourned, and alarm was expressed over "the unceasing 
machinations of the jacobins." In the same issue Rind 
attempted to arouse his colleagues into action in the forth-
coming city election to maintain the Federalists' control of 
Richmond. The editor had tickets struck off "which we beg 
our Federal Friends to send or call for."67 
Within a month, however, Rind had become completely 
discouraged. The apathy of the friends of government dur-
ing Colonel Mayo's campaign was more than the editor 
could understand or tolerate. On August 2 he published the 
final issue of the Virginia Federalist and prepared to move 
to the new city of Washington where his partisan talents 
could be employed on behalf of the friends of government 
in Maryland, who were waging a spirited campaign to win 
that key state for Adams. "The Antis were successful in the 
last election," Rind sadly observed in farewell. 
Report says Mr. Tazewell was elected by a large majority. We 
had vainly endeavored to excite the activity of the Federalists in 
this important election, by appeals both to their interest and 
their honor-the intense heat, or something constitutional [an 
allusion to the Federalists' depression over the apparent popu-
larity of the General Ticket Law] counteracted the well-meant 
effort by keeping them at home. 
As the presidential elections approached and Federalist 
strength in Virginia continued to decline, the "Government 
Men" who remained active were faced with the added 
burden of supporting a highly unpopular candidate. John 
Adams had been portrayed throughout Virginia as a mon-
archist since 1789 when his campaign to introduce titles fell 
flat in Congress. In their formal address to the people, which 
accompanied the American Republican ticket, the Virginia 
67 Virginia Federalist, June 28, 1800. 
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Federalists tried to solve the Adams problem by evading it. 
Thus, they lauded the "unvarying course of prosperity" 
enjoyed by the country and chided their readers for possibly 
forgetting that they had but recently been preserved "from 
two impending wars" and "a close alliance" with either 
France or England. But Adams' name never appeared in 
the lines. "Our Government" had been the agent of national 
preservation and protection, not the President. The singu-
larity of Adams' exclusion from conspicuous mention in the 
address was emphasized by the prominence given to Wash-
ington's deeds. "To the adoption of our Constitution, to the 
sage maxims of administration established by the immortal 
WASHINGTON, and steadily pursued by his virtuous successor, 
may fairly be ascribed our present prosperous situation."6 R 
Despite an unpopular candidate, plus the abrupt appear-
ance of a slave uprising and a yellow fever epidemic, 69 both 
of which sharply curtailed political campaigning in the 
eastern sections of the state on the eve of the election, some 
friends of government remained active to the end. A Phila-
delphia correspondent reported in mid-September that "party 
spirit and animosity rage in North Carolina and Virginia to 
a degree that must excite the regret of every real friend of 
our country." Several political duels were reportedly fought 
in Virginia, and brother literally turned against brother.70 
The extent to which Federalist candidates and their friends 
actually campaigned is unclear, though the President himself 
made several partisan speeches at Alexandria soon after the 
federal government moved to Washington. 71 Party presses 
were also active, and the party ticket and address were 
printed up as handbills and spread throughout the state. 
68 "ADDRESS ... to the People of Virginia," Dabney Papers. 
69 Norfolk Herald, October 24, 1800; Monroe to Jefferson, September 9, 
22, 1800, to Thomas Newton, October 5, 1800, in Hamilton, ed., Writings 
of Monroe, III, 205, 209-10, 213. 
70 Reprinted in Augusta Chronicle, October 4, 1800. 
71 Kurtz, Presidency of john Adams, 398. 
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Remaining Federalist editors also were busy, even occa-
sionally following the Republicans' lead late in the campaign 
by publishing sample party ballots for the electorate, as 
well as republishing the ticket in all issues of their papers 
immediately preceding the election.7~ 
The Federalists' efforts in Virginia produced no tangible 
results, however, as the party suffered a shattering loss in 
November. According to the most complete returns, Jeffer-
son carried eighty of the eighty-nine counties and boroughs 
in the state which reported results. Jefferson likewise out-
polled Adams in the popular vote, 21,311 to 6,024, giving him 
77.9 percent of the total vote to 22.1 percent for Adams. In 
some counties, notably Amelia and Nottoway, Adams did not 
receive a single vote. In others, such as Caroline, Dinwiddie, 
and Prince Edward, the President's supporters numbered 
only a handful, no more than four or five in each county out 
of a total of approximately three hundred fifty votes cast. 73 
Important as were the events in Virginia, and especially 
in North Carolina, in 1800, South Carolina more than any 
other state-including New York-held the key to the presi-
dential election that year. Both the friends and opponents 
of the current administration realized this.74 Virginia's com-
plete defection to Republicanism had been expected; North 
Carolina's partial conversion to Federalism was rewarding, 
but in the end was not decisive. But South Carolina had 
generally been Federalist. Only the temporary estrangement 
of the dominant Rutledge-Pinckney faction in 1795-1796 had 
given Jefferson eight important electoral votes that year, and 
7~ Norfolk Herald, October 9, llff., 1800. 
78 Virginia Argus, December 2, 1800. 
74 William R. Davie to John Steele, from Catawba, North Carolina, Sep-
tember 20, 1800, in Kemp P. Battle, ed., "Letters of William R. Davie," 
James Sprunt Historical Monograph, No. 7 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina 
Historical Society Publications, 1907), 42; Charles Pinckney to Thomas 
Jefferson, November 22, 1800, in Hamilton, ed., Writings of Monroe, III, 
24.5n. 
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the Federalist candidate, Thomas Pinckney, had received 
equal support. In 1800, with Jefferson generally discredited 
in those Federalist circles where he had been embraced four 
years before, it was hoped by some partisans that South 
Carolina would assure the retention of the presidency by the 
Federalists.75 
In contrast to the Virginia campaign, the Federalist cam-
paign in South Carolina was carried on with effectiveness, 
despite the death of Edward Rutledge. Party leaders worked 
diligently-though often not directly-to conduct a campaign 
of greater depth and scope than ever before. They sought to 
obtain as much support as possible in every county, parish, 
and river fork in the state. This necessitated an extensive 
knowledge of South Carolina's political geography, which 
DeSaussure and Thomas Pinckney both possessed. Even 
Robert Goodloe Harper in distant Maryland was able to 
exert strong influence over events in the backcountry through 
consistent contact during the campaign with political leaders 
there. 
The letters of these three gentleman-politicians were filled 
with information about which individuals dominated in 
which narrow areas, who might be counted on for support 
in both sections of the state, and the areas in which the 
populace decidedly favored one or the other of the parties. 
Federalist correspondence also indicates that each party 
leader in South Carolina had constructed his own private 
network of correspondence, which was used during the 
campaign for partisan political purposes. Usually these lines 
of communication were used either to implore prominent 
friends of government to stand for the state legislature, if 
only for the year, to insure the nomination of electors favor-
able to Federalism, or to urge party lieutenants out in the 
75 Virginia Federalist, June 7, 1800. 
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counties and parishes to establish closer contact and greater 
influence with the electorate. 76 
In addition to the work of influential leaders, Federalist 
essayists and letterwriters in and out of the state's press 
matched their opponents in output and scurrility.77 DeSaus-
sure himself wrote and publicly acknowledged his authorship 
of an "Address to the Citizens of South Carolina .... " In this 
partisan effort the Charleston financier branded the Republi-
cans as old Antifederalists, claimed that Virginia, the head-
quarters of that faction, sought to dominate the southern 
states, and in general condemned Jefferson as an abolitionist 
and a tool of French democratic interests, while carefully 
defending both Adams and Pinckney as men who had spent 
years in devoted public service to the nation. The pamphlet 
was circulated widely in John Rutledge, Jr.'s district of 
Orangeburg, where it attracted much public interest, inspir-
ing intense protest from the Republicans and triumphant 
rebuttals from the Federalists.78 
Perhaps the greatest break with the past which the 
Charleston oligarchs made in 1800 was their decision to 
engage in the dirtier side of popular politicking. The gentle-
man-politicians lost their aloofness and even, it would seem, 
their reserve, as they cajoled and pandered to the common 
'iH Henry William DeSaussure to Rutledge, from Charleston, August 14, 
1800; Robert Goodloe Harper to Rutledge, from Baltimore, September 20, 
1800; Thomas Pinckney to Rutledge, from Moultrieville, September 23, 1800, 
John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
77 An avowed Republican of St. Bartholomew's parish bitterly complained 
some days before the election of being "beset with and run down by 
Federalists, Federal-Republicans and their pamphlets." Charleston City 
Gazette, October .'3, 1800. 
'i8 Henry William DeSaussure, "Address to the Citizens of South Carolina 
on the Approaching Election of PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT of the 
UNITED STATES, by a Federal-Republican," Charleston, W. P. Young, 1800, 
in Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; Charleston City Gazette, 
October 17, 1800. 
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people and shepherded voters to the polling places. Charles 
Pinckney, reporting on the city elections in October, ex-
pressed a horror, which may or may not have been genuine, 
at the underhanded tricks of his opponents. 
As much as I have been accustomed to Politics and to Study 
mankind, this Election in Charleston has opened to me a new 
view of things. Never certainly was such an election in America. 
We mean to contest it for 8 or 9 of the 15. It is said several 
Hundred more Voted than paid Taxes. The Lame, Crippled, 
diseased and blind were either led, lifted or brought in Carriages 
to the Poll. 
The friends of government took a further step to insure 
their continued domination of the city. Pinckney added: 
... the sacred right of Ballot was struck at, for at a late hour, when 
too late to counteract it, in order to know how men, who were 
supposed to be under the influence of Banks and federal officers 
and English Merchants, Voted, and that they might be Watched 
to know Whether they Voted as they were directed, the Novel 
and Unwarrantable measure was used of Voting with tickets 
printed on Green and blue and yellow paper and Men stationed 
to watch the Votes.79 
A comparison of the efforts and achievements of the 
Virginia Republican party machine and the South Carolina 
Federalist oligarchy during the presidential campaign of 
1800 reveals a striking fact. Party organization developed 
by the elites where energetically directed, skillfully em-
ployed, and not threatened by legislation which placed the 
full weight of political power and party activity on the state 
rather than the local level, was not yet anachronistic in an 
age of emerging democratic party politics. Exclusivist be-
79 Pinckney to Jefferson, October 16, 1800, "South Carolina in the 
Presidential Election of 1800," American Historical Review, IV (October, 
1898), 115. 
'The Violent Spirit of Party': The Election of 18oo j 211 
liefs did not yet preclude the exercise of power and influence. 
Quite the contrary: the gentleman-politician with his numer-
ically small private faction, if dispersed over a wide geo-
graphic area for maximum effect, still remained a powerful 
political force. 
There were, however, other less benign aspects of elitist 
politics which gravely hindered the Federalists' chances in 
South Carolina in 1800. One was simple carelessness where 
interpretations of party loyalty and responsibility were con-
cerned. Robert Goodloe Harper's decision in the summer of 
1799 to remove himself to Maryland,80 for example, threat-
ened South Carolina Federalism with an immediate collapse 
of influence in the crucial backcountry regions. Harper 
finished his term as congressman from Ninety-Six district 
before retiring for many years from active public life; and 
during the election of 1800, as has been noted, he attempted 
by correspondence to reconfirm his constituents in the 
Federalist faith. The main focus of his efforts on behalf of 
the party, however, was limited to Maryland and adjoining 
states.81 Not once did he visit his constituents, and, as a 
result William Butler, a firm Republican, captured Harper's 
district in the autumn elections. 
Similar in effect to Harper's conspicuous absence from 
South Carolina during the critical months of the campaign 
was the refusal of young John Rutledge to foresake new-
found friends and pleasures at Newport to return home to 
help the party. Rutledge, in fact, had good reasons to remain 
in the North so long as he could be assured of the firm 
Federalism of his native state. DeSaussure and Pinckney, 
however, made him aware early enough that despite their 
exertions Federalism was in a precarious position in South 
80 James McHenry to Harper, from Philadelphia, August 1, 1799, Harper 
Papers, LC. 
Rl George Cabot to Hamilton, from Brookline, August 21, 1800, in 
Hamilton, ed., Works of Hamilton, VI, 459. 
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Carolina. Rutledge undoubtedly could have given greater 
support to his party-and better advanced his own develop-
ing intrigues-from Charleston than from Rhode Island, but 
he contented himself with drafting a long, arrogant defense 
of the Adams administration and of himself, which he sent 
to his constituents in July. Thereafter he seems to have done 
nothing to advance party prospects in his native state, and 
for this he suffered some gentle criticism from Harper.82 
A stubbornly independent attitude and a disdain for the 
increasing demands for party discipline and loyalty also 
marked the conduct of members of Senator Jacob Read's 
faction before and during the campaign. Read's supporters 
continued to exhibit a bitter hostility toward the members 
of the old Rutledge-Pinckney faction, and when David 
Ramsay was chosen to deliver the public eulogy of Wash-
ington early in 1800, William Read reacted with surprise 
and chagrin.s3 During the campaign itself there is no evi-
dence that either Jacob or William Read rendered material 
aid, publicly or privately, to the Federalist cause. 
Age and an overall appearance of timidity at critical 
moments also hampered Federalist efforts in South Carolina 
in 1800, despite the party's brief involvement in overt politi-
cal skullduggery at the time of the Charleston elections. 
By this time it had become abundantly clear that, the absent 
Messrs. Harper and Rutledge notwithstanding, the friends 
of government in the state no longer were young men. The 
elitist vice of exclusivism had restrained the Federalists from 
actively recruiting able and energetic young politicians. In 
1800 the party projected an image of elderly patricians 
instinctively resisting the changes being brought into South 
x~ John Rutledge, Jr., to Bishop Smith, from Newport, July 25, 1800, 
Harper to Rutledge, September 20, 1800, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 
N.C. 
83 William to Jacob Read, from Charleston, January 7, 1800, Read Papers, 
Duke University Library, Durham, N.C. 
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Carolina's public life by a younger generation oriented 
toward the Republican party. DeSaussure illuminated the 
Federalist dilemma in an unintentionally revealing remark. 
He assured Rutledge that "all the elderly men, of high 
Character, whose health will allow them ... will come out 
efficiently at the election [for the state legislature] & many 
of them will be candidates. Mr. Russell, Mr. Jones, Mr. 
Corbett & others of that stamp will offer to go."84 
In this same letter DeSaussure alluded to the comparative 
timidity-or was it simple courtliness?-of the older Federalist 
gentlemen. After pledging to "converse freely and write 
fully" on behalf of the party, he added primly, "but you 
know they use some weapons which we cannot condescend 
to do." At the same time Thomas Pinckney complained of 
the increasing loss of taste and decorum in political debate 
and of the corresponding increase in overt party rancor. 85 
When the time arrived for the battle in the legislature, 
Charles Pinckney's comparative youth and enthusiasm proved 
to be potent political weapons. 
But the prime factor which destroyed the Federalist party 
in South Carolina in 1800, and thus destroyed the party's 
national power, was the intrusion of the Hamilton-Adams 
conflict into the politics of the state. The irrevocable division 
of the party hierarchy into two bitterly opposing camps 
and Hamilton's announced determination to support Pinck-
ney for the presidency86 put the friends of government in 
South Carolina in a cruel dilemma. If they resisted the 
temptation to support Pinckney ahead of Adams, they were 
in no way assured of reciprocal loyalty for Pinckney from the 
harassed followers of the President. The problem would 
84 DeSaussure to Rutledge, August 14, 1800, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 
N.C. 
R5 Thomas Pinckney to Rutledge, September 23, 1800, ibid. 
86 Hamilton to Sedgewick, from New York, May 10, 1800, to Wolcott, 
from New York, July 1, 1800, Hamilton Papers, Vols. 75, 77. 
274 I Prologue to Democracy 
have caused sufficient anguish in any case, but with memory 
of the betrayal of 1796 still fresh in the minds of many and 
constantly being refreshed during that spring and summer 
by the friends of Hamilton, the temptation to work for a 
juggled ticket became irresistible. 
Cotesworth Pinckney himself was of no help. In a private 
letter to McHenry on June 10, the general, then at a pro-
visional army encampment at Shepherdstown, Virginia, ex-
pressed anger at the "very unworthy and indecorous treat-
ment Mr. Pickering & you have received" at Adams' hands. 
Pinckney made the pious statement that "if the Federalists 
will act with decision, energy & union I have no doubt but 
they will gain a complete victory at the ensuing Election 
over the Jacobinical party." Soon, however, Pinckney coyly 
reverted to a line of argument which rendered such prospects 
impossible to fulfill. His caution was admirable, his sense of 
intrigue refined. He wrote: 
With regard to the conduct of the Southern States at the ensuing 
Election, I think they are bound fairly and candidly to act up 
to their agreement entered into by the federal party at Philadel-
phia, with out the Eastern States should be convinced of Mr. A's 
abandonment of federal principles, his attempt to form a party 
with Jefferson, and his unfitness to be President, and on these 
accounts or some of them, should consent to substitute another 
Candidate in his stead. This event I do not think impossible, & 
his (Adams'] conduct & the critical situation of our Country may 
require it. But to preserve the Union, this must originate to 
the Eastward, the Middle States can then take it up, & the 
Southern ones with propriety follow. 87 
Pinckney's determination to move toward the presidency 
slowly and subtly decided the issue for most South Carolina 
Federalists. By midsummer Harper and Rutledge had joined 
Hamilton and became part of a quartet of ardent southern 
H7 Quoted in Steiner, Life and Correspondence of McHenry, 460. 
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and New England Hamiltonians who talked openly of 
reversing the previously-agreed-upon Federalist ticket. 88 In 
South Carolina itself party leaders and cadre also fell into 
line behind Pinckney. DeSaussure, when telling Rutledge 
of the vigorous attempts being made to insure the success of 
Federalism in South Carolina, spoke only of Pinckney. Later 
Harper remarked ominously that "Mr. Adams is expected, by 
all my letters as being very doubtful. I am glad however that 
all my friends there exert themselves fairly in his support."89 
The friends of government, then, were forced to conduct 
their campaign and to solicit public favor contrary to the 
expressed will of the party caucus and thus emphasized to 
supporters and the uncommitted alike the deep schism which 
affiicted the Federalist interest. In September, Thomas 
Pinckney committed a blunder which further accentuated 
tensions within the party. William Duane of the Aurora some-
what earlier had been indicted under the Sedition Law for 
publishing a letter supposedly written by John Adams in 
1792 in which the then Vice President had written privately 
that Thomas Pinckney had secured his recent appointment 
to the Court of St. James through family intrigue and flagrant 
British influence. Duane, however, had not been able to 
produce the original of the letter, and after some "legal 
Pantomime," as he called it, the trial had been postponed. 
Pinckney, however, could not resist the temptation to reply, 
and on September 15 he dispatched a curious letter to the 
Charleston City Gazette, claiming that the letter which 
Duane had reproduced was either a Republican "forgery 
calculated for electioneering purposes, or if genuine, must 
have been founded on a misapprehension of persons." Finck-
ss Harper to Hamilton, June 5, 1800, ibid., 457; Elizabeth Cometti, "John 
Rutledge, Jr., Federalist," Journal of Southern History, XIII (April, 1947), 
195-96. 
89 DeSaussure to Rutledge, August 14, 1800, Harper to Rutledge, Septem-
ber 20, 1800, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
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ney's resurrection of the incident was bad enough, but his 
refusal to reject completely the Republican inferences of 
profound conflict between Adams and him was worse. In 
his letter Pinckney begged the people to delay judgment 
"until the event of an investigation, which I shall immediately 
commence." The following day he wrote to Adams directly, 
enclosing a copy of the Baltimore paper in which the original 
Adams letter had appeared and the issue of the City Gazette 
containing his public reply. The tone of this letter was frigid 
and left a strong impression that Pinckney did believe the 
1792 letter to be genuine, and more importantly, that the 
letter still was capable of creating antagonism in his mind. 
Pinckney closed with a peremptory demand that Adams 
explain himself satisfactorily. He next apparently traveled 
to Washington to confront the President personally. Accord-
ing to the October 3 issue of the Aurora, Pinckney recently 
had gone to Duane, examined a letter which Duane now 
claimed to be the original, and then, with John Rutledge, Jr., 
in tow, had "waited on Mr. Adams expressly in consequence 
of this letter." Duane "was informed that Mr. Adams did not 
deny the authenticity of the letter," but stated that his 
allusion was to Charles, not Thomas or Cotesworth Pinckney. 
The entire account of the affair, especially Pinckney's trip 
north, is suspect on two counts-first, because it came from 
the pen of a zealous Republican editor, and secondly, because 
Pinckney had been in poor health for several years. But the 
fact remains that all the materials, including the public letter 
in the City Gazette and the somewhat sour private note to 
Adams, are found in Box 10 of the Pinckney Family Papers 
in the Library of Congress. Even if the account of the trip 
north and the confrontation was a fabrication, Pinckney's 
letter to his fellow citizens, which appeared in the City 
Gazette, was sufficiently damaging to Federalist fortunes, 
since Pinckney obviously was ready to take Republican 
'The Violent Spirit of Party': The Election of 18oo I 211 
campaign charges against Adams at face value. If the entire 
story is true, as it possibly is, then Pinckney's meeting with 
Adams emphasized dramatically the continuing dislike and 
distrust of John Adams among South Carolina Federalists. 
With party leaders themselves bitter and mistrustful 
toward the President, it must have seemed to many of South 
Carolina's political leaders that loyalty to Federalism was 
risky. New England Federalists might yet sacrifice southern 
interests for the sake of preserving their own, while the 
disciplined and united Republicans, also led by a prominent 
southerner, seemed to demonstrate political constancy. The 
Federalists had retained the right to rule in the state from 
1789 onward by preaching stability and order in government, 
but by 1800 their leading representatives could no longer 
claim to exemplify these values. Rather, they were victim-
ized by internal intrigue, jealousy, and ambition. In 1800 
only the Republican party in South Carolina honestly could 
appeal to those who sought the preservation of well-regu-
lated government, as well as to others who yearned for an 
extension of political democracy and the promise of the 
Declaration of Independence. 
Such considerations, however, did not initially influence 
South Carolina's politics in 1800. The relative efficiency 
and skill of the Federalist leaders, the popularity of Cotes-
worth Pinckney, and the previous traditions of political 
allegiance all helped to sustain the apparent Federalist 
ascendancy in the state during the elections. The local 
oligarchs had worked ably on behalf of the ticket, and the 
results of the Charleston legislative election90 dismayed the 
no Charles Pinckney reported that only four of the fifteen-man city delega-
tion to the lower house of the state legislature were Republicans. However, 
an examination of the partisan tickets put forth by both sides indicates that 
apparently no less than fourteen were either moderate or high Federalists. 
Charles Pinckney to Jefferson, from Charleston, October 16, 1800, in "South 
Carolina in the Presidential Election of 1800," 114; Charleston City Gazette, 
October 13, 18, 1800. 
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Republicans and gave the Federalists perhaps a fatal dose 
of confidence.91 Though it is not clearly documented whether 
the friends of government went to Columbia with a working 
majority or not, it is certain that prior to Charleston's deci-
sion Federalist and Republican leaders alike had confidently 
predicted or conceded South Carolina's loss to the Jeffer-
sonians.92 Now the issue again was in doubt. 
It was at this point, however, that the endemic weaknesses 
of sectional jealousy and suspicion within the South Carolina 
Federalist faction first began to hinder fatally its political 
effectiveness. The letters of Charles Pinckney and Peter 
Freneau describing the critical legislative session are filled 
with news of Republican caucuses and passionate pledges by 
the membership to cleave to party orthodoxy. Pinckney was 
never still. Agonizingly aware of South Carolina's central 
importance in the election of a Republican President, he 
had come to Columbia after the Charleston election to rally 
his initially dispirited forces and to assault the apparent 
Federalist majority. He eventually was successful in doing 
both. The Federalists, however, were not indolent, and 
young Pinckney spoke of "how hard and strongly contested" 
the election at Columbia was. Cotesworth Pinckney himself 
was present to lend force and prestige to the Federalist 
interest, led by William Washington.93 What destroyed 
Federalist cohesion and effectiveness at Columbia in Decem-
91 Charles Pinckney wrote to Thomas Jefferson of "the federal Interest 
connected with the British" and aided by "the Banks and the federal 
Treasury," which created a "Weight of Talent, Wealth and Personal and 
family influence" of formidable proportions. Indeed, Pinckney remarked in 
retrospect that the 1800 South Carolina legislature was at least initially 
"the most federal I ever knew." October 16, December, 1800, January 24, 
1801, in "South Carolina in the Presidential Election of 1800," ll5, 122, 128. 
92 Madison to Jefferson, September, November 10, 1800, Madison Papers, 
Vol. 21; William Boylan to Duncan Cameron, from Raleigh, October 31, 
1800, Cameron Family Papers. 
93 Pinckney to Jefferson, October 12--December 6, 1800; Peter Freneau to 
Jefferson, December 2, 1800, in "South Carolina in the Presidential Election 
of 1800," ll4-23. 
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her, 1800, was the reemergence of the Hamilton-Adams split. 
According to reports circulated in Columbia, certain 
anonymous Republicans, apparently believing it impossible 
to carry their electoral slate through the legislature, ap-
proached their opponents and offered to abandon party 
strife and settle on a compromise Jefferson-Pinckney ticket. 
Charles Pinckney, for the Republicans, and Christopher 
Gadsden, for the Federalists, both hotly denied the existence 
of such a proposed deal. 94 Of course, both had obvious 
partisan reasons for doing so. Whether or not such a propo-
sition actually had been advanced, a rumor to that effect 
swept through the taverns and boarding houses of Columbia. 
John Harold Wolfe, after a most thorough examination of 
the controversy, has concluded that an agreement to form 
a Jefferson-Pinckney ticket probably could have been ar-
ranged except that no one on either side dared to initiate 
it. However, available evidence strongly supports the con-
tention that at least some high ranking South Carolina 
Federalists did actively contemplate, if not overtly seek, a 
deal with the Republicans at Columbia. On December 3, 
1800, the day after the balloting for electors in Columbia, 
George Washington's young cousin, Bushrod, then in Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, received a letter from DeSaussure 
in which the latter stated with apparent calmness that "it is 
more than probable that Genl. Pinckney will have the whole 
[of South Carolina's] eight votes with Mr. Jefferson."95 
DeSaussure no doubt wrote from Columbia, and whether 
his remarks may be taken as sufficient evidence of an overt 
94 Charles Pinckney to Jefferson, from Charleston, January 24, 1801, ibid., 
127-28; Gadsden to John Adams, from Charleston, March 11, 1801, in 
Charles Francis Adams, The Works of 1 ohn Adams ( 10 vols.; Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1850-1856), IX, 579. 
95 John Harold Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina, The 
]ames Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 158-62n.; William 
Polk to John Steele, December 5, 1800, in Wagstaff, John Steele, I, 193. 
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willingness among the Federalists to deal with the Republi-
cans, they certainly indicate a singular drift in the thinking 
of many friends of government at Columbia. At a moment 
when unquestioned fidelity to party discipline might well 
have kept South Carolina in support of Federalism and John 
Adams, DeSaussure and his allies could not seem to bring 
themselves wholly to trust the President. As a result, they 
exposed to public view the weaknesses which continually 
had plagued the Federalist interest after the Hamilton-
Adams schism. The firmness of the Republican interest 
under. Charles Pinckney likely attracted many waverers 
away from an initial Federalist commitment, thus giving 
the state to Jefferson and Burr. The friends of government 
in South Carolina had made some notable strides toward 
construction of a crude local party organization and the 
development of several effective techniques of mass appeal 
since 1795, but the meaning of and the necessity for party 
unity on a national scale continued to elude many of them, 
even as late as 1800. Hamilton and his friends had worked 
effectively, to emphasize sectional and personal interests at 
the expense of party loyalty in the minds of many influential 
lqwcountrymen, and the Federalist cause suffered disas-
trously from Hamilton's success. 
Balloting for electors took place on December 2, and 
South Carolina fell to the Republicans by an eighteen-vote 
margin. Individuals on the Federalist ticket, headed by 
General William Washington, received from 63 to 69 votes, 
while members of the Republican ticket received from 82 
to as many as 87 votes. In short, the South Carolina legisla-
ture was Republican by a not too comfortable 8.5 to 6.5 
ratio.96 
Since the balloting was secret, it is impossible to ascertain 
the geographic and socioeconomic configuration of the vote. 
96 Charleston City Gazette, December 6, 1800. 
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The only determinant of relative party strength in South 
Carolina emerges from the results of the Congressional 
elections and from remarks in private correspondence. 
Writers on both sides agreed on one point: that the city of 
Charleston remained under firm Federalist domination. So 
thorough was the Federalist hold, in fact, that DeSaussure 
told Rutledge in August that the Republicans were having 
difficulty in finding anyone willing to challenge Thomas 
Lowndes in the Congressional race. Lowndes, who replaced 
retiring Thomas Pinckney, subsequently was sent to Phila-
delphia, though the margin of his victory was not reported.97 
Federalism still predominated in the rest of the lowcountry, 
with Benjamin Huger sweeping all of the counties in the 
Georgetown-Cheraw district, and John Rutledge, Jr., retain-
ing his seat from the Orangeburg-Beaufort area, although 
the Saxe-Gotha region went heavily Republican. In the 
backcountry, however, the results were different. William 
Butler captured three of the four electoral areas in Ninety-
Six district; the fourth, Abbeville, remained Federalist by 
a 2 to 1 margin. Thomas Sumter continued his domination 
of Camden district in all but the Fairfield area, defeating 
Richard Winn, whose politics probably leaned toward mod-
erate Federalism. Thomas Moore, who represented the 
Washington-Pinckney region, was also a Jeffersonian sup-
porter.98 Thus, for a brief period around 1800 the political 
configuration of South Carolina, with a few exceptions, took 
on a classic sectional cast, with the Republicans holding a 
97 Charles Pinckney to Jefferson, from Charleston, October 12, 1800, in 
"South Carolina in the Presidential Election of 1800," 114; DeSaussure to 
Rutledge, August 14, 1800, John Rutledge, Jr., Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
98 Charleston City Gazette, October 15, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 1800. The 
only assessment of Winn's political character which I have run across is in 
a letter from William Laughton Smith to Alexander Hamilton, from 
Winnsborough, April 24, 1793, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 19. Manning J. 
Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), 
331, 342. 
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tight control over most of the backcountry area and the 
Federalists still controlling the coast. 
A final humiliation awaited the South Carolina Federalists 
in the legislative session of 1800. Jacob Read failed to be 
elected to the United States Senate by a narrow margin of 
75 to 73. His successor, John E. Calhoun, was as staunch a 
friend of Jefferson as Charles Pinckney, the other South 
Carolina senator. The event marked the beginning of the 
Republican ascendancy in the state.99 
99 North Carolina Minerva, December 23, 1800; Charles Pinckney to 
Jefferson, from Columbia, December 6, 1800, in "South Carolina in the 
Presidential Election of 1800," 123. 
VIII. Southern Federalists and the 
'Party System, 1789-1800 
The establishment of the first American party system was 
accomplished substantially by the close of the elections of 
1800. The development of this novel system, which in terms 
of practical politics represented the United States' greatest 
contribution to the eighteenth-century western world, was 
the work of many men of both political parties in every sec-
tion of the country. Between 1789 and 1800 no single interest 
or party, no individual or group of individuals could hold a 
monopoly upon political innovation. The changes which led 
to the emergence of a national party system, a more open 
political climate and electoral process, and an ever greater 
participation by the common people in political decision 
making, were as often instigated by elitist-minded friends of 
government seeking to perpetuate their entrenched hold up-
on national power, as by those who sought equal access to 
political power. From the perspective of southern politics, 
the Federalists' indispensable contributions to the building 
of the first national party system are clear. 
It was the friends of government- who first organized into 
active, constant, and well-defined partisan interest groups in 
nearly every state as early as George Washington's first 
administration. This basic contribution to the making of a 
party system was not often matched by the Jeffersonian 
Republicans until the eve of the 1800 elections. It was the 
friends of government, moreover, who, despite a deep and 
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enduring commitment to elitist values, nonetheless pioneered 
in the development of techniques of mass appeal and of mass 
participation in the political decision-making process. The 
ad hoc public meetings, which the Federalists first arranged 
in Virginia and in the North in the autumn of 1793 and 
again in the spring of 1796, were called with authori-
tarian purposes in mind, to be sure. They were planned to 
obtain popular ratification for existing policy rather than to 
suggest new lines of action. Yet the taste of power, influence, 
and political experience which the public gained from these 
meetings could not help but have further stimulated its 
already strong desire for an even greater participation in the 
affairs of state. Finally, the friends of government from both 
the North and the South showed for the first time in 1798 
how a united, disciplined partisan political interest could 
shape the national legislative process for its own ends. 
Obviously, the activities of the Federalists in the South from 
as early as 1791 onward-and certainly from 1798-belie the 
traditional conclusion recently reemphasized that "the Fed-
eralists entertained a deep and abiding hostility to the whole 
notion of permanent political associations."1 
From 1797 to 1800 the elitist-minded southern Federalists 
moved even closer to party status as a result of the crisis with 
France and the persistence of a powerful opposition interest. 
During this time the friends of government formed broad 
coalitions of support in Virginia and the Carolinas and 
perfected various forms of party machinery in an attempt 
to maintain the gains they had made. 2 In the normal course 
1 J. R. Pole, "Jeffersonian Democracy and the Federalist Dilemma in 
New Jersey, 1798-1812," New Jersey Historical Society Proceedings, LXXIV 
(October, 1956), 264. 
2 Georgia's persistent resistance to Federalism in the 1790's carried over 
into the election of 1800. From all available evidence there seems to have 
been but a single letter in Adams' behalf in the Georgia press in 1800. At 
the same time members of James Jackson's Republican machine were 
equally quiet, indicating confidence rather than apathy. When the legisla-
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of events the state, Congressional, and presidential elections 
of 1800 would have served as a test of the durability of these 
coalitions and of the practicability and efficiency of the 
organizations established to maintain them. But this was 
not to be. 
Partially as a result of the General Ticket Law, which 
demanded the immediate creation of an active, powerful 
political force throughout Virginia, and partially because of 
the burden of carrying Adams' candidacy in Jefferson's own 
state, Federalists in the Old Dominion carried only eight 
scattered counties in 1800, all but one of which had voted 
consistently Federalist since 1795.3 
In South Carolina the Federalists ultimately saw their 
impressive successes in obtaining popular support fatally 
compromised by the bitter divisions within the Federalist 
party leadership on the national level. The schism between 
the friends of Adams and those of Hamilton had become so 
deep by the autumn of 1800 that long-standing sectional 
animosities and fears were revived among South Carolina 
Federalists, causing them to lose faith in their northern 
colleagues and in the legitimacy of the ticket. Thereafter, 
the party was doomed to defeat in South Carolina and in the 
presidency as well. Even so, Federalists in both North and 
South Carolina in 1800 apparently retained some influence 
within all of the socioeconomic groups which they first had 
attracted two years before. 4 
ture met in November to cast its four votes for Jefferson, the event was 
noted in the most perfunctory terms, while the state's Congressional 
elections were not even discussed. Augusta Chronicle, June 28, 1800; 
Georgia Gazette, October 16, November 27, 1800. 
3 The eight counties were Accomac, Augusta, Greenbrier, Hampshire, 
Hardy, Loudoun, Northampton, and Westmoreland. Virginia Argus, Decem-
ber 2, 1800. 
4 In North Carolina, it will be recalled, the Federalist candidate for 
elector in Morgan district-in the western section-did win one county. 
Federalist candidates in other unreported western districts may have 
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But while southern Federalists contributed materially to 
the making of the first American party system, most of them 
stoutly resisted to the end the basic spirit and purpose of 
the new system. From the beginning southern Federalists 
were interested not in the politics of persuasion, but solely 
in the politics of control. All partisan activity, all techniques 
of mass appeal, and all efforts to create correspondence and 
campaign networks were employed to insure that the party 
as a whole would retain its authoritarian grasp upon power. 
Philosophically, the beginnings of a consistent Federalist 
ideology in the South began in 1797 with an effective appeal 
to the "patriotic sensibility" of the electorate, a sensibility 
which one foreign observer of American institutions has 
claimed is as deep and enduring an ingredient of public 
conscience as is the impulse to liberty.5 When Adams' 
determination to maintain peace with France forced practical 
abandonment of this philosophy, however, friends of govern-
ment below the Potomac joined Federalists elsewhere in 
increasing praise of the status quo. During the great 
ideological confrontation of 1800 between eighteenth-century 
American social and political traditionalism and Jeffersonian 
liberalism, southern Federalists staunchly upheld their party's 
commitment to the defense of elitist rule and of entrenched 
religious and political institutions and practices, to the 
captured one or two counties. In South Carolina a residue of Federalist 
strength could be found in the backcountry settlements of Abbeville and 
Fairfield. There also appears to have been a significant yeoman farmer 
element in the lowcountry parishes which also voted Federalist. Any 
assumption that these lowcountry yeomen were controlled by the planters 
and thus may be discounted as a distinct political force must take into 
account the incident in 1786 when the yeomen of St. James Goose Creek 
openly defied the expressed will of Ralph Izard and voted for their 
favorite, Thomas Tudor Tucker, against Izard's son. George C. Rogers, Jr., 
William Laughton Smith of Charleston; Evolution of a Federalist, 1758-
1812 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1962), 128. 
5 M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, 
Vol. II: U.S.A. (New York: Anchor Books, 1964), 302--306. 
Southern Federalists and the Party System I 287 
maintenance of a privileged social status for the wealthy 
few, and to the broadest possible restriction upon social 
mobility and popular participation in the political decision-
making process. While a surprisingly large number of elec-
tors within all social and occupational classes in the Carolinas 
remained sufficiently conservative to support such a stand, 
they ultimately proved too few to retain these states for 
Federalism. In Virginia, the home of Republican theory, the 
Federalists' incessant articulation of the philosophy of elitism 
must be recognized, even more than the General Ticket Law 
or the burden of the Adams candidacy, as the major cause 
of Federalism's downfall. Surely one of the great ironies of 
the Federalist defeat in the South in 1800 is that the more 
effective the friends of government became in spreading 
their archaic, unpopular gospel of elitist politics through the 
various agencies of current party organization, the more 
certainly they paved the way for their own collapse. 
Even in the realm of party ideology, however, the 
Federalists made a substantial contribution to the shaping 
of the Rrst American party system. Federalists and Republi-
cans in 1800 fashioned a climate of competing opinion from 
which an already aroused electorate could develop a sense 
of partisan commitment. In 1800 for the first time both 
parties consistently attempted to enlist the support of the 
common folk in determining the broad outlines of the future 
course of American political, economic, and social develop-
ment. The Federalists unabashedly championed the closed 
society of the past in which individual opportunities for 
marked economic gain and social advancement were limited 
to the entrenched elite and only the most ambitious and 
most fortunate few from among the lower orders. The 
Republicans with their broad doctrines of equality and 
democracy encouraged the further breakup of static socio-
economic relationships and encouraged the growth of an 
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open, mobile society. A significant number of southerners 
chose to cleave to tradition and to the Federalist party in 
1800, demonstrating the extent to which political conserva-
tism remained rooted within southern thinking. The gradual 
erosion of this conservatism by a more liberal democratic 
order became the most significant theme of southern political 
history after 1800.6 
With the party, its vision, and many of its values at last 
driven from national power, many Federalists in Virginia 
and the Carolinas soon abandoned their political positions 
and either joined with the Republicans or withdrew from 
public life. Accustomed to occupying a minority political 
position in all states except South Carolina, the main impetus 
which southern Federalists had to political activity-a pride of 
identification with the national administration-was abruptly 
removed. Even before the results of the presidential election 
were fully known, a North Carolina politician wrote scorn-
fully that "the strongest Adamites that were in the habit 
[of ab]using Mr. Jefferson with the greatest scurrility now 
begin to say that they believes [sic] that Mr. J is as good as 
Mr. A and if he should gain his Election, they will be as 
happy as if Mr. Adams had, all place hunters and trimmers."7 
The following spring such party stalwarts as Henry Lee, 
Thomas Evans, Josiah Parker, and Leven Powell, vanished 
from the Virginia Congressional delegation, never to reap-
pear. Two years later William Barry Grove, William H. Hill, 
and Archibald Henderson left national life forever. 8 
6 Fletcher M. Green, "Democracy in the Old South," Journal of Southern 
History, XXII (June, 1946), 3-23; and Dewey W. Grantham, The Demo-
cratic South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), provide valuable 
insights into the persistent conflict between conservatism and democracy 
in the old and new South. 
7 Pugh Williams to John Haywood, November 7, 1800, Haywood Col-
lection. 
8 The departure of these North Carolina Federalist congressmen in 1803 
was hastened by their ostentatious refusal to be instructed by the Republi-
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Some former friends of government persevered for a time, 
no doubt heartened by the claims of at least one partisan 
newspaper that the great progress made by the infant union 
during its first dozen years must be protected by those who 
constantly had adhered to the cause of orderly government 
and elitist rule.9 
Benjamin Huger, John Rutledge, Jr., and Thomas Lowndes 
of South Carolina remained in office until they were defeated 
in the great Republican tide of 1804, which South Carolina 
Federalists apparently found useless to resist even though 
Cotesworth Pinckney had become the party's presidential 
candidate. 10 Federalism's complete collapse in South Car-
olina after 1804 was symbolically ratified by Hamilton's 
former supporter, William Laughton Smith, who by 1808 
had "evolved" his political sentiments sufficiently to run 
unsuccessfully for Congress on the Republican ticket.11 After 
1804 the South was thoroughly RepublicanP 
The passing of Federalist power in the nation was greeted 
by its older friends in the South with occasional expressions 
of relief, but more often with bitterness, despair, and 
can-dominated General Assembly. Davie also stood on this issue in his 
Congressional campaign, was defeated, and promptly went into retirement. 
Henry M. Wagstaff, "Federalism in North Carolina," The ]ames Sprunt 
Historical Studies, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Publications, 1910 ), 140. 
9 "Sketch of Parties," Federal Carolina Gazette, n.d., reprinted in the North 
Carolina Minerva, December 23, 1800. 
10 DeSaussure, in writing to an acquaintance in late August of 1804, 
made no mention of political affairs whatsoever, which was an unusual 
omission for the political boss. To Ezekial Pickens, from Charleston, August 
22, 1804, Henry William DeSaussure Papers, South Caroliniana Library, 
Charleston, S.C. 
11 Rogers, William Laughton Smith, 380-82. 
12 John Harold Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina, The 
]ames Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 195; Delbert H. 
Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1931), 128-31. 
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melancholyP A few members of the old guard remained 
active; William Boylan and the Minerva became a center of 
Federalist activity in North Carolina largely because of the 
editor's unsuccessful but untiring efforts to reclaim the posi-
tion of public printer.14 In South Carolina, Jacob Read and 
Henry William DeSaussure showed deep interest in party 
affairs in 1808, and Cotesworth Pinckney, of course, was 
again the party's standard bearer in that year with young 
John Rutledge serving as his campaign manager.15 For the 
most part, however, the old guard in the South, as in the 
North, slipped away during the early years of the Jeffersonian 
era, frequently entrenching themselves in a self-conscious 
manner-as in South Carolina-in several exclusive social 
"establishments."16 They left partisan politics to younger 
men, who completed the transformation of Federalist politi-
cal practices from elitist to egalitarian during the age of 
Jefferson. 
Yet the time which the older Federalist leaders in the 
13 In 1802, speaking of the "increasing acrimony of Party Spirits," Richard 
Bland Lee complained that "social intercourse has been too much 
embittered," before going on to make overtures of renewed friendship to 
his old ally, James Madison. The attitude of Bushrod Washington to the 
Federalists' loss of national power was more uncompromising. In November, 
1801, he wrote Hamilton of the "system of intolerance and proscription 
which seems to be the order of the day, from the General to many of the 
State Governments." Richard Bland Lee to James Madison, from Sully, 
Loudoun, March 27, 1802, R. B. Lee Papers; Bushrod Washington to 
Hamilton, November 21, 1801, in John C. Hamilton, ed., The Works of 
Alexander Hamilton ( 7 vols.; New York: John F. Trow, Printer, 1851 ), VI, 
526. In 1805 the recently defeated John Rutledge, Jr., observed to Harper 
that Philadelphia "I suspect I shall find . . . sadly changed since the 
prosperous days of the Republic which we passed there so happily." 
August 3, 1805, from Charleston, Harper Papers, LC. 
14 Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, 136--40. 
15 Jacob Read to Cotesworth Pinckney, from Charleston, June 10, 1807, 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, 
S.C.; DeSaussure to Ezekial Pickens, September 12, 1808, DeSaussure Papers; 
Rogers, William Laughton Smith, 379--80. 
16 Rogers cogently discusses this movement of South Carolina's "declining 
aristocracy," William Laughton Smith, 382-92. 
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South had spent in public life during the 1790's was by no 
means devoid of lasting influence upon the development of 
the American political tradition. Even as Jefferson came into 
office, Fisher Ames, the keeper of Federalism's darker 
conscience, already was beginning to note in bitter terms 
the "trust" which many of his colleagues had come to have 
"in the sinless perfection ... of democracy."17 Doubtless 
many retiring or soon-to-be retiring southern Federalists 
shared his views, despite all they had done to prepare the 
way for a major shift in the climate of political practice and 
principle in the young republic. Their epitaph as reluctant 
harbingers of great change in the style, scope, and scale of 
American politics unwittingly was written for them long 
years after by their arch foe, Thomas Jefferson, who, in 
remarking upon the slow growth of democratic traditions 
everywhere, observed that "the generation which commences 
a revolution rarely completes it."18 
17 Ames to Theodore Dwight, from Dedham, March 19, 1801, in Seth 
Ames, ed., Works af Fisher Ames (2 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1854), I, 292-93. 
18 Jefferson to Adams, 1823, quoted in Saul K. Padover, Thomas Jefferson 
on Democracy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1939), 21. 
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Appendix. Federalist Voting Strength in Three Southern 
States, 1795-1800 
TABLE ONE: Virginia: Vote on resolutions regarding 
Washington's conduct in connection with the Jay 
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TABLE ONE (continued) 
Representatives 
Supporting Total 
Section County Washington Representatives 
Shenandoah Valley Pendleton 2 2 
(cont.) Rockingham 1 2 
Northwestern Frontier Harrison 2 2 
Kanawha 1 2 
Monongalia 1 2 
Randolph 2 2 
Southwestern Frontier Bedford 2 2 
Greenbrier 2 2 
Montgomery 1 2 
Russell 1 2 
Washington 1 2 
Wythe 1 2 
Boroughs Richmond 1 1 
Williamsburg 1 1 
TOTALS 58 85 
1 Source: Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, November 25, 1795; 
Earl G. Swem and John W. Williams, A Register of the General Assembly 
of Virginia, 1776-1918, and of the Constitutional Conventions (Richmond: 
Davis Bottom, Supt. of Public Printing, 1918), 43-45. 
TABLE TWO: Virginia: Vote on the resolution declaring 
the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional, House 
of Delegates, December, 1798.1 
Representatives 
Opposing Total 
Section County Resolutions Representatives 
Eastern Shore Accomac 1 2 
Northampton 2 2 
Piedmont: North of Amherst 1 2 
the James 
Piedmont: South of Campbell 1 2 
the James Charlotte 2 2 
Greenville 2 2 
Halifax 1 2 
Isle of Wight 1 2 
Lunenberg 1 2 
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TABLE TWO (COntinued) 
Representatives 
Opposing Total 
Section County Resolutions Representatives 
Piedmont: South of Mecklenburg 1 2 
the James (cont.) Pittsylvania 2 2 
Prince George 2 2 
Southampton 1 2 
Sussex 1 2 
Northern Neck Fairfax 1 2 
King George 2 2 
Loudoun 2 2 
Prince William 1 2 
Tidewater King William 1 2 
New Kent 1 2 
Princess Anne 2 2 
Westmoreland 1 2 
York 1 2 
Shenandoah Valley Augusta 2 2 
Bath 2 2 
Berkeley 2 2 
Botetourt 1 2 
Frederick 1 2 
Hampshire 2 2 
Hardy 2 2 
Pendleton 2 2 
Rockbridge 2 2 
Rockingham 2 2 
Northwestern Frontier Brooke 1 2 
Kanawha 1 2 
Monongalia 1 2 
Randolph 1 2 
Southwestern Frontier Bedford 2 2 
Greenbrier 2 2 
Montgomery 2 2 
Washington 1 2 
Wythe 2 2 
Boroughs Williamsburg 1 1 
TOTALS 63 85 
1 Source: "Virginia General Assembly, Journal of the House of Delegates," 
December 21, 1798, William S. Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the 
United States (Microfilm, University of California Library, Berkeley); Vir-
ginia Gazette and General Advertiser, January 1, 1799; Swem and Williams, 
Register of the Virginia General Assembly, 50-52. 
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TABLE THREE: Virginia: Vote on the General Ticket 
Law, House of Delegates, January, 1800.1 
Representatives Total 
Section County Opposing Law Representatives 
Eastern Shore Accomac 2 2 
Northampton 2 2 
Piedmont: North of Culpeper 2 2 
the James Fauquier 2 2 
Madison 1 2 
Piedmont: South of Campbell 2 2 
the James Charlotte 2 2 
Greenville 2 2 
Isle of Wight 1 2 
Lunenberg 1 2 
Mecklenburg 1 2 
Nansemond 2 2 
Nottoway 1 2 
Pittsylvania 1 2 
Prince Edward 1 2 
Prince George 2 2 
Southampton 2 2 
Northern Neck Fairfax 1 2 
King George 2 2 
Loudoun 2 2 
Tidewater Charles City 1 2 
Gloucester 1 2 
King and Queen 1 2 
King William 2 2 
New Kent 2 2 
Norfolk 1 2 
Princess Anne 2 2 
Westmoreland 2 2 
York 1 2 
Shenandoah Valley Augusta 2 2 
Bath 2 2 
Berkeley 2 2 
Botetourt 2 2 
Frederick 2 2 
Hardy 2 2 
Pendleton 2 2 
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TABLE THREE (continued) 
Representatives Total 
Section County Opposing Law Representatives 
Northwestern Frontier Kanawha 2 2 
Monongalia 2 2 
Southwestern Frontier Bedford 2 2 
Grayson 1 2 
Greenbrier 2 2 
Montgomery 1 2 
Wythe 2 2 
Boroughs Norfolk 1 1 
Richmond 1 1 
TOTALS 73 88 
1 Source: "Virginia General Assembly, Journal of the House of Delegates," 
January 17, 1800, Jenkins, ed., Records of the States; Swem and Williams, 
Register of the Virginia General Assembly, 52-54. 
TABLE FOUR: North Carolina: Vote on the Laudatory 
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TABLE FOUR (continued) 
Representatives 
Favoring Total 
Section County Address Representatives 
Upper Cape Fear Bladen 1 2 
Cumberland 1 2 
Duplin 2 2 
Piedmont Chatham 1 2 
Franklin 2 2 
Granville 1 2 
Johnston 1 2 
Moore 1 2 
Orange 1 2 
Person 2 2 
Robeson 2 2 
Wake 1 2 
Western Counties Anson 2 2 
Cabarrus 2 2 
Glasgow 1 2 
Guilford 1 2 
Iredell 1 2 
Lincoln 2 2 
Mecklenburg 1 2 
Richmond 2 2 
Rockingham 1 2 
Rowan 1 2 
Rutherford 2 2 
Stokes 2 2 
Surry 1 2 
Mountain Counties Buncombe 1 2 
Burke 2 2 
Wilkes 1 2 
Boroughs Fayetteville 1 1 
Salisbury 1 1 
TOTALS 51 77 
1 Source: "Journal of the North Carolina House of Commons," December 
24, 1798, Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
Appendix 
TABLE FIVE: North Carolina: Vote on resolution con-
demning the Alien and Sedition Acts, House of 





















































1 Source: "Journal of the North Carolina House of Commons," December 




TABLE SIX: South Carolina: Vote on the report recom-
mending the procurement of a stand of 5,000 more 
arms to be resold to the "privates in the respective 
Regiments of this State," House of Representa-





Low country All Saints 0 
Backcountry 
TOTAL 










St. James Goose Creek 
St. James Santee 
St. John's Berkeley 

















































1 Source: "Journal of the South Carolina House of Representatives," 
December 17, 1798, Jenkins, ed., Records of the States. 
Appendix 
TABLE SEVEN: South Carolina: Ascertainable vote on 
motion to consider the Kentucky Resolutions, 
Senate, December, 1799.1 
County, Parish 
I 301 
Section or Settlement Federalist Republican 
Low country Charleston X 
Christ Church X 
St. John's Bartholomew X 
St. John's Colleton X 
St. Luke's X 
St. Stephen's X 
Saxe-Gotha X 
Winyaw-Williamsburg X 
Backcountry Abbeville X 











1 Source: "Journal of the South Carolina Senate," December 24, 1799, 
Jenkins, ed., Records af the States. 
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TABLE EIGHT: North Carolina: Ascertainable results of 
the Presidential Election of 1800.1 
Section District County Federalist Republican 
Eastern Edgecombe Beaufort No count2 
Edgecombe 303 202 
Greene 249 43 
Hyde No count2 
Pitt 388 209 
NewBern Carteret 147 14 
Craven 331 301 
Johnston 168 92 
Jones 142 87 
Lenoir 122 227 
Wayne 22 413 
932 1,134 
Warren Franklin 68 224 
(Halifax) Halifax 209 466 
Nash 47 101 
Warren 14 549 
338 1,340 
Piedmont Raleigh Chatham 232 397 
Granville 187 379 
Person 62 241 
Wake 266 302 
--
747 1,319 
Western Morgan Ashe 0 62 
Buncombe 26 155 
Burke 122 427 
Lincoln 240 11 
Rutherford 60 361 
Wilkes 36 357 
---
484 1,373 
Salisbury Cabarrus 139 101 
Mecklenburg 274 292 
~ontgomery 277 54 
Rowan 643 563 
1,333 1,010 
TOTALS 4,774 6,630 
1 Source: Raleigh Register, November 11, 18, 25, 1800. 
2 Reported as strongly Federalist. Ibid., November 18, 1800. 
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TABLE NINE: South Carolina: Ascertainable Results of 
the Congressional Election of 1800.1 
County, Parish 
Section District or Town Federalist Republican 
Low country Georgetown- Cheraw } 603 401 Cheraw Georgetown 
Williamsburg 167 110 
-- ---
770 511 
Orangeburg- Orange 174 74 
Beaufort Prince William 63 23 
St. Helena's 68 6 
St. Luke's 43 29 
St. Mathew's 95 28 
St. Peter's 98 1 
Saxe-Gotha 27 227 
Winton 206 192 
--
774 580 
Backcountry Camden Claremont 9 157 
Clarendon 0 150 
Fairfield 510 132 
Kershaw 47 189 
Lancaster No count2 
Richland 37 233 
Salem 0 153 
Ninety-Six Abbeville 405 223 
(Partial) Edgefield 69 563 
Newberry 173 414 
TOTALS 2,794 3,305 
1 Source: Charleston City Gazette, October 21, 22, 27, 31, November 5, 
17, 1800. 
2 Reported three to one Republican. Ibid., October 21, 1800. 
~ :J\fi!;e on Sources 
As I have indicated in the introduction, southern state 
politics during the Federalist era have received compara-
tively little serious and sustained scholarly attention in 
recent years. Much published and unpublished primary 
source material is available, however, for the use of historians 
and biographers. This book was written mainly from unpub-
lished sources, including manuscript collections, newspapers, 
state legislative journals, and contemporary political pam-
phlets. 
Unpublished manuscripts were of prime importance, and 
approximately sixty collections in libraries across the country 
were consulted. In the Library of Congress, the papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
John Adams, and especially those of George Washington 
and the Pinckney family, were of indispensable aid in 
tracing both the contours and the details of growing Fed-
eralist partisanship and strength in the southern states after 
1790. 
A number of smaller collections in the Library of Congress 
also contained information on the structure of southern state 
politics and the attitudes and activities of influential southern 
Federalists in this period. Among the most notable of these 
were the Richard Bland Lee, Ralph Izard, John Marshall, 
Campbell-Preston, and William Laughton Smith papers. 
The Diary of William Heth covering the years 1792-1793 
proved equally valuable. An examination of the Personal 
Miscellany File uncovered some important single pieces of 
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correspondence concerning southern Federalists and south-
em politics in general at the close of the eighteenth century. 
Duke University Library and the Southern Historical 
Collection at Chapel Hill have the next largest and most 
important collections of private papers of southern politicians 
during the administrations of Washington and John Adams. 
At Duke, the papers of Seaborn Jones, Edward Telfair, and 
James Jackson include much information pertaining to 
Georgia politics between 1789 and 1801. The Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, Jacob Read, and John Rutledge, Jr., 
papers trace the frequently vacillating and conflicting activi-
ties of the various South Carolina Federalist factions before 
and after 1794, while political developments in Virginia, and 
especially in North Carolina, prior to 1799 are documented 
in the papers and correspondence of James Iredell. The 
Southern Historical Collection at Chapel Hill also has an 
important collection of the papers of John Rutledge, Jr. In 
addition, the correspondence of William R. Davie, Ernest 
Haywood, and the Cameron and Lenoir family papers pro-
vide highly important insights into the Federalist role in 
Virginia and North Carolina politics throughout the 1790's. 
Important correspondence and private papers of various 
southern Federalists also are available at the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. The Dreer Col-
lection contains important correspondence of the Rutledge 
family during 1796 and 1797. Southern Federalists' observa-
tions on state and national politics in the 1780's and 1790's 
may also be found in the Pierce Butler papers, the Gratz 
collection, the Anthony Wayne papers, and the Charles 
Francis Jenkins collection. 
Important source material on South Carolina Federalism 
in this period may be found in the papers of Jacob Read, 
Edward Rutledge, John Rutledge, Jr., Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, Henry William DeSaussure, and Robert Goodloe 
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Harper at the South Caroliniana Library in Columbia. Re-
cently discovered correspondence between William Laugh-
ton Smith and Edward Rutledge spanning the years 1789-
1794 is now in the South Carolina Historical Society in 
Charleston. This correspondence details the course of early 
national political history with such thoroughness and candor 
as to demand skillful editing and immediate publication. 
The University of Virginia Library at Charlottesville 
contains letters and papers in the Marshall Family and 
Wilson Cary Nicholas collections on the origins and develop-
ment of the Federalist interest in the Old Dominion during 
and after 1793. The Anthony Wayne papers at the Clements 
Library in Ann Arbor are an important source of information 
concerning the genesis and often unsavory activities of the 
Federalist faction in Georgia in the early 1790's. The William 
Laughton Smith, Abraham Baldwin, and Lee Family papers 
in the Brock Collection at the Henry E. Huntington Library 
in San Marino, California, include important single pieces of 
correspondence. 
Twenty-four newspapers fairly evenly distributed among 
the four South Atlantic states were consulted during this 
study. They proved invaluable guides to the day-by-day 
political history of their time and place and also often 
provided running accounts and commentaries on various 
election campaigns from which an assessment of the relative 
growth of party spirit and organization in various areas 
could be made. The names of these newspapers and the 
locations of extant copies may be found in Clarence S. 
Brigham, History and Bibliography of American News-
papers, 1690-1820 (2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Archon Books, 
1962). 
State legislative journals were valuable chiefly in providing 
detailed information on the results of key partisan legislative 
proposals that appeared in nearly all states with increasing 
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frequency after 1795. In particular, these divisions permit 
the historian to make at least a tentative evaluation of the 
geographic and social sources of partisan allegiance as party 
activity and organization grew and expanded over ever wider 
areas of the South during the Presidency of John Adams. 
Contemporary political pamphlets contain factual material 
and partisan interpretations of specific events and develop-
ments throughout the decade. The Huntington Library has 
a large collection of these pamphlets. 
Published correspondence of various Federalist and Re-
publican partisans was the final source of primary informa-
tion consulted in the preparation of this study. In addition 
to the readily available and invaluable collected works of 
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Monroe, John 
Adams, Fisher Ames, Rufus King, and Patrick Henry, there 
exists a sizable number of fragmentary collections of the 
writings of leading southern political figures of the Federalist 
era. Among the most important of these for North Carolina 
are Griffith J. McRee, ed., The Life and Correspondence of 
]ames Iredell (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1949); Alice 
Barnwell Keith, ed., The John Gray Blount Papers, Vols. I 
and II (Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 
1952, 1959); William Henry Masterson, ed., The John Gray 
Blount Papers, Vol. III (Raleigh: State Department of Ar-
chives and History, 1965); and Henry M. Wagstaff, ed., The 
Papers of john Steele (2 vols.; Raleigh: North Carolina His-
torical Publications, 1924). In addition, Wagstaff and Kemp 
P. Battle collected and edited important political correspon-
dence of William Barry Grove, Charles Harris, William R. 
Davie, and John Steele, which may be found in Numbers 3 
and 7 and Volumes IX and XIV of the ]ames Sprunt His-
torical Studies. 
Much important data on the rise and decline of South 
Carolina Federalism between 1789 and 1800 may be found 
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in Ulrich B. Phillips, ed., "South Carolina Federalist Corre-
spondence," American Histcmcal Review, XIV (July, 1909); 
Worthington C. Ford, ed., "Letters of Ralph Izard," South 
Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, II (July, 
1909); and the anonymously edited, "South Carolina in the 
Presidential Election of 1800," American Historical Review, 
IV (October, 1898). 
Important aspects of Federalist activity in Georgia at the 
close of the eighteenth century may be found in Harriet 
Milledge Salley, ed., Correspondence of Governor John 
Milledge (Columbia, S.C.: State Commercial Printing Co., 
1949); and in "Letterbook of James Jackson, 1788-1796," 
Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (March-December, 
1953); "Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh, 1774-1799," ibid., XL 
(June, 1956); and "Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh," Collections 
of the Georgia Historical Society, XII (Savannah, 1957), all 
edited by Lilla M. Hawes. 
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234; relations with Hamilton, 145; 
cabinet of, 145, 200, 203, 233-34, 
238, 240-42, 274; relations with 
southern Federalists, 146, 148, 
153-54, 201-202, 275-77; special 
message to Congress, 147, 149, 
151; and XYZ mission, 150, 153, 
167, 168-72 passim, 186, 197; 
patronage policies of, 153-54; ad-
dress of North Carolina legislature 
to, 176, 297 -98; relations with 
France, 188, 189, 194-95, 212, 
229, 232, 286; relations with high 
Federalists, 200-204 passim, 232-
34, 238-43 passim, 249, 273, 274-
75, 279-80, 285; dispatches final 
peace mission to France, 203n, 
218, 221, 233, 249; and provi-
sional army, 206-208; and elec-
tions of 1800, 233-80 passim, 
284n, 285, 287, 288; influence of 
George Washington on, 235n; at-
tacked by Republicans, 251; Fed-
eralist defense of, 252, 254, 256, 
269, 272; and elections of 1798, 
259; and aristocratic titles, 265; 
mentioned, 8, 9, 176, 196, 199, 
220, 250, 253. See also Elections; 
Franco-American relations; XYZ 
mission 
Addison, Alexander, 252 
Albemarle County, Va., 76, 210 
Alexandria, Va.: and Bank of the 
United States, 39n; Federalists in, 
157, 197, 230; and XYZ mission, 
169; mentioned, 5, 119, 130, 188, 
222, 266 
Alien and Sedition Acts: origins of, 
154-55, 156-57, 158; reaction to, 
190-91, 193, 229, 251, 294-95, 
299; and southern Federalists, 202, 
211-15, 216; and Virginia militia, 
216n; mentioned, 187, 199, 221, 
242n, 275 
Allston, Willis, 175, 178, 179n 
Amelia County, Va., 267 
American party system, development 
of, 4-5, 50, 231, 283-92 passim 
American Revolution, 2-3, 49, 53, 56, 
106 
Ames, Fisher, 131, 291 
Amherst County, Va., 10 
Annapolis Convention, 19 
Anglo-French war (1793), 74, 90, 99 
Antifederalists: in South Carolina, 
7-8, 54-55, 107; in Virginia, 7n, 
10, 69-70, 130; in Georgia, 8, 16; 
in North Carolina, 14, 77, 84, 
176; mentioned, 46 
Army, U.S. See Provisional army 
Assumption, Hamilton's plan of: and 
South Carolina, 30-32; and Ed-
wai'd Carrington, 40; opposed by 
James Jackson, 60. See also Fund-
ing, Hamilton's plan of 
Augusta, Ga.: Federalists in, 98, 
171, 186-87; and xyz mission, 
170; mentioned, 64, 93, 98 
Augusta Chronicle, 62, 186 
Augusta County, Va., 285n 
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Backcountry, southern, 52-53, 193-
95 
Baker, Blake, 259 
Baldwin, Abraham, 34, 45 
Ball, Burgess, 120 
Bank of the United States: and 
Hamilton's patronage policy, 36, 
37; membership of, 38-39; men-
tioned, 10, 32n, 42n, 43, 44. See 
also Hamilton, Alexander 
Barnwell, Robert, 51, 138n, 185 
Bayard, James A., 179n, 242, 264 
Beard, Charles, 115 
Beaufort, S. C., 180 
Becker, Carl, 2 
Beckley, John, 35n, 67-68 
Berkeley County, Va., 129 
Bertie County, N. C., 178 
Beverly, Robert, 188 
Blair, John, 22, 24 
Bloodworth, Timothy, 84 
Blount, John Gray, 13-14, 18, 106 
Blount, Thomas: supports Constitu-
tion, 18; and sectionalism in 
North Carolina, 78-79; attitude 
toward Britain, 106; and Jay 
Treaty, 114, 128; Congressional 
resolutions of, 128, l40n, 141; 
accused of land fraud, 175n, 178; 
and elections of 1798, 178; 
supports Gales, 258; mentioned, 
149 
Blount, William: and northern spec-
ulators, 14; supports Constitution, 
18; appointment as territorial 
governor, 23, 24; and federal 
patronage, 24; and Yazoo sale of 
1789, 62; Republicanism of, 160; 
filibustering expedition of, 160; 
mentioned, 158n 
Blount family: reaction to Hamil-
ton's financial policies, 13-14; 
economic interests of, 18; Re-
publicanism of, 113, 158; and 
Tennessee, 158n; mentioned, 105, 
l15n 
Boston, Mass., 114-15 
Botetourt County, Va., 168 
Boylan, William, 255, 259, 260, 290 
Index 
British merchants: of Charleston, 51, 
106-12 passim, 116; in northern 
ports, 106, 112; in southern ports, 
106n, 112; in Virginia, 120, 129; 
and elections of 1800, 270; men-
tioned, 105, 115, 246-47 
British West Indies, southern trade 
with, 17, 18, 105-106, 112, 116, 
120 
Burke, Aedanus, 30, 54-55, 60n, 107, 
116 
Burke, Edmund, 56 
Burke County, Ga., ll8n 
Burr, Aaron, 280 
Butler, Pierce: in Constitutional Con-
vention, 7; and federal patronage, 
24, 25; social status of, 51; and 
Yazoo sale of 1789, 62n; Repub-
licanism of, 102, 103; and South 
Carolina Federalists, 102, 181; 
and national elections, 143, 248; 
mentioned, Ill 
Butler, William, 271, 281 
Cabell, Samuel }., 158 
Cabinet, U.S.: appointments to, 23; 
and Creek Indians, 86, 88, 89; 
and filibustering expedition of 
Clark, 89; conflicts with Adams, 
233-34, 238, 240-42, 27 4. See also 
Adams, John; Washington, George 
Cabot, George, 82n 
Calhoun, John E., 282 
Callender, James Thomas, 221, 224, 
226 
Camden, S. C., 183 
Camden district, S. C., 281 
Cameron, Duncan, 236, 243, 246-47, 
260 
Capital, U.S., residence of, 6, 38 
Carnes, Thomas P., 91, 95-96, 98, 
118 
Caroline County, Va., 76, 267 
Carrington, Edward: and Hamilton's 
financial policies, 11, 12, 37, 40; 
and Society of the Cincinnati, 22-
23; and federal patronage, 22-23, 
40, 41; and Federalist organiza-
tion in Virginia, 25; and Fairfax 
Index 
Carrington, Edward (continued) : 
purchase, 41-42; political career 
of, 72; social status of, 72, 73n; 
elitist political values of, 73n; and 
Genet mission, 75; and Jay Treaty, 
120, 128; and elections of 1796, 
128, 130; and sectionalism within 
Virginia, 192; and provisional 
army, 206, 210; mentioned, 100, 
101, 129 
"Casca" essays, 68 
Cassius essays, 42n 
Champlin, William, 242n 
Charles, Joseph, 33 
Charleston, S. C.: and U.S. Con-
stitution, 8; Federalists in, 37 -38; 
and Bank of the United States, 
38-39; British merchants in, 106-
112 passim; and national elections, 
143, 184, 269-70, 272, 277-78, 
281; slave conspiracy in, 163-64, 
182; and XYZ mission, 170 
Charleston City Gazette, 183, 254, 
275, 276 
Charlotte, Va., 217 
Chatham County, Ga., 63, 65, 93, 
96, 247 
Cheraw district, S. C., 116 
Cherokee Indians, 17 n, 18 
Chester, S. C., 185 
Chesterfield County, Va., 222 
Christ Church Parish, S. C., 116 
Cincinnati, Society of the: member-
ship of, 19, 19n, 22-23, 24, 26, 
39-40, 42, 50, 59, 68; and federal 
patronage, 19-20, 29; in South 
Carolina, 58, 170; mentioned, 28 
Clark, Elijah, 86, 89-90 
Clinton, George, 35, 123, 135, 136 
Columbia, S. C., 59, 102, 116, 137, 
185, 278, 279, 280 
Columbia County, Ga., 93 
Commercial Gazette, 264 
Confederation, U.S., 1, 1n, 16n, 17, 
21, 54 
Congress, U.S.: and residence of 
national capital, 6; sectional fears 
expressed in, 8-9; relations with 
Hamilton, 28-29, 33-35, 36, 44; 
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Congress (continued): 
Federalists in, 32-35, 67-68, 147-
54 passim, 197-200, 232-33, 237-
38, 239, 240n; partisan activities 
of Madison in, 33; Republicans 
in, 34, 44, 99, 113, 129, 147-52 
passim, 180, 198, 199, 238; and 
Jackson-Wayne election, 66, 67-
68; and Creek Indians, 86, 88; 
and Jay Treaty, 93, 103n, 117, 
118, 127, 128, 129, 139-40, 141; 
Jefferson's observations on, 14 7, 
237, 238; Adams' special mes-
sage to, 147, 149, 151; growth of 
party spirit in, 149-50, 237; and 
XYZ mission, 197; and provisional 
army, 208, 209; mentioned, 1, 27, 
96, 214, 253. See also Federal-
ists; Hamilton, Alexander; Repub-
licans 
Connecticut, 16n, 35n, 36 
Constitution, U.S.: ratification of, 
7-8, 30, 54-55, 107; support for, 
16, 17-19 
Constitutional Convention, 6-19 pas-
sim, 38, 56, 10n, 72, 73n 
Continental Army, 19, 26, 49 
Continental Congress, 2, 18, 21, 
54 
Continentalist VI, 1 
"Correspondent" essays, 68 
Crawford, William H., 93 
Creek Indians: and Georgia, 15, 16, 
59, 61, 64, 66, 68, 85-90, 91, 97, 
133-34, 164, 195; and Spain, 16; 
and Yazoo sale of 1795, 92, 95-96; 
mentioned, 25n, 45. See also 
Georgia; Treaty of New York 
Creek Treaty of 1790. See Treaty of 
New York 
Culpeper County, Va., 12, 76, 188 
Cunningham, Noble E., 230 
Cureton, James, 217n 
Dallas, Alexander James, 91, 110 
Darlington, S. C., 185 
Davie, William R.: and U.S. Con-
stitution, 7, 18; and Hamilton's 
financial policies, 13, 15; repre-
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Davie, W. R. (continued): 
sents British creditors, 18; and 
federal judiciary, 23; retirement 
of, 78, 157-58, 289n; and national 
elections, 79-80, 130; and Jay 
Treaty, ll8, 129; attitude toward 
France of, 158; opposes freedom 
of speech, 158; political activities 
of, 17 4; and provisional army, 
174, 210, 2ll; accuses Thomas 
Blount of land fraud, 175n; and 
XYZ mission, 176; mentioned, 
BOn, 178 
Davis, Valentine, 42n, 81n, 254 
Declaration of Independence, 277 
Defense of the American Constitu-
tions, 252 
Democratic-Republican Societies ( S. 
C.), 59 
Democratic spirit, development of, 
3, 4, 28.'3-91 passim 
DeSaussure, Henry William: social 
status of, 52; elitist political 
values of, 57; and Jay Treaty, 
ll7; and Alien and Sedition Acts, 
2ll-12n; and elections of 1800, 
230, 248, 268, 269, 271, 273, 
279-80, 281; leads South Carolina 
Federalists, 235; and high Fed-
eralists, 275; and elections of 
1804, 289n; mentioned, 39, 185, 
244 
Dickson, Joseph, 175 
Dinwiddie County, Va., 267 
Directory, French. See France, Di-
rectory of 
Duane, William, 275, 276 
Edenton, N. C., 177 
Edenton district, N. C., 178 
Edgecombe district, N. C., 261 
Election of 1796: in the South, 123-
38 passim, 140-43 passim; in Vir-
gmia, 127-33, 142, 192, 19.'3; 
in North Carolina, 127-30 passim, 
142, 260; in Georgia, 1.'33-34, 170; 
in South Carolina, 134-38, 143, 
274; in Pennsylvania, 142; men-
tioned, 85, 146, 239 
Index 
Election of 1798: in the South, 139, 
172; in North Carolina, 174-75, 
177-78, 179, 259; in South Caro-
lina, 179-85; in Georgia, 186 
Election of 1800: in Georgia, 187, 
284-85n; in the South, 230-31; 
and sectional division among Fed-
eralists, 239; in South Carolina, 
243, 248, 267-82, 285, 286n, 287' 
303; in North Carolina, 246-48, 
256-61, 285n, 287, 302; in Vir-
ginia, 245-46, 248-.5:3, 261-67, 285, 
287; party spirit in, 2SS-S6, 2.58-
.59, 266; mentioned, 1.59, 197, 
20.5, 227, 229, 28.'3, 28.5, 286, 288. 
See also Adams, John; Hamilton, 
Alexander; High Federalists 
Elections: of 1792, .'3.5, 12.3; of 1797, 
15.5-.56; of 1799, 157, 187-89, 
216-22 passim; of 1804, 289; of 
1808, 290 
Elitist political values: of Federal-
ists, .3n, 4, 47, 48-60 passim, 72-
74, 94-95, 113, 142, 179, 220, 
22.5-27, 248, 252-53, 2.56, 263, 
269-71, 272-73, 283-90 passim; 
of Republicans, 142 
Ellsworth, Oliver, 233 
England. See Great Britain 
Ethnic politics, 193-94 
Evans, Thomas: Federalism of, 147, 
148, 152, 1.56, 222; and Lyon-
Griswold affair, 198; and Alien 
and Sedition Acts, 21.5; and elec-
tions of 1799, 222, 228; and Gen-
eral Election Law of 1800, 262; 
retirement of, 288 
Eveleigh, Nicholas, 23 
Excise Tax (1791), 10, 12, IS, 32n 
Fairfax County, Va., 76, 129, 131 
Fairfax purchase, 42, 44, 1.57 
Fairfield, S. C., ll6, 281, 286n 
Fauchet affair, 19n, 71, 155 
Fauquier County, Va., 76, 129, 130 
Fayetteville, N. C.: and national 
elections, 130, 142, 260; and XYZ 
mission, 168, 169; mentioned, 14, 
79, 80, 177 
Index 
Fayetteville district, N. C., 261 
Federal Carolina Gazette, 254 
Federalist party: emergence as per-
manent national political organiza-
tion, 1.39-66; sectionalism within, 
146, 200-204 passim, 232-34, 2.35, 
238-40, 242-43, 244-45, 273-74 
Federalists: develop partisan or-
ganizations in the South, 1-2, 46, 
80-84 passim, 122, 1.'32, 1:38-.'39, 
154-57 passim, 16.5, 167, 169, 
196-97, 205, 229, 24.'3-49, 270-71, 
280, 28:3-85; elitist political values 
of, :3n, 4, 47, 48-60 passim, 72-74, 
81, 84, 94-95, 113, 142, 179, 220, 
225-27, 248, 252-53, 256, 263, 
269-73 passim, 283-90 passim; in 
New England, 3n; and develop-
ment of American party system, 
4-5, 50, 231, 28:3-92 passim; in 
Virginia, 7n, 25, 37, 39-4.5, 69-77, 
100-101, 119-25 passim, 127, 130-
.'33, 15.'3-57, 168-69, 187-93 pas-
sim, 197, 198, 216-27, 2:30, 2.'36, 
245-46, 248-5.'3, 261-67; and So-
ciety of the Cincinnati, 20; in 
South Carolina, 25, 37 -.'39, 4.5, 
51-59, 100-12, 115-18 passim, 
1.'34-38, 148-5.'3 passim, 16:3-64, 
170, 179-86, 229, 243, 248, 267-
82; in Georgia, 26. 45, 59-69, 98, 
1.'33-.'34, 164-65, 170-71, 186-87; 
newspapers in the South, 26, 80, 
94-95, 129-30, 131, 159-62, 165-
66, 172-74, 178, 179, 186, 195, 
196. 213, 222-27, 229, 244, 248-56 
passim, 258-59, 266-67; in Con-
gress, .'32-.'35, 147-54 passim, 197-
200, 232-33, 237-39; in North 
Carolina, 45, 77-80 passim, 112-
14, 118, 127, 130, 157-62, 169-
70, 17.'3-79, 229, 2.'36, 246-48, 
256-61; social status of, 48-59 
passim, 70-7 4 passim, 80; contacts 
with national party structure, 7 4-
75, 95-96, 100-101, 123-27 pas-
sim, 128-30, 135-37, 145, 155, 
157, 167-71, 189, 192, 197, 215, 
219, 288; achievements of, 81-84, 
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Federalists (continued): 
165-66, 174, 193-97, 20:3-204, 
219, 228-31, 28.'3-85, 290-91; of 
the "Old School," 82n; failures of, 
83-84, 101-12, 1:38, 177-80 pas-
sim, 186, 197, 205, 229-:30, 2:31, 
285; and Washington's neutrality 
policy, 99-100; attitudes toward 
Britain, 10.5-19 passim, 120-21, 
160-62, 165; attitudes toward 
France, 108-10, 144, 147-48, 1.50-
.51, 158-65, 167-7.'3, 176-77, 180, 
181-8:3, 198-99, 201, 208, 2:32, 
254, 269, 297 -98; petition cam-
paign of (1796), 128-.'30; develop 
conservative political philosophy, 
159-62, 167, 172, 17:3-74, 179, 
181-83, 195-96, 202, 214-15, 216, 
223-27, 249-56 passim, 257, 26:3, 
280, 286-88; and provisional army, 
202, 205-11, 214, 215, 218; his-
torical attitudes toward, 284 
-sources of strength: in Georgia, 
80, 98, 171, 186-87, 194; in Vir-
ginia, 80-81, 121-22, 190-93, 222, 
227-28, 229, 285, 29'3-97; in 
southern backcountry, 19.'3-95; in 
North Carolina, 80-81, 176, 229, 
2.'36, 260-61, 267, 297-99, .'302; in 
South Carolina, 80, 185-86, 229, 
281-82, .'300-301, 30.'3 
-decline of strength: in Georgia, 
98-99; in South Carolina, 101-12, 
1.'37-.'38, 235, 27.'3-82 passim, 280, 
288-90; in Virginia, 100-101, 133, 
2.'36, 264-67 passim, 288, 289-90; 
in North Carolina, 133, 259, 260, 
288 
-revival of strength: in South Caro-
lina, 14.'3, 165, 24.'3-44; in Virginia, 
14.'3, 165, 24.'3-44; in North Caro-
lina, 14.'3, 165-66, 174, 179, 24.'3-
44, 246 
-political activities of: in the South, 
46-47, 50, 1.'39, 205, 244, 2.56-80 
passim, 287; in Georgia, 59-69 
passim; in Virginia, 74-77, 127-
33 passim, 188-89, 196. 20.5, 216-
27 passim, 261-67, 284; in South 
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Federalists (continued): 
Carolina, 136, 183-84, 268-80; in 
North Carolina, 246-48, 257-60 
-in elections: of 1792, 123; of 1796, 
123-38 passim, 140, 142-43; of 
1797, 155-56; of 1798, 139, 172-
86 passim; of 1799, 157, 187-89, 
216-22 passim; of 1800, 230-31, 
234-82 passim; of 1804, 289; of 
1808, 290 
-and Yazoo sale: of 1789, 61-64; 
of 1795, 85, 90-99 passim 
-reaction of southern members to: 
Jay Treaty, 114-21 passim, 139, 
140, 143, 293-94; Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, 154-55, 156-57, 158, 
202, 211-15, 251-52, 294-95, 299; 
XYZ mission, 167-72; dismissals 
from cabinet, 240-42; Hamilton, 
238-43 passim, 273-74, 280 
-See also Election of 1796; Election 
of 1798; Election of 1800; Geor-
gia; High Federalists; North Caro-
lina; South Carolina; Virginia 
Fenno, John, 241 
Few, Will"am, 45, 59, 92 
Fischer, David Hackett, 82n 
Foushee, William, 42-43 
France: Federalist attitudes toward, 
108-10, 144, 147-48, 150-51, 158-
65, 169-73, 176-77, 180, 181-83, 
198-99, 201, 208, 232, 254, 269; 
and Jay Treaty, 143-44; commer-
cial depredations of, 144, 151, 
159, 160, 163, 224; Republican 
attitudes toward, 147, 151, 152, 
162, 202; mentioned, 155. See 
also Franco-American relations; 
xyz mission 
France, Directory of: humiliates 
C. C. Pinckney, 143-44, 147, 150, 
151, 159, 179, 181, 208; friend-
ship for Monroe, 144; Logan's 
mission to, 173; mentioned, 152, 
167, 201, 203n, 217, 221, 227, 
229 
Franco-American relations, 84, 143-
53 passim, 158, 159-64, 167-72, 
176, 179, 188, 194-95, 196, 199, 
Index 
Franco-American relations (cont.): 
200-201, 206, 212, 221, 224, 225, 
266, 284. See also XYZ mission 
Franco-American Treaty (1778), 144, 
164 
Frederick County, Va., 76, 122, 129, 
222 
Fredericksburg, Va., 76, 169, 221 
French Revolution, 108 
Freneau, Peter, 278 
"FRIEND TO MERIT, A," essay of, 100-
101 
Fries' Rebellion, 251 
Funding, Hamilton's plan of, 31, 40, 
60-61, 124. See also Assumption, 
Hamilton's plan of 
Gabriel's uprising, 254, 266 
Gadsden, Christopher, 116, 279 
Gales, Joseph, 17 4, 254-60 passim 
Gallatin, Albert, 91, 150, 151, 155, 
160, 221, 238 
Galphia, Creek chief, 86 
Gazette of the United States, 241 
General Election Law (Virginia, 
1800), 227-28, 251, 261-64, 265, 
285, 287, 296-97 
Genet, Edmond, mission of, 74-77, 
108, 110 
Georgetown, S. C., 116, 183, 184 
Georgetown-Cheraw district, S. C., 
281 
Georgia: Antifederalists in, 8, 16; 
and Creek Indians, 15, 16, 59, 61, 
64, 66, 68, 85-90, 91, 97, 133-34, 
164, 195; relations with federal 
government, 15-16, 59, 63-64, 
85-91 passim, 133-34, 164, 170; 
support for Const:tution in, 16; 
and federal patronage, 25-26; 
Federalists in, 26, 45, 59-69, 133-
34, 164-65, 170-71, 186-87; Fed-
eralist press in, 26, 80, 94-95, 
186, 213; social status of Federal-
ists in, 59; political and social 
structure of, 59, 64-65; legis-
l2ture of, 61-63, 91-94, 97-98, 
186-87; sectionalism within, 64; 
and Treaty of New York, 64; Re-
Index 
Georgia (continued): 
publicans in, 64, 98, 116, 119, 
133-34, 171, 186-87, 236; con-
stitutional convention of 1795, 96; 
attitudes toward Britain in, 118-
19, 165; attitudes toward France 
in, 165, 170-71; and provisional 
army, 211; mentioned, 53, 136 
-Federalist strength in: sources of, 
80, 98, 171, 186-87, 194; decline 
of, 98-99 
-and Yazoo sale: of 1789, 61-64; 
of 1795, 85, 90-99 passim 
-in elections: of 1792, 123; of 1796, 
133, 134, 170; of 1798, 172, 186; 
of 1800, 187 
-reaction to: Jay Treaty, 98, 118-
19, 165; XYZ mission, 170; Alien 
and Sedition Acts, 213 
Georgia Gazette, 26, 64, 68, 94-95, 
186, 213 
Gerry, Elbridge, 145, 154, 199, 
201 
Gibbons, Thomas, 66 
G'bbons, William, Sr., 59 
Giles, William Branch: Congression-
al resolutions of, 33, 34-35, 101; 
and Jackson-Wayne election, 67; 
political career of, 70; social 
status of, 70-71; mentioned, 27, 
110, 160 
Gillon, Alexander, uprising of, 3, 
107 
Glynn County, Ga., 170 
Goode, Samuel, 222 
Gray, Edwin, 222 
Great Britain: proposed commercial 
discrimination laws against, 88, 
99, 106, 107, 110, 113; commer-
cial depredations of, 99, 100, 106, 
108-109, 111-12, 114; activities 
in the Ohio Valley of, 99; Fed-
eralist attitudes toward, 105-19 
passim, 120-21, 160-62, 165; 
mentioned, 144. See also British 
merchants; Jay Treaty 
Greenbrier County, Va., 285n 
Griffin, Samuel, 34 
Griswold, Roger, 198, 199 
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Grove, William Barry: supports 
Hamilton, 34; and national elec-
tions, 84, 142, 175, 259; attitude 
toward Britain, 113; elitist politi-
cal values of, 113; Federalism of, 
113-14; and Lyon-Griswold affair, 
198; and provisional army, 210; 
retirement of, 288; mentioned, 
118, 130, 149, 152, 17 4 
Gunn, James: and federal patron-
age, 26, 153; Federalism of, 26; 
and Society of the Cincinnati, 26, 
68; social status of, 59; and Yazoo 
sale of 1789, 64; and Creek 
Indians, 64, 95-96; leads Georgia 
Federalists, 68-69; and Yazoo sale 
of 1795, 91-98 passim; and Jay 
Treaty, 93, 96; loss of political in-
fluence, 98; political inactivity of, 
165; and XYZ mission, 171; and 
provisional army, 208-209; and 
elections of 1800, 242 
Habersham, John, 59 
Habersham, Joseph, 59, 64, 165 
Halifax, N, C., 177, 247 
Hall, Allamand, 159, 161, 162, 172-
73 
Hamilton, Alexander: on fonm•tion 
of partisan factions, 1-2, 4-5, 7n; 
financial policies of, 10, 28-29, 32, 
36-39, 124; reaction to financial 
policies of, 10-15, 29-35, 78; and 
Society of the Cincinnati, 19, 29; 
patronage policies of 20, 28-29, 
36-45, 53; and Congress, 28-29, 
33-35, 44; and southern Federal-
ists, 31, 33, 34, 36-37, 39n, 40, 43, 
50, 123-24, 125-27, 131, 135, 145, 
146, 238-43 passim, 273-74, 280; 
and Genet mission, 75; and Creek 
Indians, 88; resignation as Treas-
ury Secretary, 100; and elections 
of 1796, 123-27, 1.31, 135, 146, 
239; and petition campaign of 
1796, 128-30, 141; and Jay Treaty, 
128-30, 13.5, 141; influence upon 
McHenry, 145; relations with 
Adams, 145, 233, 234, 239, 240, 
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Hamilton, Alexander (continued): 
273, 274-75, 279-80, 285; and 
provisional army, 175, 190, 202-
203, 206-208; high Federalism of, 
200; and Alien and Sedition Acts, 
215-16n; and elections of 1800, 
234, 236-37, 273-75, 279-80. See 
also High Federalists 
Hampshire County, Va., 285n 
Hanover County, Va., 122, 191 
Hardy County, Va., 285n 
Harper, Robert Goodloe: political 
career of, 58n; and Yazoo sale of 
1795, 93; and sectionalism within 
South Carolina, 104; and national 
elections, 135, 136, 137, 143, 180, 
182, 185, 248, 268, 271, 272; and 
Jay Treaty, 140n; develops con-
servative political philosophy, 182-
83; and XYZ mission, 183; atti-
tude toward France, 183, 198; 
and Lyon-Griswold affair, 198; 
and high Federalists, 203n, 274-
75; and provisional army, 209; 
and Alien and Sedition Acts, 211; 
mentioned, 148, 150-53 passim, 
179n, 193, 235, 290n 
Harrington, Henry William, 177 
Harris, Charles, 247, 248, 256-57, 
258 
Harrison County, Va., 169 
Harvie, John, 42-43 
Hawkins, Benjamin, 13 
Haywood, John, 113, 258 
Henderson, Archibald, 175, 177, 
193, 259, 261, 288 
Henrico County, Va., 122, 188, 191, 
222 
Henry, Patrick: and Virginia legis-
lature, 1n, 12, 188, 217; and 
Hamilton's financial policies, 12; 
and Yazoo sale of 1789, 62, 124; 
political career of, 70, 71, 72; 
social status of, 72; and national 
elections, 123-26, 130-32, 217; 
and Madison, 124-25; and Jeffer-
son, 124-25; Federalism of, 124, 
125; political influence of, 192; 
and Adams' final peace mission to 
Index 
Henry, Patrick (continued): 
France, 217-18; death of, 218; 
mentioned, 46, 157, 193. See also 
Election of 1796; Virginia 
Heth, William, 39-40, 43, 72, 73n, 
75, 192, 210 
High Federalists: emergence of, 197; 
and XYZ mission, 199; and John 
Marshall, 200-202; relations with 
Adams, 200-204, 232-34, 238-43 
passim, 249, 273, 274-75, 279-80, 
285; and provisional army, 207-
208; and Alien and Sedition Acts, 
216n; and elections of 1800, 232-
80 passim. See also Election of 
1800; Hamilton, Alexander 
Hill, William H., 175, 240, 247, 259, 
288 
Hillsboro district, N. C., 175, 177, 
246 
Hodge, Abraham: on Hamilton's 
financial policies, 13; Federalism 
of, 80-Sln, 159; develops con-
servative political philosophy, 159, 
255-56; influence of in North 
Carolina, 162; and national elec-
tions, 178, 255-56, 258-59; op-
poses Gales for printing patron-
age, 258, 259; mentioned, 130, 
179n, 244 
Hopkins, Jonathan, 155-56 
Huger, Benjamin, 184, 281, 289 
Huger, Daniel, 39n, 51 
Huger, Isaac, 23, 61 
Humphreys, David, 25n, 28 
Iredell, James: represents British 
creditors, 18; supports Constitu-
tion, 18; appointment to Supreme 
Court, 23, 24, 25, 78; opposes 
freedom of speech, 158; men-
tioned, 12-13, SOn, 132, 17 4, 
188 
Izard, Ralph: dislike of Adams, 8, 
9n; Jefferson's dislike of, 24; and 
federal patronage, 24; and fund-
ing and assumption plans, 30-31, 
25n; Federalism of, 46; social 
status of, 51, 52; elitist political 
Index 
Izard, Ralph (continued): 
values of, 56-57; and Yazoo sale 
of 1789, 62; and Butler, 102; 
retirement of, 104; opposes Ed-
ward Rutledge and C. C. Pinck-
ney, 105, 110-11; attitude to-
ward France, 109-10, 164; and 
Jay Treaty, 117; and elections of 
1796, 135-36, 136-37; mentioned, 
8-9, 103, 286n 
Izard, Ralph, Jr., 211, 286n 
Jackson, George, 222 
Jackson, James: and Hamilton's 
financial policies, 34, 60-61; social 
status of, 59; supports Madison, 
60; opposes Wayne ( 1791), 60-68 
passim, 84; and Yazoo sale of 
1789, 64; and "Old" Georgians, 
65; and Creek Indians, 64, 87, 
89, 134; and Yazoo sale of 1795, 
91, 94, 96-98; and Jay Treaty, 
98, 119; and Georgia legislature, 
96-98, 186-87; and elections of 
1800, 284n; mentioned, 170, 171 
Jay, John, 75, 146 
Jay Treaty: reaction to, 85, 112, 
114-21, 128-30, 293-94; and Con-
gress, 93, 103n, 117, 118, 127, 
128, 129, 139-40, 141; and Geor-
gia, 98, 165; and Republicans, 
125, 159; and elections of 1796, 
134, 135; and southern Federal-
ists, 143; and France, 143-44; 
mentioned, 50-193 passim. See 
also Great Britain 
Jefferson, Thomas: reaction to Shays' 
rebellion, 3; appointment as Sec-
retary of State, 23; relations with 
southern Federalists, 24, 124-25, 
148-51 passim, 198-99; political 
career of, 70; social status of, 70-
71; and Jay Treaty, 120-21, 139-
40; and elections of 1796, 131-
38 passim, 140, 141, 267; rela-
tions with Adams, 144-45, 146; 
and Congress, 147, 148, 198-99, 
237, 238; and North Carolina 
press, 17 4; Virginia Resolutions 
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Jefferson, Thomas (continued): 
of, 190-91, 193, 213-21 passim; 
on party bitterness in Virginia, 
217n; and elections of 1799, 218, 
222; and elections of 1800, 234, 
242, 264, 267, 268, 274, 279, 
285n, 288; attacked by Federal-
ists, 256, 269; on democracy, 291. 
See also Republicans 
Johnston, Samuel: supports Consti-
tution, 18; represents British 
creditors, 18; and federal patron-
age, 24-25; retirement of, 25, 45, 
157-58; and Ham:lton's financial 
policies, 35n, 38; and national 
elections, 77-78, 130; and Jay 
Treaty, 129; attitude toward 
France, 158; opposes freedom of 
speech, 158; political activities of, 
174, 176 
Jones, James, 187 
Jones, Seaborn, 64, 91, 98, 118, 
171 
Judiciary, federal: Washington's ap-
pointments to, 22-23 
Kentucky, 34, 140n, 236 
Kentucky Resolutions, 212, 213, 229, 
301 
Kershaw County, S. C., 170 
King, Rufus, 75, 123-24, 126, 233 
King William County, Va., 129 
Knox, Henry, 4, 19n, 61, 87-88, 89, 
146, 207 
Kurtz, Stephen G., 142, 192 
Lafayette, Marquis de, 202n 
Lanier, Clement, 94 
La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, le Due 
de, 40n, 51n, 74 
Laurens, Henry, 39 
Lee, Charles, 41-42, 153-54, 157, 
188, 203, 219, 233 
Lee, Henry: react;on to Shays' re-
bellion, 4; on Hamilton's financial 
policies, 11, 12; and Fairfax pur-
chase, 41-42, 157; and Society of 
the Cincinnati, 42; political career 
of, 42, 72; and Madison, 42n; 
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Lee, Henry ( continued): 
Federalism of, 42n, 100, 222; 
social status of, 72; elitist political 
values of, 72; and Genet mission, 
75; and national elections, 119, 
218, 222, 228; and Henry, 124, 
125; and Gunn, 153; and section-
alism within Virginia, 192; and 
provisional army, 206, 210, 220; 
and Alien and Sedition Acts, 214-
15; retirement of, 288; mentioned, 
50n, 264 
Lee, Richard Bland, 7n, 10, 34-35, 
57, 290n 
Lee, Richard Henry, 8-9 
Liberty County, Ga., 63, 86 
Lincoln County, N. C., 261 
Livingston, Edward: Congressional 
resolutions of, 140n, 141, 199; 
mentioned, 127, 150, 201 
Lloyd, James, 211 
Logan, George, 173, 217 
Longstreet, William, 94, 97 
Loudoun County, Va., 130, 285n 
Louisa County, Va., 156 
Louisbourg, N. C., 168 
Lowndes, Thomas, 281, 289 
Lyon, Matthew, 198, 199, 221 
McAllister, Matthew, 22, 26, 64, 67, 
93 
McClurg, James, 38; 42, 236 
McFarlan, Andrew, 254 
McGillivray, Alexander, 85-86, 87 
McHenry, James: and Society of the 
Cincinnati, 19n; agent of Hamil-
ton, 145; and provisional army, 
209, 210; dismissal from cabinet, 
234, 240; mentioned, 200, 203n, 
215n, 274 
Machir, James: Federalism of, 148, 
152, 156, 222; and Fairfax pur-
chase, 157n; and Lyon-Griswold 
affair, 198; and elections of 1799, 
222 
Mcintosh, Lachlan: and federal 
patronage, 26; Federalism of, 26; 
and Society of the Cincinnati, 26, 
59; social status of, 59; and Yazoo 
Index 
Mcintosh, Lachlan (continued): 
sale of 1789, 63, 64; and Creek 
Indians, 64; and Yazoo sale of 
1795, 93; and Jay Treaty, 118; 
political activities of, 165; men-
tioned, 26n, 66, 171 
Mcintosh County, Ga., 170 
Maclaine, Archibald, 12-13, 18, 78, 
BOn 
Maclay, William, 8-9 
McNeil, James, 62 
Macon, Nathaniel, 258 
l\Iaddell, John, 247 
Madison, James: reaction to Shays' 
rebellion, 3-4; fear of northern 
domination of the Union, 5-6; and 
Potomac River project, 5-6, 18-
19; and residence of national 
capital, 6, 38; and Virginia 
politics, 7n, 119; and federal 
patronage, 24; partisan activities 
in Congress, 33; and funding 
plan, 40; and Richmond Federal-
ist faction, 40-43 passim; and 
Jackson-Wayne election, 67; politi-
cal career of, 70; social status of, 
70-71; commercial discrimination 
plans of, 88, 99, 106, 107, 110, 
113; and Yazoo sale of 1795, 94; 
and Henry, 124-25; and Jay 
Treaty, 141; and elections of 1800, 
263; mentioned passim 
Manchester, Va., 221 
Manigault, Gabriel, 31-32, 52 
Manigault, Louis, 52 
Manufactures, Hamilton's report on, 
36-37 
Marshall, John: and federal judi-
ciary, 22; and Federalist organiza-
tion in Virginia, 25; and Fairfax 
purchase, 41-42, 157; and bank-
ing in Richmond, 42; and Ham-
ilton, 43; political activities of, 70, 
71, 72, 75-76, 77, 155-56; social 
status of, 71-72, 74; elitist politi-
cal values of, 73n, 74; and Genet 
mission, 75-76; and Yazoo sale of 
1795, 95; and elections of 1796, 
123-24, 128, 130, 132; and Jay 
Index 
Marshall, John (continued): 
Treaty, 128; and XYZ mission, 
153-54; and Adams, 154, 201-202; 
unites with Alexandria (Va.) Fed-
eralists, 157; and elections of 
1799, 188, 217, 222, 228; and 
sectionalism within Virginia, 192; 
and high Federalists, 200-202; 
attitude toward France, 201; and 
provisional army, 210, 220, 234; 
and Alien and Sed:tion Acts, 211-
12, 213; Federalism of, 222; 
leadership in Congress, 232, 237-
38; and elections of 1800, 233-34, 
240n; appointed Secretary of 
State, 241, 264; mentioned, 44, 
221 
Marshall, Thomas, 73n 
Martin, Alexander, 14, 79-80, 118, 
160, 162, 173-74 
Maryland, 18-19, 34, 35n, 55, 265, 
271 
Massachusetts, 3, 4, 9, 16n, 35n 
Mathews County, Va., 147 
Matthews, George, 69, 88, 89, 92, 
93, 94 
Mayo, John, 264, 265 
Merrens, Harry Roy, 194 
Milledge, John, 64, 98, 186 
Mobs, political, 2, 220-21 
Monroe, James: political career of, 
70; social status of. 70-71; and 
French Directory, 144; mentioned, 
40, 77, 110, 150, 151, 230, 236 
Moore, Thomas, 281 
Morgan, Daniel: social status of, 
72; political career of, 72; elitist 
political values of, 73n; and na-
tional elections, 119, 142; and 
Jay Treaty, 129; Federalism of, 
148, 152, 156; and Lyon-Griswold 
affair, 198; and provisional army, 
206, 210 
Morgan district, N. C., 261, 285n 
Morris, Gouverneur, 7 
Moultrie, Alexander, 61 
Mount Vernon, conference of 
( 1785), 19 
Murray, William Vans, 217 
I 319 
Neutrality Proclamation, 42n, 69, 
74, 75, 93, 99 
New Bern, N. C., 79, 129, 177, 257 
New Bern district, N. C., 261 
New Brunswick, N. J., 221 
New England, 3n, 34, 35n, 126, 
152 
"New" Georgians, 65 
New Hampshire, 35n 
New Jersey, 34, 35n, 36 
New Jersey plan, 16n 
New Kent County, Va., 191 
Newport, R. 1., 271, 272 
New York, 2, 34, 35n, 123, 152, 
235 
New York City, 114-15, 128n, 236 
Nicholas, John, 150, 160, 210 
Nicholas, Wilson Cary, 41-42, 43, 
44, 70, 71, 100 
Ninety-Six district, S. C., 143, 185, 
271, 281 
Norfolk, Va., 39n, 76, 120, 169, 198, 
203n, 219, 222 
Norfolk Herald, 219 
Norfolk-Princess Anne district, Va., 
132 
Northampton County, Va., 285n 
North Carolina: and U.S. Constitu-
tion, 8, 17 -18; Antifederalists in, 
14, 77, 84, 176; northern spec-
ulators in, 14; legislature of, 14-
15, 78-80, 176-77, 212, 236, 289n, 
297-99; trade with British West 
Indies, 18; and federal patronage, 
24-25; Federalists in, 45, 77-80 
passim, 112-14, 118, 127, 130, 
1.'57 -62, 169-70, 173-79, 229, 236, 
246-48, 256-61; political structure 
of, 77-80 passim; sectionalism 
within, 78-80; Federalist press in, 
80, 130, 159-62, 165-66, 172-7 4, 
179, 195, 224, 249, 254-56, 258-
59; Republicans in, 113, 114, 116, 
133, 176, 258, 259, 260, 288-89n; 
attitudes toward Britain in, 118, 
160-62; House delegation of, 152; 
attitudes toward France in, 158-
62, 168, 169-70, 172-73, 176-77, 
297 -98; Republican press in, 17 4, 
320 I 
North Carolina (continued): 
254-55, 258; and provisional army, 
210-11, 236; and Federalist re-
lations with national party struc-
ture, 247; development of Fed-
eralist partisan organizations in, 
246-48, 284-85; mentioned, 7, 
39n, 105, 136 
-Federalist strength in: sources of, 
80-81, 176, 229, 236, 260-61, 
267, 297-99, 302; decline of, 133, 
259, 260, 288; revival of, 143, 
165-66, 174, 179, 243-44, 246 
-in elections: of 1791, 77-78, 84; 
of 1792, 79-80, 123; of 1796, 
128-30 passim, 133, 142, 260; 
of 1798, 172-79 passim, 259; of 
1800, 246-48, 256-61, 285n, 287, 
302 
-reaction to: Hamilton's financial 
policies, 12-15, 34, 35; Jay Treaty, 
liS, 128-30 passim; XYZ mission, 
168, 169-70, 297-98; Alien and 
Sedition Acts, 212, 215, 299 
North Carolina Gazette, 118, 160 
North Carolina Minerva, 159, 255-
56, 259, 290 
Nott, Abraham, 185 
Nottoway County, Va., 267 
"Old" Georgians, 65 
Orangeburg-Beaufort district, S. C., 
184, 269, 281 
Orange County, N. C., 247 
Orange County, Va., 156 
Osborn, John, 257-58 
Otis, Harrison Gray, 184, 232, 2.'34 
Page, Robert, 222 
Parker, Josiah: Federalism of, 198, 
222; and Lyon-Griswold affair, 
198; and high Federalists, 203n; 
and national elections, 219, 222, 
228, 234; retirement of, 288 
Partisan ticket making: in South 
Carolina, 137-38, 183-84; in 
Virginia, 188-89, 219, 245-46, 
261-67 passim; in North Carolina, 
248 
Index 
Party organization and growth of 
democracy, 5, 28:3-91 
Patronage policies: of Washington, 
20-27, 28, 35, :36, 44-45, 51, 53, 
58n, 102-10.'3, 125; of Hamilton, 
20, 28-29, 36-45, 5:3; of Adams, 
153-54 
Pendleton, Edmund, 22 
Pendleton, Nathaniel, 22, 26, 69, 
93, 94, 97, 98 
Pendleton, S. C., 185 
Pennsylvania, 16n, 34, 35n, 36, 38, 
100, 123, 142 
Petersburg, Va., 76, 129, 169, 220-
21, 246-47 
Philadelphia, Pa. See Capital, U.S. 
Philadelphia Aurora, 275, 276 
Philadelphia Convention. See Con-
stitutional Convent:on 
"Phocion" essays, 137 
Pickens, Andrew, 86, l38n 
Pickering, Timothy; and Society of 
the Cincinnati, 19n; and Creek 
Indians, 96; and southern Fed-
eralists, 146, 153, 200-201; sec-
tional jealousies of, 146, 200; 
high Federalism of, 200; and 
Alien and Sedition Acts, 211-12n, 
213; dismissal from cabinet, 234, 
240-41, 264, 274; mentioned, 180, 
206 
Pinckney, Charles; in Constitutional 
Convention, 7; and Treaty of 
New York, 32; and assumption 
plan, 32; social status of, 51; Re-
publicanism of, 102-103; and 
national elections, 184, 230, 248, 
270, 273, 277n, 278, 279, 280; 
mentioned, 45-46, 104-105, Ill, 
276, 282 
Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth: in 
Constitutional Convention, 6-7; 
and Society of the Cincinnati, 24; 
and federal patronage, 24, 58n; 
and Hamilton, 37-38, 2:39; Fed-
eralism of, 46; social status of, 51; 
military service of during Revolu-
tion, 5:3; elitist political values 
of, 56; and Butler, 102; opposes 
Index 
Pinckney, C. C. (continued): 
Read, 104-105; estrangement from 
Federalism, 105, lll; opposes 
Izard and Smith, 10.5, 107, 110-
11; attitude toward Britain, 106-
12 passim; attitude toward France, 
108, 208; and Jay Treaty, ll6; 
ambassador to France, 135; hu-
miliation by French Directory, 
14.3-44, 147, 150, 151, 1.59, 179, 
181, 208; described by Pickering, 
146; and XYZ mission, 146, 150, 
153; and provisional army, 175, 
206-208, 209, 2ll; and Alien and 
Sedition Acts, 2ll-12n; and na-
tional elections, 239, 240n, 242, 
269, 273-79 passim, 289, 290; 
mentioned, 103, 152, 154, 235, 
276. See also Election of 1800; 
Franco-American relations 
Pinckney, Thomas: and federal 
patronage, 22; and Society of the 
Cincinnati, 22; and funding plan, 
32; social status of, 51; military 
service of during Revolution, 53; 
and Butler, 102; and elections of 
1796, 126-27, 130, 13.5-36, 239, 
268; relations with Adams, 146, 
27.5-77; in Congress, 1.52, 198-99; 
and elections of 1798, 184; at-
titude toward France, 198-99; 
and elections of 1800, 248, 268, 
271, 27:3, 27.5-77; retirement of, 
281; mentioned, 145, 23.5. See also 
Election of 1796; Election of 1800 
Pinckney Treaty, 120, 127 
Pittsylvania County, Va., 11 
Pleasants, Thomas, 13 
"POLITICKS and VIEWS of a certain 
PARTY DISPLAYED, The," 38 
Porcupine. Peter, 159 
Porcupine's Gazette, 246, 259 
Portsmouth, Va., 169 
Potomac River project, 5-6, 18-19 
Powell, Burr, 157 
Powell, Leven: and national elec-
tions, 130-32, 157, 188, 222, 228, 
26.3; unites with Richmond Fed-
eralists, 157; Federalism of, 222; 
I 321 
Powell, Leven (continued): 
retirement of, 288; mentioned, 
244 
Prince Edward County, Va., 21:3, 
267 
Prince George County, Va., 217n 
Prince William County, Va., 131 
Provisional army: officer corps of, 
17.'3-74, 174-75, 208-11, 220, 
2:36n; enlistments in, 17 4; as polit-
ical issue, 18.5, 187, 189-90, 21.5, 
2:34, 300; creation of, 199, 20.5-
ll; and southern Federalists, 202, 
205-11, 214, 215, 218, 236n; 
mentioned, 147, 201, 221, 223, 
235, 238, 250, 274 
Public Credit, Hamilton's report on, 
32 
Quakers, abolitionist petitions of, 9, 
10-ll 
"Querist" essay, 86-87 
Raleigh, N. C., 168, 169, 174 
Raleigh Register, 260 
Ramsay, David, 104-105, 138n, 272 
Randolph, Edmund: on Hamilton's 
financial policies, ll; and Fauchet 
affair, 19n, 1.5.5; and Society of 
the Cincinnati, 19n; and federal 
patronage, 23, 24; political career 
of, 70, 71, 72; social status of, 
71-72; elitist political values of, 
72; discusses Virginia politics, 
155; mentioned, 12, 43 
Read, Jacob: social status of, 51; 
and Jay Treaty, 93, 103n, ll7; 
Federalism of, 103; opposes Smith, 
103-104; opposed by Edward 
Rutledge and C. C. Pinckney, 
104-105; and national elections, 
184, 272, 282; political career 
after 1800, 290; mentioned, 105, 
llO, 163, 180 
Read, William, 117, 272 
Republicans: develop partisan or-
ganizations, 5, 82, 156, 2.30-31, 
245; in Congress, 34, 44, 99, ll3, 
129, 147-52 passim, 180, 198, 
322 I 
Republicans (continued): 
199, 238; in South Carolina, 4.5-
46, 102-103, 111, 116-17, 134-38, 
180, 184, 185, 230, 2.'36, 248, 
267-82 passim; in Georgia, 64, 98, 
116, 119, 133-34, 171, 186-87, 
236, 284n; in Virginia, 70-77 pas-
sim, 100-101, 122, 129, 1.'32, 1.'3.'3, 
188, 191, 192, 2:30, 2.'36, 245, 287; 
and neutrality, 99; in North Caro-
lina, 11.'3, 114, 116, 1.'3.'3, 176, 
258, 259, 260; develop as political 
opposition, 1.'39, 140-42; elitist 
political values of, 142; news-
papers of, 17 4, 254-55, 258; at-
titudes toward France of, 147, 
151, 152, 162, 202; political 
activities of, 189-90, 244, 256, 
257, 260; and Virginia General 
Election Law, 227, 228, 251, 262-
64; and provisional army, 234; 
and Virginia Resolutions, 252; 
and development of American 
party system, 28.'3; develop liberal 
political philosophy, 286, 287-88 
-in elections: of 1796, 126, 132-38 
passim, 140-42; of 1797, 155-56; 
of 1799, 218-22 passim; of 1800, 
230-31, 244-45, 248, 251, 260, 
261-82 passim, 284n 
-reaction to: Yazoo sale of 1795, 
91; Anglo-French war, 99; Jay 
Treaty, 114-21 passim, 125, 140, 
141, 159; XYZ mission, 150, 153, 
198; Alien and Sedition Acts, 211-
12n, 213, 242n, 251. See also 
Georgia; North Carolina; South 
Carolina; Virginia 
Revolution, American, 2-3, 49, 53, 
56, 106 
Revolution, French, 108 
Richmond, Va.: Federalists in, 37, 
75-77, 122, 127, 129, 130, 155-
57, 168, 169, 197, 218, 220-21, 
226-27, 230, 2.'36, 264; and Bank 
of the United States, 39n; bank-
ing in, 42-43; and Jay Treaty, 
129; and national elections, 1.'31, 
188, 265; and XYZ mission, 168, 
Index 
Richmond, Va. (continued): 
169; and Virginia Resolutions, 
191; mentioned passim 
Richmond County, Ga., 94, 118 
Richmond County, N. C., 177 
Rind, W. A.: edits Virginia Federal-
ist, 22.'3-27, 24.5n, 248-5.'3, 264-
65; develops conservative political 
philosophy, 22.'3-27, 249-5.'3; and 
elections of 1800, 245n, 248-5.'3, 
264-65; mentioned, 244 
Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, le Due de 
Ia, 40, 51n, 74 
Rockingham, N. C., 168 
Rutherford, Robert, 119 
Rutledge, Edward: and federal 
patronage, 24, .'39, 58n; Federalism 
of, 46, 16:3, 164; social status of, 
51; military service of during 
Revolution, 5.'3; and Smith, 10-'3-
104, 110; opposes Read, 104-105; 
estrangement from Federalism, 
105, 111, 134-.'38 passim; opposes 
Izard and Smith, 105, 110-ll; at-
titude toward Britain, 106-12 pas-
sim, 116; attitude toward France, 
108, 163-64, 181-82; and Jay 
Treaty, 115, 116, 117, 1-'35; and 
national elections, 134-.'38 passim, 
180-82, 267; expresses sectional 
fears, 135; political influence of 
in South Carolina, 1.'37; and Jef-
ferson, 149, 163; and Adams, 
163; develops conservative politi-
cal philosophy, 181-82; and Alien 
and Sedition Acts, 211; as gover-
nor of South Carolina, 235, 236; 
death of, 2.'35, 268; mentioned, 22, 
150, 153, 170 
Rutledge, Eliza, 148 
Rutledge, John: and federal patron-
age, 22, 24; and Hamilton, 37-
.'38; social status of, 51; in Ameri-
can Revolution, 53; estrangement 
from Federalism, 105, lll; at-
titude toward France, 108; at-
titude toward Britain, 106-12 pas-
sim, ll6; and Jay Treaty, ll5, 
ll6 
Index 
Rutledge, John, Jr.: social status of, 
51; estrangement from Federal-
ism, 105, 111; opposes Smith, 
110, 149; and Jay Treaty, 116, 
117; and national elections, 138n, 
180, 184, 242, 248, 271-72, 273, 
281; relations with Adams, 148, 
153, 2-32; Federalism of, 148-5:3 
passim; and Jefferson, 148, 150, 
151, 163; attitude toward France, 
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